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Abstract 
Neoliberal Extractivism and Rural Resistance: The Anti-Mining Movement 
in the Peruvian Northern Highlands, Cajamarca (2011-2013) 
By Ji-Hyun Seo 
 
This dissertation examines the political prospects of rural subaltern groups in the era of 
neoliberal globalisation by engaging with the „death of the peasantry‟ debates. To achieve this, 
it concentrates on rural resistance in the northern highlands of Peru, Cajamarca, against „new 
mineral extraction‟ by multinational capital in the form of Minera Yanacocha S.A. (MYSA), 
with a theoretical framework of critical geography on transnational activism. In particular, the 
dissertation devotes attention to the massive mobilisations against MYSA‟s Conga mining 
project between 2011 and 2013. 
The dispossession and disempowerment of the peasantry have been highlighted as the 
accumulation of global capital has intensified alongside the implementation of market-led 
development models around the globe. In the 1990s, the extraction and export of abundant 
natural resources was promoted as a „new development alternative‟. In tandem with the 
unprecedented width and depth of resource extraction, the continent has become witness to 
increasing incidences of struggles led by local communities, particularly in the countryside. 
Recent Peruvian economic growth has been boosted by a „new mining boom‟. 
Simultaneously, many Peruvians are protesting against mining activities, particularly due to 
their negative social and environmental impact. Cajamarca is one obvious example where 
neoliberal mineral extraction has generated a series of local struggles since the arrival of 
MYSA in 1993. The asymmetrical power of multinational capital vis-à-vis campesinos stands 
out in the context of the emphasis of the central government on „national development‟ based 
on natural resource extraction. 
Against this backdrop, this dissertation examines the re-articulation of rural subjectivities and 
the political possibilities in their „networked form of resistance‟, instead of focusing on the 
fragmentation, powerlessness and passivity of subaltern groups in the face of global capital 
power. Economic reductionism restricts our understanding of neoliberal globalisation to the 
exploitation of global capital vs. dispossession of local communities. Following Doreen 
Massey‟s relational geographical approach, the dissertation maintains that it is relevant to 
understand the „relational content‟ of global capital mobility and complex dynamics of 
resistance. In addition, the dualistic framework of geography and power which is based on an 
essentialist geographical understanding of the spatial (i.e. space/place; powerful global and 
powerless local) tends to regard local resistance as „reactionary‟ place-based struggle. Instead, 
the dissertation focuses on the „interconnectedness‟ of subaltern groups. It argues that diverse 
social groups shape what Featherstone terms „prefigurative solidarity‟ around „maps of 
grievance‟, via political resistance. In this process, a political identity is constructed in order 
to bring neoliberal globalisation into contestation. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
Contemporary Rural Social Movements in Latin America  
Research Background 
On the first day of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)‟s fifth ministerial conference (10-14 
September 2003) in Cancún, Mexico, a South Korean peasant leader committed suicide 
amidst the protest against the liberalisation of agricultural markets, just weeks before his 
daughter‟s wedding ceremony. The first question that came to my mind was what made him 
take this drastic action? Whenever there were protests against neoliberal globalisation in and 
outside the country, the conservative Korean media, as well as politicians, criticised 
protesters as obstacles to the expansion of market opportunity, shaming the „national‟ image.1 
Their justification is based on the assumption that opening up and liberalising the market is 
the only possible solution to overcome the financial crisis and promote the country‟s 
economic growth. Since Korea‟s financial crisis in the late 1990s, International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) policy recommendations have become accepted among economic and political 
elites. Consequently, the agrarian sector was liberalised as the state reduced subsidies and 
support, exposing most peasants to the pressure of asymmetrical global market forces. This 
story formed part of my academic interests over the following years: neoliberal globalisation, 
peasants, and social movements. Living in a „globalising‟ world, it is not hard to realise that 
what are seemingly someone else‟s problems, or events in another country, cannot be 
regarded as „foreign‟ or disconnected issues, such as climate change. Likewise, it was not 
difficult to discover that the predicament of South Korean farmers was repeated in other parts 
of the world, despite the different settings. In this context, this chapter will elucidate how I 
came to choose my research focus, develop my argument and research questions, by 
contextualising the main issues (i.e. development, rural transformation and contemporary 
rural social movements in Latin America) and locating the dissertation within the literature. 
                                           
1 I am highly sceptical about the claim that there are non-conservative media in South Korea. In the aftermath 
of the Korean War, the economic development process went hand-in-hand with state formation and the 
construction of a „highly modernist national identity‟ under successive authoritarian regimes. This atmosphere 
preserved the Cold War environment, which did not allow debates on labour rights or criticism against the 
„national‟ government.  
２０ 
In relation to the research questions, I will also elaborate on the methodology I used to 
conduct this research. Finally, I will lay out the structure of the dissertation. Although the 
anecdote about the South Korean farmer ended in tragedy, the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
growing incidences of rural social movements in recent decades demonstrate that peasants 
around the globe are not „powerless‟ and fated to „disappear‟ vis-à-vis asymmetrical global 
capital power, a debate this dissertation will engage with. 
 
„Development‟ and Transformation in the Countryside 
Capitalist industrialisation has disproportionately influenced populations in the countryside 
around the globe. Accordingly, peasants have been depicted as „victims‟ of capitalist 
exploitation and their political power to produce social change was highly underestimated. 
Although they became prominent political actors in revolutionary struggles and demands for 
structural change in the post-war period, the peasantry was only regarded as playing a 
„secondary‟ role in supporting vanguard parties and leftist intellectuals or receivers of state 
subsidies for agricultural production. This tendency was intensified as the market-led 
development model became predominant in the early 1970s. As states reduced their 
intervention in the economy, and revolutionary and reformist political agendas receded from 
political priorities, the exposure of rural producers to the power of global capital and their 
„dispossession‟ and „powerlessness‟ were underlined by many commentators. In this section, I 
introduce some observations on the changing rural landscape and its impact on peasants 
around the world in order to contextualise the objective conditions which rural subaltern 
groups face in the era of neoliberal globalisation. 
 Araghi explains peasant dispossession over three periods through a „world-historical 
framing‟: (1) „colonial-liberal globalism‟ (before the late nineteenth century); (2) „long 
national developmentalism‟ (1917-1973); and (3) „postcolonial neoliberal globalism‟, or 
globalisation (since 1973) (2009: 113). He maintains that the current phase of globalisation 
comes after colonial-liberal globalism, while the second period represented an exceptional 
reformist period which found its origin in the 1917 October Revolution in Russia. From the 
„world-historical‟ perspective, the period since 1973 follows colonial-liberal globalism 
patterns: „economic liberalism, antiwelfarism, free-market fetishism, and designs for 
constructing a truly global division of labour‟, in contrast to the reformist interregnum 
between 1917 and 1973 (Araghi, 2009: 114). The latter phase „witnessed colonial liberalism‟s 
２１ 
retreat from globalism, in response to the challenges posed by variant forms of socialism and 
anticolonial nationalism‟ (Araghi, 2009: 113). During this reformist period, dispossession was 
not completely dominant and some groups of peasants were included in the „national 
development projects‟, albeit in an „exclusionary‟ or „discriminatory‟ manner. For the 
purposes of national development in the postcolonial countries, various agrarian policies were 
implemented, particularly in the Cold War context: state subsidies were granted to peasants; 
the US government promoted a food aid policy, supported by mass domestic grain production; 
and invested in the „Green Revolution‟. Most importantly, US-style agrarian reform was 
implemented in Third World countries in the 1950s and 1960s (Araghi, 2009: 126-128). 
However, „the postwar food order depressed world prices of grain and encouraged third 
world food imports and food import dependency‟, creating a condition for another global 
„depeasantisation‟ in the following years (Araghi, 2009: 128). Although peasants played a 
particular role in the agrarian reform process, they were not the principal beneficiaries of the 
reforms (Teubal, 2009b: 152). However, there were „different types or degrees of exclusion as 
even the most excluded persons have some sort of relationship with either the economic, 
social or political system‟ (Kay, 2006: 462).  
  Since 1973, „[t]he states and economies within which peasants are subordinated have 
become increasingly integrated into global circuits of production, trade and finance, a 
phenomenon universally known as globalisation‟ (Akram-Lohdi and Kay, 2009: 4, emphasis 
in the original). As Araghi points out, this is not a new phenomenon, but the width and depth 
of globalisation are unprecedented. Against this backdrop, there is what McMichael (2006a, 
2006b, 2008, 2009) has called the „global food regime‟ developed, with most peasants 
becoming „little more than contracted petty commodity-producing pieceworkers subsumed 
within the buyer-driven commodity chains of corporate agro-food transnational corporations‟ 
(Akram-Lohdi and Kay, 2009: 5). With the implementation of neoliberal reforms, the global 
rural landscape saw a rather bifurcated production structure as Deere and Royce observe: 
„[T]he most dynamics growth sectors – non-traditional exports such as oil seeds, livestock, 
vegetables, and fruit – are largely produced by the most modern and capitalized farmers with 
links to agro-industry and by multinational agribusinesses. Those in decline include 
traditional exports…generally produced by small farmers‟ (2009: 6). Faced with the 
asymmetrical competition with global agribusiness, peasants were forcibly displaced to cities 
or became a global „massive reserve army of migratory labour‟ (Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2009: 
23). In this sense, Araghi argues:  
２２ 
 [T]he privatization of the agrarian welfare state created in the national 
developmentalist era, to the advantage of Northern agribusiness transnational 
corporations and capitalist farms, forms the context in which the relative 
depeasantization and displacement of the postwar period gave way to absolute 
depeasantization and displacement under postcolonial neoliberal globalism (2009: 
133). 
  These debates surrounding the „new agrarian question‟ arose in publications by various 
scholars working in the field of the agrarian political economy (see Akram-Lodhi and Kay 
(eds), 2009; Bernstein, 2006; McMichael, 1997; Kautsky, 1988).
2
 A detailed discussion on 
the „new agrarian question‟ is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, debates on the 
fate of the peasantry within the agrarian question are of considerable importance in the 
contemporary setting. Hobsbawm argued that „the death of the peasantry‟ is „the most 
dramatic and far-reaching social change‟ in the twentieth century (1994: 289). When 
criticising the position adopted by structuralist and modernist commentators who stress the 
insignificance of the peasantry as a political force, Petras and Veltmeyer argue: 
 Essentially the peasantry is viewed as a pre-modern social category or class that has 
been unable to adapt to the forces of change, and has consequently lost the struggle 
with modernity. (…) Hobsbawm, and modernists in general, see the peasantry as a 
relatively insignificant political factor in the wider process of change and 
development, a numerically reduced and political impotent and spent social force, 
fated to disappear into the slums, squatter, settlements and informal economies of the 
region‟s burgeoning centres (2001: 88). 
In a similar vein, they claimed that Kay also saw the peasantry as a „victim, buffeted by the 
economic and political forces acting on it‟ and a „permanent semiproletariat caught up in a 
stalled historical process‟ (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001: 87). From the structuralist point of 
view, Kay (2001, 2006) attributed the main cause of violence and poverty as well as a lack of 
development in the countryside in postwar Latin American countries to the lost promises of 
agrarian reform. Likewise, faced with social transformations intensified by the opening of 
economies, rural households forcibly diversified their sources of income and relied on 
multiple non-farm activities for subsistence, a change which has recently been termed the 
                                           
2 This new debate over the „agrarian question‟ is associated with the following question: is it still relevant to 
talk about agriculture and the peasantry in this era of globalised capitalist development? Akram-Lodhi and Kay 
(2009) point to the ongoing relevance of the issue in their edited book. They argue that the debate revolves 
around: „whether the meaning of the agrarian question in the contemporary period has fundamentally 
challenged‟; or „whether the agrarian question is now fundamentally a concept that can be relegated to the 
footnotes of history, as suggested by Hobsbawm‟ (2009: 6). 
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„new rurality‟ („nueva ruralidad‟) (see Kay, 2006, 2007, 2008). So, is the peasantry fated to 
disappear?  
 
Contemporary Rural Social Movements  
If the peasantry is disappearing or fated to disappear, how can we explain the rise of 
contemporary agrarian and other rural social movements across the globe over the last three 
decades, in which peasants have demonstrated significant political agency? Is their political 
activism only the last reactionary gasp of impoverished and powerless rural producers? There 
has been a growing incidence of rural social movements throughout Latin America, such as 
the Landless Rural Labours‟ Movement (MST) in Brazil and the Zapatista movement in 
Chiapas. Moreover, as Teubal points out: „[I]n Guatemala, Bolivia, Mexico and Ecuador, 
important parts of these movements have reaffirmed the centrality of indigenous, ethnic and 
communitarian identities‟ (2009b: 159). There is also a connection with other movements in 
the countryside, particularly those concerned with gender equality and environmental 
degradation, which are often associated with hydroelectric dam construction, mining projects, 
logging, and agro-industry, stimulated by the current export-led economic growth model 
(Teubal, 2009b: 159, see also Deere and Joyce, 2009: 7). Despite the literature being heavily 
concerned with the contemporary „agrarian‟ movements and debates regarding the fate of the 
peasantry, there has been an increasing focus on explaining the origins of „rural‟ social 
movements. This literature examines: (1) the objective political-economic conditions for the 
„emergence‟; (2) the „newness‟ of movements; and (3) their organisational capacity and 
effectiveness. However, none of these categories are exclusionary. First, neoliberal 
globalisation and its impact on rural livelihoods are highlighted as an important cause of the 
birth of these movements. Deere and Royce note: „[I]n this generally unfavourable macro 
situation, rural men and women – indigenous, white, black, and mestizo – have increasingly 
mobilized in defense of livelihoods, to contest their social exclusion, and redefine the terms 
and content of citizenship‟ (2009: 7). Second, those who postulate a new social movement 
(NSM) or „postmodernist‟ approach tend to emphasise the „newness‟ of contemporary 
mobilisations. Poststructuralists and postmodernists moved their research focus from 
materialist or structuralist to postmaterialist meanings. According to Petras and Velmeyer, 
their studies were „embodied in an exclusively grassroots analysis of social issues such as 
gender, race and ethnicity, political identity, hegemony and power‟ (2001: 89). Finally, certain 
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scholars concentrate on organisational capacity – both national and transnational – in relation 
to changing political (circumstances) opportunities and their impact on the political dynamics 
of particular mobilisations. As Deere and Royce explain, a favourable political context has 
opened for organising efforts as a result of recent social and technological change: „the 
growing rural literacy and schooling, the supportive role of transcommunity and transnational 
advocacy networks, and the impact of the telecommunications revolution‟ (2009: 8). In a 
similar vein, Kay explains the success of the MST through its leadership‟s awareness of „the 
need to forge linkages and make alliances with urban organisations in order to extend public 
support for their goals‟ (2001: 756).3 Emphasising the role of peasants and indigenous 
peoples in promoting „political and social change‟, Petras and Veltmeyer highlight that rural 
social movements, such as MST and the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of 
Ecuador (Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador, CONAIE), had a 
significant impact on national policies, as well as challenging „state power‟ (2001: 98). Given 
the upsurge in grassroots mobilisations, Borras, Edelman and Kay (2008) edited a book on 
the complex trajectories of „transnational‟ rural-based social movements, which have 
confronted neoliberal globalisation. Additionally, Borras (2010) focuses on the impact of 
„transnational‟ agrarian movements on international rural development policies, with a 
particular focus on Vía Campesina. Analysis of rural mobilisation in Latin America has, 
therefore, been an area of increasing scholarly concern over the past two decades. 
 
Main Argument and Research Questions 
Based on the literature on contemporary rural social movements in Latin America, this 
section develops my main argument, engaging with debates on „the death of the peasantry‟ 
and the political prospects of subaltern actors such as peasants. Under both national-
developmentalism and neoliberal globalisation, capitalist development has engendered 
combined and unequal development. It has produced „subaltern fragmentation within and 
across borders‟: „as a narrow minority of the popular classes are inserted into globalized 
commodity chains, whereas other sections are increasingly marginalized from global 
                                           
3 In this sense, the MST „developed connections with the urban left and the Workers Party (PT), which have not 
been without tensions, thereby being part of a wider project of social and political transformation‟ (Kay, 2001: 
756). Likewise, Petras and Veltmeyer point out that „today many of the leading cadres, militants and activists in 
the rural workers/peasant movements are educated, have a definite understanding of national politics, and have 
been exposed to and engaged in national and international debates about rural alternatives‟ (2001: 102).  
２５ 
accumulation and subjected to intensifying immiseration‟ (Motta and Nilsen, 2011: 17). In the 
global countryside, peasant groups who engage in multiple forms of rural and non-rural 
economic activities in connection with transnational capital, such as agri-business, are 
included in the former. Country people who are forcibly displaced from their land comprise 
the impoverished labour reserve in urban shantytowns or migrate (legally or illegally) to 
other countries, form the latter element. Indeed, this analysis based on materialist objective 
conditions gives us a critical perspective on the unequal way in which capitalist „development‟ 
impacts on rural livelihoods, which for the majority results in exploitation, marginalisation, 
exclusion and dispossession. However, Chalcraft has pointed out the limitations of 
materialistic perspectives: 
 [A] materialistic reading (…), far from being mobilizing, seems to demobilize and 
encourage passivity among those outside the authentic proletariat; it understates the 
role of ideas in articulating diverse interests and thus in forging oppositional blocs; it 
defines exploitation itself too narrowly; and it is too scornful of the possibilities for 
and achievements of opposition that nonetheless falls short of socialist Armageddon 
(2011: 53-54). 
To put it differently, subaltern groups are understood as only being marginalised from global 
capitalist development and left increasingly fragmented. Likewise, neoclassical economists 
share a similar position regarding the „impotence‟ or „passivity‟ of subaltern groups. As Motta 
and Nilsen note, „the assumptions of neoclassical economics colonize the political, the social 
and the subjective in an attempt to create docile subjectivities and commodified social 
relationships‟ (2011: 15). According to this approach, subaltern groups tend to be regarded as 
individual producers who at best have to improve their competitiveness in a globalised 
market and are disarticulated from „political‟ decisions which „professional‟ politicians and 
technocrats make. Accordingly, the only alternatives left for them are to improve their 
individual capability through multi-form survival activities (a modernist World Bank-style 
„recommendation‟ for rural poverty reduction) to gain material support from the government 
or international development agencies, if not promoting agrarian reform (a more „structuralist‟ 
solution). 
 Although an analysis based on objective conditions is still relevant, within the framework 
of materialist reductionism subaltern groups remain in the status quo, if not getting worse. 
However, power does not only reside in global capital. A varying degree of experiences of 
grievances resulting from neoliberal globalisation tend to provide diverse subaltern groups at 
different spatialities with motives to act collectively. It is not hard to find „power in resistance‟ 
２６ 
if you look at the dynamics of social movements in present-day Latin America. The following 
observation on the political power of peasants in the global South by Motta and Nilsen merits 
attention: 
 In the rural sector, it is typically small and marginal peasants and indigenous 
subsistence peasants that have borne the brunt of accumulation by dispossession… 
Exposed to the onslaught of global market forces they are poorly equipped to 
withstand, they are slowly being forced off their land … [However, rather than „the 
death of the peasantry‟] peasant groups across the global South have challenged their 
dispossession vigorously through movements and networks that seek to reclaim land 
rights and reorient agriculture towards the imperatives of food security and 
ecological sustainability… this has involved the construction of new subjectivities 
and social relationships that reinvent a development beyond developmentalism and 
against neoliberalism (2011:16). 
The unprecedented onslaught of neoliberal „development‟ on natural resources, such as land, 
water, biodiversity, minerals, and its exclusionary nature, have emerged as important motives 
underpinning contemporary rural social movements in Latin America. It „forges the grounds 
for unity (among diverse subaltern groups) due to the intensification of experiences of 
disempowerment and exclusion‟ (Motta and Nilsen, 2011: 15-16). Organised groups during 
the national developmentalist phase (e.g., beneficiaries from agrarian reform and peasant 
unionists) have allied with those dispossessed through neoliberal globalisation, as well as 
with other actors in civil society (such as grassroots organisations, NGOs etc.) to reformulate 
new subjectivities for contemporary rural social movements. Despite frequent tensions, these 
actors forge collective action based on common goals, i.e. opposition to neoliberal 
globalisation. Accordingly, within these rearticulated subaltern rural subjectivities, it is 
possible to voice various demands – both „materialist‟ and „postmaterialist‟. For instance, 
former peasant unionists (the „included‟ subaltern) reclaim the right to access land or state 
subsidies, once viable under nationalist developmentalism, while simultaneously 
marginalised groups (the „peripherised‟ subaltern), such as indigenous people, argue for the 
recognition of their ethnic identity or their way of life, in addition to formulating socio-
economic demands (Motta and Nilsen, 2011: 13). In this way, connections and coalitions 
between seemingly „unlike‟ actors (both „included‟ and „peripherised‟ subaltern groups) can 
be forged in opposition to neoliberal globalisation. This common dispossession across 
different or „fragmented‟ subaltern sectors (possessing both materialist and postmaterialist 
concerns) provides them with an opportunity to coalesce political activism. On this point, 
Motta and Nilsen maintain:  
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 novel articulations of popular protest had also emerged, both from subaltern groups 
that had been peripheral to developmentalism as a hegemonic project, and from 
subaltern groups that had benefited from its compromises and concessions… It was 
during the 1990s – the era of neoliberal triumphalism par excellence – that these two 
strands of popular protest seemed to be increasingly converging in social movements 
that were simultaneously critical of state-led capitalist development and 
neoliberalism (2011: 13-14). 
 Through this re-articulation of subaltern groups in the countryside, Latin America has 
become one of the world‟s most politically and socially dynamic regions in terms of 
grassroots mobilisations over the last three decades: as witnessed by the rise of various 
peasants and indigenous movements; protests against neoliberal extractivism; as well as the 
election of so-called „pink tide‟ governments across the region. As Motta and Nilsen note, 
neoliberal globalisation has created „the conditions for a radical recomposition and 
reimagining of social emancipation and political change, which is arguably most clearly 
present in Latin America, where the oppositional projects of subaltern groups move both 
beyond and below the nation-state by politicizing localities and everyday life, and 
constructing alternative forms of transnationalization such as the World Social Forum or the 
solidarity economy movement‟ (2011: 17). 
 Against this backdrop, the main purpose of this dissertation is to argue against „the death 
of the peasantry‟ perspective by examining the re-composition of subaltern agencies in 
contemporary rural social movements in opposition to neoliberal globalisation. My research 
focuses on both the objective and subjective conditions of neoliberal globalisation and rural 
resistance, which revolves around neoliberal extractivism in Peru. Although the extraction 
and export of natural resources is not a new phenomenon in Latin America, its depth and 
width have become unprecedented in the current neoliberal phase. Particularly in Peru, a 
series of neoliberal structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) were implemented in the 
aftermath of political and economic crisis during the 1980s. In line with recommendations 
promoted by the international financial institutions (IFIs) as a new „development‟ strategy, the 
mining sector has become a priority for national economic policy. However, the 
macroeconomic stability and fiscal bonanza generated by mineral extraction saw a growing 
incidence of socio-environmental protests across the country, particularly in rural areas. This 
research pays particular attention to these dynamics in Peru‟s northern highlands, the 
department of Cajamarca, which experienced the arrival of Minera Yanacocha S.A. (MYSA) 
(a Denver-based multinational). Its activities have engendered multifarious social protests by 
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local populations over the last twenty years as the „new mineral extraction‟ of multinational 
capital has advanced by „dispossessing‟ local campesinos and affecting the environment. 
However, I will argue that diverse social groups that operate within different spatialities have 
experienced a negative impact (altough to a varying degree) and these common grievances 
have motivated them to create „linkages and connections‟ to forge collective actions against 
mining activities. In order to examine the re-articulation of subaltern groups, I focus on this 
„interconnectedness‟ of subaltern groups constructed around causes of grievance resulting 
from neoliberal mineral extraction and their „networked forms of resistance‟, based on my 
theoretical framework using a relational geographical approach. Despite tensions and 
contradictions within complex power relations, I demonstrate that actors at different 
spatialities contest grievances resulting from neoliberal extractivism while simultaneously 
constructing their political identity. The recent massive mobilisations against MYSA‟s Conga 
mining project are a particular focus to answer the following questions: 
 Are campesinos in the rural highlands of Peru, specifically Cajamarca, 
„disappearing‟ or fated to disappear given the advance of neoliberal extraction?  
 Are their protests against mining activities a last „reactionary‟ gasp when faced 
with the seemingly unstoppable advance of global capital? 
 If not, how did campesinos reformulate new subaltern subjectivities in opposition 
to neoliberal mineral extraction? 
 How did they forge networks, develop political activism and construct a political 
identity when contesting neoliberal globalisation? 
 
 
Research Methodology: Reflexivity and Flexibility  
Ontological and Epistemological Reflexivity 
The research questions above took a clearer shape particularly during and after the fieldwork 
I conducted in Cajamarca between July 2011 and July 2012. Initially, my intention was to 
examine the political dynamics of local campesino organisations in relation to the possibility 
of building Peruvian leftist politics. Soon after my arrival in Cajamarca, the massive 
mobilisations against the MYSA‟s Conga mining project caught my attention and I decided to 
focus on the anti-Conga movement. In this section, I show how I developed my research 
focus, via epistemological and ontological reflexivity, and collected data in a flexible way 
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during and after fieldwork. The department of Cajamarca is located in Peru‟s northern Andes, 
bordering with Ecuador. Administratively, thirteen provinces and 127 districts form the 
department, of which the latitude and altitude show a variety of ecology, including the 
Amazonian rainforest and Andean highlands. Approximately 1.38 million people live in 
Cajamarca, comprising 5.1 per cent of the national population, of whom 68 per cent reside in 
rural areas (de Echave and Diez, 2013: 17). Cajamarca is one of the poorest departments in 
the country, and nearly 75 per cent experience poor living condition in Celendín, the poorest 
province. Most cajamarquinos were dedicated to agriculture and livestock-raising before 
1993 when MYSA arrived in the region. In contrast to central and southern departments, 
large-scale mining represented a new experience for most cajamarquinos, since historically 
only small-scale extraction had been undertaken in Hualgayoc province during the republican 
period (see Chapter 4 and 5). In the aftermath of the multinational‟s arrival, Cajamarca has 
become a zone with a long list of potential mining projects over the last two decades: some 
47.32 per cent of the departmental territory is now under mining concessions, concentrated in 
the southern and central provinces (see Chapter 5). Alongside the increasing presence of 
mining activities, the department witnessed a growing number of protests against mineral 
extraction by local populations. One of the most recent expressions of discontent are the 
massive mobilisations against MYSA‟s Conga mining project: the anti-Conga movement 
(2011-2013).  
 In comparison to the central and southern Andes, Cajamarca has little ethnic identity and a 
weak community tradition. Almost all of the population is Spanish-speaking. Taylor explains 
the reasons for weak community tradition in Cajamarca. First, the Inca Empire conquered the 
region shortly before the arrival of the Spaniards, in approximately 1475. This relatively brief 
period of Inca domination meant that the ayllu tradition was not deeply embedded in the 
region. Second, the relatively lower economic importance of the region compared to the 
central and southern highlands (where most mines were located) during colonial times 
signified that there was little need for a strict implementation of reducción (1979: 55-56). 
Due to the weaker influence of ethnic and community tradition and its distance from Lima, 
this part of the highlands received comparatively less academic attention than its southern 
and central counterparts. Before the 2000s, the academic literature in English on Cajamarca 
was concentrated on: 1) capitalist development of agriculture (Gitlitz, 1975; Taylor 1979; and 
Deere, 1990 with a gender focus) and 2) socio-political dynamics in the countryside, 
particularly the rise and fall of the nightwatch patrols (rondas campesinas) (Gitlitz and Rojas, 
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1983; Gitlitz, 1998; Starn, 1999; and Gitlitz, 2013). Since the 2000s, more research has been 
conducted on the „why‟ and „how‟ of local protests against MYSA‟s mining activities, 
particularly examining the negative impacts on rural livelihoods and the organisational 
limitations of local protests (Arana, 2002; Leyva and Jahncke, 2002; Seifert, 2003; Bury, 
2002, 2004, 2005, 2011; Bebbington et al., 2008b; Lingán, 2008; Meléndez, 2009).  
 Regarding social protests, most authors have commented on organisational constraints due 
to a lack of community tradition compared to the southern highlands, and vulnerability to 
movement fragmentation because of the pressing material needs of the minifundista peasants. 
Previous analyses have concentrated on the adverse relationship between MYSA‟s mineral 
extraction and the deteriorating living conditions of most country people, exacerbated by 
environmental degradation, which have been flagged as one of the main causes behind 
increasing mobilisations against the mining multinational. However, peasants have tended to 
be regarded as powerless political actors, or receivers of NGOs‟ paternalist support (Lingán, 
2008). In addition, it had been argued that their organisations are vulnerable to fragmentation 
(Meléndez, 2009). From this analytical perspective, objective conditions, such as the advance 
of global capital and weak traditions of political and social organisation, make it harder for 
local peasants to contest mineral extraction and to forge an alternative. Against this backdrop, 
I adopt epistemological and ontological reflexivity in finding rural subjectivities within the 
anti-Conga movement. In her explanation of methodological reflexivity, Raven argues that 
reflexivity „involves a critical exploration of not only what we know, but also more centrally 
what we do not know (i.e., our unawareness) and why and how we have come to know and 
not to know‟ (2006: 560).  
 Epistemologically, the academic privilege of knowledge production should be critically 
reviewed. Here, it is fruitful to look at Motta‟s criticism vis-à-vis the epistemological 
constraints inherent in the traditional theoretical framework of social movements, both from a 
social democratic and an orthodox Marxist perspective. When interpreting the rise of new 
social movements, social-democrats tend to regard them „either as prepolitical or politically 
impotent, concerned merely with particular issues, or dangerous for political stability and 
democratic deepening‟ (Motta, 2009: 33). From a social-democratic viewpoint, popular 
organisations should form part of a wide „development consensus‟ which emphasises „the 
compatibility between (capitalist) accumulation and participation and redistribution‟, i.e. the 
conciliatory relationship between economic development and socio-economic rights (Motta, 
2009: 37). The role of political parties is highlighted in this process. As she points out, within 
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this theoretical framework, the political is understood only within liberal representative 
democracy based on elite politicians, political parties, and the market economy, as „a capital-
centric understanding of economic development‟ (2009: 38). Consequently, the disarticulation 
between social movements and the mainstream political arena, including political parties, is 
perceived as being negative for the consolidation of democratic development. It only results 
in the marginalisation of local movements (Motta, 2009: 39). For their part, orthodox 
Marxists argue that the organisation of the working class should be led by the vanguard party 
with a goal of the seizure of state power and structural transformation. Within this perspective, 
contemporary social movements are doomed to fail, or become marginalised at best, due to 
their „lack of strategic relationship with the state, the lack of institutionalization into a party 
form… and the lack of concrete ideology to guide political action‟ (Motta, 2009: 42).  
 Accordingly, this epistemological limit of the traditional theories on contemporary social 
movements could make academics „run the risk of becoming gatekeepers of the status quo, as 
opposed to providing intellectual illumination to new forms of progressive politics‟ (Motta, 
2009: 32). Therefore, it is necessary to transcend „conceptualizations of the subaltern as 
merely a passive victim of domination and exclusion and redirecting our theoretical focus 
toward the subaltern‟s actual activity‟ (Motta, 2009: 51). This epistemological reflexivity 
helped sharpen my research focus on the subjectivity of rural political actors and their 
political practices in the anti-Conga movement, engaging in the debate over the fate of the 
peasantry. Echoing this epistemological viewpoint, I will approach the movement to examine 
the political activism of rural subjectivities in contesting neoliberal extractivism, which is 
further developed in my theoretical framework based on critical geography in Chapter 2. In 
the following exchanges, I will show how I introduced „ontological reflexivity‟ in developing 
my theoretical approach of the research. 
       #1. 
       Señorita, ¿de dónde viene? Trabaja por una ONG? Usted viene del extranjero, tiene 
que divulgar „la verdad‟ sobre nuestra lucha, no como los medios de Lima. Nosotros 
no somos radicales. Somos campesinos humildes. Luchamos por una causa justa, 
para defender nuestra agua (one campesina in the Cajamarca city, 9 April 2012).
4
 
                                           
4  # 1. „Señorita, where are you from? Do you work for an NGO? Coming from a foreign country, you should 
disseminate „the real facts‟ about our movement, not like the mainstream media in Lima. We are not radicals. We 
are humble peasants. We only protest for one just cause: in defence of our water.‟ During the regional march, 
one campesina approached me in the main square and made this comment. Looking foreign with a camera, 
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       # 2. 
       ¿Porqué estás tomando fotos? ¿Qué estás apuntando? Trabajas por la mina? Vas a 
vender  la información a la mina? (One campesino in Cajamarca, 31 May 2012).
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„Foreignness‟ is not limited to geographical distance, particularly living in this „globalising‟ 
world. Calculating only transport time, it took me almost the same amount of time to travel 
from Liverpool to Lima (approximately 15 hours by flight) as from Lima to Cajamarca 
(nearly 16 hours by coach).
6
 Despite the risk of simplified generalisation, the aforementioned 
vignettes suggest two contrasting views on what „foreignness‟ is, or should be, within the 
„local‟ context. On the one hand, being „foreign‟ indicated those with the potential to 
undertake a „rights‟ advocacy on behalf of local peasants or who sympathised with the latter, 
in contrast to the national government and media in Lima. Since independence, the Peruvian 
rural highlands (sierra rural) have been unequally incorporated, or marginalised, in political, 
economic, and social terms. The geographical distance between the coast (particularly Lima) 
and Andean regions also reflects the developmental gap within the national discourse, similar 
to the difference between developed countries and Peru. Consequently, the sierra rural has 
become a „retarded and stable‟ place in the majority mind set, which needs to be „modernised‟ 
and „developed‟ as has occurred on the coast. During the fieldwork, I had a chance to stay in 
Lima, and asked limeños what they thought about protests against the Conga project. 
Although several casual conversations cannot represent what every limeño opines, I gained a 
perception that they did not care or regarded it as one of many social conflicts led by 
„ignorant‟ highlanders or radical politicians who manipulated the campesinos. Therefore, „law 
and order‟ should be imposed to defend foreign investors as well as national economic 
growth, a position reminiscent of the limeño government and most media. In line with this 
development discourse, foreigners could be perceived among local denizens as „exploiters‟ of 
the local population and natural resources, or supporters of this exploitation. From this 
                                                                                                                                   
recorder and notebook in hand, she could have thought that I worked for an NGO or „foreign‟ media. Frustrated 
with the conservative media in Lima and Cajamarca, which described local protesters as radicals, presumably 
she thought that she should say something whenever she met foreigners. After saying this to me, she moved to 
other foreign-looking persons, making the same comments. 
5  # 2. „Why are you taking photos? What are you noting down? Are you working for the mining company? Are 
you going to sell the information to the mining company?‟ This episode happened in the middle of one of the 
tensest local environments when the second indefinite strike was initiated. I was standing in front of the San 
Francisco church in the main square of Cajamarca city after having talked with campesinos from other 
provinces who were having lunch, organised by nuns and local women in the Church‟s front yard. 
6 There is a flight between Lima and Cajamarca, but I took a road trip due to economic constraints. 
３３ 
perspective, these kinds of foreigners take a similar position to those in Lima. 
 Thinking reflexively about the comments on „foreignness‟, the geographical understanding 
of local campesinos is based on relational, not essentialist ontology. Rather than essentialist 
geographical distance, locals understand „foreignness‟ as being more associated with 
development and its related social relationships. While limeños live within the national 
boundary, they were perceived as being at a further distance than those foreigners who 
worked for an NGO or who were in favour of the movement‟s cause: the defence of water. 
Sometimes, those who are working for the mining company could be regarded as „exploiters‟ 
of humble peasants, regardless of nationality. This ontological reflexivity helps us gain a 
better understanding of a reformulated subjectivity. Rather than describing local peasants as 
„ignorant‟, „powerless‟ or „passive‟ agents bounded to underdeveloped or retarded local 
tradition, they could be seen as active political actors in contesting global capital. I will 
develop my theoretical argument based on this relational geographical ontology in Chapter 2. 
 
Flexibility in Data Collection 
Before leaving for Cajamarca, I stayed in Lima for a week, recovering from jet lag and 
meeting several contacts I had arranged beforehand. All-in-all, they gave me a strong 
perception that living in Cajamarca would not be easy since the region is highly rural and not 
„modern‟. Furthermore, my research focus would not really be relevant because mining has 
become the norm in Cajamarca. One of the comments I got was: are there any rural social 
movements in the contemporary world? So it would be better to travel and visit the hot spring, 
Baños del Inca, (a tourist site in Cajamarca), and return to Lima with another research focus. 
Thinking retrospectively, this was the reason for conducting fieldwork, by immersing myself 
in the daily life of people, using my eyes and ears to gain a better understanding of what was 
happening in the local context. In addition, it is necessary for a researcher to be sensitive to a 
local situation, not only when observing, but also learning from and reflecting on what she or 
he has „observed‟ or „lived‟ during fieldwork. In this vein, my approach to the research is not 
only limited to my engagement with academic debates but was also a learning process. This 
position was influenced by what Zapatistas called la Otra Campaña (the Other Campaign), 
declared in the Sixth Declaration of the Lacandón Jungle in 2005. According to the Zapatistas, 
La Campaña „explicitly encouraged Northern (solidarity) organizations that had been 
focusing their resources on Chiapas to shift their attention to struggles against neoliberal 
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globalization in their own homes‟ (Andrews, 2011: 142). In this sense, I regarded my research 
object not only as something to be „observed‟ but also to be learned from, a position different 
from postwar area studies or early anthropology.
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 Although the researcher may acquire a 
general idea of the research location and develop a rather detailed and fixed research design, 
the world we are living in is invariably unpredictable and more complex than we expect. For 
this reason, the research focus and questions tend to take a clearer form during and after 
fieldwork. This was what happened to me during my fieldwork in Peru. After receiving rather 
pessimistic comments in Lima, I arrived in Cajamarca in late July 2011. Luckily, as one of 
my supervisors has researched the region for many decades, he had a long list of contacts in 
Cajamarca. Futhermore, his initial presence in Cajamarca enabled me to make important 
contacts. In addition, his partner (a cajamarquina), her family and friends enabled me to 
make invaluable contacts as I stayed with her for the first months. Several weeks after 
arriving in Cajamarca, I was informed that there was a regional meeting of the nightwatch 
patrols (rondas campesinas) in the neighbouring province of Hualgayoc. Experiencing nearly 
three-hour of precarious road journey, I arrived in Bambamarca, the capital of Hualgayoc 
province, for a two-day event. Participation in this event proved a turning point, as it allowed 
me to contact important informants for forthcoming interviews. During the meeting, when 
participants divided into several groups to discuss their local issues and problems in more 
detail, I happened to join a group containing ronderos from Celendín, a province which is one 
of the main loci of MYSA‟s Conga project. This was in mid-August 2011 when mobilisations 
against the Conga project remained at the local level. During casual conversations with 
shilicos (a colloquial term for people from Celendín), I gained a vague idea of the impact and 
explosive potential of the project. Several months later, mobilisations against the project 
became massive, particularly after November 2011. In this fashion, my research focus was 
determined. 
 My data collection methods included participant observations, (semi-structure or open-
ended) interviewing, casual conversations, collection of the media coverage and documents 
(on-line and off-line), and observation of events in public spaces (see Appendix II and Photo 
1). Researching the social movement in an extremely tense environment, where police and 
                                           
7 „Both anthropologist and colonial civil servant seem to have perceived the foreigner as someone who was 
outside and different from the white middle class. So the „foreign‟ becomes something they can discover, 
research and understand … So the early anthropologist may have shared with modern „upmarket‟ tourists a 
belief in the irreplaceable intrinsic value of every culture still not affected by Western influence‟ (Silverman, 
2011: 120). 
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military forces were present in large numbers (particularly after a confrontation with 
protesters in late November 2011 and the consequent declaration of a state of emergency), 
was not an easy task (see Photo 2 and 6).
8
 First, doubts and distrust abounded in a conflictive 
atmosphere as seen in #2 above. Sometimes this made it difficult to gain access to 
interviewees. To overcome this, support from my contacts was invaluable as „gatekeepers‟ or 
„key informants‟ (Creswell, 2007: 71). For example, an interview with the lawyer of the 
prominent NGO GRUFIDE was made possible because she was a good friend of my 
supervisor‟s partner‟s niece. Another instance involved obtaining an interview with a MYSA 
worker, which was facilitated through one of my cajamarquino friends. In Celendín, one 
important contact kept informing me of successive events concerning the movement and he 
facilitated interviews with movement leaders and activities. Another issue related to sources 
of information that often contained conflicting viewpoints or propagandistic in nature. This 
characterises much of the literature which denounced the protesters‟ violence, views 
emanating from the central government and the Lima-based conservative media. To handle 
this problem I was able to utilise „participant observations‟ in protests and marches to confirm 
or deny the veracity of the information. Additionally, the process of verifying information 
was undertaken via „data triangulation‟, i.e. through employing various sources (such as 
reliable newspapers, online blogs, conversations with informants, and personal observation) 
(Robson, 2002: 174). Using a variety of sources enabled me to attain a clearer understanding 
of unpredictable situations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
                                           
8 For the implementation of the state‟s authoritarian measures vis-à-vis social movements, see Chapter 6. 
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     Photo 1.  
 
          Photo taken by the author‟s friend during the March in Celendín (28 March 2012). 
Photo 2. 
 
      Photo taken by the author in the Plazuela Bolognesi, the Cajamarca city (9 April 2012). 
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 Third, my fieldwork process was based on openness and consent when considering ethical 
issues. Research ethics are relevant both for the researcher and the researched in this 
conflictive situation. When a young foreign single woman appeared in highly rural and male-
oriented local contexts, both my presence and the research subjects sometimes faced 
unexpected situations. For instance, especially during the initial stage, when I was building 
contacts, I became an object to be „observed‟, an object of curiosity or doubt. Sometimes, 
guys approached me with undesirable intentions, saying that they would provide me with 
information. Over time, I realised that it was occasionally necessary for me to pretend not to 
understand Spanish in order to protect my own security. In addition, I tried to keep a low 
profile and acted with discretion when living in Cajamarca and conducting interviews. This 
was important for my own security as a researcher, especially given the highly charged 
political atmosphere and the government‟s keenness to „discover‟ foreign „agitators‟ in order 
to discredit the movement. 
 More importantly, I made efforts to ensure the transparency of the research process and 
security of the informants. Consequently, every time an interview was conducted, from the 
start the focus, purpose and possible outcomes of my research were made as clear as possible 
to the informants, i.e. by gaining „informed consent‟. Through this procedure, informants 
could make a decision as to their participation, and understood that they would be under no 
pressure to participate. This was important given the potential risks of state repression. 
Although not every problem that might arise could be anticipated, it was appropriate for me 
to think through potential scenarios given the tense and conflictive situation. Importantly, 
when dealing with any confidential/potentially sensitive data and personal information 
relating to the interviewees, their names and all markers were removed. Interviews were 
indicated alphabetically (see the list of interviews), and any place names/references to written 
documentation which could potentially identify a source were removed. This policy was 
followed by one of my supervisors in a recent book on the civil war in Peru's northern 
highlands (Taylor, 2006), and in a similar monograph analysing the antecedents of the armed 
conflict in Ayacucho department (Heilman, 2010). This will be especially significant when I 
publish the research. Therefore, participants were told that the information they provide 
would be kept confidential and that I would need to ask permission of informants in case of 
disclosure.  
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Structure of the Dissertation 
Considering the limitations of traditional theoretical frameworks on contemporary social 
movements, Chapter 2 examines both the objectivity and subjectivity revolving around 
neoliberal extractivism and the creative re-articulation of subaltern subjectivities and their 
political activities in contemporary transnational activism. To this aim, the first part of the 
chapter will introduce theoretical debates on place-based struggles vis-à-vis global capital 
power. Instead of focusing on the „powerlessness‟ of „reactionary‟ local subjectivities and 
their „political ineffectiveness‟ based on economic materialism and an essentialist 
geographical perspective, I will highlight the importance of understanding the „relational 
content‟ of neoliberal globalisation by drawing on Doreen Massey‟s „power-geometry of 
time-space compression‟. The second part will concentrate on the local-global nexus of 
contemporary transnational activism. Beyond the bifurcated framework of power and 
geography, I will elucidate the complex trajectories of „networked forms of resistance‟, 
echoing Featherstone‟s conceptualisation of „prefigurative solidarity‟ and his reflection on 
political identity construction. 
Chapters 3 and 4 examine the historical background of marginalisation of subaltern groups 
in Peru. These historical chapters demonstrate the condition of political and socio-economic 
marginalisation of subaltern groups, with an aim to contextualise the marginalisation of rural 
highlanders from both state-led developmentalism and market-led development initiatives. 
Chapter 3 explores the political and economic origins of neoliberalism, in order to show the 
roots of political and economic marginalisation of rural highlanders. Additionally, it intends 
to illuminate how this marginalisation was intensified under rampant neoliberalism in the 
1990s. Chapter 4 will examine one of the most representative sectors of market-led 
development, the mining sector, and the complex relationship between this „new extraction‟ 
and social struggles. Rather than focusing on bifurcated power relations, the chapter 
concentrates on the diverse dynamics related to mineral extraction and socio-environmental 
protests in Peru.  
 Chapters 5 and 6 are case study chapters which examine the relationship between the 
multinational mining company (MYSA)‟s mineral extraction and resistance of rural 
communities in the northern highlands. Chapter 5 examines local political dynamics, as well 
as the complex power-geometry and increasing political activism resulting from the presence 
of MYSA since 1993. Chapter 6 focuses on one of the largest mobilisations against MYSA‟s 
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mining project (Conga) on the basis of my fieldwork. The chapter elucidates the networked 
forms of resistance of new rural subjectivities and their construction of environmental justice 
as a political identity. Finally, Chapter 7 will summarise the argument and main findings of 
the dissertation, by reflecting on theoretical debates and the case study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
４０ 
Chapter 2  
Critical Geography of Transnational Activism  
against Neoliberal Globalisation:  
Place, Interconnectedness and Political Identity 
 
 
The recent stage of capitalist globalisation and free market mantra for „development‟ has 
taken precedence across the world. Spatial barriers across borders have diminished and thus 
previously exotic fruits, vegetables, crops and other produce have become more accessible in 
transnational supermarket chains. When you go shopping to buy clothes, shoes, electronics, 
cars and other merchandise, prices are even more affordable and varieties are so diverse as to 
sometimes make you hesitate regarding which to choose. People plan to go on a holiday to 
foreign countries by availing of cheaper flight tickets. We can watch World Cup football 
matches which take place on the other side of the globe via television, the Internet, or you can 
even travel to the host country to enjoy matches in person. You can hear news accounts of 
what is happening in other countries via global news media or social networking sites, 
sometimes even faster than people who live in those very locations. What a beautiful 
globalisation! These are positive images which proponents of neoliberal globalisation have 
promoted over the last three decades. In order to achieve this market-oriented „development‟, 
countries are obsessed with improving their investment environment and are attentive to 
credit ratings awarded by Moody‟s and S&P. Therefore, deregulation, privatisation of SOEs 
(State-owned Enterprises) and trade liberalisation have become main concerns for 
macroeconomic growth and stability in each nation-state, both in the South and the North. 
 However, the abovementioned dimensions are testament to a one-sided aspect of 
globalisation. While more prawns and salmon are on the table in one country, the biodiversity 
of mangroves on the Pacific coast of Ecuador, as well as people living in local communities, 
have been affected due to large-scale industrial aquatic farming. Cheaper T-shirts in a 
shopping mall in one location are the result of those who work in precarious labour 
conditions, including child labour, in sweatshops in Bangladesh. High-tech electronic devices 
are made by female casual workers in the maquila factories on the Mexican border with the 
US. While some people plan for holidays across borders, immigration regulations have 
４１ 
tightened for other people and illegal latino immigrants in search of work across the border 
see their lives end in the desert. While people in one place watch and enjoy football matches, 
shanty town dwellers are forcibly displaced to construct football stadia. These gloomy 
episodes of globalisation are in stark contrast to what neoliberal adherents have depicted in 
their market-led development mantras.  
 As Krishna points out, neoliberal globalisation has become „the rational commonsense‟ 
and made plausible „the triumph of the economy over politics, with the latter invariably seen 
as something that interferes with or corrupts the functionality of the “natural” and national 
logic of the economy‟ (2009: 13). Thus, this form of globalisation has become equated with 
„progress‟ or „development‟. Countries that are left behind are recommended to follow the 
way „developed‟ countries have developed, namely by opening up their markets. In this way, 
„economic‟ and „technological‟ advances are no longer subject to debate and „[C]apitalist 
globalisation is equated with globalisation tout court, a discursive manoeuvre which at a 
stroke obscures the possibility of seeing alternative forms‟ (Massey, 2005: 83). However, 
various forms of resistance to neoliberal globalisation have emerged around the world. These 
acts of resistance, located in various spatialities, became involved in different political 
experiences, demonstrating that there are alternatives to a monolithic globalisation. As 
Doreen Massey underlines, multiple spatialities have been ignored in the grand narrative of 
neoliberal globalisation. By recognising that globalisation is „a making of space(s), an active 
reconfiguration and meeting-up through practices and relations of a multitude of trajectories‟, 
it is possible to open up a space for „the politics‟ (Massey, 2005: 83). 
 Against the backdrop of globalisation and resistance, there has been a growing attention to 
transnational activism against neoliberal globalisation. Part of the literature has focused on 
place-based resistance, while other authors have devoted more attention to the connections 
made by activists between the local and the global. After laying out the objective conditions 
of neoliberal extractivism, this chapter will engage with theoretical debates on transnational 
activism. Following Massey‟s relational geographical approach to the spatial, i.e. space and 
place, the first section examines critically essentialist geographical understandings of place-
based resistance. In addition, I will point out the binary understanding of power (as 
domination over the dominated) evident in the dualistic geographical framework and 
introduce Massey‟ concept of „power-geometry‟ of time-space compression as an alternative. 
Then, in order to look into the dynamics and progressive political possibilities of place-based 
resistance to neoliberal globalisation, the following section will be devoted to 
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interconnectedness and political identity construction, which has been influenced by David 
Featherstone‟s theoretical reflections on critical geography. 
 
 
2.1. Confronting Neoliberal Globalisation: Geographies of Neoliberal 
Extractivism and Resistance 
‘Time-Space Compression’ and Neoliberal Extractivism 
David Harvey once argued that „[T]he drive for capital accumulation is the central motif in 
the narrative of historical-geographical transformation of the Western world in recent times 
and seems set to engulf the whole world into the twenty-first century‟ (2001: 121). Based on 
Marx‟s theory of accumulation, Harvey notes that crisis is inherent in the capitalist 
accumulation process but, at the same time, this crisis can generate a new condition for 
increasing productivity and accumulation (2001: 239-241). In other words, Marx‟s analysis of 
capitalist accumulation suggests that contradictions are generated in the capitalist 
accumulation process, which in turn produce a regular crisis within the capitalist production 
system and consequently requires rationalisation (Harvey, 2001: 79-80).
9
 One of these 
contradictions is found „within the capitalist class‟, where each capitalist pursues his or her 
own profit in a competitive way and at the expense of their own class interests. This 
contradiction tends to cause the „overaccumulation‟ problem, „a condition in which too much 
capital is produced relative to the opportunities to find profitable employment for that capital‟, 
leading to a regular crisis with „falling profits, idle production capacity, over-production of 
commodities, unemployment, idle money capital, and the like‟ (Harvey, 2001: 79-80). To put 
it differently, the „overaccumulation‟ problem implies the lack of profitable investment 
opportunities for capitalists at low input costs. In this sense, as Harvey maintains, „capital 
accumulation is bound to be geographically expansionary and to be so by progressive 
reduction in the cost of communication and transportation‟ (2001: 244). For capitalist 
accumulation to be constant, it is necessary to lower or eliminate spatial barriers as well as to 
speed up capital mobility by reducing the circulation costs, i.e. „the annihilation of space by 
                                           
9 To rationalise the capitalist production system in the face of crisis includes „driving out inefficient enterprises, 
reducing the power of labor to resist technological change or to command a high wage, bringing non- or pre-
capitalist sectors to heel (often through political force)‟ (Harvey, 2001: 80). 
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time‟ to use Marx‟s term (Harvey, 2001: 245-6). In Harvey‟s spatio-temporal understanding, 
„time-space compression‟ is based on Marx‟s analysis of capitalist accumulation and its 
contradictory nature.
10
 Using this „time-space compression‟ framework, globalisation since 
the late twentieth century can be understood in the following terms: „spatial barriers… have 
fallen away to a considerable degree [and] time has also changed from being a reflection of 
natural processes to become instantaneous‟ (Munck, 2007: 5). Namely, Harvey claims that „a 
stronger phase‟ of time-space compression has emerged in the context that technological 
development enhanced the speeding-up of capital mobility and  the reduction or 
disappearance of spatial barriers given advances in communications and transport since the 
1970s (2001: 123). However, in reality, globalisation has engaged in „more heterogeneous, 
differentiated and fragmented‟ spatialities (Munck, 2007: 5). 
Harvey revisits Marx‟s concept of „primitive‟ or „original‟ accumulation and emphasises 
its persistence as a form of capital accumulation under neoliberal globalisation. He terms this 
persistent mode of capitalist accumulation as „accumulation by dispossession‟ (ABD). ABD 
has become a new modus operandi of capitalist accumulation in search of a new field of 
investment for „overaccumulated‟ capital at low input costs, i.e. the „profitable use‟ of 
overaccumulated assets (Harvey, 2005: 149). In the aftermath of the 1973 crisis, capitalism 
has suffered „a chronic difficulty of overaccumulation‟ and found new profitable areas for 
investment with the neoliberal privatisation process (Harvey, 2005: 149-150). In addition, the 
demise of the Bretton Woods system, the move towards a flexible exchange rate system and 
the opening up financial markets facilitated free capital mobility. That is to say, the capitalist 
crisis in the early 1970s and the subsequent liberalisation of financial markets provided 
overaccumulated capital with profitable investment opportunities. In particular, this ABD has 
been intensified with the advance of neoliberal forms of global capitalism which became 
dominant during the Thatcher and Reagan era in the 1980s. Harvey points out: 
  [S]ince privatization and liberalization of the market was the mantra of the neo-
liberal movement, the effect was to make a new round of „enclosure of the commons‟ 
into an objective of state policies. Assets held by the state or in common were 
released into the market where overaccumulating capital could invest in them, 
upgrade them, and speculate in them. New terrains for profitable activity were 
opened up, and helped stave of the overaccumulation problem, at least for a while. 
Once in motion, however, this movement created incredible pressures to find more 
and more arenas, either at home or abroad, where privatization might be achieved 
                                           
10 For more on his theoretical reflection on capitalist development and its contradictory nature, see Harvey 
(1975. 1982, 1990). 
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(2005: 158). 
Alongside the liberalisation of financial markets and technological development, policies 
designed by international financial institutions (IFIs) with the support of hegemonic states 
facilitated ABD. As Harvey asserts, „hegemony gets constructed through financial 
mechanisms in such a way as to benefit the hegemon while leading the subaltern states on the 
supposedly golden path of capitalist development‟ (2005: 152). This ABD, Harvey contends, 
has taken the form of „the wholesale commodification of the nature in all forms‟; „capital-
intensive modes of agricultural production‟ and consequent „escalating depletion of global 
environmental commons (land, air, water) and proliferating habitat degradations‟; „the 
commodification of cultural forms, histories, and intellectual creativity‟; and „a new wave of 
enclosing the commons‟ (universities and public utilities of all kinds, including public water  
services), accompanied by what he labels neoliberal „policies of dispossession‟ such as 
liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation (2005: 148).  
 This mode of capitalist accumulation is worth noting when it comes to natural resource 
extraction. For instance, debt-stricken Latin American countries were forced to implement 
structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in exchange for new foreign loans in the 1980s, 
which included the opening up of domestic markets and the privatisation of SOEs (Harvey, 
2005: 151). While natural resources have been extracted ever since the colonial era in Latin 
America, this has been intensified in the form of ABD, with the SAPs implementation since 
the 1980s (see Galeano, 1997). One of the recommendations of a new development model on 
the part of IFIs, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), 
was to promote investment in the extractive industries including mining, hydrocarbons, 
logging, etc. Consequently, the extraction and export of natural resources gained a new 
relevance as a development strategy in developing countries. This not only emphasised its 
importance in promoting economic growth and macroeconomic stability but also its role in 
poverty reduction. In line with the IFIs‟ economic reform initiatives, national regulations 
were revised or newly written to attract more foreign investment in extractive industries. The 
goal for this deregulation or new regulation is to provide national and global capital under 
favourable investment conditions, opening up domestic markets, privatising state-owned 
companies and permitting free flow of capital. Consequently, South America has received a 
large amount of investment in the extractive industries from global capital over the last two 
decades (Veltmeyer, 2013: 82). In the mining industry, for instance, mining codes or 
regulations have been newly made or revised in more than 90 countries since the mid-1980s 
４５ 
(Bridge, 2004: 407). In this vein, taxes for investors as well as barriers against capital 
mobility were lowered. Additional regulations were implemented in order to protect investors‟ 
property rights (see Hogenboom and Jilberto, 2009: 95). Consequently, global capital 
increasingly flowed into developing countries‟ extractive industries during the 1990s. In the 
case of Latin America, the proportion of global investment in the mining sector more than 
doubled in the mid-1990s, from 12 per cent in the early 1990s to 28 per cent in 1995, to 
almost 33 per cent by the early 2000s (de Echave, 2009b: 105).  
 There are several factors to explain this new global extraction boom. As mentioned, IFIs 
have played an important role, not just in promoting the implementation of policy reform in 
developing countries but also by engaging in different investment projects. In particular, the 
role played by the WB requires attention as it uses the extractive industry as a recommended 
development strategy. For instance, the WB has adopted direct or indirect participation in 
mining investment. While the Bank has granted credit loans for private mining corporations, 
it has become directly involved in mining projects by participating as a shareholder via 
International Financial Corporation (IFC).
11
 In this way, the WB financed 27 mining projects 
in Latin America during 1993-2001 (de Echave, 2009b: 106). In addition, the Bank attempts 
to get involved in poverty reduction projects as its main priority. As part of these projects, the 
IBRD lends credits to middle- or low- income countries for public investment in 
infrastructure as well as social programmes (Holt-Giménez, 2011: 118).
12
 The Inter-
American Bank, on the other hand, participates in the Initiative for Integration of Regional 
Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA). The IIRSA plans to construct „a network of inter-
oceanic roads, ports, waterways, hydroelectric plants, pipelines and other major pieces of 
infrastructure‟ in order to „integrate and open up the continent‟ (Bebbington, 2012: 9). With 
the IIRSA plan, „entire geographic regions such as the Amazon, the Andes or the Orinoco 
river basin‟ are expected to become a target for global capital investors via massive 
infrastructure projects as well as natural resource extraction (Renfrew, 2011: 587). If the plan 
materialises, it is likely that the continent could be integrated into the global market at an 
                                           
11 The IFC, one of five institutions in the WB group, is „the largest global development institution‟ which 
finances exclusively the private sector with an aim to „achieve sustainable growth by financing investment, 
mobilizing capital in international financial markets, and providing advisory services to business and 
governments‟ (available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/about, last accessed 5 July 2014).  
12 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) „aims to reduce poverty in middle-
income countries and creditworthy poorer countries by promoting sustainable development through loans, 
guarantees, risk management products, and analytical and advisory services‟ (available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/about, accessed 5 July2014).  
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unprecedented speed and at the same time experience a devastating impact on its 
environment as well as its inhabitants. Renfrew has noted this „may create or intensify trans-
border resource conflict‟ (2011: 587; see also Castro, 2008). 
 Another factor in the recent global extraction boom is the high price of natural resources in 
international commodity markets and rising demand for minerals, oil and other resources in 
developing countries. Emerging economies have been integrated in the global market and 
made resource extraction economically profitable. As Veltmeyer notes, „the rise of China as a 
global industrial power fuelled by a demand for energy and non-renewable natural resources 
… on the world market resulted in the emergence of a primary commodities boom as well as 
a wave of large-scale foreign investments in land, water and resources‟ (2013: 79). According 
to an International Council for Mining and Metals (ICMM) report, international mineral 
prices have increased at an average annual rate of 13.7 per cent during the period 2000-2009 
(2013: 23). Since 2003, a partial contribution to the rise in mineral prices was due to the 
development of international financial markets, particularly the involvement of hedge funds 
and derivative products in commodity markets before the financial crisis in 2009 (Bebbington 
et al., 2008a: 898). In addition to high commodity prices in the international market as well as 
the development of financial technology that facilitates free capital mobility, previously 
unviable extractive projects have now been made possible with the development of new 
technologies in „mineral exploration, production and environmental management‟ 
(Bebbington et al., 2008a: 898). Consequently, the extractive industries have expanded into 
territories with little or no record of mineral extraction. In a brief overview of mineral 
extraction in the Andean regions, Bebbington argues: 
 Since 2004… the proportion of the Peruvian Amazon that has been concessioned has 
increased from 14 per cent to over 75 per cent. Eleven hydrocarbon blocks overlay 
protected areas, 17 overlap reserves for indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation 
and 58 overlap lands titled to indigenous peoples... In Ecuador, some two-thirds of 
the Amazon has been divided into blocks for oil exploration, some of which also 
overlap protected areas and regions with people living in voluntary isolation… 
While the area so far contracted in Bolivia is lower, it is still the case that over 50 
per cent of the national territory has been identified by the government as available 
for hydrocarbon exploration (2012: 13). 
 This mode of capitalist accumulation is not exclusive to mineral extraction. The list of 
examples of extraction in the form of ABD is never ending. I will just mention a few of them. 
„A new wave of agrarian capitalist expansion‟ within the wider global food regime was 
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promoted by „technological and managerial innovation as well as political economic context‟ 
(Cáceres, 2014: 11). The development of multinational agribusiness integrated small-scale 
farmers in developing countries into global market from production to the marketing process 
by promoting the use of GM (Genetically Modified) seeds and chemical fertilisers and by 
engaging farmers with global supermarket chains. This was further facilitated by the WB‟s 
plan for rural development and poverty reduction, which is reflected in the World 
Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development (WDR08). Many commentators 
have argued that the report focuses on small-scale farmers and their integration into the 
global market as a way of escaping poverty, rather than considering the capitalist power 
relations behind „new agriculture for development‟ as the main cause of poverty. As Oya 
argues, „[T]he WDR08 has uncharacteristically stressed the importance of rural labour 
markets for poverty reduction, as aspect hitherto clouded by the WB‟s obsession with 
smallholder productivity and market integration of small farmers‟ (2009: 232). In his critical 
reading of the World Bank‟s market-based approach to rural poverty, McMichael points out 
the importance of considering the capitalist power relations behind the Bank‟s policy 
suggestions: „The new agriculture for development is governed by market intensification, via 
agribusiness, aided by the state‟ (2009: 236, emphasis in the original)13. In other words, from 
the World Bank‟s point of view, small-scale farmers need to be integrated into the global 
capitalist system and to be competitive and efficient producers in order to build their assets 
and thus overcome their poverty. This market-led neoclassical economic approach sees 
peasants only powerless rural producers who should be integrated into global market for their 
survival and never expects their subjective political power.
14
 Similarly, McMichael criticises 
this approach, arguing that bringing smallholders into the global market by promoting their 
productivity would dispossess farmers and increase their dependence on capitalist power, 
rather than solving the problem of poverty. He claims: 
                                           
13  Under capitalist power relations, „corporate markets are the creation of the multilateral framework 
epitomized in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, by which heavily subsidized agribusiness has gained access 
to the liberalizing markets of the global South, in addition to accessing agricultural resources through the agro-
export dictates of the IMF/World Bank structural adjustment regime. Agro-exporting has accelerated 
differentiation among smallholders, where those capable of meeting quality and delivery standards have 
benefited as local contract farming has expanded the foundation of supply chains for new corporate retailing 
operations … Meanwhile, Northern subsidies have allowed traders to artificially cheapen commodities at the 
expense of local farmers, driving many off the land‟ (McMichael, 2009: 237). 
14 Beyond this materialist approach, which highlights the impotence and passivity of rural subaltern groups if 
not being integrated into global market system, I will examine the political imaginaries of rural subjectivities in 
Cajamarca (see Chapter 5 and 6).  
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 With the Bank‟s leadership, the development industry is gearing up to „modernize‟ 
small-scale farmer agriculture in the name of a productivity increase that will further 
eliminate smallholders, further subordinate agriculture to reductionist technologies, 
and deepen the reproduction of poverty and hunger… This form of improving 
productivity (delivering GM seeds, along with networks of fertilizer dealers, thereby 
deepening petro-farming and the control of the chemical and seed companies) is 
premised on dispossession and market monopoly, rather than supporting farmers‟ 
markets geared to feeding the poor (2009: 239-240). 
 
While the WDR08 emphasised the significance of improving the competitiveness of small-
scale farmers and their entry into the global market as a strategy to reduce poverty, it did not 
deal with underlying power relations, including agribusiness and the related issue of 
supermarket chains. Small-scale farmers are considered to be heterogeneous „producers‟ who 
adapt to a changing rural landscape by making rational livelihood choices, becoming 
competitive producers, non-farm workers or migrants, rather than ending up being 
dispossessed and impoverished under growing capitalist power. As Amanor suggests, „[T]he 
main objectives of policy are to enhance the competitiveness of smallholders to assets 
including land, entrepreneurial skills and market information‟ (2009: 257).  
 Apart from GM crop production, ABD has expanded to other areas such as „plantation 
forestry, mainly of Eucalyptus and pine varieties‟ as well as „large-scale industrial shrimp and 
salmon farming along South America‟s Pacific Coast‟ (Renfrew, 2011: 586; see also Miller, 
2014). Positive results from the extractive industry, such as an increase in foreign investment 
as well as a certain degree of macro-economic stability, have been gained at the expense of 
the concentration of benefits and the further marginalisation and dispossession of a majority 
of the poor in developing countries, including Latin America. As a consequence of this, leftist 
or progressive governments have been elected to power across the region, raising 
expectations of a „fairer‟ or more „inclusive‟ development agenda along with policies that can 
recognise difference. Greater state intervention in the economy, more social redistribution, as 
well as the exercising of national sovereignty over resources, figure among the population‟s 
demands (see Hogenboom and Jilberto, 2009; Kohl and Farthing, 2012; Simarro and Antolín, 
2012; Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012). However, these so-called post-neoliberal states 
demonstrate continued emphasis on the extractive industries as „national‟ development 
strategy, leading some commentators have termed these approaches as „neo-extractivism‟ or 
„new developmentalism‟ (see Gudynas, 2009; Svampa, 2012). These governments, 
particularly in Andean countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela and Peru, have 
４９ 
seemingly obvious justifications for this mode of resource-export development. Although 
Peru, under consecutive governments, is not necessarily included in the list of „post-
neoliberal‟ governments, its political discourse and development model („new extraction‟ in 
Bebbington‟s (2009) terms) are in parallel with those of leftist governments in the Andean 
region. The incumbent Humala government was elected on the basis of seemingly leftist 
electoral promises, but once in power his government has turned out to be more in line with 
conservative forces. This is why the country‟s poor, a majority of who gave their electoral 
support to Humala, call him a „traitor‟ (see Chapter 4). It is argued that securing more 
national sovereignty over natural resource extraction ensures a country‟s economic growth 
and thereby more fiscal resources for social distribution. This new extraction or neo-
extractivism stands out in political discourse and is best illustrated by the comments of 
different presidents (see Chapter 4). Bebbington et al. (2013) point out that this new 
extractivism has been carried out by means of three political discourse strategies: to take 
control of debates over „development‟ by defining the extractive industry as the only and best 
way of achieving this development and poverty reduction; to regard mineral extraction as a 
„natural‟ economic activities (e.g., Perú, un país minero) and to treat all opponents of this 
extractivism as either naïve or romantic leftists or environmentalists, or even extremists, anti-
developmentalists or neo-communists.
15
  
 Regardless of their ideological position, development coincides with economic growth and 
poverty reduction (in material terms) for these governments. In parallel to this, the extractive 
industry is one of their development priorities since it brings economic growth as well as 
fiscal revenues for social programmes.
16
 From this perspective, those who are against 
neoliberal or neo-extractivism can be regarded as obstacles for the country‟s development 
(Bebbington et al., 2013: 329-333). It still needs to be seen if this reclamation of the state‟s 
role in the country‟s economy and development could bring benefits to the region‟s 
population, overcoming the „resource curse‟ and thus moving towards post-neoliberalism, e.g., 
the twenty-first century socialism that several leftist leaders have argued for. In their analysis 
of the newly enhanced role of the state in terms of development in Bolivia, Ecuador and 
                                           
15 For the complexity of social struggles against neoliberal mineral extraction in Peru, see Chapter 4. This 
justification of new extraction will be highlighted in Chapter 6 as the Peruvian government used it as a basis for 
„policing‟ those activists and protesters who opposed the Conga project. 
16 This limited definition of development related to mineral extraction was one of the main causes for socio-
environmental protests (see Chapter 4 and 6). 
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Argentina, Grugel and Riggirozzi point out that „post-neoliberalism‟ is still emerging while 
displaying all the weaknesses that plague „market-oriented, export-led growth‟ (2012: 16).17 
Meanwhile, rather than focusing on the novelty of neo-extractivist policies under so-called 
post-neoliberal governments, Veltmeyer is critical of the new dimension of resource 
extraction, arguing the „new extractive imperialism‟ (2013; see also Veltmeyer and Petras, 
2014; Gudynas, 2009). While this newness refers to the unprecedented scope and speed of 
extraction backed by a „regulatory regime‟, he argues that accumulation practices have a long 
history insofar as they concentrate wealth from extraction in the hands of foreign capital and 
leave little benefit in the host countries, in this way generating unequal forms of development 
(2013: 87-88). Moreover, local communities are left with the negative impacts of extraction 
rather than benefitting from it (2013: 88). 
 In terms of neoliberal forms of mineral extraction, the socio-ecological impacts of mining 
activities are highlighted as unprecedented, particularly due to the extent of extraction, as 
well as the amount of resources such as land and water used. As Holden et al. explain, the 
technological advance of neoliberal mining extraction in the Philippines has led to the 
detection of „an economically viable concentration of ore, [and] the mining industry requires 
as much access to land as possible‟ as a result (2011: 143). They also point out the 
„overlapping‟ of mining concessions in the inhabited area, e.g., indigenous communities 
living near the mining sites. Mining concessions sometimes „overlap‟ with residential areas; 
they are also located in ecologically sensitive locations, e.g., the headwater of extensive river 
systems.
18
 Bebbington and his colleagues point out how the presence of multinational capital 
and the extraction of natural resources influenced on local populations in the form of 
„accumulation by dispossession‟ (ABD) and show how this ABD caused grievances and 
produced diverse forms of local responses:
19
 
 [D]ispossession is a question of loss in both the quantity of people‟s assets (land, 
                                           
17 Grugel and Riggirozzi argue that post-neoliberalism is „the set of political aspirations centred on “reclaiming” 
the authority of the state to oversee the construction of a new social consensus and approach to welfare, and the 
body of economic policies that seeks to enhance or “rebuild” the capacity of the state to manage the market and 
the export economy in ways that not only ensure growth but are also responsive to social need and citizenship 
demands‟ (2012: 2-3). 
18 For more social and ecological impacts of mineral extraction, see Chapter 4.  
19 Considering the scope and nature of MYSA‟s mineral extraction in Cajamarca over the last twenty years, its 
operation has become the main terrain for contestation among local populations, thereby generating a long list of 
social conflicts which will be examined in Chapter 5. 
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water courses, grazing, minerals) and the quality of these assets (water and air 
pollution). Dispossession might also be understood as loss of a way of life, and a 
certain set of taken-for-granted assumptions about livelihood and development 
(2008b: 2891). 
       [T]he shifting and expanding geographies of mineral investment… have elicited 
different forms of protest that articulate a range of concerns about environment, 
human rights, identity, territory, livelihood and nationalism (2008a: 901, see also 
Renfrew, 2011).
 20
 
The ABD produced by resource extraction has been experienced by many local communities 
and their grievances caused by social and ecological impacts vary: precarious labour 
conditions; displacement or migration of rural populations; obstacles to accessing resources 
such as land or water by indigenous or peasant communities; threats to biodiversity; 
environmental contamination of soil, water, as well as mangroves, among other issues. These 
negative experiences have become one of main causes for recent acts of resistance against 
neoliberal globalisation in Latin America.  
 
Criticism of Place-Based Resistance  
Much of this resistance derivs from grievances generated by different forms of neoliberal 
capital accumulation and have been experienced, perceived and contested in a local place. 
Drawing on Arif Dirik, Sheppard points out the importance of focusing on place-based local 
experiences of, and responses to, social change. He refers to Dirik‟s view that:  
 negative local experiences of globalization stimulate people to question the universal 
and placeless narrative of globalization that dominates discourse and to recover the 
importance of distinctive local understandings, norms, and narratives of social 
change (Sheppard, 2002: 312).  
 
In a similar vein, Escobar has noted that there are two approaches in the current literature on 
„place‟:  
 the production of place by capital and global forces, following a political economy 
approach; and the „senses‟ or, more generally cultural construction of place – how 
                                           
20 For more on land struggles and land reform in Latin America, see Moyo and Yeros (2005), Vergara-Camus 
(2009), Teubal (2009a), Wolford (2010), Bottazzi and Rist (2012); for more on „resource wars‟ see Crabtree 
(2005), Spronk and Webber (2007), Romano (2012); on struggle over „new extraction‟, see Kuecker (2007), 
Bebbington et al. (2008a, 2008b), Bebbington and Humphreys Bebbington (2010a, 2010b), Dougherty (2011), 
Sepúlveda and Villarroel (2012).  
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places are endowed with meaning and the constitution of identities, subjectivities, 
difference and antagonism, following phenomenological, interpretivist, and 
constructivist paradigms (2001: 152-153).  
These arguments suggest that „place‟ is not just material space, but also a „lived‟ area where 
the local population experiences the consequences of the political economy as well as relating 
to power relations, meanings and identities. Therefore, placed-based political activism 
implies that local grievances do not just exist as a state but can be politicised in an intricate 
way to involve meaning and power relations. As Leitner et al. (2008) put it: 
 [P]laces are imbued with meaning as well as power, which is also of critical 
importance in contentious politics. Social movements often seek to strategically 
manipulate, subvert and resignify places that symbolise priorities and imaginaries 
they are contesting; to defend places that stand for their priorities and imaginaries; 
and to produce new spaces where such visions can be practices, within that place 
and beyond (161-162). 
 
 On the other hand, Hardt and Negri, in their most influential book, Empire, have been 
critical of localised or place-based movements. They argue that place-bound local struggles, 
as well as nationalist movements which are based on „the long traditions of Leftist 
nationalism‟ are reactionary responses which intend to „defend the local and construct 
barriers‟ to the advances of global capital (2000: 44). This is premised on a „false dichotomy 
between the global and the local‟, which suggests that „local differences pre-exist the present 
scene and must be defended or protected against the intrusion of globalization‟ (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000: 44). They criticise this false global/local dichotomy and the tendency to defend 
a local identity or territory from the intrusion of global capital, since this place-bounded 
activism is „damaging‟ in terms of carrying out „the potential for liberation that exists within 
Empire‟ rather than inhibiting „the development of the capitalist imperial machine‟ (2000: 45-
46). For resistance against the global capital power of „Empire‟ to be effective, as Gibson-
Graham points out, „the local networks of place-based politics must be developed at the same 
(global) scale‟ (2002: 34). Consequently, one of the political strategies of the multitude in 
terms of potential liberation is that „each struggle, though firmly rooted in local conditions, 
leaps immediately to the global level and attack the imperial constitution in its generality‟ 
(Hardt and Negri, 2000: 56). Rather than making the „horizontal articulation of struggles, […] 
each (struggle) leaps vertically, directly to the virtual center of Empire‟ (Hardt and Negri, 
2000: 57-58). 
 In a similar vein, Harvey notes that although struggles against ABD constitute an 
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important part of the recent „anti- or alternative globalisation movement‟, they are „a volatile 
mix of protest movements‟ with little or no inter-linkages (2005: 162-167). He regards these 
mobilisations as based on a „postmodern‟ way of thinking and appreciates them when it 
comes to their openness to „heterogeneity, diversity, multiple overlapping concern of gender, 
class, ecology‟ (2001: 121). However, in his view, these „postmodern‟ movements prefer 
difference at the expense of „coherence‟. Although they can locate a „coherence‟ in terms of 
resistance when they have a similar experience  in the process of capitalist accumulation, it 
is their tendency to reject unified organisation with a common target and to pursue 
differences, fragmentation, and heterogeneity (i.e. „the worship of fragments‟) that prohibit 
the pursuit of a „more generalised political goal‟ (i.e. a unified political dynamic for „anti-
capitalist, anti-imperialist and anti-globalization struggles‟) (Harvey, 2001: 121-122; Harvey, 
2005: 174, 179). He argues that a flexible and fragmented organisational structure with its 
own distinct dynamics can make movements lose sight of „the macro-politics of what 
accumulation by dispossession was and is all about‟, as it is being left to particular localised 
acts of resistance (2005: 168-169). As a result, these struggles are often repressed with 
„ferocious violence, for the most part by, state powers acting in the name of order and 
stability‟ (2005: 167, emphasis in the original).21  
 Harvey notes the danger of these „postmodern‟ struggles by reminding us of Raymond 
Williams‟s concept of „militant particularism‟. According to Harvey, „militant particularism‟ 
is based on those „[I]deals forged out of the affirmative experience of solidarities in one place 
generalized and universalized as a working model of a new form of society that will benefit 
all of humanity‟ (2001: 172). He is also cautious about the fact that not all struggles which 
arise from a particular place are progressive. Sometimes they demonstrate a conservative 
tendency and a reactionary response to external forces by sticking to the existing order or 
putting up barriers to progressive political possibilities (2001: 190-191). In this sense, Harvey 
suggests political movements should not be reactionary but based on generality. It is 
necessary to distinguish „the progressive and regressive aspect of accumulation by 
dispossession‟ and to „seek to guide the former towards a more generalized political goal‟ 
(2005: 179). To put it differently, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist political activism should 
target global capital powers rather than pursue a particularity in defence of a place-bounded 
                                           
21 In Chapter 6, I will show that despite the use of mano dura (authoritarian measures) by the neoliberal state in 
order to guarantee private investment and to maintain public order, this laid the ground for unity in the anti-
Conga movement rather causing further fragmentation among subaltern actors. 
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territory or identity, i.e. what he called „the head-in-the-sand politics‟ (Harvey, 2001: 126). 
This does not imply that political movements should pursue the homogenising „multitude‟ 
against global capital power, instead it should attempt to connect individual acts of resistance 
to more generalised capitalist accumulation by „time-space compression‟ in the way that the 
„militant particularist movement‟ plays as a mediator between local resistance and capitalist 
accumulation (Harvey, 2001: 193).  
 Explanations of local resistance against globalisation have concentrated largely on the 
reactions of local communities in defence of tradition and territory, as well as identity 
bounded with a particular place. In most cases, these „places‟ belong to rural areas which are 
inhabited by poor peasant communities or indigenous people. It is argued that these long- 
marginalised local communities tend to identify with a place. They resist the advances of 
global capital in order to defend the sources of their livelihoods, culture and territory, as well 
as biodiversity and environment as bounded within a place. In line with Harvey‟s assumption 
that global (capital) has an asymmetrical power in comparison to the local, Escobar criticises 
the time-space compression of erasing the politics of place and of imposing „the ideology of a 
pensamiento único (single thought)‟ without permitting a political space for the economic, 
cultural and ecological differences constructed in place (2008: 18). For him, place is „an 
important source of culture and identity‟ which has been threatened or erased with the „time-
space compression‟ of globalisation (2008: 7). While Escobar notes the interactions between 
the local and global, i.e. „glocality‟, when it comes to subaltern resistance, he points out the 
importance of defending these differences contained in place and its political implications for 
progressive politics, i.e. „the deepening of democracy‟ by „questioning the very principles of 
liberal democracy‟ (2008: 15). This understanding of place is based on a territorial approach. 
Nicholls explains two conceptualisations of „place‟: territorial and relational (the latter will be 
elaborated on in the next section). While territorial conceptualisation focuses on cohesive 
social relations in a particular place, a relational understanding underlines its contingency 
(Nicholls, 2009: 79). Explaining the territorial conceptualisation of place, Miller draws on 
Agnew‟s (1987: 28) definition of place: 
 Interwoven in the concept of place…are three major elements: locale, the settings          
in which social relations are constituted (these can be informal or institutional); 
location, the geographical area encompassing the settings for social interaction as 
defined by social and economic processes operating at a wider scale; and sense of 
place, the local “structure of feeling.” Or, by way of example, home, work, school, 
church, and so on form nodes around which human activities circulate and which in 
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toto can create a sense of place, both geographically and socially. Place, therefore, 
refers to discrete if “elastic” areas in which settings for the constitution of social 
relations are located and with which people can identify (cited in Miller, 2000: 16). 
 
 Similarly, based on this bounded geographical understanding of place, some social 
movement theorists from the rational choice theoretical tradition point out that place plays a 
role in generating movement resources by providing strong territorial ties as constructed 
among groups, at the same time as they act as contact points for making frequent interactions 
and new alliances. To put it differently, while territorial place functions as a location for 
forging the strong ties constructed in social networks, it can also be a contact point for 
making new alliances. As Nicholls argues:  
 [P]lace provides diverse activists with multiple „contact points‟ where they can come 
into interaction with others in their milieu. While these complex interactions can 
spawn new alliances, they also play a role in lowering cognitive barriers, freeing the 
flow of information between different organisations, and spurring innovation. When 
these two relational dynamics complement one another in a place, activist networks 
become strong enough to maximise local mobilisation capacities and open enough to 
spur the innovative capacities of the local activist community (2009: 85). 
 
People construct mutual trust, solidarity and share meanings through frequent contacts and 
interactions within the social networks constructed in a place. In this sense, the existence of 
social networks is often necessary to motivate participants to overcome the collective action 
problem and to get involved in these actions. In addition, pre-existing networks are useful for 
the recruitment of participants in social mobilisations. This is what Melucci has called 
„submerged networks‟ whereby social groups are embedded in their daily activities and 
become a resource for collective action when faced with specific issues (see Melucci, 1989). 
 
The Power-Geometry of ‘Time-Space Compression’  
Globalisation has become a dominant term over recent decades and Harvey‟s noteworthy 
geographical and historical understanding of it is based on the speeding-up of capital mobility 
with lower spatial barriers, i.e. „time-space compression‟. As Massey mentions, „[W]hether 
through an unthinking technological determinism or through a submission to the inevitability 
of market expansion, this version of globalisation comes to have almost the ineluctability of a 
grand narrative‟ (Massey, 2005: 82). However, she criticises this understanding of 
globalisation for several reasons. First, Harvey‟s „time-space compression‟, or „the 
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annihilation of space by time‟, is a biased understanding of globalisation since it is mainly 
based on capitalism and its accumulation process (Massey, 1994: 147; 1995: 48). Although 
economic forces have become more important for impinging on people‟s lives around the 
world, it is not the only factor which has influence on our understanding of space/place. 
Rather, global capital‟s mobility, according to Massey, should be understood as „the 
stretching out of different kinds of social relationships over space‟, as well as „the stretching 
out over space of relations of power, and of relations imbued with meaning and symbolism‟ 
(1994: 158-159). She notes: 
 It is certainly the case that „time‟ (for which read an increase in the speed of 
transport and communications) reduces, and indeed on occasions even annihilates, 
some of the effect of distance… It is worth noting the irony that what is really being 
reduced here is time, and what is being expanded (in the sense of the formation of 
social relations/interactions, including those of transport and communication) is 
space (as distance) (2005: 90-91). 
 Second, Massey points out the limitations of an essentialist understanding of „place‟ as 
well as of criticism of place-based resistances against advances of global capital. In other 
words, she argues that Harvey doubts the effectiveness of place-based local resistance since 
he interprets them as reactionary responses to ABD in defence of local territory or identity. 
Through this criticism of Harvey‟s spatio-temporal conception based on capitalist 
accumulation, Massey highlights two critical points: 1) a binary understanding of space/place; 
and 2) the relationship between geography and power. Based on a binary geographical 
understanding of space and place, the latter is regarded as „a source of stability and an 
unproblematic identity‟, thus the spatial mobility of global capital for accumulation tends to 
generate reactions due to the former‟s „unsettling impact‟ in different locations (Massey, 1993: 
63).
22
 In this framework, Harvey suggests that place-based resistance is understandable in 
the face of ABD threats to a community or set of traditions, but he is still wary of the 
effectiveness of this „postmodern‟ politics. That „they are easily dominated by the power of 
capital to co-ordinate accumulation across universal fragmented space‟ makes him argue for 
anti-capitalist and anti-globalisation movements at a global level, a point that concurs with 
                                           
22 In explaining this geographical framework, as Harvey states:  
 There seems to be a widespread acceptance of Heidegger‟s claim that the authenticity of dwelling and 
of rootedness is being destroyed by the modern spread of technology, rationalism, mass production 
and mass values… Place is becoming more important to the degree that the authenticity of dwelling is 
being undermined by political-economic processes of spatial transformation and place construction 
(1993: 12). 
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Hardt and Negri in their multitude‟s political strategy (Harvey, 1993: 24). In the meantime, 
Massey disagrees with this binary understanding of space and place, arguing that Harvey 
associates „a sense of place‟ with „memory, stasis and nostalgia‟ fixed or bounded to a place, 
i.e. place-boundedness (1994: 119). This essentialist geographical conceptualisation 
forecloses „the possibility of alternative forms of social order‟ originating from a place, and 
only regarded as a limited or fragmented resistance which could be easily subordinated or co-
opted to global capital power without being articulated by scaling up to the same level 
(Massey, 1994: 256). Similarly, Featherstone notes the limitations for progressive political 
possibilities by this binary geographical understanding. As he puts it, an essentialist 
geography „obscures the ways in which subaltern politics generates multiple spatialities, 
which construct agency precisely through their distinctive and productive negotiations of 
cross-cutting relations of power‟ (Featherstone, 2003: 408). 
 Apart from this place-boundedness, Massey points out another problematic: power 
relations are fitted into this dualistic geographical framework. In this regard, it is worth 
noting Gibson-Grahams‟ point:  
 Globalism is synonymous with abstract space, frictionless movement of money and 
commodities, the expansiveness and inventiveness of capitalism and the market. But 
its Other, localism, is coded as place, community, defensiveness, bounded identity, 
in situ labor, noncapitalism, the traditional… [This is] the vision that power inheres 
in greater size and spatial extensiveness… [Therefore, there is a dualistic formula of 
geography and power, i.e.] the boundless power of the global and the relative 
impotence of the local (2002: 27-28). 
This dualistic geography-power formula – space/place, global/local and the 
powerful/powerless – is influenced by „modernist political thinking‟ (Gibson-Graham, 2002: 
50).
23
 Moreover, it does not reflect the geographical reality. A seemingly all-encompassing 
capitalist power is not „consolidated‟ nor „concentrated‟, rather „diffuse‟, „partial‟ and 
„constitutive‟ and this „constitutive nature of power brings us to the power of subjection and 
its role in our thinking beyond the global/local binary… for cultivating the capacity of local 
subjects – as agents rather than victims in a diverse economy‟ (Gibson-Graham, 2002: 51). 
                                           
23 Under traditional socialism, „oppositional strength is gained through convening the masses – breaking down 
spatial barriers, overcoming single-issue fragmentation, creating identification with one liberatory cause… [In 
this way], separateness, disarray, ambivalence, personalized actions, limited horizons, and local loyalties all 
signal a diminution of power in face of the enemy. In light of this vision, local initiatives… are embarrassingly 
inadequate and definitely uncompelling‟ (Gibson-Graham, 2002: 50). 
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For instance, while the 1994 uprisings in Chiapas could be understood as local indigenous 
people‟s resistance against neoliberal ABD, the development of communication technology 
partially helped in making transnational alliances in support of the cause of indigenous 
people who have been suffering from state repression in Mexico. At the same time, the 
Zapatistas also became a motive for other people with similar causes to mobilise both within 
and outside Chiapas and Mexico, reflecting the limitation for the binary formula of 
geography and power. Therefore, a seemingly ubiquitous neoliberal capitalist development 
has faced various spatialities to resist. For instance, in the face of many rural resistances 
around the world, the WB‟s pro-poor participatory turn demonstrated that the apparently all-
powerful and unitary institutional representation of neoliberal globalisation could be a myth. 
Arguably, the Bank was very eager to take a pro-poor stance and to generate various policies 
for poverty reduction after having led SAPs as part of its recommended solution to debt crises 
in the developing countries during the 1980s. One of the Bank‟s recent efforts on this score 
has been published as the World Development Report (WDR 2000/2001): Attacking Poverty, 
which reflects the institution‟s understanding of poverty and policy proposals for its reduction. 
In its definition of poverty, the WB emphasised that poverty has a „multidimensional‟ 
character. Although many critics (Green and Hulme, 2005; Hickey and Bracking, 2005; Kay 
2006; Bebbington 2007) demonstrate that this policy shift is only designed to facilitate 
continuous capitalist accumulation at best, this change reflects that global capital power is 
porous and sometimes vulnerable to resistance.  
 In this sense, resistance should not be understood as the „otherness‟ of power: as Sharp et 
al. suggest, based on a Foucauldian understanding of power, „power should not be viewed 
solely as an attribute of the dominant, expressed as coercion or political control, since it is 
also present in the ability to resist‟ (2000:3). In consequence, power is „entangled‟ with social 
relations at every geographical level. In addition, „no moment of domination, in whatever 
form, is completely free of relations of resistance, and likewise, no moment of resistance, in 
whatever form, is entirely segregated from relations of domination‟ (Sharp et al., 2000: 20). 
In other words, it is possible to locate „domination in resistance‟ and „resistance in 
domination‟ as constituting power becoming „entangled bundle of exchange dispersed 
everywhere through society‟ (Sharp et al., 2000: 20-21, emphasis in the original).  
 In overcoming the abovementioned limitations relating to the aspatial understanding of 
„time-space compression‟, Massey suggests a „relational‟ geographical understanding. As 
discussed, Massey understands the spatial as „social relations stretched out over space‟, rather 
５９ 
than being limited to economic determinism. In other words, space is conceptualised as 
„constructed out of interrelations, as the simultaneous coexistence of social relations at all 
spatial scales‟ and as being „full of power and symbolism‟, i.e. „a complex web of relations of 
domination and subordination, of solidarity and co-operation‟ (Massey, 1994: 264).24 In this 
relational approach, place can be understood as being „formed out of the particular set of 
social relations which interact at a particular location‟ (Massey, 1994: 168). Base on this, 
what Massey terms „a progressive sense of place‟ differs from an essentialist place-
boundedness which associates a given place with a fixed identity or bounded territory. Rather, 
it is a place which is not fixed or static, but associated with the dynamic process of social 
relations (Massey, 1993: 67-68). What distinguishes one place from another is that a place is 
produced through a particular articulation of links and interconnections of social relations of 
different scales and thus contains multiple identities since these relations are not static. 
Additionally, „all these relations interact with and take a further element of specificity from 
the accumulated history of a place with that history itself conceptualized as the product of 
layer upon layer of different sets of linkages both local to the wider world‟ (Massey, 1993: 
68). Accordingly, the global becomes an integral part of the construction of the local via 
complex social relations „stretching out‟ over networks (Massey, 1994: 5, 120). Since social 
relations are dynamic, imbued with different degrees of power and meaning, it can be argued 
that diverse social groups are differently placed in relation to the „time-space compression‟ 
via the speeding-up of global capital‟s mobility. This is what Massey calls the „power-
geometry‟ of „time-space compression‟ within a relational geographical framework. As she 
puts it, „there are differences in the degree of movement and communication, but also in the 
degree of control and of initiation. The ways in which people are placed within „time-space 
compression‟ are highly complicated and extremely varied‟ (1994: 149-150). In sum, 
progressive and relational understandings or conceptualisations of the spatial are „not a kind 
of denuded spatial form in itself (distance; the degree of openness; the numbers of 
interconnections; proximity, etc. etc.), but the relational content of that spatial form and in 
particular the nature of the embedded power-relations‟ (Massey, 2005: 93).  
 Based on Massey‟s relational geographical understanding, the next section will examine 
how the relations of various social groups are articulated in a place in order to resist 
                                           
24 „All spatial scales‟ include „the global reach of finance and telecommunications, through the geography of 
tentacles of national political power, to the social relations within the town, the settlement, the household and 
the workplace‟ (Massey, 1994: 4). 
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neoliberal forms of extractivism. Rather than arguing that acts of resistances are place-
bounded local reactions, I will suggest that they are instead imbued with complex power 
relations, contradictions and ongoing negotiations. Instead of forming a smooth 
internationalisation via a shift in scale, I will also maintain that, in the process, networked 
forms of resistances are constructed as are political identities.  
 
 
2.2. Dynamics of Place-Based Resistance: The Critical Geography of 
Transnational Activism 
Geographies of Grievances 
Apart from localised acts of resistance against ABD, the literature on transnational activism is 
based on the local-global connections and interactions between activists and organisations, as 
well as interpretive frames regarding neoliberal globalisation. This section focuses initially on 
the latter, which have been given substantial attention from social movement theorists when it 
comes to movements‟ ideational strategies. This will then be questioned via a critical 
geographical reflection. In explaining the success of the Battle in Seattle in 1999, an 
emblematic example of the global justice movement, Murphy points out that the development 
of „diagnostic frames‟, which made the World Trade Organisation (WTO) a common target 
for resistance among various social groups, both within and across borders, was critical for 
coordinated collective actions (2004: 37-38). As she puts it, „[B]y helping local activists 
identify with distant actors and helping them understand the parallels between local and 
foreign issues, social movement organisations foster a feeling of mutual fate while suggesting 
specific action to address social and environmental ills that complements the idea of global 
citizenship‟ (2004: 40).  
 Framing analysis has been introduced to add an ideational dimension to social movement 
theory (see Goffman, 1974; Snow et al., 1986; Snow and Benford, 1992). Snow et al. (1994) 
explain the „collective action frames‟, following Goffman‟s (1974) concept of frame.25 Snow 
and his colleagues point out that social movement organisations (SMOs) pursue three framing 
                                           
25 According to Goffman, frame is „an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the “world out there” 
by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within 
one‟s present or past environment‟ (cited in Snow et al., 1994: 190).  
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processes – diagnostic, prognostic and motivational – in order to mobilise and maintain social 
movements. SMOs „diagnose‟ who and what are to be blamed (diagnostic framing), come up 
with strategies to get problematic situations right (prognostic framing) and „motivate‟ 
collective action in order to put strategies into action (motivational framing). As Murphy 
notes, these framing process work when local resistances share similar grievances with 
activists or SMOs in other places. It is argued that this facilitates making alliances and 
collective actions among activists at different levels.  
 When developing this analytic framework based on the local and global nexus of global 
activism, Tarrow and McAdam posit that while the domestic context is still relevant for 
collective action, „internalisation‟ or „global framing‟ are constitutive of „global‟ activism 
(2005: 122).
26
 For Tarrow and McAdam, global activism is better understood as a 
„transnational contention‟ among actors who are rooted in a domestic political environment at 
the same time as they make alliances, articulate collective actions targeting common targets 
and share framing (2005: 123). Tarrow claims that local activists „strategically‟ use „external 
symbols to orient local or national claims‟ (sic) about grievances (Tarrow, 2005: 60). Taking 
the example of global justice movements, activists who make domestic claims within a 
national political structure make strategic use of the „global justice‟ frame which has 
produced an „effective‟ result for mobilisations (Tarrow, 2005: 73-74). Tarrow argues for its 
function: „[Global framing] can dignify, generate, and energize activists whose claims are 
predominantly local, linking them symbolically to people they have never met and to causes 
that are distantly related to their own (2005: 60). Through such process, local people frame 
their movements in line with broader transnational mobilisations. On this question, Nicholls 
maintains that: 
 As locals come to identify with (these) distant battles, they may realign with these 
distant battles, they realign their discourses, claims, targets and repertoires to reflect 
those of the general movement. Cognitive identification with this general movement 
therefore precipitates locals to transform what had been a highly localised battle into 
one particular front in the general struggle for Environmental Justice. Thus, the 
identification of locals with allies elsewhere provides sufficient levels of solidarity to 
realign local struggles with general social movements, transforming a particularistic 
battle into a new front in this loosely constituted movement (2009: 87). 
 
While focusing on the „effectiveness‟ of global framing for activists‟ mobilisation efforts, 
                                           
26 Internalisation here means „domestic claims-making against international or foreign targets‟, while global 
framing is „the mounting of domestic disputes in the language of globalization‟ (Tarrow and McAdam, 2005: 
122). 
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Tarrow also notes its limitations in that activists occasionally lose sight of specific local 
demands: 
 [Global framing] signals to overworked and isolated activists that there are people 
beyond the horizon who share their grievances and support their causes. But by 
turning attention to distant targets, it holds the danger of detaching activism from the 
real-life needs of the people they want to represent (2005: 76). 
  
 Meanwhile, in terms of a critical geographical approach to global resistance, Featherstone 
introduces the term, „maps of grievance‟. The term is defined as something which „bears on 
the (spatial) practices through which power relations become known, generated and brought 
into contestation through political activity‟ (Featherstone, 2003: 405). In other words, they 
demonstrate that the power relations which cause grievances at the same time can be brought 
into contestation via political practices. By locating spatialities of grievance with the power-
geometry of neoliberal globalisation, it opens up political possibilities for the geographical 
construction of power in an antagonistic manner, rather than by making strategic alliances 
between the local and the global (Featherstone, 2008: 51, 53). To put it differently, it is 
possible to overcome the bifurcated structure between domination of global capital flows, its 
accumulation, on the one hand, and local resistance, on the other, thereby demonstrating the 
various spatialities of power relations. Resistances are not merely domination‟s otherness but 
are „products of multiple interrelations‟, i.e. the interactions among differently placed social 
relations within the power-geometry (Featherstone, 2008: 51). From this perspective, 
Featherstone maintains that the process of constructing „maps of grievances produces diverse 
forms of political activities in diverse geographies as being placed differently and make 
different forms of solidarities as well as political identities‟ (2008: 51).  
 
Scale Shift and Place-Boundedness 
A scalar approach to transnational activism – particularly from social movement theorists and 
political geographers – has a number of different focuses: the systemic mechanism of scale 
shift (Tarrow, 2005; Tarrow and McAdam, 2005; Tilly and Tarrow, 2006); direction of scale 
jumping (Escobar, 2001; Glassman, 2002); and the political implications of scale shift (Keck 
and Sikkink, 1998; Olesen, 2005; Haarstad and Fløysand, 2007), among others. Tarrow and 
McAdam emphasise the mobilisational mechanisms from the local to the global, arguing that 
„transnational movements do not automatically emerge from global consciousness or 
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economic integration: they have to be built up through agentic processes like coalition-
building, identity formation, and a shift in scale from the local/national to the international 
level‟ (2005: 145). They underline two different processes of scale shift between national and 
international levels: „relational diffusion‟ and „brokerage‟.27 The former route is that activists 
move across borders and exchange information based on pre-existing ties and identities. 
Meanwhile, the transfer of information via brokerage happens among „two or more 
previously unconnected social sites‟ (Tarrow and McAdam, 2005: 146). By noting that the 
mechanism could be more complex, they argue that „the major strength of the current 
campaign against neoliberal globalization is that it retains local, regional, and national roots‟ 
(Tarrow and McAdam, 2005: 146). They also maintain that transnational activism is limited 
to the „transposition of part of the movement activities‟ with „partial commitments, verbal 
compromises, and organisational drift‟ (Tarrow and McAdam, 2005: 146). In a similar vein, 
Tarrow explains his political process of transnational activism as „a short cycle of 
internationally oriented domestic contention or a fusion between international and domestic 
contentious politics‟ (2005: 12). Emphasising the persistent relevance of national political 
dynamics, Tarrow uses the term „rooted cosmopolitans‟ for those activists who are involved 
in transnational activism but also retain national roots (2005: xiii, 29).
28
 This position seems 
to be focused on the effectiveness of social movements. In other words, if collective actions 
against neoliberal globalisation do not produce impacts on policy changes at global level, 
they tend to be interpreted as being limited to local or national movements. This view is 
based on place-boundedness and thus the systemic mechanism between different scales is 
limited to the interactions among activists who are „rooted‟ in national political dynamics and 
make alliances when necessary for mobilisations. This essentialist geographical 
                                           
27 Tarrow (2005) develops this systemic mechanism further in his book, The New Transnational Activism, by 
explaining two local processes (global framing and internalising contention), two transitional ones (diffusion 
and scale shifts) and two global processes (externalising contention and building transnational coalition). 
Detailing the political mechanism of the local and global nexus, Tarrow differentiates three forms of diffusion – 
relational, non-relational and mediated via brokerage – and scale shifts. He explains „diffusion‟ as „the 
emulation of local forms of collective action in other places‟, which „contribute(s) to the spread of contentious 
politics across the globes‟ (2005: 104). Scale shifts were understood not only as a reproduction of repertoire in 
different places, but also as making „new alliances, new targets and change in the foci of claims and perhaps 
even new identities‟ (2005: 121). 
28 According to Tarrow, „rooted cosmopolitans‟ are „people and groups who are rooted in specific national 
contexts, but who engage in contentious political activities that involve them in transnational networks of 
contacts and conflicts‟ (2005: 29). Their ability – which differs from domestic activists – is that they can „shift 
their activities among levels, taking advantage of the expanded nodes of opportunity of a complex international 
society‟ (Tarrow, 2005: 29).  
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understanding arguably draws a line between rooted cosmopolitans and domestic activists, 
especially considering the mobilisation and networking ability and their involvement in 
domestic and transnational politics. On the other hand, rather than focusing on the 
directionality of scale shift – upward or downward – some scholars point out multi-scalar 
strategies for mobilisations. While Escobar retains the importance of politics based on place, 
he also draws on the term „glocal‟, illustrating the interactions among actors at different 
scales. By the glocal, he means „moving towards giving equal attention to the localization of 
the global and the globalisation of the local‟ (2001: 156). In terms of a balanced approach to 
the local and the global, although Escobar places extra attention on the re-evaluation of the 
politics of place, he does not ignore the importance of the political engagement of multiple 
scales within transnational networks. As he puts it: 
 [S]ocial movements and local communities are not just trapped in places, awaiting 
for liberating hand of capital, technology or development to join the networks of 
transnational flow of commodities, images, and the like. In constructing networks 
and glocalities of their own, […] social movements might contribute to democratize 
social relations, contest visions of nature, […] challenge current technoscientific 
hype […] and even suggest that economies can be organized differently from current 
neo-liberal dogmas (2001: 166). 
 
 Apart from scale shift mechanisms, other authors have concentrated on the implications of 
scalar politics in both domestic and transnational politics. When explaining the political 
implications of transnational advocacy networks (TANs) activities, Keck and Sikkink point 
out their „boomerang effects‟ on domestic politics.29 TANs are constructed largely around 
„value-laden‟ issues – human rights, environment, ethnicity or gender. Moreover, actors 
within networks „exchange information and services‟ as well as sharing similar norms and 
values (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 9). Through activists‟ interactions within TANs, boomerang 
effects are produced, especially when the domestic opportunity structure is unfavourable for 
domestic actors to make their claims. Keck and Sikkink argue that: 
 [W]hen channels between the state and its domestic actors are blocked, the 
boomerang pattern of influence characteristic of transnational networks may occur: 
domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly search out international allies to try to 
                                           
29 TANs can be understood as a „fluid and open‟ organisational form of networks across borders among 
„committed and knowledgeable actors working in specialized issue areas‟ in order to „promote causes, principles 
ideas, and norms‟ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 8). 
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pressure on their states from outside… [Therefore,] for the less powerful third world 
actors, networks provide access, leverage, and information (and often money) they 
could not expect to have on their own…On (other) issues where governments are 
inaccessible or deaf to groups whose claims may nonetheless resonate elsewhere, 
international contacts can amplify the demands of domestic groups, pry open space 
for new issues, and then echo back these demands into the domestic arena (1998: 12-
13). 
Social movements theorists explain that although these TANs do not tend to mobilise 
themselves to promote direct actions, they provide domestic activists with resources such as 
information and sometime financial or organisational support. Importantly, the informational 
role played by TANs promotes citizens into action by offering „dramatic testimony‟, e.g. 
regarding human rights abuse, as well as „statistical‟ and „technical‟ information (Keck and 
Sikkink, 1998: 20-21). As these resources and alliances are made available, domestic activists 
can mobilise them to garner political leverage when making claims on their own governments. 
As Nolan posits:  
 [T]he potential to publicize information about rights violations outside the state is an 
important resource for local groups because it helps them get around a domestic 
blockage, thus creating a political opportunity at the transnational or international 
level to garner solidarity, create pressure on state to stop violation, and publicize the 
violation more widely… Transnational allies can provide other types of resources, 
including material resources that allow domestic groups to function as organizations 
or political resources that increase their legitimacy and influence as social 
movements in their home states (2013: 109). 
When developing the „boomerang effect‟ of TANs further, Spalding stresses its impact on the 
domestic political dynamic in her analysis of the anti-mining movement in El Salvador. 
Rather than waiting for international allies for help, she argues that domestic activists use 
these transnational allies strategically as mobilisation resources to push for national policy 
reforms. Spalding terms this as „the domestic loop variation in the boomerang pattern‟: 
„domestic groups use information, material resources, frames, and symbols, some of which 
were constructed through participation in transnational networks, to pressure their own states 
for reform‟ (2013: 26). Likewise, Haarstad and Fløysand, in their analysis of the political 
implications of scalar politics for anti-mining resistance in Peru, point out the importance of 
„the ability to jump scale‟, or „rescaling‟, as „a source of power‟, for marginalised local actors. 
They suggest that, „grassroots organizations and marginalized actors can gain empowerment 
by pressing claims and engaging in social relations at higher spatial scales‟ (2007: 292). In 
other words, local groups who have been marginalised in terms of the domestic power 
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structure could resist the mining project successfully when they made alliances and their 
claims at a higher scale, i.e. rescaling „from below‟.  
 Apart from the implications for domestic political dynamics, the impact of transnational 
activism on international relations is also highlighted. Theorists from the international 
relations field focus on international actors, particularly non-state actors such as international 
non-governmental organisations (INGOs), who facilitate the scale shift between the local and 
the global and their transnational networks (della Porta et al., 1999; Keck and Sikkik, 1998; 
Welch, 2001; Doherty and Doyle, 2013). These scholars have further developed the 
relationship between the emergence of non-state actors and their impact on international 
politics, e.g. the rise of global civil society (GCS) (Taylor, P. 2004; Taylor, R. 2004). Despite 
many arguments and criticisms regarding GCS, liberal IR (international relations) theorists 
point out the positive role of international non-state actors in deepening global democracy. In 
the context of the growing activities of multinational companies and the advances of global 
capital, there were increasing instances of international cooperation and efforts to create 
networks across borders by the late 1970s, particularly concerning issues like human rights, 
the environment and gender (Batliwala, 2004: 76; see also Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Since 
the 1990s this transnational activism has intensified. Especially in the context of the 
retreating of nation-states, non-state actors increased their involvement in international and 
domestic politics. By this time, the power of the IFIs has become increasingly influential and 
development policies across the globe have been determined by the powerful few who were 
not accountable for their decisions despite their unprecedented impact, particularly in the 
Global South. Increasing transnational activism led by non-state actors questions this 
„democratic deficit‟. This is also prompted by the technological development of 
communication and transport, which facilitated interactions and coalitions among non-state 
actors such as INGOs and Transnational Social Movement Organisations (TSMOs) which, it 
is argued, help the emergence of global civil society. In this sense, Kriesberg argues: 
 For a legitimate, egalitarian, and democratic international system to exist, underlying 
pluralistic social groupings must develop. Alexis de Tocqueville … stressed the 
importance of the many public associations in America for the maintenance of 
freedom against tyrannies by the government or by the majority of the people (1997: 
18). 
On the other hand, Tarrow focuses on better conditions for the generation of mobilising 
resources, political opportunities and framing, particularly relating to increased international 
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interactions among intergovernmental, international non-governmental organisations, as well 
as transnational networks. For Tarrow, globalisation has provided threats as well as 
opportunities in political arenas at different scales. He describes an „internationalism‟, which 
„makes the threats of globalization more visible and offers resources, opportunities, and 
alternative targets for transnational activists and their allies to make claims against other 
domestic and external actors‟ (2005: 8-9). International political arenas, it is argued, are not in 
the form of harmonious global civil society (GCS), but rather a field where various actors of 
different positions and levels make interactions (Tarrow, 2005: 28).  
 
Solidarities: Critical Geography and the Politics of Scale 
Despite its systemic explanations and political implications at different levels, the scalar 
approach to political activities across borders has a limited geographical comprehension. As 
Herod and Wright note, scale was conceptualised as „a device for bounding space‟ (2002: 6). 
Describing this conceptualisation of scale, they use a ladder as a metaphor: 
 [a] ladder, where one climbs up the scalar rungs from the local through the regional 
and national to the global, or down these rungs from the global through the national 
and regional to the local. In such a metaphor, the rungs (scales) are connected 
together by the sidepieces of the ladder yet are quite distinct, the one from another – 
each rung is a separate entity, even as each is intimately connected to the other rungs 
to give the whole its structure (2002: 6). 
To put it differently, given this essentialist understanding, scale is a geographically bounded 
concept and thus local acts of resistance are bounded to happen in a local place and 
sometimes establish contacts by jumping scales, upwards or downwards (Featherstone, 2003: 
408). Within this framework, local social groups, particularly indigenous people or peasants, 
are understood as „backward‟ or „powerless‟ and thus they should be „rescaled‟ in order to be 
„empowered‟ and make their claims heard on both a local and global scale. 30  This 
geographical understanding associates power relations „bounded‟ to a certain spatiality and 
sometimes makes transnational connections lose sight of inherent disparity of power. For 
instance, criticising paternalistic forms of solidarity between activists from the global North 
and South, Sundberg points out that activists in the North tend to regard people in the South 
                                           
30 However, as I will argue in Chapter 5 and 6, campesinos and local denizens have played a leading role in 
forging mobilisations in opposition to MYSA‟s mineral extraction.  
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as victims and to advocate on their behalf.
31
 In this way, existing power asymmetry between 
North and South is bounded in order to be repeated within transnational networks and thus 
subaltern actors in the South are described as passive recipients of support and solidarity 
(Sundberg, 2007: 160). The outcome, Sundberg holds, is in that: „[T]he geometries of power 
and geopolitical identities stemming from conventional models of solidarity naturalize 
divisions between North and South and, ultimately work to sustain empire as a way of life‟ 
(2007:161; see also Featherstone, 2012: 232-233). Furthermore, the limitation of this 
geographical understanding is that histories of social relations hidden in a place tend to be 
ignored. Organisational forms of collective actions in the past are regarded as differing from 
those in the present by emphasising the newness of today‟s organisations as small, local, 
diverse and fragmented. In consequence, it becomes difficult to imagine or explain the 
interconnectedness between unlike actors. For instance, the relatively recent emergence of 
environmental or identity politics tends to be interpreted as „post-materialist‟ movements 
which are mainly associated with INGOs in the Global North.
 
 
 Within a relational geographical framework, however, what distinguishes one place from 
another is the „accumulated history of a place‟ (Massey, 1993: 68). For Massey, as mentioned 
above, history in a place is not something relegated as a forgotten past, rather it has been 
produced by a complex articulation of social interactions at different levels. In other words, a 
particular location contains a history of social relations being „stretched out‟ over time and 
becomes an integral part of present acts of resistance by means of subaltern agency in the 
place.
 32
 When analysing the Salvadoran anti-mining movement that occurred at the apex of 
post-civil war neoliberal globalisation across Central America, it is useful to demonstrate 
historical experience‟s contribution to contemporary local resistance. In explaining the 
                                           
31 As will be seen in the anti-Conga movement, the networked forms of resistance in Cajamarca were not 
synonymous to making alliances between powerless local campesinos, who were negatively affected by the 
multinational capital (MYSA), and NGOs in the North, which have resource abundance. Instead, this connection, 
which I have termed counter-extractive networks (CENs), was built around various actors in order to contest 
grievances caused by the MYSA‟s neoliberal form of mineral extraction, thereby reformulating new rural 
subjectivities (see Chapter 6).  
32 Echoing Massey‟s position, in Chapter 5 I will demonstrate that the main participants in the anti-Conga 
movement were an integral part of the rural political dynamics in Cajamarca in the past. In particular, the 
nightwatch patrol (rondas campesinas) and the loosely formed trans-local networks accumulated in protest 
against the multinational mining company have laid the ground for the emergence of the anti-Conga movement. 
From this relational geographical understanding, the connections between seemingly dissimilar actors, 
(campesinos and urban-based NGOs) can be explained and consequently their mobilisations cannot be defined 
as a post-materialist environmental movement. 
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transnational networks constructed for this local anti-mining struggle, Spalding argues that 
international alliances „built on and expanded beyond an earlier phase of struggle and 
activism during the revolutionary conflict in the 1980s‟ (2013: 28). Central American 
countries share histories such as the civil wars of the 1980s and the spilling over of violence 
into neighbouring countries, as well as a peace-building process. This facilitated the 
networking of human rights groups across and beyond the region (Spalding, 2013: 31-32). In 
addition, Salvadoran wartime refugees, according to Spalding, „built grassroots, binational 
ties‟ with communities in neighbouring Honduras, which „left behind a layer of cross-border 
connections on which future alliances could be built‟ (2013: 30). These previous trans-local, 
trans-regional and trans-national ties became an integral part of the Salvadoran anti-mining 
resistance. In particular, cross-border wartime ties created a space for the exchange of 
information and experiences when Salvadoran anti-mining activists visited a Honduran 
community which had already experienced negative impacts from mining activities. These 
bilateral interactions against mineral extraction expanded to Guatemala via networks and 
alliances. As Spalding explains, „these links were reinforced by the cross-border migration of 
gold mine and of mine waste flowing through interconnected water systems passing 
inexorably across national borders‟ (2013: 31). Apart from these networks, the previous 
existence of environmentalists organised around water rights in the place helped the 
identification of water issues in terms of their quantity and quality (Spalding, 2013: 29). 
Furthermore, despite the weakened influence of the Catholic Church, and of liberation 
theology in particular, during the civil war period, church leaders played an important role in 
the anti-mining mobilisation.
33
 The case of the Salvadoran anti-mining protest therefore 
demonstrates how the history of the articulation of social relations at different spatialities 
generated subaltern agency for networked local resistance.
34
 As Featherstone notes, 
„subaltern spaces of politics… have been closed down by pervasive tendencies to counterpose 
a dynamic networked present to a more settled past‟ and „to define the dynamism of neo-
liberal globalization against settled and bounded forms of subaltern political activity‟ (2008: 
178). 
 Political activities via scale shift are also understood as a strategic aggregation of common 
interests at a different scale. A critical geographical approach understands it as „the 
                                           
33 For more on networked forms of resistance, including the role of Catholic Church, against mineral extraction, 
see „counter-extractive networks‟ in Chapter 6. 
34 For more on the interconnectedness accumulated from previous experiences, see Chapters 5 and 6. 
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productive relations between space and political activity, through bringing into contestation 
different geographies of power‟ (Featherstone, 2008: 158). Featherstone introduces 
„networked forms of resistance‟ and suggests a progressive concept of solidarity in any 
understanding of transnational political activities, rather than being reduced to the „rigidities 
of scalar accounts‟ (2008: 157). Local acts of resistance could form a loose form of network 
around „maps of grievance‟, instead of constructing a transnational movement by jumping 
scales and drawing on global framing grievances strategically. In his relational understanding 
of „militant particularisms‟, Featherstone explains the political possibilities of this networked 
form of resistance which can open subaltern political spaces. He adopts a critical stance on 
Harvey‟s interpretation of Williams‟s „militant particularisms‟ as „essentially bounded forms 
of political activity‟, which are „formed and then networked‟, as understood from the 
perspective of scalar politics (2005: 252). Instead, he positions them as „the ongoing products 
of the diverse routes and connections that make up subaltern space of politics‟ (2005: 252). In 
order to conceptualise „prefigurative solidarity‟, Featherstone grounds his interpretation on 
Gramsci‟s political analysis. According to Featherstone, Gramsci did not regard subaltern 
actors as bounded to a certain spatiality and thus left powerless. Rather, he used a relational 
geographical understanding and noted the generative linkages constructed among subaltern 
agencies across different places (Featherstone, 2012: 26). In this way, Gramsci theorised 
relational spatial articulations and thus „solidarity as part of the conduct of political activity 
and struggle‟ (Featherstone, 2012: 28). This position differs from Lenin‟s explanation of 
class-based alliance making, e.g., between the proletariat and the peasantry. Since each 
subaltern group has „fixed and static interests‟ and is distinctively placed, connections and 
solidarities tend to be made by a third party such as the „vanguard party‟, which was 
„envisioned simply as a strategic means to the greater end of the revolution‟ (Featherstone, 
2012: 27). However, subaltern actors do not have a unitary political identity bounded to a 
given spatiality and tend to make more creative geographical linkages forged for the purposes 
of progressive political projects.  
 Based on a Gramscian theoretical perspective, Featherstone suggests prefigurative 
conceptualisation of solidarity as a networked form of resistances, which is not based on 
„common ideology‟ but on linkages among different struggles constructed around „common 
target‟ (2012). It is a creative geographical generation of relations, i.e. „unruly flows of social 
relations‟, through political activities against the transnational power relations of neoliberal 
globalisation. Featherstone claims this solidarity making is progressive political practices, i.e. 
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the creation of „geographies of power in antagonistic ways‟, by bringing neoliberal 
globalisation into „contestation and political debate‟ (2003: 405, 409). Here solidarity is not 
merely limited to „the coming together of actors with common interests or understanding‟ or 
to alliances between actors with altruistic intentions mostly in the Global North and 
marginalised masses in the South (Featherstone, 2008: 157). Rather than unilateral empathy 
flowing from North to South, often based on resource-abundant NGOs‟ goodwill by 
providing information of the affected in the South to sympathetic listeners in the North, 
alliances are constructed among actors with diverse political trajectories in different places, 
both in the North and South, around „common enemies‟ (Featherstone, 2003: 406). As a result, 
it becomes possible to make solidarities between unlike actors, moving beyond divisions 
between rural and urban and between labour unions and environmental NGOs, in order to 
contest neoliberal globalisation in a progressive way. In sum, „[S]olidarities are not produced 
on a smooth surface between discretely bounded struggles, but rather are part of ongoing 
connections, relations and articulations between places‟ (Featherstone, 2008: 44).  
 Solidarities between different struggles are constructed through political activities. As 
Featherstone points out, solidarities are generated „through a politics of identification on the 
basis of shared practices of resistance against common enemies‟ (Featherstone, 2008: 162, 
emphasis on the original). To put it differently, the construction of solidarities are constantly 
made by collective political practices which distinctively placed activists and groups in 
transnational power-geometry articulated by locating „sites of grievance‟ (Featherstone, 2003: 
410). Rather than collective actions being articulated by pre-existing organisations or 
networks possessing a unitary political will and solidarities based on common interests, 
political practices are articulated in a place where different social relations converge as an on-
going process (Featherstone, 2008: 174). Routledge et al. explain that the meeting up of 
diverse social relations in place-based political activities „provide performative spaces that 
play a vital role in face-to-face communication and exchange of experience, strategies and 
ideas‟ (2006: 846).35 Solidarities are consequently forged via collective political activities, 
„constituted through unruly patterns of flow and alliances and formed through antagonistic 
relations to dominant ways of generating globalization‟ (Featherstone, 2008: 22, emphasis in 
the original). From this perspective, the network is not prefigured, rather it is a product of 
                                           
35 Routledge explains that „these places become [different] articulated moments in the activity of grassroots 
globalization networks where opposition to neoliberalism as well as alternative visions are articulated‟ (2003: 
342). 
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ongoing interactions of social relations. Networked forms of opposition are constructed 
through political activities converged in a place, through which participants share collective 
experiences and forge solidarities. This accumulation of interactions can facilitate activists 
coordinating further collective actions. In addition, providing a space for the connections and 
interactions of different social groups can both „reconfigure local political identities‟ and 
„change on the terms on which maps of grievance […] are constructed‟ (Featherstone, 2008: 
35, 55).
36
  Rather than positing that transnational movements are generated through 
coordination between SMOs in different places by sharing strategic frames around similar 
grievances and targeting common enemies, Featherstone highlights geographical connections 
among different resistances depending on how grievances are experienced and demonstrates 
diverse forms of political activities in „sites of grievances‟. Through this networked form of 
politics, it is possible „to make visible and contestable‟ the power relations of neoliberal 
globalisation and „opened up political spaces for the possibility of generating globalization in 
other ways‟ (Featherstone, 2008: 134-135). 
 
Political Identity Construction 
Political identities of resistance can be constructed depending on how solidarities are 
articulated within trans-local networks around „maps of grievance‟. Identity construction is 
made possible via networked subaltern politics, by bringing geographies of power relations 
into contestation. In explaining the political identity construction of a working-class 
community in South Wales and adopting a critical approach to essentialist „militant 
particularism‟, Featherstone argues:  
 Rather than being the already constituted building blocks of wider struggles, place-
based political identities can be reconfigured and intensified through these political 
activities. The formation of militant working-class communities in South Wales was 
not […] something emerged out of bounded communities, but was something that 
was the product of connections which brought together different experiences of 
activity and assertive political identities. The formation of subaltern political agency 
and identity through place-based struggles was directly related to the ongoing and 
                                           
36 I will develop the „networked forms of resistance‟ of the anti-Conga movement in Chapters 5 and 6, which I 
term „counter-extractive networks‟ (CENs). Following the Featherstone‟s reflection on „prefigurative solidarity‟, 
I will demonstrate that the CENs were in the ongoing process of construction of solidarities among various 
actors around the „maps of grievance‟, which also played an important role in forging more political activities 
(see Chapter 6). 
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productive negotiation of such connections (2008: 34). 
In a political space opened up through political activities, social groups with different 
histories and identities make continuous interactions, enabling previously unexpected 
solidarities are constructed between unlike actors. This dynamic interaction and connection is 
associated with the construction of political identities. For example, contemporary 
transnational agrarian movements, such as Vía Campesina, connected previously disparate 
subaltern actors, e.g. peasants and environmentalists, by calling into question the global food 
regime. In explaining an „agrarian question of food‟, McMichael points out that 
contemporary peasant movements are not limited to „a conservative back-up role in the class 
politics of capitalist modernity‟, rather they are „against the accumulation imperative‟ (2008: 
210). The transnational solidarities between peasants and other social justice activists were 
made via transnational political activities against the global food regime. These include 
resistance against biotechnology (and its use for the production of agro-fuels and GM food), 
export-led agriculture, as well as its devastating social and ecological impacts – exodus and 
the de-peasantisation of rural populations, declining access to resources, monoculture and its 
impact on biodiversity, and environmental contamination, among others.
37
 Such interactions 
and connections forged via political practice, resulted in the process of constructing „food 
sovereignty‟ against „food security‟, which called into question neoliberal policies that 
„encloses questions of social reproduction within a legitimating rhetoric of feeding the world‟ 
(McMichael, 2008: 216, emphasis in original).
38
 Building networked geographies of 
opposition opened up „a political space‟ for the construction of „food sovereignty‟, „an 
emerging ontology‟ which is „grounded in a process of revaluing agriculture, rurality and 
food as essential to general social and ecological sustainability‟ (McMichael, 2008: 213). The 
emergence of food sovereignty as a political identity occurred in a space opened for 
„dialectical negotiation between agriculture, state, and society‟ (Wittman, 2013: 179). As 
McMichael argues, „[T]his is a politics that, in rejecting the uniform vision of capitalist 
modernity and the singular liberal subject, articulates distinct social, cultural and ecological 
                                           
37 This global corporate food regime produces policies like „market-led land reforms and WTO trade rules that 
facilitated targeting Southern markets with artificially cheapened food surplus from the North‟ (McMichael, 
2008: 209). Movements against this regime argued that this policy reform has been promoted by IFIs, and the 
WTO in particular, „dictated by the interests of large traditional companies and superpowers‟, including agro-
industry multinationals (McMichael, 2008: 211). 
38 Similarly, the environmental justice political identity of the anti-Conga movement was constructed in the 
process of oppositional political activism within CENs contesting neoliberal forms of mineral extraction (see 
Chapter 6). 
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realities as part of a complex movement in process‟ (2008: 224). 
 This is not to say that the smooth construction of political identity happens at a higher 
scale. Political alliances among diverse social groups sometimes generate tensions and 
contradictions as they are distinctively located in the power-geometry of globalisation. As 
Featherstone suggests, „transnational organizing practices have brought activists from 
markedly different political traditions and trajectories. Such trajectories have not produced 
smooth articulations, but rather have often been articulated on profoundly unequal terms‟ 
(2012: 202). In explaining the existence of multiple identities within the resistance contesting 
for regional autonomy in the Bolivian lowlands, Tarija, Bebbington and Humphreys argue 
that it is erroneous to regard regional conflict as being solely „orchestrated by racist regional 
elites‟ (2010b: 140). Rather, there exist multiple identities embedded in the power-geometry 
of hydrocarbon extraction. In this sense, the construction of political identity is an ongoing 
process of negotiation and contradiction among social groups of different geographies and 
histories (Featherstone, 2008: 135-139).  
 Despite tensions and contradictions, geographies of connections and interactions and the 
process of political identity construction have some political implications. In accounting for 
the significance of the ICC (Inter-Continental Caravan)
39
, Featherstone points out: 
 [T]he bringing together of different activists cultures was a process that was 
generative of debate, negotiation and contestation rather than a simple coming 
together of homogeneous action or pre-existing political wills… [In this way], 
intersections and alliances can be integral to kinds of political identities and 
alternative political imaginaries they articulate. These connections rather than just 
generating a larger movement can also produce the unsettling and transformation of 
identities which Laclau and Mouffe envisioned by the term equivalences. To this 
extent counter-globalization movements can usefully be thought of as engaging in 
forms of „collective experimentation‟ that are antagonistic to the collective 
experiments orchestrated by neo-liberalism (Featherstone, 2003: 416-417). 
In this way, what Fraser termed „subaltern counter-publics‟ can be created in which 
solidarities are articulated and political identities are constructed. These spaces are where 
„parallel discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate 
counterdiscourses, so as to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests 
                                           
39 The Inter-Continental Caravan (ICC) is „an ambitious project which united activists from the Indian New 
Farmers Movements with West European green activists in contesting neo-liberal institutions and biotechnology‟ 
(Featherstone, 2008: 150). 
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and needs‟ (Fraser, 1990: 67). By engaging in various political acts of resistance, different 
social groups problematise the dominant meanings of neoliberal globalisation and articulate 
political identities with negotiations and tensions. This is significant in terms of deepening 
democracy in Latin America. Rather than being reduced to a limited practice of liberal 
democracy which is mainly concentrated on the institutionalisation of politics, it extends the 
scope of the political by bringing pre-determined and naturalised dominant meanings of 
development and politics into contestation. 
 
2.3. Conclusion 
„Time-space compression‟ is a term coined by David Harvey, whose spatio-temporal 
understanding is based on Marx‟s notions of capitalist accumulation and its inherent crisis. 
According to Harvey, the 1970s capitalist crisis introduced a new form of accumulation, i.e. 
accumulation by dispossession (ABD), with policy designs supported by IFIs and global 
capital. In particular, neoliberal extractivism has taken the form of ABD. In the case of Latin 
America, the implementation of SAPs in the 1980s and a market-oriented development model 
introduced foreign investors – particularly in extractive industries – at an unprecedented pace. 
This neoliberal extractivism across various sectors had strong support from governments in 
Latin America, regardless of their political orientation, and has produced various acts of local 
resistance across the continent. 
 Against this backdrop, there has been growing academic attention to transnational 
activism against neoliberal globalisation and the focus has been largely devoted to local 
resistances or to the local-global nexus. Theorists like Harvey, as well as Hardt and Negri, 
emphasise the limitations of place-based resistance as reactionary responses to the advances 
of time-space compression. Within essentialist geographical frameworks, they interpret local 
resistance based on a place as bounded within identity or tradition. Harvey regards them as 
„post-modern‟ acts of resistance against ABD, which should be scaled up to the level of 
global capital in order not to be co-opted or marginalised into fragmented local struggles. 
This geographical understanding also tends to foreclose political possibilities, as power is 
considered as equated with domination within a dualistic geographical framework rather than 
„entangled‟ with social relations. Instead, Massey suggests a relational understanding of the 
spatial in which social ties are „stretched out‟, and imbued with power relations and meanings. 
From this perspective, she understands „place‟ as constructed through the interactions of 
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various social relations articulated in a particular location. In a similar way, the global can be 
understood as an integral part of constructing the local.  
 Other scholars have given more attention to the dynamics of place-based resistance, by 
focusing on connections and interactions among activists both in terms of the local and the 
global. In particular, social movement theorists analyse the „why‟ and „how‟ of transnational 
social movements based on interpretive frames, mobilisation resources and political 
opportunity structures, both locally and globally. When it comes to the dynamics of activists‟ 
interactions and connections, these scholars adopt a scalar approach which focuses on the 
systemic mechanism of scale shift and its domestic and international political implications, 
such as „boomerang effects‟ and empowerment. In order to overcome the limitations of place-
boundedness, I draw on David Featherstone‟s theoretical reflection derived from critical 
geography‟s analysis of transnational activism. Rather than understanding transnational 
activism as a product of an accumulated aggregation of strategic interests and as scale-
jumping of local resistance, he focuses on „networked forms of opposition‟ against neoliberal 
globalisation, which are constructed though political activities converged in a place, through 
which activists share collective experiences and forge solidarities. Through this process, 
political identities are constructed depending on how solidarities are articulated in trans-local 
networks around „maps of grievance‟. In this way, these networked forms of opposition can 
bring neoliberal globalization to the terrain of contestation by opening up various spatialities 
of subaltern agency.  
 Based on this theoretical framework, the following two chapters will elucidate political 
and economic conditions of marginalisation and exploitation of subaltern groups in Peru 
under state-led developmentalism and its intensification and dispossession under market-led 
developmental model. However, rather than resting with the uneven patterns of development 
and pessimism of „fragmented‟ subaltern actors, the latter two case study chapters will 
examine the re-articulation of new subaltern subjectivities and their political dynamics of 
resistance in the rural highlands of northern Peru, which has long been marginalised in the 
country‟s history. Accordingly, Chapter 3 will examine political and economic origins of 
neoliberalism and „democratic deficit‟ since the second half of twentieth century. It will also 
explore the implementation of market-led development reform under authoritarian regime. 
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Chapter 3 
Contemporary Political and Economic Roots  
of Marginalisation and Dispossession in Peru 
  
 
A recently published book on Peruvian democracy by Crabtree et al. (2011), titled Fractured 
Politics: Peruvian Democracy Past and Present, examines the historical roots of the Peruvian 
„democratic deficit‟ and the limitations of reform efforts in the post-Fujimori period. After a 
decade-long authoritarian rule under Fujimori, efforts have been made to establish a more 
responsive and participatory democracy, such as the Law of Decentralisation (Ley de Bases 
de la Decentralización (Law No. 27783), enacted in 2002) and the Law of Political Parties 
(Ley de Partidos Políticos (Law No. 28094), enacted in 2003). However, democratic 
institutions, including political parties and Congress, as well as politicians, seem to fail to 
gain trust both at the ballot box and in society in general. The post-2000s electoral results 
continued to show a stark contrast between affluent coastal areas, on the one hand, and 
(politically, economically and socially) marginalised highlands and jungle regions, on the 
other, particularly regarding a dissimilar position on neoliberal policies, which had produced 
unequal distribution of benefits among the population (Crabtree, 2010: 380). However, rather 
than strengthening the political party system or developing grassroots organisations to 
represent the latter part of the population, the general electoral tendency continues to 
demonstrate dependency on prominent political figures. These candidates emphasise social 
inclusion and a sustainable model of national development, favourable to a majority of the 
population. In contrast, Peruvian macro-economic policies in the post-2000s have not shown 
a great difference from those under the Fujimori regime. One of the consequences is the low 
level of popular trust of democratic institutions, as well as high electoral volatility and 
subsequent political instability (see Latinobarómetro Report, 2010). Despite the institutional 
reform for developing the political party system, „most parties are little more than personal 
groupings with scant institutional life except at times of elections. They have virtually no 
structured existence over much of the country [… and] therefore fail to act as a channel for 
public participation in the decision-making processes of the state‟ (Crabtree, 2010: 359). 
Regarding the decentralisation, a slow pace and the lack of political will to institutionalise 
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sub-national administrative agencies obstructes opening up participatory political channels. 
Against this backdrop, the gap between the state and society has widened. 
 Faced with the unprecedented impact of neoliberal globalisation, the last three decades 
have seen increasing socio-political responses across Latin America. In Peru, neoliberal 
restructuring programmes were implemented with little opposition during the 1990s. 
Moreover, the Peruvian case was exceptional in that political and social activism was 
comparatively less visible in the following decades, despite the orthodox form of neoliberal 
reform. There was no Peruvian PT (Workers‟ Party) or MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) 
which led or developed from social movements. Neither did indigenous people gain 
prominence as important political actors as in the case of Zapatista‟ uprising and CONAIE. 
This does not mean that there were no social responses to neoliberal globalisation. Rather, 
there was little political coordination so as to develop a political party or grassroots 
organisations to represent the marginalised population. Additionally, while dealing with 
socio-economic inequality and poverty, one of the main demands of the majority of the 
population, has become a priority for politicians during election campaigns, it did not seem to 
find a solution within democratic institutions. Consequently, the last decade saw increasing 
social protests across the country concerning „such issues as privatisation, coca eradication, 
mining development, the defence of local interests, the land rights of indigenous peoples in 
the Amazon, and so on‟ (Crabtree, 2010: 376). Sometimes, they turned violent with little 
possibility to find a politically mediated answer. 
 In this context, this chapter aims to examine the political and economic origins of 
marginalisation of subaltern groups in the second half of the twentieth century and its 
intensification and dispossession in the context of neoliberal reform and „democratic deficit‟ 
in the 1990s. For this purpose, three main issues will be examined first: the mixed results of 
state capitalism; the limitations of the Peruvian Left; and the mismanagement of democratic 
governments in the 1980s. The last section will be dedicated to the implementation and 
impact of economic reform under authoritarian rule in the 1990s. 
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3.1. From Mobilisation to Transition  
Rural Change and the Leftist Activism 
Uneven capitalist development and import-substitution industrialisation endorsed in 1959 and 
its adverse impacts on agriculture resulted in increasing demands for social change in the late 
1950s and 1960s, particularly in the rural highlands.
40
 State policies (domestic currency 
devaluation; price control on food products and subsidy for food imports, measures that were 
unfavourable for rural producers) were intended to provide cheap food for the industrial 
labour force and to increase the purchasing power of the middle class (Kay, 1982: 147). In 
particular, the new encroachment of the landed oligarchy into peasant communities, as well 
as population growth, led to more demand for land in the countryside. Consequently, the mid-
twentieth century saw an escalating rural unrest in the highlands, raising concerns for the 
ruling class, including rural landowners. Pressure for land reform could not be ignored any 
longer and the military junta responded to peasant mobilisations in the La Convención and 
Lares valley by applying agrarian reform to this limited zone in 1962 (Petras and La Porte, 
1971; Blanco, 1972).  
 In the face of social transformation and growing social unrest, the ruling oligarchy ended a 
long acrimonious relationship with the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (Alianza 
Popular Revolucionaria Americana, APRA) and permitted a partial incorporation of the party 
into the political system in exchange for support for the government in 1956, a period called 
convivencia. APRA, Peru‟s oldest political party, has been an important player in the 
country‟s political scene since its foundation by Víctor Haya de la Torre in March 1931.41 
During the 1930s, it entered into fierce competition with the Peruvian Socialist Party, led by 
José Carlos Mariátegui, and emerged as the main organisation following Mariátegui‟s death 
at the age of 36. It had long been a hegemonic party among popular sectors with its anti-
oligarchy and nationalist rhetoric. However, its political activities had been declared illegal 
and obstructed by the military and the oligarchy since the Trujillo uprising in 1932, 
stimulated by claim of electoral fraud, with the exception of several years under the 
Bustamente y Rivero regime (1945-1948). Consequently, its incorporation into the main 
political system had become APRA‟s foremost objective over more than twenty years of 
                                           
40 Due to the space constraints, rural migration, urbanisation and subsequent cholificación will not be treated 
here (see Matos Mar 2004; Albó, 2004; Burt 2006; and Paredes 2011). 
41 For more on APRA, see Klarén (1976). 
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clandestine activities, while suffering official repression. However, its adoption of a 
conservative stance in the mid-1950s lost a significant opportunity to gain mass support and 
to consolidate itself as a genuine hegemonic party among the popular classes, thus 
overcoming its northern and urban bias.
42
 
 The domestic context was changing in line with international events – the Sino-Soviet split 
and the Cuban Revolution in 1959 – which influenced the rise of a variety of leftist groups in 
Peru in the 1960s, including Maoists, Trotskyists, and Guevarists. First, dissatisfied with the 
party leadership‟s accommodation with the oligarchy, APRA‟s youth wing created the APRA 
Rebelde led by Luis de la Puente at the party‟s sixth national convention in 1959, after which 
the Movement of Revolutionary Left (Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria, MIR) was 
founded in 1961 (González, 2011: 21). On 5 June 1965, MIR and the Army of National 
Liberation (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN), influenced by the Cuban experience and 
its foco tactics, launched guerrilla movements in the central and southern highlands, only 
being defeated by state repression within six months. Alongside the Belaunde government‟s 
(1963-1968) suppression, these guerrilleros, who were largely of urban middle class origin, 
lacked an appropriate understanding of rural conditions. More importantly, peasants had 
already become an important subjectivity on the political scene during their successful and 
organised demands for land during the period 1956 to 1964. However, the MIR and ELN did 
not fully appreciate their political power and regarded them as playing only a secondary role 
in the revolutionary struggle against state power. As a result, the gap between the peasantry 
and guerrilleros in terms of political objectives as well as tactics did not facilitate a repetition 
of the Cuban experience in Peru. With this failure, many leftist groups were seriously 
weakened as their leaders were imprisoned or killed. As Giesecke explains, the Shining 
Path‟s armed struggle in the 1980s and 1990s is partially reminiscent of the failure of the 
earlier guerrilla movements with little understanding of rural conditions and disrespect for the 
peasants as political actors (2008: 142).  
 In the meantime, international communism‟s division between Moscow and Beijing in the 
1960s had influenced local fragmentation – either pro-China or pro-Soviet – and the decade 
saw the rising influence of Maoism within the Peruvian Communist Party (Partido 
Comunista del Perú, PCP). One of the main reasons for the PCP division was ideological 
                                           
42 As will be seen in Chapter 5, APRA maintained a strong support base in Cajamarca due to the department‟s 
connectedness with the northern coast, where the party had originated. 
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dogmatism, particularly concerning the pace of revolution. Differing with the central 
committee‟s revisionist stance and sympathising with Maoist emphasis on the role of the 
peasantry, a pro-China faction led by José Sotomayor, Santurnino Paredes and Manuel Soria 
split from the PCP (the rest of the PCP, the pro-Soviet faction, will be called PCP-Unidad or 
PCP-U) and created the PCP-Red Flag (PCP-Bandera Roja, PCP-BR) in alliance with the 
secretary general of the PCP‟s youth group (Juventud Comunista) in 1964 (Navarro, 2010: 
156-7). However, a fissure within the leadership was made public in the midst of open 
conflict between the secretary general, Santurnino Paredes, and the Ching Kang group 
supporters who opposed Paredes‟ Maoist dogmatism in 1967. The latter created the PCP-Red 
Homeland (PCP-Patria Roja, PCP-PR) in 1969 (Navarro, 2010: 162-3). Finally, Abimael 
Guzmán split the PCP-BR again and founded the PCP-Shining Path (PCP-Sendero Luminoso, 
PCP-SL) in 1970, before its launch of the „prolonged people‟s war‟ in 1980.  
 Alongside the Maoist groups, Hugo Blanco, a Trotskyist peasant leader, became one of the 
left‟s leading protagonists when he ranked in third place in the Constituent Assembly 
elections in 1978, despite the faction‟s relative weakness in Peru. His role in peasant 
struggles in the La Convención valley led to this electoral success. During the 1960s, so-
called New Left groups, neither aligned to the Soviet Union or to China, came to the fore, 
starting with the MIR in 1961. The Revolutionary Vanguard (Vanguardia Revolucionaria, 
VR), founded in 1965, is one prominent example and it was led by Ricardo Letts (originally 
from Acción Popular), Edmundo Murrugarra (from PCP) and Ricardo Napurí (Trotskyist and 
from MIR) (González, 2011: 23-4).
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 VR became an important component of the Unified 
Mariateguist Party (Partido Unificado Mariateguista, PUM). As it will be seen later, the 
PUM was founded in 1984 and grew to become an intergral part of the United Left (Izquierda 
Unida, IU). Despite the increasing political activism of various leftist groups, the 
fragmentation of the PCP represented an important characteristic of the Peruvian Left: i.e., 
orthodox dogmatism and factionalism, which laid ground for a division between party leaders, 
as well as between the leadership and the rank-and-file. This influenced the misunderstanding 
of rural reality, causing the party leaders‟ differing revolutionary goals and tactics vis-à-vis 
the peasantry, a reason for the failure of both the intellectual-led guerrilla movement in the 
mid-1960s and the PCP-SL‟s two decades later.  
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 VR had its root in „intellectual study circles and the university student movement‟ and included ideologically 
diverse groups (Roberts, 1998: 207). 
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Military Reformism and Transition to Democracy 
Scholars have offered various explanations for the rise of the Revolutionary Government of 
the Armed Forces (RGAF) (1968-1980) (Cotler, 1978; McClintock and Lowenthal, 1983; 
Booth and Sorj, 1983; Gorman, 1982; Kay, 1985). Long-term and short-term accounts can be 
given for the „Peruvian Revolution‟ in the late 1960s and 1970s. Over the first half of the 
twentieth century, the Peruvian economy was dominated by export-led growth, particularly 
agricultural produce (sugar, cotton) – and natural resources (copper and oil) – which foreign 
capital and the landed oligarchy dominated. By the 1960s, however, exports of commodities 
declined due to the lack of new investment and partially due to resource constraints (Cotler, 
1983: 41; see also Thorp and Bertram, 1978). In the meantime, import-substitution 
industrialisation started comparatively late in Peru and thus the domestic industrial 
bourgeoisie was weak. While traditional exports were in decline, chipping away at the 
oligarchical power base, newly emerging bourgeois groups did not have enough power to 
undertake the reform needed for industrialisation (Kay, 1985: 153). At this juncture of 
structural crisis, „the crisis of hegemony‟ among the ruling class became obvious in face of 
increasing social pressure (Kay, 1985: 153; see also Quijano, 1971). The 1963 election of 
Belaunde, with his reformist Popular Action party (Acción Popular, AP), and his, reformist 
efforts, such as agrarian reform and the nationalisation of the International Petroleum 
Company, were only obstructed by the conservative APRA-Odría coalition in Congress, 
leading to the military‟s intervention. In the meantime, the short-term explanation is largely 
based on officers‟ class, their ethnic, geographical and educational background; and their 
previous experiences. While the Peruvian military had been a firm guarantor of ruling class 
interests, signs of change appeared in the 1960s. Their participation in controlling rural unrest 
in the highlands raised awareness of the urgent need for agrarian reform as well as other 
changes. Additionally, the poverty and marginalisation of „deep Peru‟ („Perú profundo‟) were 
reminiscent of their own humble socio-economic and provincial backgrounds. The education 
provided to officers in the Centre for High Military Studies (Centro de Altos Estudios 
Militares, CAEM) played an important role in providing them with „the critical analysis of 
Peru‟s social and political problems‟ (McClintock, 1999: 322-3).  
 Against this backdrop, the RGAF pursued „the broader goals of national development‟ by 
implementing nationalist and anti-oligarchy reform, hoping to promote „political stability‟ by 
incorporating the popular sectors „from above‟ and establishing a support base for the regime 
(Gorman, 1982: 2). Due to constraints of space, here it suffices to mention briefly one of the 
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major reform programmes and its limited results: the agrarian reform.
44
 The Velasco 
government proclaimed the Agrarian Reform Law in 1969. Its principal political and 
economic objectives were: „increas[ing] the agricultural marketable surplus for the rapidly 
growing urban centres as well as expanding the internal market for the incipient local 
industry [and incorporating] the peasantry into the political system under the tutelage of the 
State‟ (Kay, 1982: 149). Reform was mainly applied to two different geographical areas: the 
coast and the highlands. The reformed sector was organised into cooperative enterprises: 
Agrarian Production Cooperatives (Cooperativas Agrarias de Producción, CAPs), 
Agricultural Societies of Social Interest (Sociedades Agrícolas de Interés Social, SAIS), and 
Peasant Groups (Grupos Campesinos) or Communal Cooperatives (Cooperativas Comunales) 
(Kay, 1982; McClintock, 1982). Although this agrarian reform was considered to be one of 
the most radical in the region, ending the existing oligarchic order, it had rather mixed 
consequences.
45
 In contrast to a small minority of ex-hacienda workers, the majority of poor 
peasants were largely marginalised from reform benefits due to the persistence of government 
policies favourable to capital-intensive export agriculture and the relatively slow pace of the 
reform process in the highlands, among others (although the result varies from region to 
region). Better access to pasture and „the end of some feudalistic services to hacendados 
[landowners]‟ were partial benefits for poor peasants from communities or landless 
temporary workers (McClintock, 1982: 140). In addition, state control over decision-making 
within the cooperative enterprises concerning „land use, employment, wages and managerial 
nominations‟ did not produce positive results to agricultural development and quelling rural 
unrest (Kay, 1982: 155). Accordingly, Kay considers the Peruvian agrarian reform as taking 
the „State capitalist road‟ in that, despite the organisation of collective nature and the 
government‟s rhetoric, these enterprises were actually controlled by „the State‟ (1982: 165-
166). When economic conditions became increasingly negative during the second phase of 
the RGAF, poor peasants started organising in response to the slow reform pace and the 
government authorities‟ control. They actively participated in land invasions and also 
engaged in anti-government mobilisations in the late 1970s in an alliance with trade unions 
and other popular organisations.
46
 As Paredes notes, „[T]he unresolved struggle over land… 
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 For more on various reform programmes, see Schydlowsky and Wicht (1983). More details on the agrarian 
reform can be also found in Kay (1982) and Mayer (2009).  
45
 Nearly 39 per cent of the land (8.6 million hectares) and about 8 per cent of livestock (2.2 million head) were 
distributed to almost 390,684 peasants by 1980 (Hunefeldt, 1997: 110). 
46 For more on land invasions, see Sánchez (1979) and García-Sayán (1982).  
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led peasants in the southern highlands to strengthen their ties with parties of the left‟, 
particularly VR which had sent their militants in order to work with peasants since 1970s 
(2011: 138-139). In organising the peasantry, party affiliates introduced traditional party 
structure led by cadres, which was „adopted willingly by peasants in the context of increasing 
confrontation with the state… Moreover, land seizures were tactically demanding operations, 
involving the sort of vertical, semi-military organisation introduced by left-wing militants‟ 
(Paredes, 2011: 140-141). 
 Another aspect of the „Peruvian experiment‟ included corporatist social mobilisation 
which was intended to allay social unrest by providing state benefits. In fact, the 
implementation of mobilisation policies was less coherent than that of economic reform due 
to the lack of consensus over its ultimate goal within the military government (Mauceri, 1997: 
17). The government created the National Support System for Social Mobilisation (Sistema 
National de Apoyo a la Movilización Social, SINAMOS) in 1971. Before the mid-1960s, 
labour unions were predominantly controlled by the APRA-led Confederation of the Peruvian 
Workers (Confederación de Trabajadores Peruanos, CTP). The Velasco government 
implemented several legal measures favourable to workers: the legalisation of trade unions 
and passing an employment security law. Consequently, the rate of unionisation of workers 
doubled. The military‟s lingering hostility toward APRA led to them officially recognising 
the General Confederation of the Peruvian Workers (Confederación General de Trabajadores 
del Perú, CGTP) under the influence of the Communist Party, and the Christian-Democrat 
dominated National Central of Workers (Central Nacional de Trabajadores, CNT) in 1971. 
By 1977 the number of unions affiliated to the CGTP rose to 44 per cent, while 27 per cent 
were aligned with the CTP (Mauceri, 1996: 22). In 1972, the government created its own 
union organisation, the Central of Workers of the Peruvian Revolution (Central de 
Trabajadores de la Revolución Peruana, CTRP), in order to weaken independent labour 
organisations and to take control of them, although to no avail. In 1972, the government 
formulated the National Agrarian Confederation (Confederación Nacional Agraria, CNA) in 
order to organise rural producers in a corporatist manner (CNA came into de facto existence 
in 1974). However, these state attempts to incorporate the popular sectors and to gain their 
support were not successful, only helping further mobilisation of society. Given the economic 
crisis and more orthodox policies initiated after 1975, these sectors led mobilisations and 
protests in alliance with other leftist groups against the military government and contributed 
to a transition to democracy.  
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 By 1973, the military-led reforms faced challenges as the national coffers were running 
low, traditional exports were falling and industrialisation lagged with little investment 
motivation and poor economic management. Alongside economic crisis, the government 
increasingly depended on external borrowing with the exaggerated expectation of a 
commodity boom and favourable Eurodollar market (Thorp, 1983: 51). Consequently, 
external debt and a crisis in the balance of payments forced the Bermúdez government to 
adopt a series of austerity programmes in the midst of rising pressure both from international 
creditors and popular sector protests during the second half of the 1970s (Mauceri, 1995: 17). 
After the initial general strike led by the CGTP on 19 July 1977, an alliance of various 
popular organisations and leftist groups protesting against the austerity package, the 
Bermúdez regime announced a schedule for the Constituent Assembly elections in 1978 and 
a transition to democracy (Balbi, 1989: 113-114). Two major general strikes took place in 
1977 and 1978, and to a large degree rising labour militancy and popular mobilisations were 
influenced by many leftist groups. In face of the PCP and CGTP‟s relatively moderate stance 
towards the military government, most adopted a clasista position, radicalising their rhetoric 
and tactics, which raised their level of influence over various popular sectors alienated by 
government repression of popular mobilisations as well as the firing of labour leaders after 
their participation in protests against economic austerity. For example, the Peasant 
Confederation of Peru (Confederación Campesina del Perú, CCP) became reorganised under 
the leadership of VR in 1974, while Maoist parties exerted control over the teachers‟ as well 
as the miners‟ unions. Additionally, the government‟s own corporatist organisations, such as 
CNA, took a more independent and anti-government stance. In the 1978 Constituent 
Assembly elections these alliances between leftist parties and popular sectors helped generate 
positive results for the Left for the first time in Peru‟s history: five groups gained a combined 
29.4 per cent of the vote, an impressive increase from less than 5 per cent.
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 In sum, state 
capitalism was implemented under a reformist military regime in response to a structural 
crisis in the country‟s economic development, only producing mixed results. Moreover, state-
led industrialisation was unfavourable to rural producers and increased peasant struggles in 
the southern highlands. In the aftermath of agrarian reform, the traditional oligarchy lost 
power, leaving a political vacuum in the countryside where many leftist parties and unions 
attempted to control. While the military regime mobilised society in a corporatist manner 
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 The five leftist groups included FOCEP (Frente Obrero, Campesino y Popular), Pro-Velasco PSR (Partido 
Socialista Revolucionario), PCP, UDP (Unidad Democrática Popular), the Frente Nacional de Trabajadores y 
Campesinos (Roberts, 1998: 320). Maoist groups abstained from participation.  
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with an aim to gain legitimacy from the popular sector and quell social unrest, this effort only 
encouraged social protests in late 1970s, leading to democratic transition.  
 
 
3.2. The 1980s Democracy: Electoral and Radical Left 
Democratic Experiences: from Belaunde to García  
The 1980 general elections took place with a larger and younger electorate as suffrage was 
extended to the illiterate, as well as to those older than eighteen years old under the 1979 
Constitution. APRA‟s infighting and the Left‟s failure to unify created a favourable context 
for AP‟s candidacy (see Woy-Hazleton, 1982; Letts, 1981). Belaunde was elected with 45.39 
per cent of the vote and was inaugurated into a second term, twelve years after he had been 
ousted by the military coup in 1968. He and his AP did not participate in the elections for the 
1978 Constituent Assembly, questioning the impartiality of the voting conditions. AP‟s 
reformist rhetoric helped ensure it a majority in the Congress when it made an alliance with 
the Christian Popular Party (Partido Popular Cristiano, PPC). In order to deal with the 
economic crisis, the Belaunde government adopted austerity programmes, reducing state 
spending and promoting trade liberalisation. However, in practice, these orthodox economic 
policies were carried out incoherently due to internal discord within the government, 
structural conditions, and inefficiencies. As Mauceri explains, privatisation was only limited 
to small state firms and the resources saved became vulnerable to clientelism and corruption. 
State investment was concentrated on national defence as well as the colonisation of 
Amazonian jungle regions. An export boom boosted by traditional products was soon hit by 
climatic disasters and a decline in commodity prices (1996: 47-8). Consequently, the 
economy went into recession and became more dependent on external financing, leading to a 
debt crisis during the period 1983-1985 (Mauceri, 1996: 47-48). According to Strokes, GDP 
contracted by 12.3 per cent in 1983, while inflation soared from 60 per cent in 1980 to 125 
per cent in 1983, with real wages dropping by almost 35 per cent between 1982 and 1985 
(1996: 546). With the backdrop of poor economic performance and the inability of the 
government to deal with revolutionary insurrection, AP‟s share of votes fell during the 1983 
municipal elections and APRA won the presidential election in 1985 by a large margin.  
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 After a period of internal strife around the succession, APRA reorganised under the 
leadership of a charismatic young leader, Alan García (Mauceri, 1996: 60). In the face of 
economic and political difficulties, APRA‟s populist and nationalist rhetoric appealed not 
only to the country‟s poor but also to the middle class who were concerned with the armed 
struggles being waged by the radical Left (PCP-SL) (Mauceri, 1996: 61). García won the 
election without the need for a run-off (53.1 per cent of the vote), while Barrantes from the 
leftist electoral coalition, the United Left (Izquierda Unidad, IU), gained 24.7 per cent and 
the AP‟s electoral tally fell to a mere 7.3 per cent. However, when García announced that the 
country would put limits on the debt service to 10 per cent of exports, which he intended to 
renegotiate with international creditors to secure better conditions, with the expectation of 
cementing popular support, it backfired as the IMF declared Peru to be an „ineligible 
borrower‟ in August 1986 (Mauceri, 1996: 62; Strokes, 1996: 547). Although the García 
government enjoyed economic growth for the first two years, prompted by the state‟s 
expansionary policies, thus achieving political popularity, it became more isolated from the 
international financial community and attracted less private investment. To make things 
worse, the announcement of the nationalisation of the financial system in 1987 further 
alienated international creditors and also encouraged the unification of the country‟s 
conservative forces against the government under the leadership of Mario Vargas Llosa. By 
mid-August 1987, anti-nationalisation protests gained support from „all business groups as 
well as AP and the PPC‟ (Mauceri, 1996: 67). The implementation of an austerity package 
resulted in an unprecedented economic crisis leading to a recession, rising foreign debt and 
four-digit hyper-inflation after 1988. According to Poole and Rénique, inflation per year 
soared from 665.9 per cent in 1988 to 3,400 per cent in 1989 and finally to 8,000 per cent in 
1990 and consequently the living standards of the Peruvians fell back to 1960s levels (1992: 
4). In addition, corruption scandals were rampant within his cabinet and party members, and 
involved García himself (Mauceri, 1997: 31).
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The Electoral Left: the IU 
For leftist parties, underperformance in the 1980 general elections increased the necessity of 
unification and this resulted in the creation of the IU, a loose electoral alliance, in September 
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the same year (see Taylor, 1990; Roberts, 1998; and Woy-Hazleton, 1982). After their 
unification, the IU produced good results from general and municipal elections during the 
1980s. At its apex in the early and mid-1980s, the IU won 28.8 per cent of the national vote 
in the 1983 municipal elections and Alfonso Barrantes was elected mayor of Lima. Although 
Barrantes lost the 1985 presidential election to APRA‟s García, the IU‟s electoral 
performance at a sub-national level was still impressive, gaining a third of the national vote in 
the 1986 municipal elections. However, the inherent disunity within the IU became more 
obvious by the mid-1980s. Both internal and external factors can explain the limitation of the 
electoral Left.  
First, its ideological dogmatism and factionalism within the coalition made it vulnerable to 
fragmentation. With little tradition of intra-party democracy and the personalised nature of 
parties – a characteristic not limited to leftist parties – factions within the party tended to split 
and create a new party when facing ideological or tactical differences with others. As a result, 
the IU, an amalgamation of different leftist groups of diverse ideological positions, 
maintained its coherence initially since Barrantes, a relatively moderate leader, played a 
coordinating role and offered a certain electoral appeal as a prominent leftist leader. However, 
when Barrantes took an ambiguous stance toward the APRA and even attempted to make an 
alliance with the APRA government, IU‟s radical elements – including the PUM, FOCEP and 
the Maoist Unity of Revolutionary Left (Unión de Izquierda Revolucionaria, UNIR) – 
criticised him for his increasingly exclusive focus on elections. Moreover, the IU‟s response 
to the Shining Path (the PCP-SL) was initially ambiguous. The rhetoric and tactics of this 
radical revolutionary Maoist party did not differ from radical forces within the IU given their 
emphasis on the necessity of armed struggle for socialist revolution. For the latter, 
„democracy was associated with political marginalization and the maintenance of an 
oligarchic status quo, rather than a popular conquest leading to social or economic reform‟ 
(Roberts, 1998: 214). In this way, popular organisations became strategic and competitive 
arenas for both the IU and the PCP-SL.  
 Second, the IU could not channel diverse popular demands into formal democratic politics 
through its organisational structure. Similar to other political parties (the AP, PPC and 
APRA), many leftist parties were dependent on their political leaders and increasingly 
alienated from their organisational and popular roots. Third, structural change weakened the 
social base of leftist parties. Increasingly, more of the population became employed in 
informal sectors and suffered from precarious labour conditions and employment insecurity. 
８９ 
This reduced incentives for workers to be affiliated with trade unions and raised the socio-
economic costs of their involvement in collective actions. Rather, people preferred 
individualised survival strategies in order to meet their basic needs such as health and 
education. However, many radical parties could not adapt to structural changes nor could 
they come up with alternatives to satisfy an impoverished population (see Cameron, 1994). In 
contrast to the late 1970s, the gap between the party leaders and the rank-and-file had been 
widening in the context of one of the worst economic crisis. In the end, the IU split in two in 
1989 when Barrantes founded his own electoral party, the Socialist Accord (Acuerdo 
Socialist, AS), later renamed as the Socialist Left (Izquerda Socialista, IS).  
 
The Radical Left: the PCP-SL 
One of the principal outcomes produced by the 1969 agrarian reform was the elimination of 
the oligarchy‟s rule. The country‟s highlands had long been under the control of gamonales 
(local political bosses), many of whom were made up of the landed elite instead of the central 
administration. Agrarian reform undermined the material base of elite groups, producing a 
political vacuum given the increasingly heterogeneous rural landscape. By filling this power 
vacuum in the countryside, a revolutionary Maoist PCP-SL started to consolidate its social 
base in the southern highlands of Ayacucho.
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 Abimael Guzmán (known as „President 
Gonzalo‟), the party‟s leader and a professor of philosophy at the National University of San 
Cristóbal of Huamanga (UNSCH), split from the PCP-BR in 1970 and established his party 
base in the university. During the 1970s he limited the party‟s activity to the Andean region 
of Ayacucho, by consolidating the party‟s ideology as well as its structure in preparation for 
the „prolonged people‟s war‟.50 It launched an armed insurrection on the same day as the 
presidential election was held on 18 May 1980 by burning the electoral register and ballot 
box in the village of Chusqui, Ayacucho. Initially, the PCP-SL‟s armed attacks did not gain 
national attention, being regarded as another outbreak of peasant violence in the marginalised 
rural highlands. However, the magnitude and intensity of attacks made it increasingly hard 
for the government to ignore the reality. Indeed, this revolutionary armed struggle and the 
government‟s anti-subversive responses militarised most parts of the country, spiralling into a 
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de facto civil war during 1980s and 1990s and producing a terrible epoch of human right 
abuses.  
 After early indifference to the PCP-SL, the anti-subversive policies of two democratic 
governments turned out to be inefficient and incoherent, leading to the country‟s 
militarisation. Belaunde did not respond appropriately for the first two years, thus only 
increasing the intensity of subversive attacks. In December 1982, the government dispatched 
the military to Ayacucho and declared a state of emergency in eight provinces. The 
subsequent submission to military rule in affected areas stripped away the basic rights of 
citizens and bypassed democratically elected authorities. This led to „massacres, extrajudicial 
executions and disappearances‟ as well as military forces acting with impunity (Poole and 
Rénique, 1992: 5; Burt, 2006: 39-47). In the face of increasing criticism of massive human 
rights abuses, the García government attempted to take a different approach to the PCP-SL 
insurgency, focusing on social programmes and promising to deal with human right issues 
more seriously, rather than pursuing dirty-war style „draining the sea to catch the fish‟ tactics 
(Poole and Rénique, 1992: 7). Problems were pointed out in the government‟s anti-subversive 
tactics. The military forces did not differentiate between the PCP-SL‟s insurgents and 
ordinary citizens. Some of military officers argued that one of the main reasons for the 
revolutionary insurgency was the precarious socio-economic conditions in the rural highlands. 
They postulated the urgent need to improve living conditions for the poor campesinos. 
However, an economic downturn and empty state coffers constrained the roll-out of this 
developmentalist approach, increasing the dependence on private „solutions‟ such as 
paramilitary death squads, e.g. the Comando Rodrigo Franco (Rodrigo Franco Command), 
which was created in July 1988 (Kenney, 2004: 32-33). By the late 1980s, demand for public 
order and return to normality was on the rise. As Burt points out, „while institutions such as 
the police and judiciary have rarely been seen as acting on behalf of ordinary citizens, these 
institutions‟ lack of responsiveness to the growing violence and the resulting breakdown in 
civil order further eroded their credibility‟ (2006: 40). At the same time, leftist party leaders, 
popular organisations, elected authorities, as well as human rights organisations, became 
victims at the crossfire between the military and the PCP-SL, undermining social solidarity 
and trust within Peruvian society (Burt, 2006: 40). Consequently, commitment to democratic 
norms and the legitimacy of democratic institutions waned to the extent that many Peruvians 
conceded „citizenship and other rights‟ for „public order‟ and „stability‟ (Burt, 2006: 41). 
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 On the other hand, the PCP-SL had its own limitations: its ideological dogmatism and 
structural closeness. A cell-based party structure did not permit contacts between members of 
different cells and the party‟s hierarchy. Decisions were made largely by the party‟s central 
committee and Guzmán himself. Therefore, when faced with efficient and stronger 
government responses based on a strengthened intelligence capacity and resources in the 
early 1990s, the party turned out to be vulnerable. The capture of its leader and central 
committee members dealt a death blow to the party and violent attacks had reduced 
remarkably by the mid-1990s. At the centre of the PCP-SL‟s ideology was „Gonzalo thought‟. 
Guzmán, as „the fourth sword of communism‟ after Marx, Lenin and Mao Zedong, argued 
that the party needed to apply Marxism to Peruvian reality, which was reminiscent of 
Mariátegui‟s „Peruvianisation of Marxism‟ (Starn, 1995). He also emphasised the role of the 
peasantry in an armed struggle against state power in line with the Maoist stance. Rather than 
stressing the political role of the peasantry, however, the PCP-SL emphasised the important 
role of a vanguard party in the revolutionary armed struggle. In addition, Gonzalo thought 
reflected Guzman‟s „blindness to Peruvian history and disinterest in Peru‟s indigenous roots‟ 
and „the bland economism of a prefabricated narrative about class struggle and capitalism‟ 
(Starn, 1995: 413).  
 In this sense, the PCP-SL‟s armed insurrection was a revolutionary armed struggle led by 
an intellectual-based vanguard party rather than a peasants‟ rebellion based on a „subsistence 
crisis‟ (McClintock, 1989). Initially, the party gained peasant support as its activities were 
considered as „benevolent gamonales‟ by punishing corrupt and abusive local authorities and 
brining public order (Taylor, 2006: 24). Major adherents of the party, however, were 
intellectuals and high school and university students of provincial origin. Increasingly, the 
party‟s dogmatism and authoritarian measures alienated the population. Peasants organised 
self-defence peasant militias with the support of the government, particularly under 
Fujimori‟s administration.51 The party‟s interpretation was that a majority of Peruvians lived 
in a semi-feudal rural society. However, it misinterpreted the social change which occurred in 
the second half of the twentieth century (Taylor, 2006: 21). Moreover, as the PCP-SL lacked 
an understanding of the importance of the market in the countryside, the party‟s „authoritarian 
interventions into their systems of production and marketing‟ as well as traditional and 
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９２ 
religious rituals frustrated the local population (Poole and Rénique, 1992: 62). In sum, as 
Starn correctly points out, „even as it fought in the name of the peasantry, the Shining Path 
reinscribed the old insensibility of privileged Peruvian society towards mountain villagers, 
and the elevation of the European over the Andean‟ (1995: 414). 
 
The Rise of Fujimori 
Despite active political involvement of many leftist parties in the countryside after agrarian 
reform, the inherent limitations of the Left increasingly made it vulnerable to the 
fragmentation, and ideological radicalisation. By the late 1980s most Peruvians suffered from 
a double crisis: four-digit hyper-inflation and a Maoist armed struggle and government‟s 
counter-insurgency operations. These economic and political crises eroded the living 
conditions of a majority of Peruvians, debilitating the social base of political parties and 
labour unions and mobilising and organisational ability of civil society (Cameron, 1994, 1997; 
Roberts, 1996). Alongside the underperformance of democratic regimes, the country‟s weak 
political party system also explains why democratic institutions as well as politics lost 
legitimacy among citizens (Tanaka, 1998; Levitsky and Cameron, 2003; Roberts, 2006; 
Taylor, 2007; Crabtree, 2010).
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 Namely, political parties did not come up with viable 
solutions for the country‟s problems. In addition, the lack of internal democracy and the 
widening gap between the party leadership and the rank-and-file account for rising support 
for independent candidates who appeared disassociated from traditional parties. Accordingly, 
the legislature did not represent popular demands by producing viable policies. 
Simultaneously, it could not carry out checks and balance functions vis-à-vis strong executive 
power. Fujimori‟s candidacy as a political outsider was successful in this regard. As Mauceri 
points out, „the parties remained highly personalist, fragmented, and authoritarian structures‟ 
(1997: 32). Rather than intra-party democracy, they are dependent on party leaders (caudillos) 
and thus prone to fragment when there is internal discord, as shown in the case of the IU. In 
the 1980s, four political parties –AP, PPC, APRA, and IU – comprised the Peruvian party 
system at a national level. Despite high levels of electoral volatility, this four-party system 
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was maintained during the 1980s. Although Belaunde‟s AP won the presidential elections in 
1980, it garnered less than 10 per cent of the vote in the 1985 elections. Similarly, García‟s 
impressive electoral performance in 1985 was not reserved in the 1990 elections. In other 
words, while electoral backing changed from one party to another, it was still within the 
political party system and support for extra-systemic, or independent, candidates remained 
less than 10 per cent. This tendency began to change in the late 1980s when the share of votes 
for anti-systemic outsiders became bigger than for partisan candidates. When an independent 
television show host, Ricardo Belmont, won the 1989 municipal elections in Lima with 44 
per cent of the vote with his electoral movement Obras (Works), this was a sign of significant 
change at the ballot box. The share of independent votes rose to 29 per cent, compared to less 
than 8 per cent in the 1986 municipal elections (Kenney, 2004: 43). The rise of independents 
became more obvious in the 1990 presidential elections when two political outsiders 
contended in the runoff: Mario Vargas Llosa, a candidate from the conservative electoral 
coalition FREDEMO, and Alberto Fujimori, an agronomist professor and anti-systemic 
candidate from a loose electoral coalition, Cambio 90 (Change 90). To the surprise of many, 
Fujimori won the election with 56.5 per cent of the vote, defeating Vargas Llosa (33.9 per 
cent) in the second round.   
 Another reason for the election of Fujimori was that there was little alternative for a 
majority of the poor electorate. García‟s government and his APRA party were blamed as the 
main culprit for political and economic crises in the late 1980s. The FREDEMO, which 
included Vargas Llosa‟s Democratic Front (Frente Democrático) in association with AP and 
PPC, could not garner popular support due to its ethnic and class bias. In particular, Vargas 
Llosa‟s electoral promises, such as economic shock therapy, alienated much of the electorate 
who had already suffered from a series of austerity programmes. Additionally, division 
within the IU in 1989 encouraged the perception that politicians were more interested in 
personal interests and thus votes for the Left were considered as wasted votes. Under these 
circumstances, Fujimori emerged as an attractive alternative, being a political newcomer not 
associated with traditional parties. Fujimori‟s social background and apolitical stance helped 
his election. A majority of the electorate could sympathise more with Fujimori, of Japanese 
immigrant origin, than with the renowned white novelist who epitomised privileged and 
wealthy limeños. Moreover, Fujimori apparently differed from Vargas Llosa in economic 
policies by promising that he would implement economic reform gradually. Furthermore, as 
his electoral catch phrase – „honesty, technology, and work‟ – demonstrated, his apolitical 
９４ 
stance distanced him from traditional politicians. Instead, he emphasised hard and efficient 
work in order to solve the challenges the country faced. In addition, Fujimori gained support 
from „small and informal entrepreneurs, protestant evangelicals, and entourage from the 
Agrarian University where he was rector‟ (Cameron, 1997: 46). Alongside García‟s tacit 
support for the Fujimori candidacy, Montesinos, who became Fujimori‟s secret advisor for 
the next decade, eliminated the final obstacle for his election. During the runoff campaign, 
Fujimori was accused of irregular real-estate dealings and Montesinos solved this scandal 
using his informal contacts within the judiciary.
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 After that, the Fujimori-Montesinos duo 
ruled the country at their discretion.
54
 
 
 
3.3. Authoritarianism and Economic Reform under Fujimori 
Fujimori encountered tremendous challenges when he assumed the presidency in July 1990. 
First, Peru had been undergoing a multifaceted crisis to the extent that the country was on the 
brink of ruin. The population had been afflicted by unprecedented hyperinflation, reaching 
7,649 per cent in 1990. In addition, 3,708 people died or were injured and 302 people 
disappeared in the crossfire of the revolutionary insurrection and the military‟s counter-
attacks in the same year (Mauceri, 1996: 140).
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 Second, although his outsider status was a 
favourable trait during the electoral campaign, Fujimori did not have a firm social base rooted 
in a political party. While his own party, Cambio 90, was only a loose coalition of diverse 
independents with little partisan loyalty, Fujimori did not hold a legislative majority to 
support his administration, in contrast to his predecessors in the 1980s. Third, he was well 
informed of the military‟s coup plans by his intelligence advisor, Montesinos. The plan called, 
Plan Verde (Green Book), had been devised within the military in order to deal with 
catastrophic political and economic situation in the late 1980s and promote market reforms 
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 According to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Comisión de la verdad y Reconciliación, CVR) 
report, „the number of those who died in Peru‟s internal armed conflict reached about 70,000 people… 
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Huancavelica, and Huánuco)‟ (Munarriz, 2008: 432).  
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under a „guided democracy‟ (see Rospigliosi, 2000). Confronting these challenges, Fujimori 
attempted to stabilise the economy by implementing a series of shock programmes and 
reducing the state‟s role in the economy. The regime also undertook authoritarian measures 
aimed at imposing public order and discouraging popular mobilisations. In an attempt to 
overcome his lack of political legitimacy Fujimori relied on personal networks rather than 
consolidating his political party, accusing politicians and political parties of being the main 
culprits behind the country‟s ills (see Crabtree and Thomas, 1998). 
 
The Self-Coup (Autogolpe) 
On 5 April 1992, Fujimori staged a bloodless coup against his government and suspended 
democratic institutions and the rule of law by dissolving the legislature and closing down the 
judiciary. The main purpose of the self-proclaimed „emergency government of national 
reconstruction‟ was to reform the legislature and judiciary, to make the bureaucracy more 
efficient, to guarantee public security and to deepen the process of economic reform (Costa, 
1993: 28). Although the legislative obstruction of Fujimori‟s plan can directly explain the 
self-coup, as Kenney (2004) has argued, this is not enough to account for its origin. 
Responses to the autogolpe were rather mixed. While the majority of politicians (with the 
exception of the members of Cambio 90), intellectuals and the international community were 
opposed, the government‟s authoritarian decision was given approval by a majority of the 
population, as well as the military, security forces and business sector. In particular, popular 
support for the 1992 autogolpe and the Fujimori regime itself was an obvious expression of 
strong popular discontent with democratic institutions, including the political parties. 
Capitalising on popular distrust of political parties, Fujimori denounced traditional parties as 
causing the country‟s crises by calling them the partidocracia. This anti-partidocracia 
discourse helped to establish legitimacy or tacit acquiescence among the population for the 
autogolpe. In addition, the regime‟s initial effectiveness in dealing with the country‟s 
problems helped many Peruvians to endorse this undemocratic measure in exchange for 
public order and economic recovery. Despite the implementation of serious shock 
programmes with little consideration for their social costs, the economy showed signs of a 
slow recovery by late 1991 and, more importantly, the hyperinflation that had afflicted the 
country dropped significantly. Moreover, the checks and balances attempts made by the 
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Congress backfired as many Peruvians perceived them as legislative sabotage by self-
interested politicians to undermine executive efficiency (Weyland, 2006: 22).  
 In contrast to its popular support, the autogolpe was not welcomed by the international 
community, including almost all Latin American countries and the US government. Under 
pressure from important foreign countries and international organisations, such as the OAS 
(Organisation of American States), Fujimori promised a schedule for Constituent Assembly 
elections and the reopening of Congress at the second foreign ministers‟ meeting of OAS 
held in the Bahamas on 18 May 1992. While APRA, AP and other parties did not participate 
in the November election, Fujimori‟s electoral alliance, Cambio 90/Nueva Mayoría (Change 
90/New Majority, C-90/N-M), garnered an absolute majority (44 seats of the 80 member 
unicameral body) in the Democratic Constituent Congress (Congreso Constituyente 
Democrático, CCD). Alongside the abstention of traditional parties, agents of the Counter-
terrorist Directorate (Dirección contra el Terrorismo, DIRCOTE) succeeded in arresting the 
head of the PCP-SL, Abimael Guzmán, together with the majority of members of the party‟s 
central committee on 12 September 1992 after the intensification in intelligence activities. 
Due to this successful operation, the President‟s popularity soared to 75 per cent from a 
previous high of 61 per cent in August, confirming the government‟s ability to confront 
terrorist forces which had afflicted most parts of the country for more than a decade (Costa, 
1993: 39). 
 
Strong Executive and Authoritarianism 
After the autogolpe, the government concentrated executive power by attacking democratic 
institutions and taking more authoritarian measures. In order to legitimise the new 
constitution enacted in the Fujimori-controlled CCD, the government managed to authorise it 
via a plebiscite in October 1993, winning by a small margin of less than 5 per cent (52.23 per 
cent of approval and 47.67 per cent disapproving). Under the new constitution, the size of 
Congress was reduced to an 80 member single legislative body and control over the 
legislature and the judiciary increased. The capacity of Congress to make laws and to hold the 
executive in check diminished. According to Cameron, of those laws passed, only 39 per cent 
were introduced by Congress after the coup, while Congress remained as a rubber stamp for 
executive initiatives (1998: 129). In addition, the legislature could not proceed with 
investigation commissions, particularly regarding executive power abuses over security 
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issues (Cameron, 1998: 130). The control over the judiciary increased in the name of the 
efficiency and transparency of the legal system. In November 1995, the Administrative 
Commission of the Judiciary (Comisión Ejecutiva del Poder Judicial) was created by law 
26546. Thereby central government took control of the judiciary‟s administration (Belaúnde, 
1998: 180). In this way, the judiciary‟s independence was undermined as the executive 
exerted more influence over personnel management, budget administration, as well as 
decision-making within the judiciary (Belaúnde, 1998: 184). Alongside the control over the 
legislative and judicial bodies, the decentralisation process initiated during the García 
government was reversed and the government returned control to the executive. In this vein, 
the Transitory Committee of Regional Administration (Consejo Transitorio de 
Administración Regional, CTAR) was created in the aftermath of the autogolpe, replacing 
regional assemblies. This committee was controlled by the Ministry of the Presidency, with 
reduced autonomy for subnational governing bodies.
56
 In addition, the Fujimori regime 
attempted to concentrate power in the executive and to reduce the influence of municipal 
government over popular organisations and local self-help and participatory initiatives such 
as the Glass of Milk programme (Mauceri, 2006: 52).  
 Fujimori also opted to bypass democratic institutions rather than consolidating his own 
political party when striving to establish his political legitimacy. During the 1990s, rather 
than building a political party, Fujimori created several political movements in preparation 
for each election.
57
 Instead of political parties, Fujimori also used personal networks based 
on civilian technocrats, the military, the national intelligence service (Servicio de Inteligencia 
Nacional, SIN), familial contacts, ex-colleagues from La Molina Agrarian University, as well 
as evangelical Christians, among others. Fujimori‟s appointment of highly globalised 
professional technocrats, particularly in his economic team, was significant in accomplishing 
the country‟s economic restructuring, as well as in making contacts with the international 
financial community. Fujimori‟s informal advisor, Hernando de Soto, was the director of 
Peru‟s leading free-market think tank, the Institute of Liberty and Democracy (Instituto 
Libertad y Democracia), and he played a role as an intermediary between the Peruvian 
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government and international creditors in terms of negotiations concerning rescheduling 
foreign debt and agreeing conditions for new loans (Mauceri, 1995: 18). The appointment of 
a pro-market minister of the economy, Carlos Boloña, helped to gain trust from domestic 
business groups, while professional technocrats took charge of increasing the efficiency of 
administrative functions, e.g., the national tax collection agency (Superintendencia Nacional 
de Administración Tributaria, SUNAT) and the Commission for the Promotion of Private 
Investment (Comisión de Promoción de la Inversión Privada, COPRI).
58
 Competent 
professionals, such as „lawyers, accountants, economists‟ who studied in foreign countries, 
were employed in these agencies (Mauceri, 2006: 56). One of the most obvious examples of 
government efforts to improve administrative efficiency was the restructuring of SUNAT. 
With the appointment of Manuel Estela as director in May 1991, SUNAT produced positive 
results in extending the tax base, increasing fiscal revenues, as well as simplifying the tax 
system in the first half of the 1990s. With executive backing and a professional reform team, 
tax revenue increased to 11 per cent of GDP in 1993 and 14 per cent in 1995, from a mere 4.9 
in the first half of 1991 (Kay, 1996: 70; Durand and Thorp, 1998: 212-221).
59
  
 Fujimori‟s secret intelligence advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos, was one of his most 
important personal contacts. A former army captain who was accused of national betrayal and 
lawyer for drug-traffickers, Montesinos gained the trust of Fujimori during the runoff in 1990, 
as mentioned above.
60
 On taking office, Fujimori appointed Montesinos as director of the 
SIN. Well-acquainted with the military, the head of the SIN was an important contact point 
between Fujimori and the armed forces. In the initial years, Fujimori, advised by Montesinos, 
dedicated himself to the internal reorganisation of the military by putting pro-Fujimori 
generals and officials in key positions, thus taking control of the security forces (Mauceri, 
1995: 20). In this vein, General Nicolás Hermoza Ríos was designated as commander of the 
armed forces in 1991. Control over the military and a recalibrating of intelligence activities 
not only served to guarantee national security against terrorist attacks, but also helped in 
repressing and discouraging opponent politicians, journalists and the leaders of popular 
organisations. The military were used everywhere, from the enforcement of tax collection to 
food distribution to shantytown dwellers (Mauceri, 1995: 20).  
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 In the meantime, Montesinos used the strengthened intelligence capacity of the SIN and a 
paramilitary death squad, the Colinas Group, in order to raid presumed subversive forces and 
to intimidate and repress critics of the regime.
61
 Assaults were made on those assumed to be 
terrorists, but turned out to be innocent civilians, as in the case of the Barrios Altos massacre 
in November 1991 and the killing of students and a professor at Cantuta University in July 
1992. Alongside the increasing influence of Montesinos and the SIN, more authoritarian 
measures were introduced, leading to abuses of power by the security forces and a damning 
human rights record. After the autogolpe, the government passed anti-terrorist legislation. 
Under this law, civilians who were accused of terrorism or treason were not guaranteed basic 
legal process and could be tried in military courts using unidentified or „faceless‟ judges 
(Cameron, 1998; Burt, 2006). These measures were often overused to control government 
critics and discourage civil society activities, „by equating opposition activity with terrorism‟ 
(Burt, 2006: 51; see also Munarriz, 2008: 434). Similarly, the issue of impunity was raised 
when the Amnesty Law passed in June 1995 and shortly after „assassins who had been 
convicted of crimes committed between 1980 and 1995 went free‟ (Cameron, 1998: 129).  
 
Economic Reform: State vis-à-vis Civil Society  
Whilst austerity programmes had been implemented since the late 1970s and into the 1980s, 
economic liberalisation had not been predominant due to opposition from domestic capital 
and leftist parties, as well as popular organisations. The intensity and extent of economic 
reform in the 1990s, however, was considered one of the most radical on the continent. In 
addition, the Fujimori regime did not face serious opposition to economic reform and instead 
he maintained a high level of popularity during most periods of his rule (Solfrini, 2001: 44). 
While power was increasingly concentrated in the executive and more authoritarian measures 
were implemented under Fujimori‟s regime, political parties and civil society organisations 
were too weak to ensure executive accountability. This created favourable conditions for 
centralised decision-making by the president, his technocrats and the intensification of 
authoritarian rule. At the same time, the Fujimori regime adopted neopopulist policies in 
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order to co-opt a disorganised population, thus avoiding engaging with intermediary 
organisations between the state and civil society. 
 Still, traditional parties could garner nearly 40 per cent of the vote in the 1993 municipal 
elections. But electoral backing for them dropped to less than ten per cent in the 1995 
presidential elections, leading to the demise of the political party system.
62
 Since the mid-
1990s, politicians themselves who pursued electoral success appealed to a disarticulated 
electorate without strong partisan ties. They also conducted apolitical and pragmatic electoral 
campaigns with a loose electoral coalition. One obvious example was Alberto Andrade, a 
two-time mayor of Lima elected in 1995 and 1998 respectively. He improvised Somos Perú 
(We are Peru) for elections but the party was not intended to consolidate partisan loyalties. 
Apart from Andrade, another independent who rose to the top and was thus attacked by the 
government in the lead-up to the 2000 presidential elections was Luis Castañeda Lossio, head 
of the social security institute (Instituto Peruano de Seguridad Social, IPSS) from 1990-1996 
and a founder of the National Solidarity party (Solidaridad Nacional).
63
 Although the public 
preference for a democratic regime was consistent, democratic institutions constantly lost 
their legitimacy among many Peruvians, thereby creating an electoral opportunity for 
political outsiders with little democratic commitment, as in the case of Fujimori (Kay, 1996: 
86).  
 Parallel to the collapse of the party system, unions, peasant federations, and popular 
organisations – once strong parts of civil society – lost their importance as political actors. By 
1990, afflicted by hyperinflation and prolonged economic recession as well as militarisation 
and violent attacks from both subversive forces and the state, most grassroots organisations 
were incapable of defending their collective interests and became easily disarticulated. 
Already debilitated, civil society organisations became further weakened with the 
implementation of economic structural reform. Despite initial success in retaining inflation 
and achieving economic stabilisation, serious problems such as poverty and unemployment 
remained unresolved. As demonstrated in the 1993 referendum when the new Constitution 
passed by less than a 5 per cent margin, an increasing number of Peruvians started to feel the 
impact of economic reform on their livelihoods. In particular, economic shock therapy before 
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the autogolpe was implemented with little consideration for social emergency programmes 
required to alleviate its social impact. In preparation for the 1995 presidential elections, the 
Fujimori government intensified spending on social relief programmes, particularly those 
targeting disarticulated and poor Peruvians in both urban shanty towns and the impoverished 
countryside.  
 When confronting the economic crisis, priority was given to stabilisation and the country‟s 
re-entry into the international financial community. Regarding these aims, just two weeks 
after his inauguration, Fujimori reversed his promises and introduced shock programmes 
which were largely similar to those proposed by Vargas Llosa. With the appointment of a 
pro-market liberal, Carlos Boloña, as Minister of Economy and Finance in February 1991, the 
Fujimori government intensified economic reform. In June 1991, the Congress gave the 
executive the authority to implement legislative decrees via Law 25327 (Kenney, 2004: 151). 
Fujimori made use of this legislative prerogative to enact a series of laws which were 
intended to reform the economy and to give more authority to the military in terms of its anti-
subversive operations (Mauceri, 1995: 23). Initial shock therapy saw positive outcomes: the 
monthly inflation rate on average fell from 14.5 per cent in 1991 to less than 5 per cent in 
1992 (Kay, 1996: 63). In addition, new loans from international creditors were now viable 
and capital inflows reinitiated, the economy started to show signs of recovery. After a short 
interruption due to autogolpe, the government resumed negotiations with international 
lenders regarding debt scheduling as Fujimori‟s promise to hold Constituent Assembly 
elections and reconvene Congress. By 1993, the Peruvian economy started to recover and 
GDP increased by 12.8 per cent in 1994 (Solfrini, 2001: 60). 
 With the intensification of economic restructuring, the country adopted a market-oriented 
development model different from the state-led one of the 1970s. In addition to its 
administrative efficiency improvement, the Fujimori government reduced its intervention in 
the economy through spending cutbacks and eliminating state subsidies. In a similar vein, it 
started to sell state-owned enterprises (SOEs). By 1990, the financial status of SOEs was 
already in the red due to inefficient and poor management, corruption and lack of investment 
during the 1980s. During the period 1985-1990, SOEs lost $1.6 billion, an average annual 
loss of US$330 million (Kay, 1996: 61). In the context of fiscal deficits and the economic 
crisis, the necessity for increasing state revenues from the privatisation of SOEs rose. Against 
this backdrop, a new decree created COPRI which oversaw the privatisation process from 
September 1991. COPRI‟s strategy for privatisation was to first sell small firms and to 
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restructure SOEs in order to make them more attractive to investors. In addition, the selling 
of larger SOEs proceeded at a gradual pace. Initially investors showed little interest in buying 
small firms. After the autogolpe, the privatisation process developed momentum. In 
particular, „mining, manufacturing, telecommunications and the energy sectors‟ attracted 
more foreign capital (Kisic, 1998: 50). Between 1991 and 2000 almost 80 per cent of state 
companies were privatised, with priority being given to sectors such as agriculture, fisheries 
and mining (see Carrión, 2006; Abugattas, 1998).
64
 The state also sought to open up the 
economy by lowering trade obstacles and promoting the free movement of foreign capital. 
The introduction of unitary exchange rates, reductions in import tariffs, and the withdrawal of 
labour protections figured among those measures introduced to encourage trade liberalisation 
and promote foreign investment.  
 Due to the prolonged economic crisis, wage levels declined and more Peruvians faced 
difficulties finding a stable waged job in the formal sector. In addition, workers in the 
informal sector increased in number as the state-led industrialisation strategy was abandoned. 
As a result of changing economic structures and recession, the amount of workers who were 
affiliated with unions diminished, weakening the social base of labour unions. Indeed, the 
insistence on a confrontational strategy by union leaders did not produce positive outcomes 
for workers in the context of decreasing real wages and precarious working conditions. As 
labour organisations lost legitimacy, many workers preferred individual strategies, such as 
developing one‟s own working performance rather than collective alternatives in order to 
improve their livelihoods. Consequently, unions kept losing their organising capacity for 
collective action, as demonstrated in successive failures of the CGTP to call national strikes 
from the 1980s onwards (see Balbi, 1997). Economic reform under Fujimori enhanced this 
tendency by making the labour market more flexible, arguably a precondition for the 
competitiveness of Peruvian enterprises in the international market. The deregulation of the 
law on employment security enacted under the Velasco government increased the number of 
contract labourers. After the autogolpe, the government issued the Law of Collective 
Relations of Labour (Ley de Relaciones Colectivas de Trabajo), deregulating basic labour 
rights – „unionization, collective bargaining and strikes‟ – a development more favourable to 
private companies rather than guaranteeing these rights for workers (Solfrini, 2001: 64). 
                                           
64
 For the privatisation of SOEs in the mining sector, see Chapter 4. Of revenues from privatisation, „48.2% was 
spent on assistance policies, 22.85% on military defense, and 24.2% on external debt payments‟ (Solfrini, 2001: 
71). 
１０３ 
 Similarly, the reform process in the agricultural sector was designed to increase 
agricultural production and bring about favourable conditions for small-scale producers as 
well as poor peasants. Indeed, it turned out that it made the rural landscape more 
heterogeneous, providing little long-term solutions for rural poverty. Financial and trade 
policies promoting a more open economy, albeit with an increase in agricultural exports, 
were more favourable to the importation of agricultural produce, an average of US$ 1,035 
million during the period 1996-99 from US$488 million in 1986-90 (Crabtree, 2002: 143). 
The reduction in state spending caused by eliminating subsidies and development banks, such 
as the Agrarian Bank (Banco Agrario), was also an adverse development for small-scale 
producers. Under reform initiatives, peasants had less access to technology, inputs, credit and 
markets in comparison to large-scale capital-intensive producers who exported tradable 
produce. Importantly, previous collective initiatives under the Velasco government began to 
change as members could dissolve cooperative enterprises and sell land parcels individually. 
The Land Law (Ley de Tierra) enacted in 1995 was intended to make peasants use the land as 
collateral by guaranteeing property rights.
65
 This land-titling process was in line with the 
initiatives of IFIs (such as WB and IDB) in terms of promoting rural development (Crabtree, 
2002: 142). The land-titling initiative benefited those who could afford land and capitalise on 
it most: „larger-scale producers oriented primarily towards agro-industry and foreign markets 
(Crabtree, 2002: 143). In the context of the debilitation of once strong peasant organisations 
such as the CCP and CNA, small-scale producers and the landless rural poor had to 
supplement their income with non-agricultural employment or migration to cities or other 
countries in order to make ends meet. 
 Faced with increasing rate of unemployment and poverty, the Fujimori government 
adopted short-term „solutions‟ via targeted social programmes. The government created the 
National Fund for Development and Social Compensation (Fondo Nacional de 
Compensación y Desarrollo Social, FONCODES) in August 1991 with the aim of buffering 
the social impact of economic reform and supporting social projects to meet the basic needs 
of an impoverished population. This had an earmarked fund of US$425 million from the IDB 
(Kay, 1996: 78).
66
 Most of the social programmes were project-specific with little longer-
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term development potential. Sometimes they lasted only for several months. With centralised 
decision-making under the control of the Ministry of the Presidency, an estimated 60 per cent 
of the projects which were implemented via FONCODES were associated with infrastructure 
construction (Solfrini, 2001: 62). To a certain degree, while this increase in projects was the 
state‟s response to the resilient unemployment problem, the temporary employment of many 
contract workers on public works did not represent a fundamental solution.
67
 Moreover, 
social programmes targeted mainly the unorganised and disarticulated poor both in 
countryside and in urban shantytowns. This comprised an integral part of the political 
strategy of the Fujimori government, which attempted to make direct ties with „the masses‟ 
by bypassing already moribund political parties and popular organisations.
68
 The 
government‟s food assistance programme, the National Fund of Alimentation (Fondo 
Nacional de Alimentación, PRONAA), was controlled by the Ministry of the Presidency and 
implemented with a bias toward pro-government groups, sometimes in competition with 
autonomous social organisations which were active in the 1980s (Kay, 1996: 80). This 
asistencialista nature of social emergency programmes tended to keep impoverished 
segments of the population dependent. Moreover, the government used these programmes 
according to the political cycle in order to garner more electoral support from a disarticulated 
electorate (Arce, 2006: 43). Through these mechanisms, Fujimori won the 1995 election by a 
landslide (66 per cent of the vote) against ex-UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar 
(22 per cent), while the former‟s C-90/N-M won a legislative majority (67 seats of the 120 
member unicameral Congress). This politically targeted funding was repeated before the 
2000 presidential elections. 
 
The Demise of Fujimorato 
Successful treatment of the country‟s immediate problems, such as hyper-inflation, laid the 
support base for the autogolpe and the government itself, in parallel with the implementation 
of authoritarian and populist policies. Consequently, Fujimori was re-elected by a landslide in 
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1995 and enjoyed high levels of popularity for over a decade. After maintaining expansionary 
policies in preparation for the election, an economic recession followed, putting a strain on 
the already impoverished majority. As a result, the level of support for the regime fell to 35-
45 per cent after mid-1997 from a high of 75 per cent in January 1996 (Weyland, 2006: 27-8). 
In explaining the dilemma of the authoritarian regime, Weyland (2006) points out the shifting 
attentions of the population which affected their support for the government: two seemingly 
unresolvable issues the country faced in 1990 turned out to be a favourable asset for the 
regime as the economy stabilised and political violence diminished during the first term. 
However, this success brought to the fore greater challenges, particularly unemployment and 
poverty. In the face of these more intractable problems which were hard to solve within a 
short-term period, the government did not develop political organisations of its own, so could 
not help but to resort to authoritarian measures and expansionary spending in order to 
maintain its rule. Weyland (2000; 2006) has called this dilemma „a paradox of success‟.  
 Authoritarian measures and the concentration of power emboldened Fujimori to exert a 
firm grip on the military and SIN, both of which were used to eviscerate political opponents 
and popular organisations. At the same time, the regime did not promote the rise of its own 
political organisation or any potential successor to the personalist leader. Rather Fujimori 
attempted to perpetuate his rule by all possible measures, legal or illegal. After being elected 
twice in 1995 under the new Constitution, the regime started to prepare for his third term 
election. By mid-1996, the C-90/N-M-dominated Congress passed „the law of authentic 
interpretation‟ (Law 26657). According to this law, Fujimori‟s first term (1990-95) was kept 
out of consideration since the 1993 Constitution was not applied retroactively. Therefore, 
Fujimori was deemed to be eligible to run for the 2000 elections, which was to be interpreted 
as his second term once he was elected. Controversy over the constitutionality of this law 
followed. When faced with the opposition of three members of the Constitutional Tribunal, 
the government dismissed them and abolished the function of this highest judicial authority. 
Civil society opposition led by Foro Democrático attempted to garner signatures to call for a 
referendum on the law. However, the government modified electoral regulations on the 
referendum by adding a provision which required 48 votes out of the 120-member Congress 
together with a certain number citizens‟ signatures. In the end, the referendum efforts, which 
succeeded in gathering 1,441,535 signatures, failed being short of three Congressional votes 
in 1998. In this way, the legal groundwork was laid for Fujimori‟s second re-election. 
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 Alongside this legal measure, the Fujimori government, in alliance with the military and 
SIN masterminded by Montesinos, used authoritarian or illegal measures in order to 
intimidate and debilitate political opponents and critical media. In the runoff elections on 
May 2000 Fujimori became the only candidate after Alejandro Toledo decided to abstain.   
Despite accusations of electoral irregularity, Fujimori was sworn in on 28 July 2000 after 
supposedly having garnered 51 per cent of the vote while Toledo‟s Perú Posible won 18 per 
cent.
69
 Four months after Fujimori managed to start his third term, he was to fax his 
resignation in a rather disgraceful manner.
70
 The direct reason was the release of a videotape 
via Channel N in September 2000, in which Montesinos was caught bribing an opposition 
congressman, Alberto Kouri, giving him US$15,000 in compensation for changing to the 
government party. The revelation of this and other videos, widely known as Vladivideos, 
revealed to what extent Montesinos had abused his power in order to maintain Fujimori‟s 
authoritarian government. Although the Vladivideos were not the sole reason for the demise 
of the regime, it was directly related to it.  
 Montesinos co-opted and collaborated with politicians, judges and the media via material 
rewards, i.e. bribery, and non-material compensation in exchange for their cooperation with 
the government.
71
 Simultaneously, the head of SIN used his intelligence networks and death 
squads in order to debilitate and punish opposition politicians, as well as critical media. When 
Perú 2000 lacked a majority in the Congress, occupying only 51 seats, Montesinos bought 
opposition congressmen. The Kouri video was a case in point. In the same way, he corrupted 
many judges and newspapers, including tabloids and television channels in the run-up to the 
elections, by providing cash as well as favours such as tax exemptions or promotions. 
However, when faced with opponents, Montesinos did not hesitate to use his well-developed 
intelligence activities, such as wiretapping, installing hidden cameras and dispatching 
infiltration agents. Sometimes, if necessary, he sent his death squads with the aim of 
intimidating, torturing, kidnapping and even killing opponents. The case of Baruch Ivcher, 
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the owner of Channel 2 (Frecuencia Latina), is a representative example. After the television 
channel broadcast programmes on Montesinos‟ extravagant salary and on the torture and 
murder of ex-SIN agents, Ivcher, of Israeli origin, was stripped of Peruvian citizenship (and 
thus of his company) in 1997. All this was possible under Fujimori‟s personalist and 
authoritarian regime given the near absence of congressional checks and balances and 
effective opposition from political parties or popular organisations. Although there were 
student-led mobilisations against Fujimori‟s run for a third term in the second half of the 
1990s, they were not capable of coalescing and becoming a serious opposition force. The 
resignation of Fujimori led to a swift decision of Congress to call for presidential elections in 
2001 arguing the moral incapacity of Fujimori regime. During the next nine months, the 
transition government of Valentín Paniagua took charge of returning the government to a 
newly elected democratic regime. Alejandro Toledo won the 2001 presidential election by 
taking advantage of his political leadership during the „March for Cuatro de Suyos‟ held in 
opposition to Fujimori‟s third term. 
 
 
3.4. Conclusion  
In the face of decreasing opportunities for exporting traditional primary goods, Peruvian 
economic development encountered a structural crisis in the 1960s. While international 
financiers were reluctant to invest, domestic capital – which had been mostly dependent on 
foreign capital – was less prepared to lead investment initiatives. Against this backdrop, 
Peruvian society underwent a profound transformation, involving industrialisation, migration, 
and urbanisation. In addition, while peasants in the southern sierra mobilised with demands 
for land during the late 1950s and 1960s. To deal with the structural crisis of development in 
the context of increasing social pressure, General Velasco undertook a series of reformist 
policies in pursuit of state-led development. The military regime also attempted to organise 
the population in a corporatist manner with an aim to quell social unrest and to gain social 
support for state-led reformism. However, state capitalism in the 1970s had limitations: its 
dependency on „external borrowing‟; inefficient and corrupt management of SOEs; its failure 
to attract domestic investors; and a lack of social programmes (Wise, 1994: 115). 
Consequently, the „Peruvian experiment‟ produced an economic recession and debt crisis 
after the mid-1970s. Organised Peruvians responded with a series of mobilisations and 
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general strikes in alliance with radicalised leftist parties, demanding a transition to democracy. 
Particularly in the rural highlands, the ambitious agrarian reform did not benefit most poor 
peasants, leaving a political vacuum as the material base of the oligarchy disintegrated, a 
space which many leftist groups, including a Maoist radical party, attempted to fill.  
 After twelve years of military rule, in 1980 Peru enjoyed at least procedural democracy 
until the autogolpe of 1992. During this period, four political parties – AP, PPC, APRA and 
IU – were maintained within the democratic system. Despite substantial electoral volatility, 
the inter-party system remained stable during most of the 1980s. In the face of economic 
recession and debt problems, austerity programmes were adopted under the Belaunde 
government. However, their implementation was rather incoherent and short-sighted in the 
midst of pressure from domestic capital and democratic opposition. In contrast to his 
predecessor, García followed a heterodox economic policy during the first half of the regime. 
Despite initial economic successes and consequential levels of popularity, the late 1980s saw 
one of the worst economic crises in the country‟s history due to a series of policy failures (e.g. 
the decision to nationalise the banking system). Moreover, despite the important role played 
by leftist parties in the democratic transition, ideological dogmatism and factionalism turned 
out to be an intractable obstacle and led to IU‟s internal divisions in 1989. Similar to other 
major political parties, IU was composed of leftist parties which were highly personalised and 
lacked intra-party democracy. The weakness of political parties was one of the causes of 
democratic underperformance in the 1980s, widening the gap between state and society. In 
addition, the PCP-SL, a radical leftist group, maintained its ideological dogmatism and 
structural closeness. With unprecedented hyperinflation, the revolutionary violence launched 
by the PCP-SL in 1980 placed Peru at the crossroads of economic crisis and political violence, 
impacting on a majority of Peruvians already in a state of predicament. By the late 1980s, 
democratic institutions, including political parties, lost credibility among the population. 
Popular demands for economic recovery and public security were the principal motives 
behind the election of Fujimori in the 1990 presidential elections.      
 Faced with multifaceted challenges, Fujimori‟s regime adopted a series of economic 
restructuring programmes and strengthened its intelligence capacity in order to respond to 
subversive attacks. Consequently, a sign of economic recovery and public order earned the 
regime a certain degree of legitimacy. This credibility gained from his government‟s 
performance laid the ground for the autogolpe in April 1992. Despite a high rate of popular 
support and the backing of the military and business groups, Fujimori‟s government called for 
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a Constituent Assembly election in November 1992 when faced with international pressure 
for a return to democracy. Over a decade of authoritarian government, the regime enjoyed 
high levels of popularity. However, the neoliberal economic reform increasingly degraded the 
already precarious living conditions of many impoverished Peruvians. In order to rebuild 
popularity, especially in the run-up to elections, the government increased social spending by 
targeting the country‟s many poor. But it simultaneously implemented a series of legal and 
illegal measures masterminded by the director of SIN, Montesinos, with the intention of 
ensuring Fujimori‟s third term election in 2000. Despite a number of mobilisations, 
particularly led by students, and critical comments by opposition politicians and a few 
relatively independent parts of the media, it was the revelation of one videotape which caused 
Fujimori‟s collapse after a decade of authoritarian rule. The exposure of the Vladivideo 
demonstrated the wide extent of the abuse of power over practically every sector of society 
under Fujimori‟s regime. Despite promises of economic growth, by the late 1990s the result 
was not impressive. The economy grew by 1.2 per cent on average during the last two years 
(McMillan and Zoido, 2004: 90). The gap between the rich minority and poor majority 
increased while the record of human rights abuses worsened. In the end, Fujimori had to flee 
the country and sent his resignation via fax. Shortly after the re-democratisation process 
started as Paniagua oversaw a transition government until Toledo‟s election in 2001.  
 A decade of authoritarian rule and the implementation of neoliberal reforms provide a 
direct explanation for the deepening marginalisation of the majority of the population. 
However, alongside the backing of military and business group, a majority of population 
granted rather a high degree of acceptance for economic reform and anti-democratic 
measures on behalf of economic stability and public order, particularly during the first half of 
the regime. This high approval rate requires political and economic explanations regarding 
the previous decades: structural crisis of economic development and mixed result of 
subsequent state capitalism; ideological dogmatism and factionalism of the Peruvian Left and 
the consequent IU‟s fragmentation and PCP-SL‟s radicalisation; and the mismanagement of 
economic and security policy and the weak party system under the  democratic regimes of 
the 1980s. When faced with deteriorating living conditions caused by neoliberal economic 
policies and human rights abuses, a majority of afflicted Peruvians were left with little 
recourse (i.e. neither political parties nor social organisations) to address their problems, such 
as unemployment and poverty. The most marginalised sectors only became a target for social 
relief which the government provided them dependent on the electoral cycle. Given this 
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contextualisation, the next chapter will examine one of the most prominent sectors in which a 
neoliberal form of development has been implemented, i.e. the mining sector, and the 
complex relationship between neoliberal mineral extraction and socio-environmental protests 
across the nation, particularly since the late 1990s. 
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Chapter 4 
Mining and Social Protests in Neoliberal Peru 
 
 
According to Lima Chamber of Commerce (Cámara de Comercio de Lima, CCL), boosted by 
the mining and hydrocarbon sectors, the country‟s economy is expected to increase by 5.2 to 
5.7 per cent in 2014.
72
 In particular, important mining projects are being initiated, including 
Toromocho, Las Bambas and Constancia. Neoliberal economic reform has attracted 
substantial foreign investment in the mining sector, which has become a crucial element in 
the country‟s export and fiscal bonanza. Despite the economic growth based on mineral 
extraction, wealth and resultant benefits have been unequally distributed. Recently released 
statistics (Poverty Indicator Report 2012, Informe Cifras del Pobreza 2012) show that 
(financial) poverty has been reduced in a majority of Peruvian departments, while poverty 
continues to be prevalent in the departments of Apurímac, Cajamarca, Ayacucho and 
Huancavelica.
73
 According to the report, Cajamarca, one of the most important departments 
for the recent mining boom, was ranked the second poorest: 54.2 per cent of the department‟s 
population are categorised as poor. To a certain degree, this adverse relationship between 
mining, economic growth and poverty suggests why the country has witnessed growing 
socio-environmental conflict during the past two decades. 
 In addition, social protests have increased with the post-2000 re-democratisation process. 
Under the authoritarian Fujimori regime, collective actions were infrequent compared to the 
post-Fujimorato era. According to an analysis of social protests between 1995 and 2006, their 
total number was 5,443 and of these 36.3 per cent occurred in the period between 1995 and 
2000, while 63.7 per cent took place over the next six years (Garay and Tanaka, 2009: 59). 
The number of social protests started to rise after the mid-1990s when students led 
mobilisations against Fujimori‟s second re-election attempt and soared in the wake of the 
regime‟s fall. Not only did the political environment become more favourable for collective 
actions, the implementation of more than a decade harsh austerity economic policies 
impacted negatively on the population, particularly those marginalised from the benefits 
                                           
72 „Economía del Perú crecerá hasta 5.7 % en el 2014, estima la CCL‟, La República, 7 May 2013. 
73 „Ayacucho, Cajamarca, Apurímac y Huancavelica son los más pobres del país‟, La República, 9 May 2013. 
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generated by economic growth. IFIs started to devote more attention to the impact of 
neoliberal economic reform on local communities and their policy focus moved towards 
poverty reduction and promoted the participation of local people through engagement by 
international and domestic civil organisations, with a consideration of „sustainable 
development‟.74 Against this backdrop, the rise of socio-environmental protests in Peru has 
taken place in parallel to increasing mineral extraction and high international prices.  
 Alongside growing socio-environmental mobilisations, large-scale extractive projects and 
their impact on local development has become a significant issue at the ballot box, as well as 
affecting the stability of successive governments. Humala, once denounced as a radical ally 
of Hugo Chávez and defeated by Alan García in the 2006 presidential poll by a small margin, 
moderated his campaign in the 2011 elections.
75
 In the second round, Humala and his allies 
argued that he was a candidate who could govern the country responsibly, announcing his 
electoral promises under the banner of the so-called „la Hoja de Ruta‟ („The Roadmap‟). This 
plan advocated a strategy comprised of more equitable and inclusive development in parallel 
with macroeconomic growth and stability. His electoral promises for change gained the 
support of many Peruvians. After decades of economic liberalisation, the socio-economic and 
political marginalisation of the poor had not improved substantially, even in the context of 
relatively stable economic growth. Initially, the new government enjoyed comparatively high 
popularity ratings. Within three months of his rule, support for the Humala administration 
rose to 63 per cent, as compared to his predecessors, Toledo (42 per cent in 2001) and García 
(62 per cent in 2006) at a comparable stage during their term in office.
76
 The government‟s 
outlook looked favourable until internal tension within the cabinet surfaced following a 
number of social conflicts, particularly in Cajamarca and Espinar (Cusco). Many left-wing 
politicians had joined the government, while the economic team was composed mainly of 
orthodox economic liberals. The supposedly well-balanced composition of Humala‟s first 
cabinet could not resolve its different stances regarding how to deal with particular social 
                                           
74 „In 2006, the World Bank Peru Country Management Unit published a report providing recommendations to 
the Peruvian Government on the management of large-medium-scale mining operations… It recommended that 
both the government and industry assume their respective responsibilities in contributing to the promotion of 
environmentally and socially responsible mining in Peru‟ (Triscritti, 2013: 441). 
75 For more on „un unlikely comeback‟ of García in 2006 and his campaign strategy, see McClintock (2006). 
76 Figures taken from the IPSO-APOYO polling organisation, the most respected in Peru, available at 
http://www.revistargumentos.org.pe/desde_la_aprobacion_publica.html. 
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conflicts. Against this backdrop, mobilisations against the Conga project put an end to 
Lerner‟s so-called Concertación cabinet in December 2011. 
 Rising opposition to mineral extraction influenced the electoral landscape during the 
campaign period, polarising the already divided electorate along socio-economic and 
geographical lines. However, this tendency explained that elections were highly dependent on 
personalist or outsider politicians, suggesting a precarious democracy with no organic party 
system. In this context of „fragmented‟ political and civil society, it is rather difficult to 
expect the implementation of coherent policy reform for the construction of a just and equal 
society as protesters demanded. Rather, the country‟s political and economic elites criticised 
opponents of mineral extraction as „anti-miners‟ or „anti-developers‟, emphasising an urgent 
need of mining activities for the country‟s „development‟. Against this backdrop, this chapter 
aims to contextualise neoliberal mineral extraction in Peru which was promoted as a new 
development strategy. It also analyses the complex dynamics of socio-environmental 
conflicts in the „power-geometry‟ of neoliberal mineral extraction and the related 
„entanglements‟ of power, overcoming a binary perspective on them: i.e. mineral-based 
„development‟ vs. „under-development‟ of anti-mining protests.  
 
 
4.1. Mining Industry in the Twentieth Century: Historical Review 
The extraction of precious metals was a principal attraction for the Spanish colonisers during 
their rule. In 1545, silver mines were discovered in Potosí (part of the Viceroyalty of Peru 
and present-day Bolivia) (Thorp and Bertram, 1978: 73). Alongside the Potosí mines, the 
development of the Santa Barbara mine in Huancavelica was also significant since mercury 
was an essential element in refining silver ore (Dore, 1988: 76). After this, Potosí and 
Huancavelica become two pillars of the colonial economy. Tax revenues from mineral 
extraction proved vital for the colonial administration.
77
 The accumulation of wealth by 
Spanish colonisers and the prosperity of the booming mining town of Potosí contrasted with 
the precarious working conditions of indigenous people who were forced to labour in the 
                                           
77 „Under Spanish law all minerals within the Empire belonged to the Crown... In exchange for royal 
concession [for exploitation] the Spanish mine owners... paid a royalty of one-fifth of the silver they produced‟, 
which was called the quinto real (Dore, 1988: 65-66). Viceroy Toledo introduced a twenty per cent tax on 
mineral extraction in 1504, the quinto real, reduced to ten per cent in 1723. 
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mines. The viceroyalty introduced the Inca mita system (labour obligation) for mines in order 
to respond to the labour shortage problem.
78
 This exploitation of indigenous labour became 
one of the main issues shaping the relationship between the colonial administration and local 
communities.
79
  
 
Cerro de Pasco: Industrial Mining and Foreign Capital in the Central Highlands 
Since independence, mining was not economically relevant until the 1880s and 1890s, when 
obstacles to mineral extraction were gradually overcome. While the export of natural 
fertiliser, guano, drove the country‟s economic boom between the 1840s and 1870s, mining 
was depressed partly due to the destruction of infrastructure during the post-independence 
civil wars (Long and Roberts, 1984: 31-32). The discovery of new deposits and technological 
advances resulted in a temporary increase in silver and gold production in the late 1800s 
(Thorp and Bertram, 1978: 73-75), while copper production became concentrated in the 
country‟s central highlands, as well as the southern regions to a lesser degree. In the 1890s, a 
number of problems impeding copper production in the central highlands were overcome, 
including: transport bottlenecks; production and refining facilities; and lack of finance. The 
central railway, which connected the capital to La Oroya, was completed in 1893, while 
several new smelters were opened and started to buy metal from local miners. In addition, a 
drainage tunnel began to be constructed after the creation of the Empresa Socavonera del 
Cerro del Pasco in 1900, which was financed by Lima capitalists (Thorp and Bertram, 1978: 
77-78). 
 During the twentieth century, the Peruvian mining industry was largely dominated by 
copper production upon the arrival of US capital in the Cerro de Pasco region, the central 
highlands. The introduction of the Mining Code of 1901 provided favourable legal conditions 
for the investment of foreign capital in the sector. The Cerro de Pasco Mining Corporation 
(the Cerro) started operations in 1902 and continued until 1974, when the company was 
expropriated by the military government. The long-term presence of foreign capital and its 
large-scale production in the central sierra had a significant influence on the regional 
                                           
78 In 1573, the mita system was introduced in mines under the decree of Viceroy Toledo and was abolished de 
jure in 1812 despite the persistent use of the system in practice (Dore, 1988: 68).  
79 Indigenous people died from the harsh working environment or mercury poisoning. By the 1600s, African 
slaves were imported, thereby providing a labour force for the mines. 
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economy and people‟s livelihoods. With the takeover of locally-owned smaller mines and the 
opening of the processing complex in La Oroya in 1922, the company took control of nearly 
80 per cent of mineral production in the central highlands (Dore, 1988: 102). The Cerro 
dominated not only mines and smelters, including the Cerro de Pasco, Morococha, Casapalca, 
Yauricocha and Cobriza mines, but also became the largest landowner in the central 
highlands. When the Cerro was faced with accusations over environmental contamination in 
the mid-1920s, it bought nearly 200,000 hectares of land in the affected areas and created the 
División Ganadera de Cerro de Pasco (Scurrah et al., 2008: 74). From the company‟s 
perspective, this decision was appropriate in order to deal with environmental accusations as 
well as to reduce labour costs by providing food to miners directly from its latifundio. 
 While some literature has emphasised the predominance of foreign capital, dependency 
and minimal impact on national development (Becker, 1983), other scholars have 
concentrated on the labour-capital relationship and capitalist development within the mining 
industry (Dore, 1988; Mallon, 1983; DeWind, 1977). It has been noted that peasants‟ access 
to land made it difficult to turn them into fully proletarianised wage workers for the labour-
intensive mining industry, separating them completely from pre-capitalist relations. In 
addition, as DeWind (1977) noted in his study of the Mantaro valley in the central highlands, 
local peasants did not oppose working in the mines. Rather, as the wage level was low, 
peasants could not make ends meet, thus maintaining peasant-miner status was their most 
appropriate survival strategy (DeWind, 1977: 15). In this way the initial process of „primitive 
accumulation‟ did not prelude the development of capitalist production relations in the 
Peruvian central highlands. The mining company sometimes had to depend on a debt labour 
system (enganche) in order to respond to labour demands. 
 In the meantime, Peruvian domestic capital played a minor role in the development of the 
mining sector. Several small-scale operations were established, particularly where the 
presence of foreign capital was low or absent. Between 1930 and 1948, foreign investment 
stagnated as did copper production, due to protectionism in the United States, Britain and 
France introduced after the onset of the economic depression (Dore, 1988: 124). Against this 
backdrop, in the 1930s domestic mining firms reactivated mineral extraction, including silver, 
gold, lead and zinc (Thorp and Bertram, 1978: 160-162). Moving into the 1940s, the mining 
sector experienced a crisis due to low productivity, wage inflation, and increasing labour 
militancy (Dore, 1988: 135; DeWind, 1977: 68). 
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Capital Intensive Mining and National Sovereignty 
A new Mining Code was introduced in 1950 when the Odría government adopted laissez-
faire economic policies. Under this Code fiscal incentives as well as a guarantee for long-
term rights to mining concessions were provided in an effort to promote investment in the 
sector. Companies were to pay taxes on „profits‟, not on „total production‟, and „the depletion 
allowance‟ was taken into consideration before tax was levied (Dore, 1988: 141-142). Given 
that a company could gain profits from the depletion of mines while the state lost its natural 
resource reserves, compensation for the depletion of mines should have been made to the 
state rather than the company (DeWind, 1977: 76 -77). In addition, businesses could hold the 
right to mining concessions for as long as they wanted if they paid a low tax rate (DeWind, 
1977: 73). Given this favourable environment, US capital invested in two important large-
scale projects: the Toquepala copper mine (the Southern Peru Copper Corporation, SPCC) 
and the Marcona iron mine (Marcona Mining Company). The Marcona Mining Company 
signed a 21-year contract with the Peruvian government in 1952 and conducted the first 
large-scale open-pit operations (Thorp and Bertram, 1978: 212). This open-pit method of 
mineral extraction is suitable for extracting evenly distributed large ores and can reduce 
production costs (DeWind, 1977: 79). The SPCC was founded in 1952 after ASARCO‟s 
victory in legal disputes with the Cerro de Pasco Mining Corporation and it signed a 
favourable contract with the Peruvian government (Dore, 1988: 144).
80
  
 In comparison to previous labour-intensive mining operations, capital-intensive open-pit 
operations were criticised in the 1960s for having little local economic impact given that 
large profits were enjoyed exclusively by the companies. In face of demands for reforms, the 
Belaunde government renegotiated a previous tax preference with the SPCC and agreed to 
increase tax rates from 30 to 51 per cent on the Toquepala operation‟s net profits (Thorp and 
Bertram, 1978: 218). In the context of stagnant investment in new mines in the late 1960s and 
1970s, the Cerro de Pasco Mining Corporation limited its expenditure to „smelting and 
refining facilities‟ (Dore, 1988: 169). Moreover, expropriation of the Cerro‟s hacienda in 
1969 led to a closure of the División Ganadera, resulting in rising labour costs in the midst of 
increasing labour militancy (Dore, 1988: 170). Facing the crisis in the mining sector and the 
                                           
80 ASARCO (American Smelting and Refining Company) was the main stakeholder in SPCC, with the 
participation of Cerro de Pasco, Newmont Mining and the Phelps Dodge Corporation (Dore, 1988: 144). 
Starting with exploration and production in the Toquepala mine, SPCC continued its mining operations into the 
1960s, such as the Cuajone project. 
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resultant social instability, the reformist military regime expropriated Cerro and created a 
state-owned company, Centromín Perú, in 1974. In a similar vein, decisions were made in 
order to increase the state‟s role in the development of the mining industry, including: the 
creation of Hierro Perú (from Marcona Mining) and Minero Perú, as well as MINPECO 
(Minero Perú Comercial), which was in charge of the marketing and commercialisation of 
minerals. Although the government‟s objective was to „develop new mineral deposits‟ and to 
„expand refining capacities‟ by establishing Minero Perú, the outcome was very limited. 
Developments included the establishment of the Cerro Verde mine in 1976, the Tintaya mine 
in the 1980s, the construction of a copper refinery at Ilo in 1976 and one for zinc at 
Cajamarquilla in 1980 (Dore, 1988: 174-175). The only exception from the nationalisation 
process was the SPCC. The company invested US$649 million in the Cuajone project 
between 1972 and 1976 (Campodónico, 1999: 7). 
 State-led mining development was not successful, however. State investment was 
dependent on the level of external debt and mineral exports did not increase (Dore, 1988: 
176). The Cerro de Pasco Mining Corporation had already started to reduce its investment in 
new deposits by the 1950s. In the midst of increasing production costs and labour struggles, 
the company had intended to sell its mines to the Peruvian state. On balance, state 
expropriation was carried out for rhetorical reasons rather than by rational calculation. 
Consequently, the state increased its role in the sector but only took charge of already 
debilitated mineral operations. Moreover, the mining sector faced a crisis in the 1980s as 
international mineral prices declined. Due to low investment, small mines were sometimes 
closed or over-exploited. Mining SOEs (State-owned Enterprises) became bankrupt or de-
capitalised. In response, the state created the Mining Consolidation Fund (Fondo de 
Consolidación Minera, FOCOMI), although with little impact (Glave and Kuramoto, 2007: 
138). 
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4.2. New Mineral Extraction 
Neoliberal State: Deregulating Mineral Extraction 
Promotion of Investment and Privatisation 
Alongside generalised political and economic crises, the 1980s saw stagnation in Peru‟s 
mining sector partly due to lack of investment and inefficient management of mining SOEs. 
However, since the 1990s the sector has been revitalised. The recent increase in international 
capital inflows and a parallel mining boom requires an explanation in terms of both the 
international and domestic environment.
81
 In line with three World Bank pillars for a new 
development strategy, the Peruvian government promoted foreign capital investment in 
extractive industries (particularly mining) in the country: to create favourable conditions in 
order to attract investment in mining; to reform the state as a regulator; and to privatise State-
owned enterprises (Urteaga, 2011: 24). The Fujimori regime adopted policy reform geared to 
attract foreign investors and to privatise mining SOEs, making the sector the promoter of 
economic growth.
82
 During 1991 and 1992, Fujimori introduced a raft of new legal 
regulations with the aim to provide judicial protection for investment and tax incentives for 
foreign investors.
83
 In early 1991, the Law for Promotion for Foreign Investment (la Ley de 
Promoción de la Inversión Extranjera, Legislative Decree No. 662) came into force, a piece 
of legislation intended to encourage foreign direct investment in all economic sectors (Bury, 
2011: 82). Another legislative decree for the Promotion for Private Investment (Ley Marco 
para el Crecimiento de la Inversión Privada, Legislative Decree No. 757) was approved on 
13 November 1991. With this decree, the government eliminated obstacles which could 
generate additional costs for companies‟ economic activities and resource extraction, 
including a modification of the 1990 Environmental Code (de Echave, 2009a: 297). The 
                                           
81 For the international context, see Chapter 2. 
82 Starting from August 1990, the Fujimori government implemented the stabilisation programmes, called 
Fujishock, in order to make the country‟s re-entry into the international financial community by confronting 
hyperinflation and serving external debts. The following decade saw a series of structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs) dictated by orthodox neoliberals: trade and financial liberalisation; deregulation of every 
sectors including the labour market and the land market under the banner of improving market efficiency; 
privatisation; fiscal reform involving the reorganisation of the SUNAT. For more on the process of SAPs, see 
Gonzales (1998). For the political and economic context of the neoliberal reform during the 1990s, see Chapter 
3. 
83 The Fujimori government promulgated 923 decree laws between March 1991 and December 1992 with an 
aim to implement neoliberal economic reform under the leadership of then minister of Economy and Finance, 
Carlos Boloña (Gonzales, 1998: 43).  
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regime introduced the Law of Promotion for Investment in the Mining Sector (la Ley de 
Promoción de Inversiones en el Sector Minero, Legislative Decree No. 708) on 14 November 
1991, which was designed to attract investors. The Fujimori administration identified the 
status of the mining sector as a national priority and modified the process of mining 
investment, including simplification of the mining concession process (de Echave, 2009a: 
297-298). In June 1992, the government approved the TUO (el Texto Ú nico Ordenado de la 
Ley General de Minería), via Supreme Decree No. 014-92-EM. This regulation combined a 
series of modifications to the 1981 Mining Law (Ley General de la Minería, D.S. No. 109) 
and reaffirmed the emphasis on private investment and the smaller role of the state in the 
sector, while also providing tax stability contracts and incentives (Campodónico, 1999: 17-
19).
84
 The state signed a fiscal stability contract (contratos de estabilidad tributaria) with 20 
companies which were involved in 30 mining projects according to Article 80 of the TUO (de 
Echave, 2009a: 298-299).
85
 In line with legal reforms, the government attempted to provide 
foreign corporations with another form of investment guarantees by making bilateral or 
multilateral agreements (Bury, 2011: 82). For example, the country ratified the convention of 
MIGA and entered into a bilateral agreement with 28 countries before 2000 (Bury, 2011: 82-
83). In this way, the Fujimori administration made legal changes favourable to foreign 
investors in the mining sector, which has become a priority of new development strategy. 
 As a backdrop of the privatisation policies introduced under COPRI, the Fujimori regime 
initially sold the state‟s shares in medium-scale private mining companies, such as the 
Buenaventura and Condestable mines in the 1991 and 1992, respectively (Campodónico, 
1999: 25).
86
 From late 1992 onwards, mining SOEs were officially put up for public bidding 
and sold to multinational corporations: Hierro Perú to Shougang in November 1992; during 
1993 and 1994, Cerro Verde to Cyprus Amas and Tintaya to BHP, as well as refineries at 
Cajamarquilla (to Cominco/Marubeni) and Ilo (to SPCC); and finally Centromín Perú to 
Doe Run Perú in 1997 (Campodónico, 1999: 25-27). Multinational companies were actively 
involved in the privatisation of already existing mines rather than new exploration activities, 
                                           
84 The TUO is composed of 15 titles, 54 chapters, 226 articles, 15 transitory regulations and 8 final regulations. 
85 Of 30 projects, the contract for 15 projects was for 15 years, with 14 others lasting for 10 years and with one 
until the company – the Santa María mining company – recovers its investment (de Echave, 2009a: 298-299). 
86 Since June 1991 the government started to sell SOEs (mainly primary resources and service sectors, 
including gas, electricity and telecommunications) and transfer administrative functions and services to private 
sectors (Gonzales, 1998: 55-56). As a consequence, 132 SOEs were privatised by 1997 (Gonzales, 1998: 55). 
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in which junior companies were the main participants (Campodónico, 1999: 28).
87
 As a 
result, „more than 200 mining operations were privatised in the period 1992-2000, generating 
US$ 1200 million (of) direct income‟, and by 1999 nearly 95 per cent of mining operations in 
Peru were conducted by private corporations, particularly foreign capital (Bury, 2011: 90; de 
Echave, 2009a: 294).  
 As a consequence of the mining boom stimulated by international involvement in mining 
investment and domestic economic reform, Peru has enjoyed economic growth and 
macroeconomic stability over the 1990s and 2000s. While the mining sector has only 
contributed between 4 and 6 per cent to national production over the last two decades, its 
share in the nation‟s export and FDI has an important significance.88  Mining exports 
occupied 45.5 per cent of total exports in 1997, increasing to 61.8 per cent in 2006 and to 
61.1 per cent in 2010 (ICMM, 2013: 26). During the period 2001-2003, foreign investment in 
the mining sector made up 37 per cent of total FDI (Bebbington, et al. 2007: 5). In addition, 
the proportion of FDI in the mining industry increased 65 per cent between 2002 and 2007 
(Arellano-Yanguas, 2011: 620). Moreover, the expansion in mineral exports has contributed 
to the national coffers. In 2010 alone fiscal revenues from the hydrocarbon and mining 
sectors were 20 per cent of total revenues, of which 60 per cent originated from mining 
(ICMM, 2013: 24). In the meantime, the country‟s economic structure, being dependent on 
the export of primary resources, has not been diversified to a significant degree, leading to a 
structural vulnerability to the international price of minerals. In addition, while profits were 
unequally distributed, the impact on employment and the local economy turned out to be 
weaker than expected.
89
  
 
                                           
87 Several MNCs became involved in large-scale mining projects either as part of consortiums with other 
domestic or foreign mining companies: e.g Yanacocha in Cajamarca and Antaminas in Ancash. Junior mining 
companies of Canada in particular were actively involved in the exploration of new mines: Canadian capital 
invested in Peru amounted to approximately US$ 8 billion, of which the mining and financing sectors are the 
most important: there are 90 Canadian mining companies working in Peru, most of them are junior (i.e. at 
anexploration stage). See „Inversiones canadienses en Perú suman casi US$ 8,000 millones‟, Gestión, 28 
September 2013. 
88 The proportion of mining revenues as part of GDP was 4.4 per cent in 1990, 6.6 per cent in 2005 and 4.9 per 
cent in 2011 (ICMM, 2013: 26). 
89 On the impact of mining activities on local the population and development, see Chapter 5: the case of 
Cajamarca. 
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Deregulation of Territory/Land 
Against the backdrop of a favourable investment environment, Peru has seen a mining boom 
since the 1990s. Peru is an important contributor to the production of various mineral 
resources such as copper, zinc, gold, tin and silver („the Map of the Mining Project‟, a 
Ministry of Energy and Mining‟s publication on the mining projects, both in exploration and 
production, MINEM 2013).
90
 Mining operations can be divided into three categories: large-, 
medium- and small-scales.
91
 Large-scale mining projects in Peru mainly concentrate on two 
metals – copper and gold. The Swiss-based multinational company Glencore Xstrata has been 
involved in several large-scale copper projects in central and southern Peru, including: Las 
Bambas (a US$ 4.23 billion project in Apurímac department); an important shareholder of the 
Antamina mines of the Compañía Minera Antamina (CMA) (the current portfolio comprised 
of BHP-Billiton (33.75 per cent), Xstrata (33.75 per cent), Teck Corporation (22.5 per cent), 
Mitsubishi (10 per cent) in district of San Marcos, Ancash) and Antapaccay (a US$ 1.5 
billion invested in Espinar province, Cusco).
92
 Another important copper investment is the 
Toromocho project (a US$ 4,832 million operation dominated by Chinese capital, Minera 
Chinalco Perú S.A.) in the department of Junín (district of Morococha, Yauli province).
93
 
                                           
90 In Latin American terms, Peruvian production by volume of gold, zinc and tin ranked first and copper and 
silver second. At the international level, gold occupied sixth place and zinc, tin, copper and silver each ranked 
third (see „the Map of the Mining Project‟ [MINEM, 2013], available at 
http://www.minem.gob.pe/minem/archivos/file/Mineria/PUBLICACIONES/MAPAS/2013/MP2013%20-
%20BR.pdf). 
91 There are also artisanal and small-scale mining operations conducted using low-level technology and capital 
investment. While this activity provides important employment opportunities for poor miners, it has become a 
serious challenge for the government due to its negative impact on the environment and precarious labour 
conditions. The issue of small-scale mining is beyond the focus of this dissertation, but increasing numbers of 
policymakers and academics have devoted attention to it recently, particularly the use of mercury in gold 
extraction and its impacts on health and environment (Gardner, 2012; Ashe, 2012). The incumbent Humala 
government made an effort to regulate small-scale gold mining activities in the Peruvian Amazon, particularly in 
Madre de Dios department, by ordering the registration of artisanal mining operation in February 2012, which 
caused a clash between small-scale miners and police, leaving three people dead in March the same year 
(Gardner, 2012). 
92 On 13 April 2014, Glencore Xstrata announced that it had sold the Las Bambas mines to a Chinese 
consortium (Minmetal Corp. Ltd. (62.5 per cent); GuoXin International Investment Corp. Ltd. (22.5 per cent); 
Citic Metal Co., Ltd. (15 per cent)) for US$ 5.85 billion. See „Glencore Xstrata vende Mina de Cobre Las 
Bambas en US$ 5,850 millones‟, Gestión, 13 April 2014. 
93 Increasing demands for minerals in China created its search for mineral investments around the world. Four 
Chinese mining companies – Chinalco, Minmetals, Shougang and Zijin – are expected to invest more than 
US$ 7.4 billion in various projects between 2013 and 2017 (Els, 2012, „Chinese miners to pour $7.4bn into 
Peru‟, mining.com). Chinese capital has invested in other mining projects in Peru, such as Shougang Hierro 
Perú‟s investment in the Marcona iron mine in Ica (US$ 1,480 million for the project‟s expansion), a US$2.5 
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The Cerro Verde copper project entered into its second phase of operation ($US 4.4 billion) 
in Arequipa (construction for expansion started in 2013 and its full production is expected to 
initiated from 2016),
94
 while Yanacocha‟s expansion plan of the gold mining project Conga 
(US$ 4.8 billion) is temporarily suspended due to the opposition of local residents since 
2011.
95
 
 As a consequence, more than 20 per cent of national territory is currently under mining 
concessions (CooperAcción, 2013).
96
 Nearly a third of departments have more than 40 per 
cent of their territory under mining concessions. In Moquegua more than two thirds of its 
territory is affected in this way (75.68 per cent), in Apurímac (66.45 per cent) and La 
Libertad (63.92 per cent).
97
 Alongside decree laws and tax incentives designed to promote 
mining investment, other reforms have been carried out with an aim to reduce barriers which 
were considered as unfavourable to investment conditions. Regarding mineral extraction, the 
state has the right to exploit natural resources and it is the state which concedes the authority 
for mineral extraction to a third party. However, while the mining concession contains the 
right to explore and exploit the subterranean minerals, it does not include the right to the land 
where mineral deposits are located.
98
 In 1995, the Land Law (Ley de Promoción de la 
Inversión en las Actividades Económicas en la Tierras del Territorio Nacional y de las 
Comunidades Campesinas y Nativas, or simply Ley de Tierra, Law No. 26505) was passed 
and facilitated a subordination of communal land property to mining or energy projects (Pinto, 
                                                                                                                                   
billion El Galeno project by Lumina Copper S.A.C. (a consortium of Minmetals Corporation [60 per cent] and 
Jiangxi Copper [40 per cent]) in Cajamarca. In addition, Rio Blanco copper project (US$ 1.5 billion) is invested 
by Zijin mining consortium (Zijin Mining Group [45 per cent], Tongling Nonferrous Metals Group [35 per cent] 
and Xiamen Construction and Development [20 per cent]) in Piura, despite a temporary suspension of its 
development. See „Empresas chinas son los nuevos actores de la minería peruana‟, El Comercio, 15 April, 2014. 
94 See „Cerro Verde Copper-Molybdenum Mine, Peru‟, available at http://www.mining-
technology.com/projects/cerro-verde-copper-molybdenum-mine/ (accessed 10 August 2014). 
95 Cajamarca is one of the leading departments for gold production due to the presence of the MYSA (Minera 
Yanacocha S. A.) mining complex. For the implication of MYSA‟s mineral extraction in Cajamarca, see Chapter 
5. The mobilisations against MYSA‟s recent Conga project will be treated in detail in Chapter 6. 
96  By June 2013, there were 60,647 mining concessions at national level, occupying 21.02 per cent 
(26,752,220.08 hectares) of national territory (CooperAcción, 2013, „Concesiones Mineras y Conflictos‟, 
available at http://www.cooperaccion.org.pe/Descargas-Infografias/13-12-12_Infografia13OCM.pdf). 
97 Some 57.79 per cent of the territory in the department of Ancash is under mining concession, 57. 04 per cent 
in Tacna, 53.83 per cent in Lima, 53.28 per cent in Arequipa, 52.33 per cent in Huancavelica and 45.17 per cent 
in Cajamarca (CooperAcción, 2013,„Concesiones Mineras y Conflictos‟). 
98 „The mining concession transfers the right to the exploration and exploitation of conceded natural resources 
to the title holder… The mining concession is a property distinct from the land where minerals are located‟ 
(Texto Ú nico Ordenado de la Ley General de Minería, Article 9: my translation). 
１２３ 
2009: 89). Article 11 of the law requires two thirds of votes in agreement at a general 
assembly in which community members participate when a mining company intends to 
access communal land. In 1996, the regulation of the Land Law officially recognised the 
process required for access to communal lands and stipulated that a mining company should 
make adequate compensation for land use in the case of its failure to strike a direct agreement 
with the community (de Echave, 2009a: 314).  
 
Mining and Sustainability in Peru 
Sustainable Mining 
Since the 1970s increasing attention has been devoted to the relationship between 
development and the environment. Within the international development community, 
„sustainable development‟ has become a dominant catch-all term since the 1990s, despite its 
vagueness.
99
 Regarding the mining sector, the scope of mineral extraction and its use of 
advanced technology have raised many concerns over its impact on human health and the 
environment.
100
 In the meantime, decision making regarding mineral extraction has been 
highly concentrated on the central government since rights to exploit minerals legally belong 
to the state.
101
 However, increasing pressure from international institutions and multinational 
capital to reduce state intervention in resource extraction multiplied the activities of various 
non-state actors in terms of becoming involved in decision-making processes, alongside „the 
growing relevance of transnational legal regimes for investment, such as IFC and MIGA, 
decision-making in the mining sector‟ (Himley, 2010: 3272). Simultaneously, an increased 
demand and pressure for accountability on the part of mining operations came from „national 
and international NGOs, legal agencies, and individual lawyers, a globalizing media‟ who 
were committed to sustainable development (Ballard and Bank, 2003: 289). There are several 
                                           
99  By the term international development community, I mean international development institutions, 
organisations, including IFIs, development banks, national and international development NGOs, national 
development agencies, academics, etc. 
100 The development of modern technology and its various impacts will be examined later in the chapter. 
101 „Natural resources, renewable or non-renewable, are patrimony of the Nation. The state is sovereign 
authority in their utilization. The Act determines the conditions of their use and granting to private individuals. 
Such concession grants the title-holders a real right subject to those legal regulations‟ (See Article 66, Chapter II 
Environment and Natural Resources, 1993 Constitution, available at 
http://www.congreso.gob.pe/_ingles/CONSTITUTION_29_08_08.pdf). 
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international and national NGOs which are concerned with the negative impact of mining 
activities on the environment and local communities: the U.S.-based Earthworks, OXFAM 
America, Mining Watch Canada, Mineral Policy Institute (Australia), the region-wide 
OCMAL (the Obersevatorio de Conflictos Mineros de América Latina) and the Lima-based 
CooperAcción, Red Muqui, and Cajamarca-based GRUFIDES, and so on.
102
 Some of these 
organisations became involved in a campaign designed to promote sustainable mining 
operations and to protect the environment and communities affected by mineral extraction: 
e.g. the Earthworks‟s „No dirty gold campaign‟ and Mining Watch Canada‟s involvement in 
the „Open for Justice‟ campaign.103 As Ballard and Bank elucidate, „[A] loose international 
alliance of environmental, human rights, and indigenous rights NGOs have been able to 
direct attention to particular mining projects through a series of campaigns‟ (2003: 304). The 
activities of these NGOs played a certain role in promoting policy changes in mining 
companies concerning social responsibility and environmental sustainability, despite the 
former‟s personnel and financial resources limitations (Ballard and Bank, 2003: 304).  
     Faced with pressure and the opposition to mineral extraction from civil society, the 
international mining industry sector has devoted increasing attention to sustainable mining 
                                           
102 Earthworks is „a nonprofit organization dedicated to protecting communities and the environment from the 
adverse impacts of mineral and energy development while promoting sustainable solutions‟ and is comprised of 
two organisations which were integrated in 2005: Mineral Policy Center (created in 1988) and the Oil and Gas 
Accountability Project (founded in 1999) (see http://www.earthworksaction.org/about). Mining Watch Canada is 
„a pan-Canadian initiative supported by environmental, social justice, Aboriginal and labour organisations from 
across the country‟ and created in 1999 with an aim to „address the need for a co-ordinated public interest 
response to the threats to public health, water and air quality, fish and wildlife habitat and community interests 
posed by irresponsible mineral policies and practices in Canada and around the world‟ (see 
http://www.miningwatch.ca/about-us-1). Mineral Policy Institute was founded in 1995 „in response to a 
recognised lack of capacity and expertise to engage in mining issues, particularly where Australian mining 
companies were working overseas without adequate legislation, regulation and monitoring‟ (see 
http://www.mpi.org.au/about/). OCMAL was a product of an increasing concern about mining activities across 
Latin America since 1990s and more directly concerning the meeting of various organisations in Oruro, Bolivia 
in 2007. The goal of the OCMAL is to protect communities and population who are affected mining activities in 
the region. For more on the Observatorio, see http://www.conflictosmineros.net/?view=featured. For Peruvian 
NGOs, see Chapter 6. 
103 The „No dirty gold‟ campaign was launched by the Earthworks, „an international campaign working to 
ensure that gold mining operations respect human rights and the environment. The No Dirty Gold campaign 
seeks to educate consumers, retailers, manufacturers about the impacts of irresponsible gold mining, and to 
enlist their support to persuade the mining industry to clean up its act‟ (see the Earthworks website, available at 
http://nodirtygold.earthworksaction.org/about_us). The „Open for Justice‟ campaign aims „to allow those who 
have been harmed by the international activities of Canadian mining companies to come to seek justice in 
Canada‟, in which Mining Watch Canada participated (see the Mining Watch Canada website, available at 
http://www.miningwatch.ca/get-involved/canada-must-be-open-justice-organizations-call-action-overseas-
victims-canadian-compani). 
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operations and its partnership with local communities. For example, the International Council 
on Mining and Metals (ICMM), a representative entity of leading mining companies, was 
created in 2001 in line with the industry‟s stated commitment to sustainable development.104 
Its origin dates back to 1999 when representatives of the nine largest mining companies 
(Anglo American, BHP Billiton, Codelco, Newmont, Noranda, Phelps Dodge, Placer Dome, 
Rio Tinto, and WMC Resources) gathered at the World Economic Forum at Davos and 
created the Global Mining Initiative (GMI), which initiated a two-year project, Mining, 
Minerals, and Sustainable Development (MMSD), carried out by the International Institute 
for Environment and Development in 2000 (Himley, 2010: 3273-4). The MMSD conducted 
research and analysis on the industry‟s role in sustainable development and laid the 
foundation for the creation of ICMM.
105
 In a similar vein, the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) was created by the U.K. Department for International 
Development (DFID) in 2003 against the backdrop of growing attention to the resource curse 
thesis. EITI is mainly concerned with the more transparent and accountable management of 
revenues generated by natural resource extraction and has developed into a „global rules-
based transparency standard‟.106 Since 2005 the World Bank has also started to publish an 
annual report, Extractive Industries Review (EIR), which is „a multi-stakeholder review of its 
support for extractive industries in the fight against poverty‟.107 In this sense, the World Bank 
has set a goal for the extractive industry (EI): „to help developing countries provide their 
                                           
104 ICMM „brings together 22 mining and metals companies (Barrick, Mitsubishi Materials, Rio Tinto, Teck, 
BHP-Billton, Gold Fields, Newmont, Vale, etc.) and 32 national and regional mining associations and global 
commodity associations‟, available at http://www.icmm.com/about-us/about-us. 
105 „The MMSD project recognized the industry‟s potential contributions to society, identified core challenges 
and established an agenda for implementing change which would become the foundation of ICMM‟s mandate‟ 
available at http://www.icmm.com/about-us/about-us 
106 With the growing interest of academics in resource curse as well as pressure from civil society organisations, 
Tony Blair, then British prime minister, initiated an idea of the EITI at a speech for the 2002 UNCSD in 
Johannesburg. Subsequently, in June 2003, DFID „convened a meeting of civil society, company, and 
government representatives in London‟ and „a statement of Principles (12 EITI Principles) to increase 
transparency of payments and revenues in the extractive sector was agreed‟. „Over 40 institutional investors 
signed on to a State of support for the EITI‟. Showing an agreement with the initiative, the G8 urged the IMF 
and the WB to provide governments committed to the EITI with technical and financial support and the WB 
established the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) for the EITI in 2004. While the EITI was mainly administered 
by the DFID initiative between 2002 and 2006, the EITI was more institutionalised with the creation of the 
International Secretariat in 2007 (cited in the EITI website, available at http://eiti.org/eiti/history). 
107 Cited in 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/Industry_EXT_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/Industries/Oil%2C
+Gas+and+Mining/Development_Impact/Development_Impact_Extractive_Industries_Review/ 
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people with access to clean, affordable, and sustainable sources of energy and to ensure that 
extractive industries contribute to economic growth, sustainable development and poverty 
reduction‟ (World Bank, 2004: iv). According to Triscritti, national governments and 
international organisations have also made investment with a commitment to sustainable 
development: a four-year project which aimed to develop headwaters governance system 
initiated by the Netherlands government in 2004; another four-year conflict mediation project 
for Peru was supported by the European Union in 2006; and USAID (the United State 
Agency for International Development) has sponsored the Poverty, Reduction and 
Alleviation (PRA) project with mining companies since 2008, contributing to reducing social 
tensions in mining communities (Triscritti, 2013: 441). 
 
Sustainable Environmental „Management‟ 
Against this backdrop and faced with increasing opposition to neoliberal mineral extraction, 
the Peruvian government started to take an ambiguous and rather contradictory position, by 
integrating a certain „sustainability‟ component into policy-making considerations which was 
designed to promote environmental sustainability and social responsibility.
108
 One of the 
WB‟s policy guidelines and recommendations for governments, mining companies and IFIs – 
including the IFC – is to mitigate environmental and social risks: „social and environmental 
assessments, community participation in monitoring of projects, as well as other more 
technical guidelines that related specifically to EI including the use of cyanide, mine closure, 
tailings disposal and waste management, and acid rock drainage‟ (World Bank, 2004: 7). In 
this vein, while the Fujimori government promoted mining investment, it was obliged to 
adopt an environmental management model in accordance with World Bank criteria in order 
to receive its financial support (de Echave, 2009a: 301). The Reglamento para la Protección 
Ambiental en la Actividad Minero-Metalúrgica (D.S. N. 016-93-EM) was approved in May 
1993, namely a regulation on the environment which was included in the 15
th
 Title of the 
TUO of the Mining Law. This legal norm recognised the Ministry of Energy and Mining 
(MINEM) as the exclusive authority for environmental administration in the mining sector. 
                                           
108 When it comes to social responsibility, debates closely related to the literature on participatory, grassroots 
democracy and community-led development across the region have taken place(discussion on this issue is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation): e.g., participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, participation in 
community councils in Venezuela, etc. For more information on the subject, see Cameron et al. (2012); Cannon 
and Kirby (2012). 
１２７ 
As a result, MINEM played a role both as the promoter of mining investment while acting as 
environmental regulator, representing the limitation of environmental regulations in the sector, 
which has become an important cause of social conflict.
109
 Since environmental management, 
including the control and mitigation of environmental contamination generated by mining 
activities, was important only within a potential range which does not include discouraging 
investment in the sector. In addition, it introduced mechanisms for the environmental 
supervision of mining activities, including the Programme for Adaptation and Environmental 
Management (Programa de Adecuación y Manejo Ambiental, PAMA) and the Environmental 
Impact Assessment (Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, EIA). Mining operations in progress 
before 1993 were obliged to submit a plan, the PAMA, to mitigate or eliminate the 
contamination generated by their mining or metallurgic activities prior to commencing 
operations. The EIA is a legal obligation with which companies with mining concessions 
should comply in order to initiate any exploitation. Despite these efforts, Peru has not 
developed integral institutional monitoring and regulations for environmental management. 
Rather, Peruvian regulations for environmental management have been subordinated to each 
industrial sector.  
 In the face of accusations regarding legal limitations, the Ley Marco del Sistema Nacional 
de Gestión Ambiental (Law No. 28245) was approved in 2004 in an effort to promote integral 
environmental regulations. In October 2005, the Toledo government promulgated the 
Environmental Law (Ley General del Ambiente, Law No. 28661). However, the law still has 
limitations, including: „the necessity of preventive measures are depreciated‟; „a claimant has 
the responsibility to submit the evidence of environmental damage‟; „there is no unitary 
authority to control environmental issues and to impose sanctions over environmental 
damage‟; and „the international standards for environmental management were only used as a 
reference point while domestic standard were not definitively established‟ (Pinto, 2009: 96). 
Finally, the Ministry of the Environment (Ministerio del Medio Ambiente, MINAM) was 
created (Decree Law No. 1013) in 2008. MINAM was only given limited authority to provide 
technical advice and plays a subsidiary role in terms of environmental issues related to 
mining activities. As Pinto points out, „the environmental system was created in an 
undemocratic context and established unfavourable environmental criteria in exchange for 
promoting investment in the extractive industry‟ (2009: 97). As a result, the decision-making 
                                           
109 On the correlation between lax environmental regulation and socio-environmental conflict, see Chapter 6 on 
resistance to the Conga mining project in Cajamarca. 
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process lacks transparency and remains centralised in the executive, while regulation remains 
fragmented along sectoral lines, bureaucratic procedures favour multinationals while 
marginalising local communities (Pinto, 2009: 97). While environmental consideration can 
not be ignored in the context of increasing international and national concerns on sustainable 
mineral extraction, it has only been left to oversee a very limited environmental criteria, i.e. 
environmental management of mitigation and control. As will be examined later, this 
restricted aspect regarding the environment and its relation with mineral extraction has 
become a significant arena for contestation, representing the limitation of the Peruvian 
development model and democracy. 
 
„Canon Minero‟: Decentralisation and Social Distribution  
Alongside environmental management, another component of sustainable mining has much 
to do with the social aspect, i.e. participation of local communities in the distribution of 
benefits generated by mineral extraction. This participatory element of sustainability is 
closely related to democratic reform, particularly after the demise of Fujimori regime. One of 
the democratic reform initiatives in the post-Fujimori era included decentralisation.
110
The 
main cause for the canon minero is that local communities might benefit through the 
distribution of tax revenues paid by mining enterprises.
111
 As mentioned above, subterranean 
natural resources legally belong to the state. Their exploitation is possible as companies gain 
concession rights for extraction which are administered by the state. Local communities do 
not have a direct right to these resources and can only benefit via the canon. Between 1996 
and 2013, approximately S/. 33 billion (nearly US$ 1,357 million, at an exchange rate, US$ 1 
= S/. 2.8) were distributed to regional and local governments in the name of canon minero 
                                           
110 Under the Toledo regime (2001-2006) major constitutional changes were introduced for the decentralisation 
process in 2002 and 2003: notably the Ley de Bases de la Decentralización (Law No. 27783); Leyes Orgánicas 
de Gobiernos Regionales y de Municipalidades (Laws No. 27867 and No. 27972). For more on the 
decentralisation, see McNulty (2011); Ballón (2011); Bland and Chirinos (2014); Crabtree (2014). 
111 There are six types of canon – forestry, hydro-energy, fishing, mining, oil and gas – and each has a distinct 
system of calculation. The canon minero is „part of the regular corporate tax revenue paid by mining companies 
to government‟ (Bebbington, et al. 2007: 34). It is „the special arrangements for the geographical redistribution 
of the corporate tax that is paid on income generated by mineral extraction‟ (Bebbington, et al. 2007: 34-35). 
Since the canon depends on corporate income, the amount of tax varies depending on international prices of 
minerals, the management of mining companies and their profits. In an extreme case, if the mineral price is low 
and the company cannot make high profits from extraction, the canon cannot be levied (de Echave and Diez, 
2013; Barrantes, 2005). 
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(„Reporte Canon Minero‟, SNMPE, 2013). However, the transfer of the canon concentrated 
on a few departments. If you look at the proportion of the distributed canon in July 2013, 
only six departments have received more than 70 per cent: Ancash (S/. 935 million, 25 per 
cent); La Libertad (S/. 519 million, 14 per cent); Cajamarca (S/. 502 million, 13 per cent); 
Arequipa (S/. 424 million, 11 per cent); Moquegua (S/. 282 million, 7 per cent); and Tacna 
(S/. 239 million, 6 per cent). This unequal distribution has intensified compared to 2007, 
when six departments which composed 16 per cent of the total population obtained more than 
50 per cent of the fiscal resources (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011: 623).
112
  
 The distribution regime of fiscal resources to regional and local governments has changed 
several times and each modification has been ad hoc in nature in order to quell social protests 
against mining projects (see Table 1). In parallel to the decentralisation reform process, 
changing the allocation of fiscal bonanzas from central to sub-national governments was 
underlined. In 2001, the distribution of the canon minero from central government to 
production regions rose from 20 to 50 per cent with the passage of the Ley de Canon Minero 
(Law No. 27506). This increase was achieved against a backdrop of decentralisation 
initiatives and rising socio-environmental conflicts across the country. The distribution of the 
canon was mainly oriented to quell social unrest related to mining operations, instead of 
reversing the fiscal regime favourable to global capitals. However, as Arellano-Yanguas 
(2011) has observed, this law could not satisfy both local communities and the state. On the 
one hand, devolution of the canon was biased in favour of the cities rather than to those rural 
municipalities where resources are mostly extracted. On the other hand, rather than meeting 
local needs, the government is more concerned that this legal change might undermine 
investment stability. After much discussion, a new Ley de Canon (Law No. 28077) was 
introduced in 2004, whereby the central state ensured the maintenance of tax exemptions for 
companies under tax stability contracts, while the destination of the revenues distribution was 
changed by prioritising localities where minerals are extracted. This modification was the 
government‟s ad hoc response to increasing social protests of local communities against 
mineral extraction, rather than providing a fundamental answer to the problem of unequal 
distribution. Later, this new law was modified in order to prioritise the municipalities of 
„districts‟ where minerals are extracted (Law No. 28332). As a result, the canon regime 
favoured communities directly affected by extraction rather than considering the wider 
                                           
112 Those six departments include Ancash, Tacna, Cusco, Cajamarca, Moquegua and Pasco. 
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picture of poverty, or the state of social provision, such as health, education or local facilities. 
In this sense, social distribution of economic windfall, an integral part of sustainable mining, 
did not materialise, the canon becoming a contested arena for different power and social 
relations. 
 Alongside the canon minero, successive governments have introduced policy changes 
rather than implementing tax regime reform. The second García administration (2006-2011) 
introduced the Popular Solidarity Mining Programme (Programa Minero de Solidaridad con 
el Pueblo, PMSP) in 2006. This represented a voluntary donation (better known as the óbolo 
minero) by the mining companies.
113
 The óbolo minero was criticised for being the result of 
non-transparent negotiations between a „captured‟ state and mining corporations since the 
measure did not address the controversial issues of taxing extraordinary profits and tax 
exemption contracts. It allowed mining corporations to make a „voluntary‟ contribution to 
invest in social or community development programmes in production regions over the 
following five years.
114
 The Humala administration also faced political and social pressure to 
reform the tax regime. Within two months, the government promulgated several legal 
changes (D.S. 173-2011-EF): a modification of the mining royalty law (Ley de la Regalía 
Minera, Law No. 29788); the introduction of a special tax on mining (Ley del Impuesto 
Especial a la Minería, Law No. 29789) and the gravamen minero (Ley del Gravamen 
Especial a la Minería, Law, No. 29790). When it comes to the royalty, the Law on Mining 
Royalty (Ley de la Regalía Minera, Law No. 28258) was first introduced in 2004 (see Table 
1). According to this law, mining companies were obliged to pay tax at a fixed rate (between 
one and three per cent), while those companies with a tax stability contract were exempted. 
With the modification, royalties were levied at a flexible rate (one to twelve per cent) based 
on operating income (las utilidades operativas) rather than total sales profits (la venta). In 
contrast to the first two, the gravamen minero is applied to companies holding a tax 
                                           
113 This policy was synchronised with mining industry‟s interests within the framework of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), which will be examined in the next section. 
114 As Manrique points out, the outcome of the implementation of the óbolo minero is limited considering the 
total amount involved, unenthusiastic participation levels and slow and inefficient investment. Mining 
companies deposited more than S/. 1.7 billion in the name of the óbolo between January 2007 and January 2011, 
short of the estimated amount (S/. 2.5 billion). Moreover, 15 mining companies out of the 39 who made an 
agreement with the government, contributed more than 90 per cent of the óbolo. In total, 62 per cent of the 
deposited contribution has been used for investment, showing the inefficient management of the fund (Manrique, 
„Impuesto a las sobreganacias debe reemplazar al óbolo minero‟, La República, 6 March 2011). 
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exemption, even in a voluntary manner.
115
 In sum, the implementation of the canon minero 
and royalty did not produce impressive results due to its unequal distribution, lack of 
coordination between different levels of government and inefficient administration. As 
Arellano-Yanguas points out, canon and royalty were transferred to sub-national governments 
without consideration of „real needs‟, resulting in „the implementation of a myriad of tiny 
projects with little impact in terms of structural development‟ (2008: 33-34). In addition, 
successive administrations introduced short-term social programmes or community 
development schemes at the discretion of mining companies, instead of reforming fiscal 
regulations in a fundamental way. In this way, despite legal changes in the post-Fujimori 
period, the Peruvian state turned out to be „decentralising‟ social conflicts to sub-national 
governments, which will be examined later more in detail.  
 
Table 1. Distribution of the Canon Minero and Royalties to Sub-National Governments 
                         
Jurisdiction 
Year and Law  
Regional 
Government 
Municipalities of 
the Department 
with Mineral 
Extraction 
Municipalities of 
the Province with 
Mineral 
Extraction 
Municipalities of 
the District with 
Mineral 
Extraction 
Pre-2002 
Canon minero law, 1992 
 60% 40%  
2002 
Law on Canon (Law No. 27506), 
2001 
 
20% 
 
60% 
 
20% 
 
2004 
New Law on Canon (Law 28077) 
25% (5% to 
National University 
in the region) 
40% 25% 10% 
2004 
Law on Mining ‘Royalty’ (Law 
28258) 
20% ( 5% to 
National University 
in the region) 
40% 20% 20% 
     Source: de Echave and Diez (2013) 
 
                                           
115 The government was expected to make an agreement with mining companies in order to apply the gravamen 
minero. However, the main concern for the government was that its implementation should not be to a level that 
discourages investment incentives in the sector. 15 mining companies which are inscribed to 18 stability 
contracts would be the object of this new regulation. According to MINEM, an important fiscal resource was 
expected to be gained since these companies have contributed nearly 60 per cent of mining income tax 
(„Gobierno promulgó reglamento del gravamen especial al sector minero‟, La República, 29 September 2011). 
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CSR: Community-Based Development and Social License  
The third dimension of sustainable mining is closely associated with the industry‟s move 
toward sustainable development and its investment in community development by 
incorporating the participation of local denizens in the management of local natural resources 
and the design of community development programmes. Alongside its growing emphasis on 
clean and modern mining technology, this focus on a „participatory‟ component has a 
particular implication under the frameworks of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
Against the backdrop of increasing opposition to mineral extraction, mining companies have 
started to recognise the necessity to gain social legitimacy in order to continue their 
operations. The concept of CSR originated in the World Bank‟s regulatory regime on „public 
sector infrastructure projects‟ and its negative impacts on local communities and later 
expanded to the private sector (Szablowski, 2002: 248).
116
 Those mining projects to which 
IFC and MIGA provide financing should comply with Operational Directive 4.30 
(Szablowski, 2002: 248). As Szablowski puts it, „[O]ver the last ten years, an increasing 
number of mining transnationals have adopted and publicized Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) policies dealing with social, environmental, and ethical issues‟ (2002: 
249). In line with measures, such as óbolo minero or gravamen minero, mining companies 
invested in social or development programmes with the increasing participation of local 
communities.  
 Some authors have argued for rise of „good governance‟ or „public-private partnership‟ 
among various actors in the context of the decreasing role of the state in public service 
provision (Triscritti, 2013; Sagebien and Lindsay, 2011). Pointing out the necessity of good 
governance for sustainable mining, Triscritti emphasises the „increased consultation and 
participation of local communities in the management of natural resources was needed in 
order to ensure sustainable mining practices‟ (2013: 438). On the other hand, it is argued that 
mining companies become involved in these programmes as another regulating form of 
accumulation in the context of the decreasing regulating power of the state. Himley argues, 
„institutional arrangements… serve[s] to stabilize accumulation in the extractive economy… 
                                           
116 The WB‟s Operational Directive 4.30 (on Involuntary Resettlement) well represented the concept. The 
objective of the Directive is „to ensure that the population displaced by a project receives benefits from it‟ 
(Operative Directive 4.30. Para. 3). It suggests that while cash compensation is not sufficient, „land-based 
resettlement strategies‟ are recommended (Para 4). When they are not available, „non-land based strategies built 
around opportunities for employment or self-employment may be used‟ (Para. 4). 
１３３ 
as having a governing effect on a variety of populations and environments‟ (2013: 399). In 
explaining the local employment programme of the Barrick mining corporation as part of 
CSR in communities at the nearby Pierina mine (Ancash department), Himley argues that it 
can be „viewed as an effort to (at least temporarily) regularize large-scale mining and ensure 
continued accumulation‟ (2013: 395, emphasis in the original).117  In other words, the 
programmes were created as a way to „address the potential for social opposition‟ and gain 
social license for mineral extraction by distributing economic, though temporary, opportunity 
created by mining activities among local communities (Himley, 2013: 395).
118
 As with the 
distribution of the canon, the social provisions or community development programmes 
resulted in „privatising‟ disputes by directing demands by local communities at the mining 
companies. As will be examined later, this engagement of the mining company as an 
important regulator provided a converging space for contention among various actors. 
 
 
4.3. Socio-Environmental Protests in Contemporary Peru 
Mining and Associated Struggles: Past and Present  
Before the late 1990s disputes related to the mining industry were connected more to labour 
issues, such as struggles for better working conditions and wage increases, particularly in the 
central highlands. As mentioned above, major copper mines were labour-intensive in the first 
half of the twentieth century. As a consequence, mining unions and leftist parties were 
involved in this type of struggle. Under the influence of APRA, in the period between 1945 
and 1969 miners‟ activism was motivated largely by economistic concerns and party political 
interests. Following the legalisation of the CGTP in 1969, one of the most important miners‟ 
federations, the FNTMMSP (Federación Nacional de Trabajadores Mineros, Metalúrgicos y 
Sinderúrgico del Perú), was created. By the late 1970s some unions took a radical clasista 
stance in line with radical leftist parties.
119
 However, the advent of „new extraction‟, political 
re-democratisation and the rise of civil society organisations changed the dynamic of mining 
                                           
117 For more on Barrick‟s CSR programme, see the next section. 
118 For conditions to gain social license, see Prno (2013). 
119 For more on miners‟ struggles in the central highlands before the 1990s, see DeWind (1977); Dore (1988); 
Laite (1980); Balbi (1989). 
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conflicts from the late 1990s.
120
 Taking the La Oroya case as an example, since the Cerro de 
Pasco Corporation opened the metallurgic complex in 1922, the district of La Oroya 
(province of Yauli, Junín department) has depended heavily on mining activities, attracting 
migrant workers from nearby regions and stimulating local commercial activities (Scurrah et 
al., 2008: 70-71). From its inception, locals expressed their concerns about the air pollution 
generated by smelting activities and its effect on their health, such as lead-poisoning, in 
addition to the impact on agricultural produce and livestock. The initial reaction of the 
company to environmental accusations was limited to short-term solutions rather than solving 
the root of the problem. As mentioned previously, Cerro bought the affected land and 
established a livestock raising division (División Ganadera). In the meantime, the presence of 
the metallurgic complex and its negative environmental consequences discouraged peasants 
from accessing land for agricultural production and the raising of livestock, facilitating their 
proletarianisation in comparison to other mining sites where access to land proved viable 
(Scurrah, 2008: 77). Unions and the local populations were more concerned with socio-
economic issues, such as wages and working conditions and considered contamination as a 
secondary problem (Scurrah, 2008: 84). In the late 1990s, however, the question of 
contamination and disquiet about local citizens‟ health conditions gained the attention of 
national as well as international NGOs committed to sustainable development and the 
environment. In late 2002, the health issue became a priority in the relationship between the 
newly privatised company, the Doe Run Perú S.R.L., and local communities (Scurrah, 2008: 
85-88).
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 Regarding the increasing incidences which are closely related to the rise in international 
mining prices, the democratic socio-political environment in the post-Fujimori era and the 
                                           
120 The rest of the chapter will be dedicated to socio-environmental conflicts related to large-scale mining 
projects in Peru. The re-democratisation process began after the fall of the authoritarian Fujimori government in 
2000. Although there have been various attempts at democratic reform, the market-oriented economic policies 
based on the export of primary goods have not changed under successive governments: Toledo (2001-2006); 
García (2006-2011); and the incumbent Humala (2011- ). 
121 One of the central points for dispute between local residents and the company was the latter‟s various 
attempts to extend the PAMA deadline, an obligation for mining projects which have already been conducting 
mineral extraction before 1993. The company had to submit a plan for the mitigation of environmental 
contamination generated by its activities. Doe Run Perú intended to delay this obligation, arguing that 
contamination was caused by previous activities from the Cerro and the Centromín Perú era prior to 
privatisation. Given fierce polarisation over the issue, the company also claimed that the contamination was 
generated by traffic as well as the lack of sanitary awareness among the local population. In the end, the 
government made a decision favourable to the company, leading to an escalation of the dispute. For more on this 
conflict in La Oroya, see Scurrah (2008). 
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different dynamics behind disputes related to mining activities, it is possible to refer to the 
Peruvian Ombudsman‟s office (Defensoría del Pueblo), which has published a monthly 
report on social conflicts since May 2004. The purpose of its publication is „to provide the 
state, companies, leaders of social organisations, the media and the population in general with 
information on actors, problems and unfolding of social conflicts registered by the 
Defensoría‟ (Defensoría Report No. 119, my translation).122 A recent report registered 214 
cases in June 2014 („Reporte de Conflictos Sociales‟ No. 124).123 Of these, 63.1 per cent 
(135 cases) relate to socio-environmental issues. According to the Office, socio-
environmental protests are caused not only by disputes over „the control, use and access to 
environment and natural resources‟, but also related to „political, economic, social and 
cultural questions‟ (Defensoría Report No. 124). 124  While conflicts related to socio-
environmental matters occupied 15-20 per cent of the total by 2006, the proportion has risen, 
making up more than 40 per cent in the second half of 2007, nearly 50 per cent since 2008 
and more than 60 per cent since mid-2012 (see Appendix 1). In particular, the mining sector 
was the main cause of socio-environmental grievances, totalling 98 cases in June 2014 (72.6 
per cent), followed by the hydrocarbon industry (17 cases). As mentioned already, mining 
activities became one of the most important promoters for the country‟s economic growth 
since the early 1990s. However, at the same time it has become one of the principal reasons 
for social conflicts, particularly since the late 1990s.
125
  
      
 
                                           
122
 The Defensoría prepares its monthly report based on „the information provided by the actors involved via its 
28 regional branches and other complementary information sources‟ (Defensoría Report, No. 119, my 
translation). By distributing its publications, the institution intends to „prevent‟ social conflicts, to play an 
„intermediary role‟ between the actors involved (rather than addressing disputes directly) and sometimes 
provides a legal advisory or defence service in the case of human rights abuses. 
123 Since 2009 reported disputes have totalled more than 200 cases monthly. The number peaked in September 
2009 (288 cases), and the period between June and November 2009 was recorded as the most serious in 
numerical terms.  
124 The Defensoría categorised 10 types of disputes: those related to national/regional/local government; socio-
environmental; territorial demarcation; illegal cultivation of coca leaves; labour; communal; electoral and others.  
125 According to a Defensoría‟s special report, titled „The Extractive Activities and Socio-Environmental 
Conflicts in Peru‟, a total of 30 cases of socio-environmental conflicts have been registered between May 2004 
and February 2007, and 77 per cent of those (23 cases) were caused by mining activities (Defensoría, 2007). 
During this period, socio-environmental conflicts were concentrated in 13 departments and Cajamarca turned 
out to be the department with the highest frequency of conflicts (eight cases), followed by Ancash, Cusco and 
Pasco with three cases each respectively (Defensoría, 2007). 
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New Mineral Extraction: An Arena for Contention 
The now famous comment „el síndrome del perro del hortelano‟ („the dog in the manger 
syndrome‟), uttered by ex-president Alan García, one of the most enthusiastic proponents for 
neoliberal extractivism, is often repeated by other leftist presidents in the region. García 
argued for the necessity of the extractive industry for the country‟s „development‟ and 
„poverty reduction‟ and criticised indigenous peoples‟ opposition to extraction in the 
country‟s Amazonian regions due to their having „the dog in the manger syndrome‟. In his 
justification of the expansion of hydrocarbon extraction and in his criticising of NGOs‟ 
„naivety‟ in opposing this expansion, the Bolivian president Evo Morales said: „What, then, is 
Bolivia going to live off if some NGOs say “Amazonia without oil”? They are saying, in 
other words, that the Bolivian people ought not to have money, that there should be neither 
IDH [a direct tax on hydrocarbons used to fund government investments] nor royalties, and 
also that there should be no Juancito Pinto, Renta Dignidad nor Juana Azuerduy [cash-
transfer and social programs]‟ (cited in Bebbington, 2009: 16). In an interview the 
Ecuadorian president, Rafael Correa, fiercely criticised opponents of natural resource 
extraction and argued for the rationale of development based on extractive industries. Correa 
said: „It is madness to say no to natural resources, which is what part of the left is proposing – 
no to oil, no to mining, no to gas, no to hydroelectric power, no to roads. This is an infantile 
left, which can only legitimate the right…We cannot lose sight of the fact that the main 
objective of a country such as Ecuador is to eliminate poverty. And for that we need our 
natural resources…What we need to do is exploit those resources in the right way… the 
proper exploitation of natural resources can help to conserve nature rather than destroying it‟ 
(Interview with Rafael Correa, in New Left Review, 2012: 95-96). Regardless of political 
positions, new mineral extraction has become important for „national development‟. In this 
sense, opposition to this extractivism underwent fierce criticism from government and mining 
interests, opponents being denounced as anti-mining, anti-development, naïve leftists or 
radical environmentalists. This part of the chapter intends to show that this bifurcated 
perspective on mining vs. anti-mining, or development vs. under-development, makes it hard 
to understand the complex dynamics of socio-environmental conflicts that are imbued with 
diverse social and power relations. 
 As intensive forms of mineral extraction, i.e. „new extraction‟, expanded across the 
country from the 1990s, socio-environmental conflicts followed suit (Bebbington, 2009). A 
substantial academic literature has attempted to account for the relationship between large-
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scale mining projects and the nature of these disputes in Peru (Bebbington, 2007, 2008b, 
2009, 2011, 2013; Arellano-Yanguas, 2008, 2011; de Echave, 2009a; Defensoría, 2007). 
Among the explanations advanced figure the following: opposition against the mining project 
itself; mobilisations demand a greater distribution of benefits or socio-economic opportunities; 
and concerns surrounding the state‟s obvious regulatory deficiency regarding environmental, 
socio-economic and human rights (Bebbington, 2007). Based on a political-ecological 
approach, Bebbington et al. (2008b; 2011) also point out other roots of socio-environmental 
conflicts: „accumulation by exploitation‟; „accumulation by dispossession‟; and „colonisation 
of lifeworld‟. In the meantime, de Echave et al. (2009a) examined the „why‟ and „how‟ of 
socio-environmental grassroots activism based on social movement theory. They categorised 
four types of conflicts with two variables: perception of impacts caused by mining operations 
on local communities, and the existing level of social organisation (2009a: 196-198). 
Additionally, the Defensoría (2007) detailed the origins of conflicts, including concern 
regarding possible environmental contamination, the hitherto negative record of mining 
activities, lack of respect for the fundamental rights of local citizens, insensitive corporate 
behaviour, and popular distrust of state institutions vis-à-vis environmental management. 
Overall, neoliberal forms of mineral extraction have become an area for contention among 
various actors. Alongside the lack of appropriate state regulations, additional attention to 
sustainable development and participatory democracy complicated protest dynamics further, 
and embraced diverse interests among different agencies (the state, mining company, regional 
and local government, and local communities), as well as different interpretations on the 
relationship between mineral extraction, „development‟ and „democracy‟. Consequently, in 
order to understand the nature and dynamics of socio-environmental conflicts, it is necessary 
to examine the diverse social and power relations surrounding mineral extraction. In this 
sense, the following sections will analyse four characteristics of contemporary disputes. 
 
„Decentralising‟ Conflicts 
First, socio-environmental conflicts have much to do with neoliberal structural reforms. As 
mentioned, the Fujimori government (1990-2000) carried out economic reform policies with 
the aim to attract foreign investors in the mining sector. A favourable tax regime was 
introduced so that multinational mining companies benefited from stability of contracts with 
ridiculously low rates of tax and royalty obligations. Increasing corporate profits caused by 
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the rise in international mineral prices after the early 2000s made a stark contrast with the 
impoverished population who live in mineral extraction communities. As a consequence, 
reform of the fiscal regime has become a central issue for public debate, with some 
protagonists calling for the modification or cancellation of fiscal incentives for transnational 
mining companies via tax stability contracts. The state came under increasingly intense 
pressure to implement legal changes given the rising number of socio-environmental conflicts. 
Rather than introducing tax reform, successive governments in the post-Fujimori era changed 
the regulations on the distribution of the canon minero, placing them under subnational 
jurisdictions, hand-in-hand with a decentralisation process. This matched increasing public 
attention about sustainable mining with more concerns relating to the social distribution of 
economic gains. However, rather than quelling social conflicts related to mining activities, 
the transfer of the canon fuelled more disputes among various actors as the abundant fiscal 
revenues became an arena for contention. Focusing more on the correlation between 
distribution of fiscal resources and the rise of social tensions in a decentralisation context, 
Arellano-Yanguas argues that increases in tax revenues generated by the mining boom 
between 2004 and 2009 tended to generate more conflict (Arellano-Yanguas, 2008; 2011). He 
explains that the distribution of the canon minero to sub-national governments motivated 
additional conflict among various actors, including: disputes between local residents and 
local/regional governments regarding the former‟s accusation of the latter‟s administrative 
incapacity; among different levels of government over distribution of the canon minero; 
territorial demarcation; and labour conflicts (Arellano-Yanguas, 2008; 2011). 
 First, despite the large amount of fiscal resources transferred to regional and local 
governments, they were not well prepared to administer the canon effectively against the 
backdrop of high expectations among local communities. As Arellano-Yanguas elucidates, 
„the lack of implementation of initiative and the quality of projects‟ made people living in 
local mineral-producing communities accuse local authorities of its inefficient administration‟ 
(2011: 632). This also enabled the Lima government to denounce local or regional authorities 
for their administrative incapacity to invest the canon minero effectively. In particular, 
conflicts became more frequent in communities located in departments, such as Ancash and 
Tacna, where a large quantity of the canon was transferred (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011: 632). 
Second, the asymmetrical or ad hoc nature of the canon distribution further complicated the 
local dynamics. Since changes in legal regulations on its transfer were made in particular as a 
response to rising opposition to mineral extraction, they have prioritised communities where 
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mining activities are in process. As a consequence, territorial demarcation between different 
departments, provinces or districts has become an important and contested point since it can 
make a big difference in terms of the amount of the transferred canon. In the case of 
Moquegua, the regional government had 23 territorial conflicts with the neighbouring 
departments of Tacna, Puno and Arequipa, while municipalities are also in conflict within the 
department for the same reason (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011: 632). Thirdly, against the backdrop 
of an incomplete decentralisation process, resource abundance also became an object of 
power struggles. For example, local politicians often led protests against mining activities in 
order to gain political legitimacy among the local electorate, presenting themselves as a 
defender of the latter in gaining more socio-economic benefits. At the same time, they 
contested the proposed mineral extraction as „a pre-emptive move against the pressure of 
citizens (on municipal mayors) or mayors (on regional presidents)‟ (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011: 
632). In this way, devolution of the canon multiplied the actors involved, complicating social 
and power relations, as well as opening up possibilities for contention. 
 
„Privatising‟ Conflicts  
Alongside the decentralisation of fiscal revenues, the reformed tax regime also left mining 
companies with a space to participate in local development by creating social funds and 
implementing community development programmes, a measure suitable for mining 
companies‟ CSR framework. For example, the Minera Barrick Misquichilca, S.A. (herafter 
Barrick), a Peruvian subsidiary of the Toronto-based Barrick Gold Corporation, invested in a 
diversity of development programmes in 18 communities which are located in the area of 
influence of the Pierina gold mine, located to the north of Huaraz city, Ancash department.
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According to Himley, Barrick has become an indispensable agent in promoting local 
development, particularly in the neighbourhood of the mine site (2010: 3283). Its 
implementation of community development programmes, such as a local employment 
programme, health, education and infrastructure investment, have helped it establish 
authority in the relationship between the mining company and local population, by providing 
an opportunity for the social distribution of mining extraction (Himley, 2013: 396). While this 
has permitted the company to gain social legitimacy to continue with its operations, it has 
                                           
126 Apart from the Pierina mine, Barrick gold conducts another gold mining operation in the department of La 
Libertad, the Laguna Norte mine, located 140 kilometres east of the city of Trujillo. 
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created a public image of socially responsible mining committed to sustainable development 
(Himley, 2013: 405-406). Moreover, these programmes have helped establish favourable 
conditions for the company. As Himley argues, „the local employment initiative at Pierina … 
[was] to establish the terms of debate regarding mining‟s development contributions, to limit 
the scope of residents‟ demands, and to foreclose the possibility of more radical or systemic 
change‟ (2013: 396). As a consequence, local people‟s demands to Barrick centred on the 
distribution of additional material benefits, i.e. „privatising‟ social conflicts (Himley, 2010: 
3284). In this fashion, the private sector has become a target for local claim-making, 
particularly around the distribution of material benefits, while maintaining considerable 
leeway to set the terms of debates on local development. While Barrick can define „what is 
possible in regards to community residents‟ involvement with the mining economy‟, it has 
opened up a socio-political space for contention targeting the mining company itself (Himley, 
2013: 410). In similar vein, local communities have sometimes opposed a new mining project 
or expansion of a pre-existing project, as they intended to utilise the protest as a negotiating 
strategy vis-à-vis mining companies and thus gain more material benefits (Arellano-Yanguas, 
2011: 630). They have often demanded the delivery of previously unfulfilled promises from 
an enterprise in the context of rising mineral prices and fair compensation for land sales 
undertaken in the initial mine construction stage (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011: 630).  
 
Territory, Indigenous Rights and Participation (ILO Convention 169) 
High mineral prices and thus large multinational profits stand in stark contrast to the 
marginalisation of most local populations where mining is prevalent. Public awareness 
regarding company profitability helps explain why many local communities protesting 
against mining activities mainly demand extra participation in the distribution of socio-
economic benefits, rather than opposing mining itself. The following two sections will 
examine other aspects of mining-related disputes. Most mining activities are conducted in the 
already-marginalised rural highlands, inhabited by poor peasants or indigenous people long 
neglected by the state policies. As mentioned, the granting of mining concessions has 
therefore complicated the nature of social conflicts as they have become entangled with 
longstanding problems around question of ethnicity, poverty and political exclusion. The 
division between the surface and the subterranean has become a key area of dispute. If 
deposits are located in peasant communities, things turn particularly complicated for mining 
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companies since they need grassroots consent for access. To compound matters, in the 
highlands much land has no or imprecise land-titling. Increasingly, mining concessions are 
granted to mining companies to explore and exploit mineral deposits which are located within 
peasant communities. By 2013, the proportion of overlapping between mineral deposits and 
peasant communities rose to 48.6 per cent, becoming an important cause of conflicts.
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 As 
noted, changes in land regulation represent different perspectives between the state and local 
communities on land/territory. To the state and mining interests, it is important to guarantee 
property rights in order to ensure that companies with concessions can access land and 
proceed in mining deposits. In contrast, to peasants or indigenous people land is an integral 
part of their livelihood and more than material significance.  
 The violent confrontation between the police and indigenous people in Bagua, the 
„Baguazo‟, in June 2009 illustrates this dimension of the conflicts in an explicit way. One of 
the main reasons for the „Baguazo‟ was associated with the indigenous collective right to 
territory. Against the backdrop of a growing international recognition of indigenous people‟s 
rights – promoted by NGOs and indigenous movements – free, prior and informed 
consultation, included in Article 6 of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 
169 (Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention), has become an important reference point 
for those who defend the right to territory from the advances of neoliberal extractivism.
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The Peruvian government ratified the ILO Convention on 2 February 1994. However, the 
implementation of this Convention has largely been ignored, lagging behind particularly with 
regards to „communal property and the continued exploitation of natural resources‟ (Salmón, 
2013: 373). As mining concessions have increased across the nation, social conflicts have 
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 See „CooperAcción: Superposición de la minería en territorio de comunidades campesinas llegó al 49%‟, 
Gestión, 21 July 2013; and „45% de territorios campesinos en Perú está concesionado a empresas mineras‟, La 
República, 18 November 2013.  
128 Article 6 (ILO Convention 169) states: 
1. In applying the provisions of this Convention, governments shall:  
(a) consult the peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative 
institutions, whenever consideration is being given to legislative or administrative measures which may affect 
them directly;  
(b) establish means by which these peoples can freely participate, to at least the same extent as other sectors of 
the population, at all levels of decision-making in elective institutions and administrative and other bodies 
responsible for policies and programmes which concern them;  
(c) establish means for the full development of these peoples' own institutions and initiatives, and in appropriate 
cases provide the resources necessary for this purpose.  
2. The consultations carried out in application of this Convention shall be undertaken, in good faith and in a 
form appropriate to the circumstances, with the objective of achieving agreement or consent to the proposed 
measures.  
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followed suit in the context of a lack of consultation, as well as different perspectives 
regarding territory.
129
 In addition, decision-making to grant concessions is highly 
concentrated within central government and local populations are barely consulted. As a 
consequence, conflicts tend to be generated from the initial stage, i.e. when a company 
attempts to buy land for exploration. Such a lack of information and consultation at the 
grassroots level stimulates disagreement over land sales, sometimes accompanied by 
company intimidation, or the conducting of land transactions at an unfair price.
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 This 
scenario has shaped local residents‟ negative perceptions of multinationals, as well as of the 
state, which is seen as colluding in their exploitation. To address the resulting grievance, 
local communities made claims dependent on differing understandings of territory, as well as 
participation, in deciding the development model.  
 
Environment, Sustainability and Development 
Technological innovations in recent decades have made possible new exploration and 
exploitation of hitherto untouched areas, thus raising environmental concerns. In the case of 
gold extraction, most large-scale gold mines use the cyanide heap leaching method.
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Despite its technological advantages, the process has raised widespread controversy, since it 
causes negative impacts on human bodies and the environment through the deployment of 
toxic materials like cyanide. Another main environmental concern related to large-scale 
mining operations is that it leaves large non-economic piles of gangue minerals on site after 
separating them from the commodifiable mineral-containing ore. Tailing piles can 
                                           
129 On September 2011, the Humala government „enacted a law (Law No. 29785, Ley del Derecho a la 
Consulta Previa a los Pueblos Indígenas u Originarios) mandating free, prior, and informed consultation in 
efforts to recognize the needs of indigenous peoples‟ (Salmón, 2013: 354). The law took effect in April 2012. 
However, de facto legal effectiveness is still under scrutiny. 
130 An example of this is referred to in Chapter 5: the case of Cajamarca. 
131 The cyanide heap leaching is the dominant extraction method in present-day gold mining due to its 
economic efficiency. According to Bury, the way gold is extracted is: „once the ore has been removed from large 
open pits and placed on lined leach pads in terraced piles, cyanide leach solution is applied to the ore through 
drippers. The gold-pregnant solution then flows to large ponds, where it is separated‟ (2005: 230). It is a method 
to extract gold from low-grade ore, which was created in late nineteenth century Scotland. Since the 1970s, it 
became generalised in gold extraction. Compared to the previous mercury amalgamation process which recovers 
no more than 60 per cent of gold from the ore, the use of cyanide is a more advanced technology in that more 
than 97 per cent of gold is recovered (see „Cyanide Leach Mining Packet‟ [Mineral Policy Center, 2000], 
available at http://www.earthworksaction.org/files/publications/Cyanide_Leach_Packet.pdf). 
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contaminate surface and groundwater via acid mine drainage (AMD), which „occurs because 
of the exposure of sulphide-bearing minerals (such as pyrite) to air and water, forming 
sulphuric acid. This acid dissolves metal such as lead, zinc, copper, arsenic, selenium, 
mercury and cadmium, into ground and surface water. Acid mine drainage can poison ground 
and drinking water and destroy aquatic life and habitat‟ (Bebbington et al., 2007: 4). In 
addition, gold extraction requires a large quantity of natural resources, such as land, water 
and energy, generating asymmetrical competition over resources between multinational 
capital and local community. Finally, the location of extraction has generated increasing 
concerns about accessibility and the preservation of natural resources, particularly water. 
Mining deposits are sometimes located in ecologically vulnerable areas such as headwaters of 
rivers or glaciers, affecting downstream communities as well as threatening biodiversity and 
the provision of clean and sufficient water. Given these problems, as Himley argues, „while 
the adoption of mega-mining techniques may be a sound economic strategy for firms, the 
value of this method of extraction as a socially inclusive and ecologically friendly 
development strategy is more questionable‟ (Himley, 2010: 3275, emphasis in the original). 
As shown in conflicts concerning the negative impact of mineral extraction on the 
environment and local people‟s health, e.g., the Rio Blanco (or Majaz) project in Piura or 
Cerro Quilish and Conga project in Cajamarca, protesters decried a lack of consultation in the 
decision-making process despite the negative impact on the environment, as well as on 
people‟s livelihoods. Opponents claimed the right of local people to decide on their own 
development model. Rather than the present extractive based development, they argued for 
„sustainable development‟, the meaning of which became an arena for considerable debate, 
involving both the government and mining companies, on the one hand, and local 
communities, on the other.
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4.4. Conclusion 
In the twentieth century the mining industry has been an important issue for policymakers 
and academics, as well as the Peruvian population and this continues to be the case. Since the 
country is endowed with mineral abundance, it has been argued that it has a comparative 
                                           
132 This dimension of conflicts will be examined in the next two chapters.  
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advantage in the exploitation and export of subterranean wealth, which could be a significant 
source of foreign currency, thus leading to economic development. Based on this assumption, 
legal mining codes have been created and altered with the intention of promoting foreign 
investments in the sector, such as the 1901 Mining Code and the 1950 New Mining Code. For 
most of the twentieth century, mineral extraction has been concentrated in the central and 
southern highlands, with the investment of US capital focusing on copper mines. In particular, 
the Cerro de Pasco Mining Corporation became the main owner of mines and smelters, as 
well as a large landowner in the central sierra, influencing the livelihoods of local citizens to 
a significant degree. Although domestic mining companies invested in silver, gold and zinc 
mines on a smaller scale, they played only a complementary role when foreign capital 
investment and mineral prices stood at a low level.  
 Foreign capital was reluctant to conduct new explorations given the backdrop of 
decreasing international mineral prices. In addition, the 1960s witnessed a wave of reformist 
demands and miners‟ protesting for better working conditions and wage rises. Moreover, the 
minimal impact of mineral extraction on regional development contrasted with the profits 
mining companies generated, bringing criticism regarding the benefits of mineral extraction. 
This included the creation of mining enclaves, Peru‟s dependence on the mining industry, as 
well as the exploitation of miners labouring under precarious working conditions. In the face 
of such criticism the Velasco government introduced policy changes intended to revitalise 
mineral extraction by increasing state participation in the production, refining and marketing 
of minerals. As part of the process of nationalisation, the military regime expropriated the 
Cerro and created Centromin Perú in 1974, after more than 70 years of its activity in the 
Peruvian highlands. However, the state turned out to be inefficient and incapable of 
improving on already debilitated mineral production and many mining SOEs were in crisis or 
bankrupt by the 1980s. 
 The 1980s witnessed one of the worst political and economic crises in Peruvian history. 
Subsequently, the Fujimori government implemented neoliberal economic reforms in order to 
overcome four-digit hyperinflation and thereby re-enter the international financial community. 
In line with policy recommendations and the support of IFIs as a new development strategy, 
the Peruvian government reformed regulations vis-à-vis the mining sector in order to promote 
foreign investment. It also reduced state intervention in the sector and privatised SOEs. 
However, at the same time it had to introduce environmental regulations in light of 
sustainable development initiatives, despite loopholes and limitations. Favourable legal 
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changes and fiscal incentives have attracted many foreign investors in large-scale projects 
across the country since the 1990s, and the sector has become one of the principal promoters 
of the country‟s economic growth. While mineral-based development has brought macro-
economic stability and a fiscal bonanza, the sector has also become a main arena for social 
struggles, particularly after the late 1990s.  
 Compared to miners‟ demands for better wages and working conditions in the 1940s and 
1960s, contemporary struggles against mining activities have been led mainly by local 
communities where minerals were extracted. Sometimes the state and mining companies have 
criticised these struggles as „anti-mining‟, even as „anti-development‟, claiming that they 
were led by radical leftists or naïve environmentalists. In other words, the resistances of local 
communities tend to be viewed as reactionary responses, which are claimed to be 
unfavourable in terms of „national development‟, i.e. macro-economic growth. However, this 
dichotomous view on socio-environmental protests does not help explain their multifaceted 
dynamics. Alongside the policy reform implemented by the neoliberal state, increasing 
international and national attention regarding „socially responsible‟ and „environmentally 
sustainable‟ mining operations complicate the nature of social protests, multiplying actors 
who are distinctively located with regard to mining activities. With the aim to quell social 
unrest and make little change to the fiscal regime which was favourable to foreign capital, 
successive governments in the post-Fujimorato introduced several legal changes that 
impacted the distribution of fiscal bonanza to regional and local governments, the canon 
minero, with little consideration regarding the institutionalisation of decentralised 
administrative agencies. The ad hoc nature of the canon devolution turned out to fuel more 
protests at sub-national level, by way of „decentralising‟ conflicts. This is mainly due to the 
mismanagement of fiscal resources, blurry territorial demarcation, as well as power struggles 
among various actors (including local politicians, local and regional authorities, and local 
communities). Struggles have also been „privatised‟ since mining companies have become a 
local authority via their social or community development programmes. While socio-
economic benefits have been partly distributed among local populations via social 
programmes, companies have turned out to be a main target for claim-makers particularly in 
the context of mine sites. Still, these conflicts have concentrated on more participation in the 
socio-economic distribution of benefits. However, there are other protests which bring the 
neoliberal form of mining operations into contestation, demanding more participation in the 
decision-making process and a respect for different interpretations of territory, and 
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development per se. Meanwhile these resistances have uncovered the limitations of a new 
development model based on mineral extraction as well as deficits in Peruvian democracy, 
from which a majority of poor and marginalised populations suffer different „grievance‟ 
simultaneously opening up „political possibilities‟ to contest these. The ensuing two case 
chapters will examine this variegated dynamics of socio-environmental struggles in the 
department of Cajamarca, one of the most representative regions for „new mineral extraction‟ 
and which has a high level of related social protests.  
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Chapter 5 
MYSA’s Gold Extraction:  
‘Power-Geometry’ and Rural Activism in Cajamarca 
 
 
In the public imaginary, the sierra peruana (Peruvian Andes) has been perceived as a 
„retarded‟ and „static‟ place. This temporal and spatial illusion has also shaped socio-
economic, political and cultural norms of the sierra. Namely, the Peruvian highlands have 
been considered as a place „bounded‟ to the past and resistant to change, different to the 
„modern‟ and „developed‟ coast. Although the sierra could represent an „exotic‟ culture to 
outsiders‟ eyes, it remained „inferior‟ to the coast and thus would be excluded from „rational‟ 
political decision-making. As a consequence, political and economic forces are concentrated 
on the coast, particularly in Lima. In this view, the sierra peruana should be „modernised‟ 
and „assimilated‟ to the way in which the coast has developed. The highlands exist to be 
exploited, or „developed‟. Additionally, when highlanders resist „development‟ or 
„modernisation‟, they tend to be criticised as „retarded‟ and „violent‟ ignorant people (see 
Vich, 2009). As seen in Chapter 3, however, misunderstandings of rural reality by urban 
intellectuals was one of the main reasons for the failure of guerrilla movements in the mid-
1960s and the Shining Path in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Cajamarca has become one of the most representative departments of Peru‟s „new mining 
boom‟ since the Yanacocha mining company (Minera Yanacocha S.A., MYSA) started its 
operation in 1993. To the disappointment of many, however, nearly two decades of MYSA‟s 
mining operations in the department have not produced the „development‟ promised. 
Cajamarca is still one of the poorest regions in the country. To compound matters, 
accusations have been levelled over unfair treatment and environmental degradation caused 
by the presence of one of the biggest gold mining companies, only resulting in dissatisfaction 
and distrust among local campesinos. But at the same time, this accumulation of social 
discontent and the perceptions of „injustice‟ has laid the ground for complex trajectories of 
rural activism, creating layers of social relations and becoming an integral part of the massive 
mobilisations against MYSA‟s Conga mining project since late 2011. In other words, despite 
the marginalisation from capitalist development and state formation and neoliberal mineral 
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extraction, there have been complex socio-economic and political dynamics in this part of the 
northern highlands. Rather than a bifurcated power structure – dominance vs. the dominated 
or exploitation vs. the exploited – the chapter shows that there has been a complexity of 
power relations and political dynamics accumulated in the rural highlands of Cajamarca. 
Considering this, the aim of this chapter is to contextualise the anti-Conga movement by 
examining the long-term historical trajectories of rural politics in Cajamarca. If the 
movement is interpreted within the traditional theoretical framework, we come to understand 
it within a limited perspective: 1) the „why‟ of the movement would be „grievances‟ of local 
communities caused by the multinational‟s neoliberal mineral extraction unless they were 
motivated by anti-mining or anti-development radicals or naïve environmentalists as the 
government and mining company would argue; 2) the „how‟ would be focused on lower 
visibility of the mobilisations after temporary suspension of the mining project (due to the 
lack of organisation or fragmentation of the leadership); and a lack of political impact despite 
its massive scope and victims; or particular attention to the „newness‟ of the movement (due 
to its cause of environmental justice, i.e. the defence of water, and the „new‟ element of urban 
and foreign based-environmental organisations „helping‟ poor peasants). From this 
perspective based on essentialist geography, the possible conclusion is that local communities, 
with the support of or in alliance with „benevolent‟ NGOs at a higher scale, protested firmly 
in opposition to the power of global capital and the emphasis on national „development‟ by 
the neoliberal state. However, the impotence and passivity of local campesinos and their lack 
of organisation only resulted in smaller scale protests and did not have enough power to 
produce political and economic changes, i.e. to achieve an alternative development model 
and the consolidation of a democratic system by creating links with political parties. While a 
long list of the movement‟s limitations and policy reform proposals could be suggested, this 
conclusion tends to maintain the status quo of the bifurcated power relations, if not its 
deterioration. As I argued in Chapter 2, this approach adopts the dualistic geography-power 
formula based on an essentialist geographical understanding and does not tend to see the 
political imaginaries of subaltern subjectivity. In order to examine the reformulation of rural 
subjectivities within the anti-Conga movement and its complex dynamics of „networked 
forms of resistance‟, I will focus on how diverse social relations were historically articulated 
in this part of the rural highlands and how they laid the ground for the re-formulation of rural 
subjectivities in contesting the neoliberal mineral extraction, on the basis of relational 
geography. At the same time, noting that this „networked form of resistance‟ is not a smooth 
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articulation of actors, I will also elucidate the complex power-geometry of MYSA‟s new 
extraction in Cajamarca.  
 
 
5.1. Rural Highlands of Cajamarca: Historical Review 
Capitalist Development of Agriculture and Rural Politics  
The purpose of this section is to explain that the marginalisation of the cajamarquinos 
originated not only from MYSA‟s new mineral extraction but has long historical roots in the 
process of capitalist development and there was a certain degree of resistance of campesinos 
in response to capitalist exploitation. 
 
Timing and Nature  
Wool manufacturing, centred on obrajes (textile plants), along with silver mining (mainly in 
Hualgayoc province) comprised major economic activities during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century. Regarding the capitalist development of agriculture in Cajamarca, some 
disagreement exists in the literature. Gitliz argues that „no great boom affected agriculture in 
the department until the development of the milk industry in the late 1950s‟ (Gitlitz, 1975: 
425). On the other hand, Taylor (1979) notes two stages of the region‟s capitalist 
development. In the initial stage (1880 to 1930), a significant expansion in the cultivation of 
export crops on the northern coast increased demand for the region‟s labour, livestock and 
food crops, accelerating integration into the national market (see also Cristiansen, 2000). The 
dairying industry had an important role in consolidating this trend (between 1930 and 1960). 
In 1947, the multinational Nestlé opened its subsidiary, PERULAC (Nestlé Perú S.A., 
Compañía Peruana de Alimentos Lácteos) in Cajamarca. This multinational company had a 
factory in Chiclayo in the neighbouring northern coast department from 1937, but the milk 
supply was not sufficient locally (Indacochea et al., 2001: 57). In 1949, PERULAC 
consequently opened its processing factory in Cajamarca. This was possible since the 
company‟s need to secure the supply of local fresh milk was supported by local and national 
efforts. The departmental elite pressured the government for the consolidation of a profitable 
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dairy industry via its trade association, the Association of Agriculturalists and Cattlemen of 
Cajamarca (the Asociación de Agricultores y Ganaderos de Cajamarca). 
 As a consequence, the capitalist development of agriculture in the region has followed the 
„Junker‟ path, with the landowners being the prime promoter by subdividing, selling lands 
and promoting investments.
133
 Even before the agrarian reform in the 1960s and 1970s, 
landlords started to subdivided haciendas by selling unproductive lands to peasants at high 
prices. By doing this, hacendados could secure capital to finance the introduction of 
advanced technology and concentrate their investment in fertile lands for commercial dairy 
production. Additionally, selling unproductive lands to small holders helped mitigate rural 
unrest. Although this process of agricultural advancement did not proceed in a uniform way, 
it produced more stratification among the peasantry, widening the gap between richer and 
more pauperised peasants or proletarianised landless families. Between 1920 and 1960, 
„households belonging to all strata of the peasantry found themselves more deeply integrated 
into labour and commodity markets and evolved ever more intricate survival strategies in the 
pursuit of capital accumulation or mere subsistence‟ (Taylor, 2006: 54). 
 
Politics in the Countryside 
During the nineteenth century, the haciendas were the dominant land tenure institution, 
leading to concentration of land in the hands of the few and thus power, particularly due to 
mining and livestock activities in the central and southern regions. Following independence, 
communities lost their legal status as individual property rights were favoured over 
communal land holding until official recognition was recovered in the 1920s. In Cajamarca, 
however, land concentration in large estates had begun during colonial times (Deere, 1990: 
29).
134
 In consequence, smallholding peasants had to lease plots from landowners, paying 
rents in labour, cash or kind (Deere, 1990: 31). Highland landowners could exert political and 
economic power over their tenants and neighbouring communal peasants (comuneros) in the 
                                           
133  Woods (2011: 57) summarises two „paths‟ to the capitalist development of agriculture: „from above‟ or 
„from below‟, often referred to as the „Junker/Prussian‟ or „North America/French‟ paths. See also Kay (1974; 
1980; 2000; 2007). For more on capitalist development of agriculture in Cajamarca, see Taylor (1979) and 
Deere (1990).  
134 While the proportion of privately owned large estates was close to two-thirds of the provincial land of 
Cajamarca, almost 70 per cent of the rural population lived in areas outside haciendas (Christiansen, 2000: 28; 
Indacochea et al, 2001: 56). 
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context of unequal land distribution and enjoyed a significant degree of autonomy from 
government interference. Hacendados occupied important posts in regional administrative 
and political institutions themselves or supported those who were in charge (Cristiansen, 
2000: 28). While land of free peasant smallholders was forcibly fragmented with population 
pressure, the economic situation of tenants was often better (Cristiansen, 2000: 28).  
 Regarding changes in social relations associated with capitalist development, Chritiansen 
compares two positions. Deere emphasises labour exploitation of landowners over tenants to 
extract more profits, „under the threat of expulsion from the estate‟ (Critistiansen, 2000: 27). 
In contrast, Taylor notes that peasants could partially resist the proletarianisation process due 
to the economic interconnectedness between Cajamarca and northern coast, as well as local 
political context. On the one hand, free peasant smallholders could migrate for temporary 
labour opportunities in monoculture plantations on the neighbouring coast. On the other hand, 
local political tradition – factional rivalry among landlords and banditry - provided them an 
opportunity not only to be exploited by landowners. As Taylor notes, prior to the 1930s, there 
were usually at least two or three rival factions at the provincial level. Each faction consisted 
of a landowner as a patron, who presided over a hierarchical network of clients. Factions 
were usually in fierce competition for the exclusive control of political power and economic 
gains (Taylor, 2006: 55). In addition, „hacendados assisted fleeing criminals and peasants 
resisting taxation and conscription by hiding them on their estates, where their state officials 
were not allowed‟ (Cristiansen, 2000: 30-31). Simultaneously, a lack of effective control over 
the serrano (highland) population by the central government, continued with a „fragmented 
power structure‟ based on landlords, facilitated peasant involvement in rural criminality, such 
as banditry (see Taylor, 1986). Peasants participated in a bandit gang „as a means of attaining 
better pay for less work‟ and sometimes as a form of labour (Taylor, 2006: 58-60). In this 
way, tenants and free peasant smallholders sometimes used local hacendados or appealed to 
central state institutions in order to escape from exploitation and to resist power abuses 
(Cristiansen, 2000: 31). 
 
Structural Reform and Rural Political Dynamics 
The presence of multinational capital only intensified the dispossession of local campesinos, 
most of whom did not benefit from state-led reform under the military regime. Rather than 
remaining marginalised, however, campesinos were engaged in peasant unions and also 
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created grassroots organisations. The articulation of these social relations and political 
activities has accumulated over time, forming an integral part of the anti-Conga movement, 
on which this section will focus. 
 
Agrarian Reform and Peasants Response 
Growing rural unrest in the 1950s and 1960s encouraged the first Belaunde government to 
introduce an agrarian reform law in 1964, although its implementation proved ineffective. In 
the case of Cajamarca, peasant struggles were comparatively less visible, although smaller 
scale protests, such as those in Llucho community and Cospán did occur (García-Sayán, 1982: 
53). Literature on peasant mobilisations in Cajamarca at this juncture has emphasised its 
marginal impact. Peasant protests were „limited in scope to one hacienda, one community or 
a community-hacienda complex… with a partial success‟ (Gitlitz, 1975: 5). In a similar vein, 
Taylor notes: „although conflicts between landlords and peasants were constantly recurring, 
they were never generalized enough to pose any meaningful threat to established social 
relationships‟ (1979: 179). When explaining the reasons for less visibility of peasant 
struggles in the 1960s compared to other highland regions, Taylor points out weak 
community tradition, the embedded APRA influence, and land parcelisation (1979: 324). 
Cajamarca has little apparent ethnic identity and weak community tradition in comparison to 
the central and southern Andes. In addition, as the process of capitalist development was 
closely related to the cultivation of export crops, such as sugar cane and rice, on the northern 
coast, social relations were „stretched out‟ beyond regional borders. Since the party‟s 
foundation in 1931, the department of Cajamarca formed an important part of the APRA‟s 
„sólido norte‟ (strong support base in the north). It managed to establish deep roots among the 
peasantry, workers and artisans living in highlands towns, in addition to strategic middle 
class groups such as lawyers and teachers (see Taylor, 2000). Backing for APRA in 
Cajamarca‟s rural districts remained strong, being reinforced by the ever increasing 
movements of migrants on coastal sugar, rice and cotton estates. On these properties the trade 
unions were dominated by APRA activists with the result that migrants took a pro-APRA 
stance back to the highlands once they had fulfilled their labour contracts.  
 Following Belaunde‟s unsuccessful attempt at agrarian reform, it fell to the Velasco 
government to push a thorough-going land distribution. It aimed to modernise the country‟s 
agricultural sector as well as mitigate rural unrest. Despite its ambitious reform initiatives 
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based on collective production, it had a limited impact on the structure of land tenure and the 
quality of living conditions for a majority of the peasantry. Most households received no land 
and it failed to halt the process of fragmentation. Indeed, parcelisation intensified as 
landowners needed to subdivide their properties and carried out decapitalisation due to a fear 
of expropriation. The slow progress of land reform in the department enhanced this process. 
Furthermore, since peasant mobilisations during the 1960s were not intense in Cajamarca, the 
region was not designated a priority for the government‟s reform effort. The reform process 
also encountered other obstacles, such as opposition within the local administrative structure, 
limited resource allocation from central government, anti-reform propaganda promoted by 
the Association of Agriculturalists and Cattlemen of Cajamarca with a tacit support of 
PERULAC (Taylor, 1979: 344-8). Finally, land was distributed unequally, benefiting 
„primarily labourers and tenants settled on expropriated properties‟ or „more prosperous 
smallholders‟, intensifying stratification among the peasantry (Taylor, 2006: 73). This 
fragmentation of the peasantry and the predicament of their living conditions made it difficult 
for many peasants to organise. As seen in social protests in the 1990s, this is one of the 
reasons why the peasants‟ response was weak and limited. 
 With APRA‟s turn to the right and its anti-agrarian reform position, the party lost much 
legitimacy in the region.
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 Other leftist parties and organisations attempted to fill this 
political vacuum and got involved in peasant politics. One of the region‟s important peasant 
organisations at this juncture was FEDECC (Departmental Federation of Peasants of 
Cajamarca, Federación Departamental de Campesinos de Cajamarca). The Federation was 
founded in 1961 with the initiative of APRA. However, given that the party did not play an 
important role in peasant mobilisations, the federation was split in 1969. Some leaders 
remained loyal to, while others sympathised with the PCP-U (García-Sayán, 1982: 54). 
Against this backdrop, at the fourth Peasant Convention of FEDECC held in 1974 in the 
community of Huacataz, more than 17 peasant committees (comités de campesinos) 
participated and declared their affiliation to the Peasant Confederation of Peru (CCP, 
Confederación Campesina del Peru), which illustrated the federation‟s more radicalised 
strategy for land occupations such as in Huacataz (1973) and Pomabamba (1974) (García-
Sayán, 1982: 56-69). As a consequence of the limited results of land reform and the 
                                           
135 Although the party continued to be the main political force in Cajamarca until the 1980s, during the 1970s it 
faced increased competition as a consequence of its pro-oligarchic stance and opposition to land reform during 
the 1960s (Taylor, 1979: 323). 
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continuous tendency of parcelisation in the 1970s, the rural landscape in Cajamarca 
demonstrated a complex composition: comprised of kulaks, cooperative leaders, small-
holding peasants, landless wage labourers as well as sharecroppers (Taylor, 2006: 79). In this 
context, peasants organised the nightwatch patrols in order to address direct problems, which 
demonstrated political activities of rural subaltern groups rather than being unilaterally 
exploited, „fragmented‟ and „fated to disappear‟. 
 
Rondas Campesinas (the Nightwatch Patrols) 
Against the backdrop of economic difficulties and unmet expectations of reformist efforts, 
the 1970s saw an increasing coordination between the peasantry and leftist parties as well 
social organisations. Simultaneously, hacendados lost the legitimacy of their presence in the 
wake of agrarian reform, leaving a political vacuum in the countryside. Filling this power gap, 
radical Maoists in the central rural highlands started to prepare for revolutionary armed 
struggle and soon controlled rural populations in the central and southern sierra and extended 
their influence to Lima, plunging the country into a spiral of political violence. In the case of 
Cajamarca, however, the influence of Shining Path was relatively limited to the southern part 
of the department: the province of Cajabamca and San Marcos (see Taylor 2006). Starn notes 
that the relatively weak inroads made by the Maoist group could be explained by the presence 
of rondas campesinas (1992: 109). Rather, Cajamarca is the origin of the nightwatch patrols. 
Rondas campesinas were born out of the urgent needs of the rural population due to 
increasing economic difficulties by the mid-1970s: deepening proletarianisation, rising urban 
migration and a decline in employment opportunities. In December 1976, the first ronda 
composed of local peasants started its patrol at the village of Cuyumalca, in the province of 
Chota. The ronda was organised to deal with the specific problem of cattle rustling and petty 
thievery, in addition to the lack of political legitimacy of the state and corruption of local 
judicial authorities.
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 According to Gitlitz and Rojas, cattle were important within the 
peasant economy, not just as a means of subsistence but as a significant source of financial 
security, especially in times of emergency (1983: 169-170). Moreover, when the living 
conditions for peasants were in decline due to unfavourable terms of exchange between 
peasant produce and consumer goods, livestock came to play a greater role in peasant 
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 For more on the history of rondas campesinas in the Peruvian highlands, see Gitlitz and Rojas (1983); 
Gitlitz (1998); Starn (1999); and Gitlitz (2013).  
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survival strategies (Gitlitz and Rojas, 1983: 170-171). Accordingly, cattle rustling became a 
severe problem for peasants, who could expect little support from corrupt authorities, who 
frequently allowed criminals to act with impunity. An increase in livestock smuggling 
perpetuated by organised or informal networks was driven by economic crisis and increasing 
demands for meat in cities during the 1970s (Gitlitz and Rojas, 1983: 175).  
 The activities of the rondas proved highly successful in countering the problem of cattle 
rustling. This effectiveness not only stimulated their geographical expansion, they also 
widened the range of functions. In other words, rondas were organised not only in the 
Cajamarca region but over most of the northern highlands by the mid-1980s, and they had 
even spread to the central and southern sierra by the end of the decade (Gitlitz, 1998). The 
success of rondas in dealing with the problems peasants faced heightened their legitimacy 
among the rural population. Moreover, given the corrupt local judicial system and the 
discriminatory treatment against peasants common among officials, rondas attempted to 
implement an alternative and transparent legal system. They also got involved in small local 
public projects. By the mid-1980s, however, their activities were in decline. Although their 
organising capacity at village level was alive, rondas faced difficulties to coordinate and 
maintain federations at regional and national level: due to a lack of financial resources; 
geographical barriers for communication; and diverse and divisive interests among the 
peasantry (Starn, 1999: 247-8). Furthermore, political factions generated divisions among 
rondas, while the state tried to co-opt these grassroots organisations for their own political 
purpose. One prominent example of party factionalism inside the rondas concerned the 
rivalry between Daniel Idrogo of Patria Roja and Pedro Risco of APRA in Chota province, 
the birthplace of the nightwatch patrols. The political rivalry of rondas between APRA and 
various leftist groups also resulted in four federations being established only within the 
province of Cajamarca. This division, actively promoted in Alan García‟s first administration 
(1985-1990), resulted in many local bodies becoming moribund. However, as will be seen 
later, this peasant organisation became a leading part of the social protests against the 
MYSA‟s mining activities since the 1990s. 
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The Church of „Poncho and Sombrero‟ 
The role of the Roman Catholic Church cannot be omitted in explaining the peasants‟ 
political activism in Cajamarca and this experience also became an integral part of the 
networked forms of resistance against MYSA‟s Conga project. The close relationship 
between the Church and local peasants in Cajamarca dates back to 1962 when the bishop 
(monseñor), José Dammert Bellido, was appointed to the diocese of Cajamarca, coinciding 
with a changing context of the Church across the continent with the Second Vatican Council 
(1962-1965) and the Latin American Episcopal Council (Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano, 
CELAM) in Medellín in 1968. In the aftermath, the Church played an important role in 
conducting social works and raising political consciousness of the marginalised in the 
countryside and urban shanty towns across Latin America. According to Klaiber, these two 
events were „deeply influenced by the new idea of inculturation, liberation theology and 
conscientisation (of Paulo Freire)‟ (2009: 410). In Cajamarca, the concept of inculturation 
and conscientisation (concientización) was an important element in raising political 
consciousness among the peasantry under bishop Dammert. In explaining „inculturation‟, 
Klaiber drew on the example of the bishop of Chiapas, Samuel Ruiz, (1960-1999). Impressed 
with the concept of inculturation after his attendance at the Second Vatican Council, he 
dedicated himself to „the formation of native catechists (catequistas) to teach the people in 
their own language and in cultural terms‟, contributing to generating political consciousness 
(2009: 410). According to Klaiber, „many Zapatistas were catechists trained by Samuel Ruiz‟ 
(2009: 411). Regarding concientización, Anderson explains the influence of Paolo Freire, a 
Brazilian educator and philosopher who developed a critical approach to pedagogy: Freire‟s 
two pedagogical methods – the „banking method of education‟ and „dialogical problem 
solving‟. The former concerned the division between teacher and student, a passive receiver 
of information. The dialogical approach, to which Freire gave more attention, is to overcome 
dichotomous separation between the educator and the educated and to involve the latter in the 
process of problem solving in a continuous way (Anderson, 1988: 102). In particular, „[F]or 
Freire, the key to concienización is the uprooting of the oppressor‟s image of the oppressed 
(as lazy, stupid, deserving of their lot) that the oppressed have internalized. [In this sense], 
Christian evangelization is one vehicle for transforming the self-image of the oppressed‟ 
(Anderson, 1988: 103). 
Before the arrival of bishop Dammert in Cajamarca, the Church was poised to maintain 
the status quo of elite rule rather than to protect the interests of marginalised peasants. Poor 
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people wearing ponchos, llanques and sombreros were not often allowed to enter the church, 
and if so, only to occupy the back seats.
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 Peasants even feared facing priests directly and 
were almost always discriminated against. The divine words, the Bible, were read exclusively 
by the minority literate and urban rich. In the experience of poor peasants, the Church existed 
for administering official ceremonies, such as baptisms or weddings. Bishop Dammert, a 
professor of canon law, was named as the assistant bishop (Obispo auxiliar) of Lima in 1958. 
One example of his involvement with the poor and social problems was the creation of the 
Semana Social (Social Week) in Lima in 1959, which was the church‟s response to massive 
social change within the country (Knecht, 2005: 40). Around this time, he criticised the 
Church‟s insulation from social issues and argued for its role in promoting social justice in 
order to practice God‟s words, i.e. every individual is equal to God. On arrival in Cajamarca, 
structural injustice was at the root of his historical understanding of rural conditions. To put it 
another way, peasants who comprised a majority of the population were discriminated against 
in favour of the urban, rich minority. In addition, the Church existed in order to maintain the 
latter‟s privileges or to share in them, exploiting and marginalising the former.  
 Based on this interpretation and the concept of concientización and inculturation, 
Dammert‟s plan in Cajamarca prioritised „evangelisation, in the form of the Church 
incarnated in Christian communities, through the poor, and in the formation of pastoral lay 
people‟ (Knecht, 2005: 51). During the thirty years of his term as bishop (1962-1992), the 
peasantry‟s consciousness and social position changed relative to the past. Part of the reason 
is due to „re-evangelisation‟ and the activities of catequistas. Re-evangelisation signifies „a 
re-education of faith‟, by raising the „religious and social consciousness of the peasantry‟, 
(Knecht, 2005: 52). In other words, rather than leaving them in a state of „oppression, 
marginalisation and discrimination‟, it promotes the consciousness of the peasantry on their 
own capacity to change the unjust status quo, not remaining as inferior social position 
(Knecht, 2005: 52). In order to carry out these religious as well as social functions, bishop 
Dammert emphasised the importance of the role of lay people, i.e. to educate and specialise 
„catequistas‟. After taking short religious courses organised by priests, local peasants were 
titled as catequistas with a mission to disseminate what they learned from the courses to 
neighbours in their village in order to construct a „Christian community‟ and to conduct 
religious ceremonies. These catequistas also came to take up leadership roles in organising 
                                           
137 Poncho, an outer clothing, llanques, rustic sandals, and sombreros, wide-brimmed traditional hat, represent a 
typical appearance of local peasants. 
１５８ 
poor peasants. Many catequistas later assumed important responsibilities in rondas 
campesinas, although the relationship between rondas and catequistas varied (Gitlitz, 1986 
cited in Anon.: 28-29). Bishop Dammert supported the nightwatch patrols since he considered 
this peasant organisation capable of sowing the seed of grassroots democracy and playing a 
role in protecting the region from the spread of the Shining Path (Gitliz 1986 cited in Anon.: 
28-29). Obviously, these socially-oriented peasant-based evangelical activities brought an 
onslaught of criticism from the urban population, sometimes denouncing priests and 
catequistas as communists, which has been repeated in comments about the involvement of 
priests in mobilisations against mining activities since the 1990s.  
 As will be seen later, this historical layer of social relations in rural Cajamarca constitutes 
a fundamental part of socio-environmental struggles against MYSA‟s mineral extraction since 
the 1990s. As argued in Chapter 2, the local/place is not the „other‟ of global/ space. Based on 
a relational geographical understanding, „a progressive sense of place‟ is a particular 
articulation of diverse social relations at different scales. In addition, what distinguishes a 
place from another is „the accumulated history of a place‟ over which the tissue of social 
texture has thickened through „different sets of linkages both local to the wider world‟ 
(Massey, 1993: 68). If you look at the history of this part of the rural highlands from an 
essentialist geographical approach, campesinos would be regarded as the victims of the 
powers of capital and the highly centralised government in Lima. Their protests tend to be 
interpreted as „fragmented‟ or „the last gasp of reactions‟ for their mere subsistence. However, 
there has been a constant political activism by rural subjectivities: sometimes by taking 
advantage of the rural political vacuum left by the central administration, patron-client 
relationships, banditry; by being engaged with political parties and peasant unions; organising 
grassroots nightwatch patrols; and raising political consciousness promoted by progressive 
pastoral activities. This accumulation of social relations of political activism has sometimes 
been imbued with complex power relations, such as political factionalism and rivalry, and 
gained political legitimacy among the peasantry. However, this particular articulation of 
social texture has made Cajamarca distinguishable and these social relations per se has 
formed an integral part of the re-formulated subjectivity of the current activism against 
mining operations in the region. Accordingly, rather than reactionary anti-mining protests of 
ignorant serranos (highlanders), in the view from successive Peruvian governments, or „new‟ 
peasant environmentalism, as many NSM theorists would argue, the nature and dynamics of 
the opposition to mining activities can be better interpreted by understanding this particularity 
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of rural Cajamarca built up through historical social texture. However, it is noteworthy that 
the social relations are not smoothly articulated without contradictions and negotiations. 
Indeed, the arrival of multinational capital in the region has further complicated the power 
relations among the local authorities and the population, which the time-space compression 
of neoliberal globalisation based on materialism and essentialist geographical approach has 
omitted, as argued in Chapter 2. In this sense, before looking at „the relational content‟ of the 
networked resistance of social protests against mining activities since the 1990s, the next 
section will examine the „power-geometry‟ of MYSA‟s new mineral extraction in Cajamarca 
(Massey, 2005: 93). 
 
 
5.2. MYSA and Changing Landscape of Cajamarca 
Minera Yanacocha S.A. (MYSA) since 1993 
The city of Cajamarca has a historical significance, in which conquistador Francisco Pizarro 
invaded and captured Inca Atahualpa in 1532. After receiving a large amount of gold and 
silver as ransom, the Spanish colonisers did not liberate the Inca but instead executed him 
(Indacochea et al., 2001: 55). It forms a constant reminder of gold exploitation by external 
colonisers. Historically, mining in Peru was centred predominantly in the country‟s central 
highlands and the south, while there has been no history of large-scale mining exploitation in 
Cajamarca; the main centre of activity since colonial times being small-scale gold and silver 
mines in Hualgayoc province.
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 However, over recent decades Peruvian mineral extraction 
has expanded to previously un- and under-developed areas, such as the northern coast and the 
Amazonian jungle, the result of policies promoting investments in mega-mining projects 
throughout the country since the 1990s. In Cajamarca, Minera Yanacocha S.A. (MYSA), as 
part of the „new extraction‟, commenced exploitation in 1993, with finance emanating from 
the International Financial Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank (5 per cent); the US-based 
Newmont Mining (32.3 per cent); the Peruvian Compañía Minera Buenaventura (32.3 per 
cent); Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minieres (BRGM, 24.7 per cent, a French 
                                           
138 For more on silver mines in Hualgayoc, see O‟Phelan (2013). 
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government–owned company).139 Today the shares are controlled by the Newmont mining 
corporation (51.35 per cent), Buenaventura (43.65 per cent) and IFC (5 per cent). Behind this 
changing composition of the company‟s portfolio, there has been a long process of legal 
conflicts between two companies – Newmont and the BRGM – including accusations of 
corruption and diplomatic lobbying by the US and French governments.
140
  
The contribution of Cajamarca to national mineral production is largely due to gold 
extraction. According to de Echave and Diez, Cajamarca represents 31.62 per cent of national 
gold production and MYSA produces 79.6 per cent of the nation‟s gold, followed by Gold 
Fields (10.28 per cent) and Minera La Zanja (8.43 per cent) (2013: 26). In 2000, MYSA 
became a „leading gold producer‟ in Latin America (an annual production of 1.8 million 
ounces) at the lowest cost (Bury, 2004: 81). MYSA has developed a series of open pit mega 
mining projects since the 1990s: Carachugo (1993), Maqui Maqui (1994), San José (1996), 
Yanacocha (1997) and La Quinua (2001). The area directly affected by these sites includes 
32 hamlets where local peasants are dedicated to livestock rearing and small-scale agriculture, 
such as potato, wheat and corn (de Echave and Diez, 2013: 82). MYSA operations are largely 
located in three districts of Cajamarca province: La Encañada, Baños de Inca and Cajamarca. 
Alongside the Yanacocha complex, there are other mining projects. For example, La 
Encañada included Michiquillay project by Anglo American mining company and the Galeno 
project involving Chinese capital (Lumina Cooper). In Chota province, there is a US$100 
million La Granja copper project by Río Tinto Minera Perú. The Tantahuatay (Coimolache 
S.A. mining company: Buenaventura [40.1. per cent]; Southern [44.2 per cent]; Espro S.A.C. 
[15.7 per cent]), Cerro Corona (Gold Fields La Cima) and La Zanja projects (Buenaventura 
[53.06 per cent] and Newmont mining [46.94 per cent]) are located in Santa Cruz province. 
The province of Cajabamba is the site of the Shahuindo operation (Sulliden Shahuindo 
S.A.C.), among others. As a result, mining concessions in Cajamarca have increased 
                                           
139 As Bury noted: „the Yanacocha project was the first large foreign investment in Peruvian mining since 1976‟ 
(Bury, 2004: 80). 
140 Legal disputes started in 1994 when the French government decided to sell its shares in a series of 
privatisation plans, arguably without consent from other shareholders. The BRGM and Newmont mining 
entered into legal conflicts and the Peruvian Supreme Court adjudicated in favour of the latter in 1998. It has 
been argued that there was pressure from the Peruvian spymaster, Vladimiro Montesinos, in the final decision. It 
was exposed in the so-called „Vladivideos‟, which were secretly recorded in Montesinos‟s SIN office. After 
having dragged on for seven years in Peruvian lower and supreme courts, as well as the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), this was finally concluded in October 2000 with an additional 
compensation of US$80 million to the BRGM. For additional information on these issues, see Seifert (2003). 
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progressively (despite a few years of decreasing rates in the early 2000s) to occupy 
1,576,489.4 ha. (47.32 per cent of the departmental territory) in 2011, largely concentrated in 
the department‟s central and southern provinces (de Echave and Diez, 2013: 29-30).141 Due 
to these mining concessions, the economic structure has changed in Cajamarca: the 
proportion of the EAP (economically active population) employed in agriculture, hunting and 
forestry has declined from 42 per cent in 1990 to 20.1 per cent in 2010, while that of mining 
has increased from 5.9 per cent to 20.2 per cent during the same period, when it became the 
main economic activity (de Echave and Diez, 2013: 24-5). 
 
‘Power-Geometry’ of MYSA’s Mineral Extraction 
Over the last two decades varying segments of cajamarquinos both in the city and the 
countryside have had distinct experiences with the presence of a „new neighbour‟, generating 
different responses by diverse local actors. This section will examine this „power-geometry‟ 
of MYSA‟s mining activities in arguing for the „messiness‟ of the relationship rather than a 
bifurcated power-geographical framework. First, the mining sector has been criticised for 
creating an „enclave‟ economy with no (or fewer) forward and backward linkages to other 
economic sectors and thus without exercising a great influence on local development. In this 
sense, linkage effects are crucial in determining if a mining operation has had a positive 
impact on local socio-economic conditions or alternatively have produced an „enclave‟ (see 
Hirschman, 1958). Advocates for mineral extraction argue that such investments can generate 
a backward linkage by employing local people, in addition to purchasing local supplies and 
services. While high standards are required for formal employment in the „modern‟ mining 
industry, local employment opportunities are normally limited to a qualified labour stock 
with unskilled workers being temporarily hired at the initial stage, e.g., in the construction of 
road infrastructure. Also, most local labourers tend to be employed indirectly via sub-
contracting („contratista‟) companies.142 Moreover, working conditions here tend to be 
                                           
141 The proportion of mining concessions in some provinces (such as San Pablo and Hualgayoc) have reached 
more than 90 per cent of their territory while other provinces (such as Jaén and San Ignacio in the department‟s 
north) have less than 30 per cent of their territory under concession. For additional data on the proportion of 
mining concessions of each province, see de Echave and Diez (2013: 32-46). 
142 According to Avila et al., less than one per cent of employees were directly contracted by the mining 
companies; almost 45 per cent of employed workers were from other regions, while only 20 per cent were 
locally employed in 2008 (2011: 176).   
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precarious, especially since being temporarily and indirectly employed means that it is hard 
to organise trade unions. Precarious working conditions have been continuously denounced. 
In particular, ex-workers of MYSA have complained of health problems and have demanded 
appropriate compensation. For example, in October 2009, more than 30 ex-workers for 
MYSA went to Lima, demanding legal justice, which they argued was hard to find in 
Cajamarca. They claimed that they were fired from the company without notice as they had 
been found ill. Their illness, according to them, was a product of precarious working 
condition and abuses from MYSA. In addition, the mining company did not report labour 
accidents in working place.
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 While mining companies purchased almost 66 per cent of 
goods and services from other regions, mainly in Lima, only 7 per cent – particularly services 
- was obtained locally (Avila et al., 2011: 175). Consequently, while a minority of local 
people benefited from MYSA‟s linkage effects via employment and providing products and 
services to MYSA, many cajamarquinos were dissatisfied with mining activities: after initial 
high expectations of better living conditions, once a concession in operation their hopes 
frequently became frustrated. In other words, this disproportionate distribution of benefits 
was obvious inside the city as well as different ecological zones of rural areas and generated 
different responses among the local population, depending on how they were located within 
the power-geometry of MYSA‟s mineral extraction, despite mostly having expressed 
discontents. This is a relevant aspect for a better understanding of the complex dynamics of 
rural activism by overcoming the simplified framework of exploitation of global capital and 
resistance of local communities. Simultaneously, understanding this power-geometry is 
important in that while it generates different experiences with neoliberal mineral extraction, it 
also provids a ground for unity among diverse actors.
144
  
 Its geographical closeness to the MYSA open pit mines has caused changing living 
conditions in the city of Cajamarca. While there has been a rise in criminal rates and 
prostitution, increasing housing rents, along with the cost of living, certain segments of the 
urban population, such as those involved in commercial activities, including hotels, 
restaurants or shops, benefited due to the immigration of mine workers from other regions or 
from outside the country. Furthermore, as Steel (2013) demonstrates, the inflow of national 
                                           
143 See „Ex trabajadores de Minera Yanacocha denuncian que mina los botó enfermos‟,  La República, 27 
October 2009. 
144 I will pick up this latter point in the next chapter in explaining the „maps of grievance‟ and the construction 
of political identity in the anti-Conga movement. 
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and international professionals into the city represents a stark contrast of living conditions, 
representing rising inequality. For example, international experts who occupy high positions 
in a mining company mostly inhabit a residential zone of Baños del Inca, where property 
prices have risen to the extent that local people find it difficult to afford them (Steel, 2013: 
242). Alongside this affluent residential area, the children of these „new mining elites‟ have 
better access to high quality education, e.g., the Davy College, in which classes are provided 
in English and the fee amounts to approximately US$ 500 a month (Steel, 2013: 242). In the 
meantime, as Meléndez points out, gains from MYSA activity are also unequally distributed 
in the rural areas. Peasants who live in the higher ecological zone (jalca) benefited from 
mining activities to a certain degree.
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 While prior to the arrival of the company they could 
barely make ends meet and operated a precarious small-scale agriculture, the social 
programmes and micro-finance projects launched by the mining company sometimes benefit 
them, alongside the possibility to sell their small parcel of land. Accordingly, this section of 
campesinos is in favour of MYSA‟s presence and takes a pro-Conga position as will be 
demonstrated later. Meanwhile, agriculturalists inhabiting lower ecological zones are more 
likely to oppose mining activities due to their concerns about the quality and quantity of 
water in particular (Meléndez, 2009: 329). In addition, the rise in circulation of mining 
machinery and trucks is not welcomed by nearby communities, since sometimes their animals 
are hit and killed or their communal pastures damaged (Meléndez, 2009: 328).  
 In his study on the transformation of local landscape by MYSA‟s mineral extraction, Bury 
adopts a „livelihood‟ approach and analyses how transnational capital has transformed the 
availability of resources – produced, human, natural and social capital – which peasant 
households use to create their livelihood, and often has led to peasant collective actions 
against mining operations (see also Bebbington, 2004). According to his study, while 
peasants can get increased „produced‟ and „human‟ capitals, the availability of natural and 
social capital has been reduced in the affected areas. Although the impact is not uniform, the 
access of local communities to produced and human capital has improved via advances in 
infrastructure (road construction) and MYSA‟s social programmes (health and education 
programmes). Meanwhile, in terms of natural resources, such as land and water, competition 
                                           
145 Bury explains that economic activities are vertically distributed according to ecological zones in the affected 
areas: „quechua – 2400 – 2700 m‟ (above the sea level); „ladera – 2700 – 3500 m‟; and „jalca -3500 – 4200 m‟. 
He continues to illustrate that „generally, jalca zone of production, where mineral extraction is normally 
conducted, is utilized by households for seasonal grazing activities‟ (2005: 233). 
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over access has heightened between multinational capital and local peasants. When it comes 
to land, for example, MYSA has faced protests during the process of land sales. Bury argues, 
„[N]ew “mega” mining projects have become some of the largest and most influential 
landowners and agents of change in the region‟ (2002: 4). MYSA‟s operation has transformed 
access to land resources in three areas: prices; tenure structure; and the pattern of use (Bury, 
2005). The company‟s purchase of large areas of land has not only raised prices, but also 
changed the value of land-use by favouring or prioritising the function of land for mining 
over other activities, i.e. the „revalorization‟ of land-use (Bury, 2005: 231). The presence of 
transnational capital has also initiated the land-titling process, resulting in a change in the 
tenure structure. As seen in the previous chapter, Peru entered into the land-titling process 
under Fujimori. When MYSA intended to purchase land in rural Cajamarca, the tenure 
structure, particularly in the countryside, was not well institutionalised and it was MYSA 
which took the initiative of demarcating private land ownership for its operations. As Bury 
puts it, „in rural Cajamarca, where the neoliberal land-titling initiatives of the state were 
virtually nonexistent in the early 1990s, MYSA became the de facto agent of land-tenure 
change because the mine needed to clarify the legal ownership of lands where it planned to 
commence operations‟ (2005:231). However, the land-titling process has been slow, similar to 
the agrarian reform period in Cajamarca. As mentioned, the mining operation largely 
occupies the „jalca‟ ecological zone. Consequently, local peasants are forced to move to 
lower ecological zones or the city after selling their land (Bury, 2005: 234). After land sales, 
these people have often joined the informal sector on the outskirts of the city, becoming street 
vendors or day labourers (Steel, 2013: 241). Simultaneously, MYSA‟s operation via cyanide 
heap leaching methods requires large quantity of water and its use of toxic chemicals (such as 
cyanide) has raised concerns for water contamination.
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 As will be shown later, in various 
episodes of collective actions in the region, water provision and security have become a 
principal concern among local population related to mining activities.  
 In addition to insufficient linkage effects and unequal impacts of mineral extraction on the 
local population, the distribution of canon minero generated from MYSA‟s mineral 
extraction has contributed to more complex dynamics of local social and power relations. 
According to research conducted by de Echave and Diez, the transfer of canon minero and 
royalty to Cajamarca has increased by 736 per cent from almost S/. 66.4 million (2003) to S/. 
                                           
146 MYSA‟s mines are open-pit where cyanide heap leaching method is used. MYSA‟s operations resulted in 
changes in water diversions and land configuration in the region (see Deza, 2002). 
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555 million (2011) (2013: 55).
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 Despite the distribution of an impressive fiscal bonanza, 
several limitations in its allocation and use are evident vis-à-vis sustainable regional and local 
development in the longer term. First, canon and royalty is unequally distributed with a 
preference for the provinces and districts where extraction takes place (See Table 2 and Chart 
1). Almost half of the transfer is concentrated in the province of Cajamarca, with most of 
these fiscal reserves (73.4 per cent) being distributed in three districts (Cajamarca, Baños del 
Inca and La Encañada). This unequal allocation of fiscal reserves does not match the map of 
poverty in the region. For example, the province of Celendín has the highest incidence of 
absolute poverty in the region, with a low level of human development, but it received only 
3.8 per cent of the canon and royalty transferred between 2003 and 2011. Celendín is not the 
province where mining extraction is mainly located. Second, the distributed canon and 
royalty is exclusively used to invest in limited range of projects, such as infrastructure 
construction. Between 2004 and 2011 regional government invested more than 97 per cent of 
the canon and royalty in health, sanitation, energy and transportation (de Echave and Diez, 
2013: 63-64).
148
  However, as de Echave and Diez note, the proportion of investment in 
sectors such as agriculture, livestock, as well as environmental administration, was relatively 
small: during the same period, investment in the former two occupied 7.4 per cent on average 
and in the latter 2.7 per cent (de Echave and Diez, 2013: 64-65). Considering that agriculture 
and livestock rearing are important in terms of regional production and employment and 
environmental issues are the main concern of local population, the effectiveness of the 
implementation of fiscal bonanza can be limited to reduce regional poverty and to quell social 
conflicts, which is the main argument of the regime in Lima for mineral extraction and the 
distribution of fiscal revenues to sub-national governments. 
 
 
 
                                           
147 While the canon was composed of 94 per cent of the transferred amount, only 6 per cent was distributed via 
mining royalty in Cajamarca (de Echave and Diez, 2013: 55). 
148 With an asymmetrical focus on building up infrastructures, investments have been made exclusively in 
projects such as the construction of regional hospital, of urban potable water and sewage system, of 
infrastructure of rural electricity, road construction, as well as building of education centres (de Echave and Diez, 
2013: 64). 
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Table 2. Distribution of Canon and Royalty to the Provincial Governments and the 
Conditions of Poverty in Provinces of Cajamarca 
 
Province 
Transfer of Canon and 
Royalty (2003 – 2011) 
(millions of soles) 
(%) 
Incidence of 
Absolute Poverty 
(%) in 2007 
Human 
Development 
Indicator (2007) 
Ranking (2007) 
Cajamarca 1,068.414 46.5 47.5 0.58 84 
Hualgayoc 158.457 9.0 70.3 0.53 165 
Chota 165.125 7.4 64.5 0.55 138 
Jaén 156.291 7.1 47.8 0.59 72 
Cutervo 144.269 6.5 70.7 0.56 130 
San Ignacio 116.556 5.3 62.9 0.56 113 
Celendín 79.698 3.8 75.1 0.53 169 
Santa Cruz 58.723 3.1 61.3 0.57 105 
San Miguel 58.162 3.0 64.9 0.56 110 
Cajabamba 59.818 2.7 66.8 0.56 128 
San Marcos 44.405 2.0 70.2 0.52 178 
San Pablo 44.405 1.8 71.3 0.53 174 
Contunmazá 39.632 1.8 48.1 0.59 77 
The Department 2,193.953 100  0.56 20 
 Source: de Echave and Diez (2013) 
 
Chart 1. The Transfer of Canon and Royalty in Districts of Cajamarca Province 
 
Source: de Echave and Diez (2013) 
 As a consequence, rather than contributing to regional or local development, monetary 
transfers or investment projects have become an arena for power struggle among different 
actors – national government, mining company, as well as local authorities – to gain political 
Cajamarca 
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Baños del Inca 
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Transfer of Canon and Royalty in Districts of Cajamarca Province 
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legitimacy. The quantity of canon minero and royalty have become more important than its 
administration after being transferred. Faced with the incidence of socio-environmental 
conflicts increasing to an unprecedented level, the distribution of canon and royalty has left 
the central government some room for lessening social pressure and an opportunity to gain 
political legitimacy by investing in social programmes and introducing an institution 
favourable to partial participation. While it can provide a seemingly fair justification for 
„development with social inclusion‟, a responsible management of those fiscal reserves only 
falls on regional and local authorities, while blaming the latter‟s administrative inability and 
inefficiency when faced with criticism on mismanagement.  
 Alongside the government‟s distribution of canon, MYSA has become an important local 
power through its engagement in social provision, as well as relations among the local 
population. For these aims, the company has adopted two tactics: distribution and division. 
The former is associated with MYSA‟s CSR programmes. 149  MYSA has invested 
considerable sums in community development programmes in coordination with the 
company-supported NGO, ALAC (Asociación Los Andes de Cajamarca).
150
 In 2008, the 
Conga Project Team (organised by Newmont Mining Company) devised a „sustainable local 
development‟ in collaboration with ALAC and set up a „2015 Community Vision‟ after 
identifying problems and demands from 32 communities within the project‟s area of 
influence. This focused on fixed targets in four specific areas: „community-wide 
empowerment‟; „health and education‟; „productivity and earning power of farmers‟; and 
„critical infrastructure‟.151 To complement this original plan, Newmont has set out details for 
the additional provision of funds for local communities within the Conga project‟s direct and 
indirect area of influence. Another company tactic is to deepen divisions between the 
                                           
149 According to Triscritti, „Newmont is signatory to several Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiatives, 
such as the UN Global Compact (2004), International Council of Mining and Metals (2001), the Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights (2002)‟ (2013: 446-7). 
150 ALAC is „a corporate organization that emerges as part of social responsibility to promote Yanacocha 
sustainable human development‟ (Social Development sheet of Conga, Newmont Mining Corporation), 
available at 
http://www.newmont.com/sites/default/files/u87/Conga%20Project%20Social%20Development%20Fact%20Sh
eet-010512.pdf. According to Gilfford and Kestler, ALAC „supported primarily small business development 
projects‟ in the region, and „its administration and financing were almost completely reliant on Yanacocha‟ 
(2008: 348). 
151 For more details, see the Newmont Mining Corporation‟s fact sheet of on the social development of Conga. 
Available at 
http://www.newmont.com/sites/default/files/u87/Conga%20Project%20Social%20Development%20Fact%20Sh
eet-010512.pdf. 
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proponents and opponents of mining activities. In a similar vein, MYSA‟s limited approach to 
the „area of influence‟ has generated fissures within nearby communities and others. This 
„divide and rule‟ approach is carried out by constructing a so-called „cordón social de 
seguridad‟ („social belt of security‟). According to Vásquez, this strategy was designed by the 
North Group (Grupo Norte) several years ago and aims to support sections of the population 
who back mining activities, thus ensuring that these communities become defenders of the 
mining company.
152
 This is advantageous to the corporation since it is likely to avoid direct 
confrontation with opponents by generating conflicts among local populations.
153
 Through 
these measures, the mining company can argue that the mining project is supported by local 
communities, ensuring a „social licence‟ for carrying it out. During my fieldwork in 
Cajamarca, I observed this „social belt of security‟ strategy via my participant observation. 
Efforts to attend a march to the lakes (a local collective action against MYSA‟s Conga mining 
project) with a group of members of SUTEP on World Water Day, 22 March 2012, failed 
when members of the pro-Conga community blocked our access to the road to the lake sites. 
We tried other accesses, but in vain (see Photo 3).
154
  
          
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
152 Grupo Norte is a corporate-sponsored NGO led by Peruvian Buenaventura mining corporation. 
153 Mirtha Vásquez , „Vista Alegre y las estrategias de las empresas mineras‟ (Voces No. 23 October 2009).  
154 I took the photo inside the combi, a local minibus which was rented by the SUTEP organisers in the city of 
Cajamarca. It was quite hard to take more pictures due to the tension between the two sides afterwards. When 
my informant called me that he and his compañeros from Celendín had already arrived at the lake site, I did not 
expect this obstacle. My conversation with people who were in the combi, suggested that those who blocked the 
passage were probably not community campesinos since their clothing was not representative of local 
comuneros. According to them, they were „personas vendidas o compradas‟ („sold or paid people‟), meaning 
that comuneros who supported MYSA due to the company‟s provision of material benefits or simply people who 
were paid by MYSA to block access to the mine sites. Despite the credibility of this information, it was obvious 
that there were a lot of tensions every time people mobilised and attempted their march to lake sites, implying 
different interests and power relations over MYSA‟s mineral extraction. After several more attempts, we only 
turned on local radio on the road back to the city and listened to what participants said in the march.  
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Photo 3.  
 
          Photo: taken by the author in Cajamarca, 22 March 2012. 
 
 Meanwhile, since the arrival of MYSA in Cajamarca, the local political landscape has 
been closely related to mining operations and fiscal resources generated from them. The 
investment opportunities offered by the transferred canon and royalty, as well as those 
provided by MYSA, are also indispensable for local authorities, as it has proved to 
accumulate political stock among the local electorate within a „fractured‟ political context. 
One of the main local politicians is Luis Guerrero, a political outsider, who was elected as a 
provincial mayor of Cajamarca twice (1993-1995 and 1996-1998) with his local political 
party FIR (Frente Independiente Regional, Regional Independent Front).
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 He was also 
member of Congress (2000-2001 and 2001-2006). He maintained a cooperative position with 
the Fujimori administration in promoting MYSA‟s mineral extraction in Cajamarca and 
became a prominent figure for pro-mining investment. In the meantime, some of local 
authorities took a rather ambiguous or critical position depending on the dynamics of the 
                                           
155 Before the decentralisation in 2002, the electoral post of regional president did not exist and mayors of 
provincial municipalities were important local administrative position. 
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political environment or electoral calculations. Faced with rising criticism around MYSA‟s 
exploration of Cerro Quilish, Hoyos Rubio, then provincial mayor (FIR), issued the 
municipal ordinance 012 in 2000, declaring the Cerro Quilish as an intangible zone.
156
 In 
2002 when regional and local elections were carried out in the decentralisation process, 
apristas won the elections in Cajamarca, having a provincial mayor, Emilio Horna, and 
regional president, Luis Pita. Although APRA kept a friendly relationship with MYSA, local 
authorities sometimes took an ambiguous position. When faced with a strong opposition 
against Cerro Quilish in 2004, Emilio Horna himself called a provincial strike on 15 
September 2004 against the exploration of Cerro Quilish (Meléndez, 2009: 361- 362).  
 Cajamarquinos have experienced a varying degree of impacts from MYSA‟s mining 
activities. While some people have benefited from social programmes implemented by 
MYSA or via canon distribution, most have been left with unfulfilled expectations of 
employment opportunities and little impact on local economic dynamism. Additionally, those 
limitations surrounding the allocation and management of canon and royalty help fuel 
dissatisfaction among local communities vis-à-vis mining activities, a scenario that is 
particularly the case with MYSA in Cajamarca. Furthermore, it has become a complex terrain 
for power struggles among different social and political actors, a local dynamism which is 
very different from what proponents of mineral extraction argue for: i.e. „development with 
social inclusion‟. Echoing the national political landscape, local electoral campaigns, as well 
as political discourse, have become increasingly dominated by mineral extraction, as political 
and social leaders compete to gain political legitimacy among local electorates. 
Simultaneously, Cajamarca has become one of the most conflictive regions with protests 
against MYSA‟s mining operations, with particular concerns about their social and 
environmental impacts, to which the next section turns. 
 
 
 
 
                                           
156 Mobilisations in defence of Cerro Quilish will be examined in the next section. 
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5.3. MYSA’s Mineral Extraction: an Area for Contention 
Conflict over Land: MYSA’s Initial Contact with Local Communities 
MYSA began its activities by purchasing land from 41 local peasant families (covering 
4,068.95 hectares) in the province of Cajamarca between 1992 and 1996 (Leyva and Jahncke, 
2002: 22). These initial contacts manifested an outstanding power asymmetry between the 
local population and multinational capital, in the context of national regulations on land 
which favour mining capital, a problem compounded by the lack of state capacity in 
coordinating different interests. Land which the mining company purchased was used mainly 
as pasture by local smallholders. They were initially sold at price between S/. 100 and s/. 140 
per hectare, although some families received a slightly better price. Many households in the 
affected area were illiterate and not well aware of the land titling process. When peasants 
proved reluctant to sell their lands, the mining company sometimes engaged in intimidation, 
using Peruvian law to pressure those resistant to selling.
157
 Although local families appealed 
to various local authorities protecting them from the unjust process of land sales and 
denouncing intimidation made from the mining company, they received no redress.  
 Alongside the power asymmetry unfavourable for peasant families, it was evident that 
they lacked organisation in order to articulate effectively their own demands before the state, 
particularly due to the intensified stratification and fragmentation of the peasantry after the 
agrarian reform. Despite the successful experience of nightwatch patrols in the region, they 
went through a period of crisis in the late 1980s and 1990s as internal divisions undermined 
their cohesion. In some cases, local irrigation committees (las juntas de regantes) played a 
role as base organisations in the areas affected by mining activities, but also lacked 
articulation with other social actors (de Echave et al., 2009a: 81). In parallel with weak 
organisations, local peasants possessed different interests and demands when faced with 
precarious living conditions: some were attracted by rosy promises from the mining company 
relating to permanent job offers, free education for their children, social security, and road 
construction, among others (Leyva and Jahncke, 2002: 25).  
                                           
157 With regard to land sales, „Ley de Tierra‟ (Law No. 26505) states that when surface land is private property, 
mining investors have two alternatives: to reach an agreement with the landholder or to demand an acquisition 
process, an option favourable to the mining company (Leyva and Jahncke, 2002: 32).  
１７２ 
 Against this backdrop, the Catholic Church finally intervened in the dispute. This 
intervention resulted in promises of additional compensation and the creation of a 
development fund for affected families from the part of MYSA. Conflicts over land thus 
appeared to be settled due to the mediation of the Church, assisted by local NGOs, although 
the underlying causes of the problem remained unresolved.
158
 In consequence, the initial 
encounter between villagers and the mining company generated social conflicts over land in 
which demands of the rural population were rather limited to pressing for fairer treatment and 
more benefits from the company. However, this settlement of disputes over land did not mean 
the end of the problem. Rather, it represented the start of an accumulation of discontent 
fuelled by the spread of a negative perception of mining activities among many smallholders. 
This growing sentiment, when allied with the fact that the transnational did not establish a 
good initial relationship with local denizens, signified that it had to proceed with its mining 
activities in an increasingly tense social atmosphere, a situation exacerbated by the near 
absence of state regulations on mineral extraction, including land sales, a fair justice system, 
a dispute settlement system and environmental consequences, which have become the main 
points of „grievance‟ for local populations. 
 
Mercury Spill: Raised Awareness of Environmental Issues 
On 2 June 2000, a truck which was transporting mercury turned over near the small 
settlement of Choropampa, spilling 151kg of mercury on the highway between Cajamarca-
Pacasmayo (leading to Lima). MYSA initially rejected any responsibility for the incident, 
attributing the blame on the subcontractor, the transportation company RANSA. This stance 
and delay in responding adequately by both the company and government only deepened the 
damage to their reputation by intoxicating more local people. The problem was that the state 
had little safety control over the transportation of risky chemicals, nor the capacity of 
supervision and meaningful prosecution to ensure that the company adopted responsibility for 
the accident. Rather, both government and company avoided their duty for investigating the 
spillage, a position that acted to markedly intensify distrust and concern among local people.  
                                           
158 Additional data on the conflict mediation process and the role of the Church and the National Coordinator 
for Human Rights (Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos, CNDDHH) can be found in Arana (2002); 
Leyva and Jahncke (2002); Lingán (2008). 
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 In the eye of the population involved, instead of defending the rights of its own citizens, 
the state appeared to take sides with the transnational. The population in the affected districts 
and beyond also lost confidence in the viability of socially and environmentally responsible 
mining, a message the company had always been keen to promote. Rather the accident 
confirmed a belief that the pursuit of economic benefits was strongly prioritised over 
environmental questions. The MYSA initially arrived in the region arguing that its activities 
would not affect the environment because they would employ modern technology to manage 
risky materials and wastes. However, this accident raised an environmental awareness among 
the populace both in rural and urban areas, to the extent that many questioned the company‟s 
presence per se in the region. Environmentalists and local NGOs, such as Ecovida and Adea, 
played an important role in raising environmental awareness. Since the late 1990s, NGOs and 
civil society organisations which work on human rights and environmental issues have gained 
an important presence in the political arena, establishing national and international networks. 
Meléndez (2009) has called the rise of active environmentalist organisations an „informative 
boom‟ as they worked to provide information to the public as well as proffering legal and 
technical advice. Popular awareness was also significantly enhanced with the release of a 
powerful documentary that was shown in town and villages across the region and beyond.
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Particularly in the face of asymmetrical power and lack of organisations, negotiation between 
MYSA and the affected communities was only limited to debates over how much the 
compensation should be or how to distribute it; questions surrounding the necessity of an 
investigation into the impact on the health of the population in the affected area were largely 
ignored. This unsatisfactory situation contributed to recurrent protests in the affected 
communities: more than a decade since the accident, when protests against the Conga project 
were at their highest, inhabitants of Choropampa and adjacent communities actively 
sympathised with the mobilisation. Memories of the environmental and health damage, along 
with the unfair treatment at the hands of MYSA and the Peruvian state remain strong. 
 
Accusations over Water Contamination in Bambamarca and Cajamarca 
Negative perceptions and direct experiences caused by the mining activities have sometimes 
prompted panic and overreacted responses from local populations vis-à-vis environmental 
                                           
159 For detailed information, see the documentary, „Choropampa: The price of gold‟ (Guarango, 2002). 
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issues, particularly controversy relating to water contamination. In March 2001, rondas 
campesinas from the town of Bambamarca initiated protests and a road blockage, cutting 
communication between Cajamarca and Bambamarca for one week. Campesinos accused 
MYSA of causing the death of numerous trout which groups of women raised in the local 
fishery. In the mediation process, the mining company left the dialogue roundtable when 
faced with a long list of demands from local people, even though MYSA argued that no 
„scientific‟ evidence attributed its mining operation to the accident. To the company and 
some specialists, the death of trout can have many reasons, such as climate change, or the 
application of agrochemicals, since fish are highly sensible even to minor changes. They 
argued that no verifiable evidence existed to relate the trout death to mining. To local 
peasants in Bambamarca (a province where many accusations over contamination from 
mining have emanated in the past), however, environmental damage is a very sensitive issue. 
MYSA‟s insinuation of innocence was not believed. 
 Similarly, in the city of Cajamarca, rumours about the existence of solid mercury in the 
domestic water pipeline of several houses circulated around the city on 25 September, 2001. 
This soon terrified citizens, who took to the streets in large numbers. Violent protests erupted 
including an attempt to set fire to the MYSA office in the city and that of the public water 
company of Cajamarca (SEDACAJ). This protest was initiated by rumours which lacked 
concrete evidence, but blame was attached the mining company, even though some scientists 
argued that in most circumstances mercury cannot be found in the pipeline due to the 
principle of gravity. The episode illustrates the high level of public concern about possible 
environmental contamination, concerns that could quickly prompt spontaneous and massive 
responses protesting against the very presence of MYSA. Street disorders were also 
encouraged due to a widespread lack of trust in the state and a perception that it always acted 
in favour of the extractive multinationals. 
 
Cerro Quilish: the Massive Mobilisations in Defence of Water  
On 5 October 2000, the municipal ordinance 012-2000 was published with the support of the 
mayor of Cajamarca, Jorge Hoyos Rubio. The ordinance declared the Cerro Quilish (Quilish 
mountain) a protected area. In response, MYSA entered into a process of legal proceedings 
aimed at gaining access to exploit this site, which also happened to be a key source of 
domestic water for the city. Although the mining company could not win the law suits against 
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this ordinance in the regional court, the constitutional tribunal in Lima made a rather 
ambiguous adjudication: while it recognised the legality of the municipal government to 
establish a protected natural area, it prioritised the right of the concession given to the 
company by the central government before the ordinance was proclaimed, and 
simultaneously recommended that MYSA conduct an evaluation of environmental impacts. 
The situation tensed when the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MINEM) announced the EIA 
(Environmental Impact Assessment) results and gave the company authorisation for 
exploration on 16 July 2004 (via resolution 361-2004-MEM). MYSA consequently attempted 
to proceed with exploration in the Quilish mountain area against a backdrop of rising popular 
discontent at the decision. During August, local peasants in the affected area (organised 
around irrigation base groups) urged the public authorities to intervene to stop drilling and 
demanded the removal of excavation machinery from the area. However, attempts at dialogue 
initiated by a local authority (prefecto de Cajamarca) proved frustrated when the authorities 
did not attend the second meeting scheduled on 26 August. In response, peasant leaders in the 
Quilish areas agreed to implement collective action measures, scheduled for 2 September.     
 On the first day of the protest, almost two thousands smallholders from the affected areas 
occupied the MYSA‟s exploration site and instigated a road blockage of Cajamarca-
Bambamarca in defence of Cerro Quilish and clean water provision.
160
 Tens of protestors 
were left injured and detained in a confrontation with the police and private security forces 
hired by the company. On the second day, the protests extended to the city of Cajamarca as 
urban residents took to the streets, including students. On 8 September, a regional strike 
occurred against the exploration on Cerro Quilish. Shortly afterwards, the Civil Unitary 
Committee in Defence of Life and Environment in Cajamarca (el Comité Cívico Unitario 
para la Defensa de la Vida y del Medio Ambiente en Cajamarca) were formed, representing 
many civil organisations involved in the protests. Although dialogue and negotiations were 
attempted by leaders of the frente de defensa (front of defence) and of GRUFIDES, including 
Marco Arana, between 10-15 September, an agreement proved difficult to strike. The conflict 
consequently extended to a regional level, the central demand being the cancellation of 
exploration at Cerro Quilish. The „Comando de Lucha‟ (Movement Command) was 
established to coordinate activities between the Civil Unity committee, student federations, 
Teachers‟ and labour unions, calling for another regional strike scheduled for 15 September. 
                                           
160 For a detailed chronology of the conflicts over Cerro Quillish, see Lingán (2008); de Echave et al. (2009a); 
Meléndez (2009). 
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It is estimated that almost 40,000 people participated in this mobilisation from all 13 
provinces of Cajamarca, making it one of the largest demonstrations in the history of the 
department. In the end, these protests in defence of Cerro Quilish halted the exploration plan, 
as the MINEM released another resolution (427-2004-MEM/AAM) on 16 September, which 
invalidated the previous resolution (de Echave et al., 2009a: 90-92). 
 The main issue behind the protest was that local people perceived the Cerro Quilish as the 
origin of their water supply and that it would be contaminated by MYSA‟s operation. As 
Grompone explains, those who opposed mining on Cerro Quilish considered it a „colchón 
acuífero‟ („water cushion area‟), i.e. a special location for absorbing precipitation and storing 
water resources, indispensible for the well-being of the local population (2009: 24). 
Additionally, a severe drought in that year raised concerns of water shortage among peasants 
living adjacent to Cerro Quilish. The mining company, on the other hand, had a strong 
incentive for continuing with its exploration plan since the gold price on the international 
market had soared. According to MYSA‟s calculations, the costs of social conflicts could be 
offset by enhanced economic profits, which would also strengthen the Peruvian government‟s 
support for mining investors. However, after having accumulated a list of accusations over 
social and environmental impacts of mineral extraction, as well as unfair treatment by both 
political authorities and multinational capital, protests of large scale, at a departmental level, 
could achieve to put an end to the exploration plan.  This was one of the largest expressions 
of the local population against MYSA‟s mining operations.  
 
Combayo in La Encañada: Unfulfilled Promises and Ad-hoc Agreement 
La Encañada, one of twelve districts in the province of Cajamarca where Yanacocha‟s mining 
complex is located, is composed of 105 villages (centros poblados, CPs). As expected, there 
is a long list of social conflicts in this district and La Encañada comprises one of three 
districts where the Conga mining project is sited (see Chapter 6). The protests during August 
and September 2006 are one example. In June 2005, when denizens of CP Combayo became 
aware that the Technical Administration of Irrigation District of Cajamarca (the 
Administración Técnica del Distrito del Riego de Cajamarca, ATDR) had given permission 
for the construction of El Azufre dam (part of the extension plan of MYSA‟s Carachugo II 
project, via resolutions No. 087 and 098–2005–GR–CAJ / DRA–ATDRC), they mobilised 
for the cancellation of those resolutions and of the construction of the dam, voicing key 
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concerns regarding the quantity and quality of water to be affected by the mining 
operation.
161
 Issues raised by the protests appeared to have been negotiated when the 
company agreed to invest US$ 1.5 million in development projects and the creation a 
commission to monitor the quantity and quality of water. In addition, demands for 
employment and infrastructure work for the community were considered (de Echave and 
Diez, 2013: 85). Through these promises, the conflict seemed to subside for a time. However, 
more than 500 denizens from the hamlets of Bellavista Alta, Bellavista Baja, El Triunfo, El 
Porvenir, Pabellón de Combayo, Apalín y San Luis marched to the area where the Carachugo 
II project was planned on 2 August 2006. In the ensuing confrontation with the police, one 
local peasant, Isidro Llanos Echevarría, was shot dead and many left wounded. In response, 
the inhabitants of Combayo undertook a road blockage and captured the installations of 
MYSA, accusing the company of not meeting the agreements negotiated in 2005. In this 
action they attained support from some university students and people from nearby 
communities. Faced with increased protests, MYSA had to announce the suspension of its 
operation plan, with the excuse of the lack of security for its workers. In the end, the PCM 
(Premier‟s Office) in Lima intervened to reconcile the two parties and managed to negotiate a 
signed agreement (acta de entendimiento) on 3 September. According to de Echave and Diez, 
the agreement included the implementation of a water study conducted by the University of 
Texas at Austin and a technical team of the Inter-American Development Bank; the 
employment of local people; priority contracts for local companies; along with infrastructure 
works for the benefit of local communities, among others (2013: 85).  
 
In sum, the absence of appropriate regulations for mineral extraction and the government‟s 
unilateral decision-making favourable to global capital, and the asymmetrical power of global 
capital turned out to be the main reason for a series of local protests against MYSA‟s mineral 
extraction. In line with Harvey‟s argument, MYSA‟s neoliberal form of mineral extraction 
caused ABD among many cajamarquinos, particularly with concerns about unfair treatment 
and socio-environmental impacts. Additionally, the lack of articulation and organisation of 
the „fragmented‟ rural population was highlighted with regards to the limited impact of their 
protests. In other words, the description above can be a representative case of Harvey‟s 
                                           
161 See Ombudsman‟s Office monthly report No. 30 and 31; „Informe especial sobre Combayo: Crónica de un 
Enfrentamiento Anunciado‟, Voces Cajamarquinas, No. 3 (September, 2006). 
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explanation of a „post-modern movement‟ and what Hardt and Negri criticised as place-based 
local „reactionary‟ responses: i.e. local resistance of the dispossessed and fragmented 
subaltern groups vs. the power of global capital. Although this depicts the status quo well, 
this understanding tends to be limited to economic reductionism and a dualistic framework of 
geography and power, not opening up space for political imaginaries of subaltern 
subjectivities, as I argued in Chapter 2. In order to uncover the political possibilities of rural 
subaltern groups, the next section will examine the „relational content‟ of the resistance 
against mining-related grievances articulated in Cajamarca, by looking at a loose form of 
trans-local networks which was constructed through these collective actions, not only by 
local peasants but also other social groups, such as NGOs and the Church (Massey, 2005: 93). 
This is also relevant since this loose form of networks became an integral part of the anti-
Conga movement, which will be examined more in detail in Chapter 6. 
 
 
5.4. Contesting Mineral Extraction in Trans-Local Networks  
Over more than a decade, actors at local, national, regional or global levels formed local 
resistance. In other words, social relations at a different scale were articulated through 
oppositional political activities and created a loose form of trans-local networks. As argued in 
Chapter 2, when viewing the local-global nexus of resistance as a smooth shift in scale, 
place-based protests can be understood as being supported by paternalist support of 
organisations at a greater level due to the powerlessness and fragmentation of local 
organisations. However, examining the „relational content‟ of struggles can provide us with a 
plausible explanation of progressive political acts of resistance and re-articulation of unlike 
actors around grievances generated by global capital. This aspect will be examined in this 
section focusing on the network of peasants, Church and NGOs. Since these networks were 
still in the process of construction, they only maintained a loose form with contradictions and 
tensions before they were further developed in the anti-Conga movement. 
 
Catholic Church Networks 
Although the organisation of „fragmented‟ peasants was not well developed, the previous 
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pastoral activities under the bishop Dammert left a legacy of raising political consciousness 
among the peasantry and catequistas‟ activities and in activists and priests defending human 
rights, which played an important role in mobilisations against MYSA‟s mining operations.162 
The departure of bishop Dammert in 1992 coincided with the arrival of MYSA in 
Cajamarca.
163
 The principal discourse changed, although some local parishes and their 
priests maintained the position of the previous bishop.
164
 One of the main protagonists is 
Marco Arana Zegarra, ex-priest of the parish of Cristo Ramos of Porcón. He has been 
actively involved in mining-related problems in favour of the local population and has 
sometimes attempted to facilitate a dialogue between local communities and the mining 
company.
165
 He also created an important local human rights and environmental NGO, 
GRUFIDES (Group of Formation and Intervention for Sustainable Development, Grupo de 
Formación e Intervención para el Desarrollo Sostenible), with several graduates from the 
National University of Cajamarca in 2002. Later, he became further involved in mining-
related conflicts and took the initiative to create his own political movement, Tierra y 
Libertad (Land and Freedom) in 2009.
166
  
                                           
162 This represents a general influence of the progressive part of the Church in Latin America. Although there 
were religious groups who gave tacit consent to repressive regimes, those bishops and priests committed to the 
cause of social justice worked to defend human rights under military dictatorships and internal political violence 
in the 1970s and 1980s: e.g. Cardinal Raúl Silva Enrique and his Vicariate of Solidarity under the Pinochet 
dictatorship; the archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas and his Tutela Legal (Legal Advice) in El Salvador (Klaiber, 
2009: 412-413). While democratisation subsequently transferred the Church‟s role as human right defender to 
non-church organisations, political and social groups, there was a lasting influence as many religious social 
workers became involved in activities of progressive parties and human rights organisations (Klaiber, 2009: 
414). 
163 Under the papacy of John Paul II (1978-2005), conservative bishops, who were critical of liberation 
theology, were appointed across the region, sometimes resulting in fragmentation and tension within the Church 
(Klaiber, 2009: 414). Similarly, Luis Cipriani, the Cardinal and Archbishop of Lima since 1999 and a member of 
Opus Dei, brought a conservative turn in Peru. For example, he took a critical position of the CVR activities to 
investigate human rights abuses after two decades of unprecedented political violence (Klaiber, 2009: 418).  
164 According to ex-priest Marco Arana, one of the reasons for the failure of the Church‟s facilitating role in the 
negotiation process after the mobilisations of the Bambamarca peasants in March 2001 was the different 
position adopted by local priests and the bishop, which was intensified with the appointment of many Opus Dei 
bishops after Dammert. In addition, MYSA attempted to control the Church‟s influence by providing material 
donations. For example, the Vicaría de Solidaridad lost credibility as a facilitator of dialogue among local 
peasants after its decision to receive funds from MYSA since 2000 (2002: 116-7).  
165 In the case of Combayo in 2006, while the government asked the ex-priest to intervene in the meditation, 
MYSA did not accept him as a facilitator. When the conflict intensified, an improvised dialogue roundtable was 
established and finally the Premier‟s office had to intervene to calm the situation. 
166 Tierra y Libertad presented candidates in regional elections and Arana himself ran for the 2011 presidential 
elections. Both results were poor. Recently, it was inscribed by the National Electoral Tribunal (JNE, Jurado 
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In the early 1990s, the response of local peasants to MYSA‟s mining activities was rather 
unorganised. In the context of weak local representation and organisation of peasant interests, 
combined with the indifference of local and political authorities, the Church became the main 
facilitator between the mining company and local families in the process of settling disputes 
regarding land sales in affected areas.
167
 MYSA‟s pressure for land purchase worried 
peasants in the area of Cerro Quilish, who expressed their discontent to the parish priest of 
Porcón, after failing to gain support from various authorities. Through the coordination of the 
parish and the Vicaría de Solidaridad del Obispado de Cajamarca, they accused the company 
of „land usurpation and attempted fraud‟ („por usurpación de tierras y tentativa de estaf
a‟) in front of the Regional Prosecutor (Fiscalía Superior Decana de Cajamarca) in 
December 1993. In this process, local peasants were provided with legal advice and support 
via the parish‟s trans-local network. Lawyers from the CEAS offered them legal advice. In 
addition, the Porcón parish has a solidarity pact with its German counterpart, Saint Gallus de 
Tettnang, and this German alliance sent letters to the World Bank, the President of Peru, 
Newmont‟s US office and the German ambassador in Peru with the intention of informing 
them of events in Cajamarca (Bebbington et al, 2011: 212). In the end, MYSA attempted to 
negotiate with peasants in an extra-judicial way in 1994, but the offer was declined.
168
  
 
Rondas Campesinas and NGOs in Trans-Local Networks 
Alongside the linkages of the Church, peasant organisation and NGOs constituted a 
significant part of the networked forms of resistance via collective action against MYSA. 
Despite a general decline in rondas‟ activity, their legitimacy, based on their capacity to solve 
problems, was maintained among the peasantry. When peasants were faced with another 
                                                                                                                                   
Nacional de Elecciones) in March 2012 (via Resolution 0023-2012-ROP/JNE). The official name for inscription 
was Tierra y Dignidad (Land and Dignity) at the request of Marco Antonio Zevallo Bueno in March 2011. See 
„Tierra y Dignidad logró su inscripción como partido político ante el JNE‟, El Comercio, 28 April 2012.   
167
In the early 1990s, the Vicariate of Solidarity of Cajamarca, with support of CNDDHH pressured MYSA and 
Newmont into creating a fund of $US 500,000 - with the aim of providing micro-credits to 41families in land 
conflicts (Leyva and Jahncke, 2002: 30). The CNDDHH is a national human right organisation, created in 1985. 
In 1994, it was composed of 44 distinct groups and seven permanent observers, including the Bishops‟ 
Commission on Social Action (CEAS, Comisión Episcopal de Acción Social) which was created in 1965 after 
the Second Vatican Council and emphasised the Church‟s role in the consolidation of justice, democracy, 
development and peace in Peru (Klaiber, 2009: 413). The CNDDHH, now with 81 member organisations, has „a 
Special Consultative Status before the Organisation of American State (OAS)‟. For more information, see 
http://derechoshumanos.pe/english/. 
168 Peasants finally ceded to MYSA in the midst of intimidation and the provision of financial incentives, and 
the Cerro Quilish area became the company‟s private property during 1995 and 1996. 
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problem or crisis, as in the past, they could easily organise themselves again in order to solve 
their problems. In this way, rondas provided a good resource for mobilisation and 
recruitment for participants, playing a role as what Melucci would call „submerged networks‟. 
As Taylor points out, the legacy of rondas‟ activities facilitated the organisation of the rural 
population particularly at village-level (2011: 424, see also Starn, 1999).
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 By the 1990s, the 
main threat to peasant livelihoods became mining activity and its social and environmental 
impact. In order to defend their livelihoods and the environment and mobilise against mining 
activities, rondas campesinas played an important role as demonstrated in the various 
protests in Cajamarca and other regions. Assessing the rondas‟ persistent mobilising capacity, 
Chacón (2002) argues that they have embraced another function of environmentalism since 
the late 1990s, via mobilisations against MYSA‟s mining activities. The principal contextual 
difference is that the nature of socio-environmental issues is more difficult and complicated 
to address, in comparison to cattle rustling. They also include more diverse social actors, not 
just limited to local dimensions, but also tend to embrace national and international 
involvement.
170
 
 Regarding rural base organisations, Cajamarca is not a region where the peasant 
community is traditionally strong, which has historically been one of the main factors in 
peasant mobilisations. According to de Echave and his colleagues, mobilisations in 
Cajamarca stood out in the sense that peasant communities did not play an important role 
(2009a: 237). In the central or southern highlands, peasant communities led protests against 
mining activities, as well as got involved in negotiation process: e.g. Huaripampa and 
Carhuayoc communities inhabited in the nearby Antamina mines (San Marcos district, 
Á ncash department); and Huisa, Huisa Collana, Huarca, Antaccollama and Suirocama, 
excluded from previous agreement led protests against Xstrata (located in Espinar province, 
department of Cusco) (de Echave et al., 2009a: 238). In contrast, irrigation committees 
(juntas de regantes) or hamlet mayors were important actors in mobilisation at village level 
                                           
169 In his analysis of rural voting results in the 2006 presidential and general elections in Cajamarca, Taylor 
(2008) also points out the reactivation of the rondas particularly in regions where there were mining activities. 
Taylor (2011) goes deeper in his analysis of the role of the rondas campesinas in the mobilisation of anti-mining 
peasant protests in the southern province of San Marcos, Cajamarca. 
170 In recent years, rondas have attempted to expand their agenda to discuss and develop an alternative legal 
system in the context of the re-democratisation process (although this is not the focus of this thesis, it will be an 
interesting topic for future research, especially given the backdrop of constitutional changes undertaken by 
several progressive governments in Latin America). Gilitz (2013) has recently published a book on this issue. 
See also Picolli (2008). 
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in Cajamarca (de Echave et al., 2009a: 239). However, as the social and environmental 
impact generated by mining activities became felt more strongly, rondas campesinas started 
to become more involved in the issue, as seen in protests over the water contamination 
problem in Bambamarca, as well as protests in defence of Cerro Quilish. The first regional-
level attempt to deal with problems related to MYSA in Cajamarca was the Regional 
Congress of Rondas Campesinas  held in June 1999 and this raised issues such as 
contamination and the lack of water provision caused by mining activities (Lingán, 2008: 56-
57).  
Nevertheless, this base organisation is rather heterogeneous and vulnerable to 
fragmentation as in the previous decade. According to Chacón (2002), rondas campesinas 
in Cajamarca were divided into two factions: the Federación Departamental de Rondas 
Campesinas y Urbanas de Cajamarca (Departmental Federation of Peasant and Urban 
Rondas of Cajamarca) and the Federación de Rondas Campesinas Femeninas de Cajamarca 
(Women‟s Federation Peasant Rondas of Cajamarca, FEROCAFENOP).171 The former has 
been under the influence of the PCP-PR since 1985 when the first Departmental Congress of 
Rondas Campesinas took place (Chacón, 2002). The latter is composed of mainly 
independent members. FEROCAFENOP and its leadership have been actively involved in 
mining related issues and by the late-1990s had made useful national and international 
contacts. For example, this federation has collaborated with international NGOs, e.g., Project 
Underground.
172
 In addition, the federation participated in the creation of CONACAMI 
(National Confederation of Peruvian Communities Affected by Mining, Confederación 
Nacional de Comunidades Afectadades por la Minería) in 1999, its president being elected as 
secretary of Institutional Development as well as leading the environment council (Lingán, 
2008: 57).
173
 However, when CONACAMI attempted to create a regional counterpart in 
                                           
171 FENOCAFENOP was founded in 1986 in response to the male oriented-character of the nightwatch patrols, 
with a particular interest in gender-related issues and the organisation‟s unequal internal gender roles.  
172 Project Underground became the FEROCAFENOP‟s major international contact, utilising its technical and 
financial advice. According to Bebbington et al., this North American NGO facilitated the federation president‟s 
travel to the Newmont shareholders‟ meeting in Denver, as well as attempting to impede the federation‟s 
radicalisation, preventing the federation‟s taking violent measures, such as the invasion of the MYSA‟s 
installations by force (2011: 213). In addition, FEROCAFENOP submitted a complaint to IFC‟s ombudsman 
office, working closely with Project Underground in March 2001 (Lingán, 2008: 57). 
173 CONACAMI was created in October 1999, with the support of civil society organisations, such as Lima-
based NGO, CooperAcción. It aims to respond to an increasing demand of the communities affected by mining 
activities when traditional peasant organisations, such as CNA and CCP, did not represent the interests of these 
communities (Padilla, 2009: 158). Main concern for the Confederation was environmental impacts generated by 
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Cajamarca, CORECAMI-Cajamarca (Confederación Regional de Comunidades Afectadades 
por la Minería) in 2001, the organisation never took root, particularly due to 
FEROCAFENOP‟s conflict with other regional organisations (Lingán, 2008: 57).174 To 
compound matters, the leader of FEROCAFENOP struck an agreement to receive funds from 
MYSA, and this dealt a death blow to the federation, generating criticisms of its closeness 
with the mining company and diminishing its legitimacy in the region.
175
  
 While CONACAMI did not have influence in Cajamarca, the Frente de Defensa de los 
Intereses, Ecología y Medio Ambiente de Cajamarca (Cajamarca‟s Front of Defence of 
Interests, Ecology and Environment, FDIEMAC), officially founded in August 2001, was 
another attempt to organise around local environmental issues related to mining activities. In 
FDIEMAC‟s congress in Bambamarca, rondas campesinas from almost all provinces 
participated, together with members of the teachers‟ union, SUTEP-Cajamarca, and Juventud 
Popular-Cajamarca (Cajamarca‟s Popular Youth organisation), as well as local NGOs and 
environmental activists (Chacón, 2002).
176
 Although participants in the FDIEMAC congress 
could agree on the environmental importance and necessity of sustainable development in the 
face of mining activities, as Chacón (2002) points out, there were several limitations, 
including: the limited capacity of the organisation; distrust of its politicised leadership; and, 
more importantly, the subsistence issue among poor peasants.
177
 Despite organisational 
                                                                                                                                   
mining activities, as well as communities‟ right to land (Vittor, 2009: 198). In the process of institutionalisation 
(from „Coordinator‟ status to „Confederation‟), the gap between the leadership and bases widened as the latter 
was alienated gradually (Padilla, 2009: 160-161). Meanwhile, in the aftermath of an exchange of experiences 
with indigenous organisations in neighbouring Ecuador and Bolivia such as ECUARUNARI (Confederación de 
Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Kichwa del Ecuador) and CONAMAQ (Consejo Nacional De Ayllus y Markas del 
Qullasusyu), during the first half of 2000s, the Confederation self-defined as an indigenous organisation at its 
second National Congress in 2003 by incorporating ethnic identity (Vittor, 2009: 199-202). 
174 When CONACAMI attempted to organise CORECAMI-Cajamarca, it chose two local leaders for the task: 
the president of FEROCAFENOP, Segunda Castrejón, and Reinhard Seifert, a civil engineer and environmental 
activist of German origin. The clash between two local leaders frustrated CONACAMI‟s plan. In addition, 
CONACAMI‟s relationship with FEROCAFEP closed down the possibility of forging links with another 
Rondas Campesinas federation, the Federación Departamental de Rondas Campesinas y Urbanas de 
Cajamarca, due to its rivalry with FEROCAFEP (Chacón, 2002; Lingán, 2008; Bebbington et al., 2011). 
175 According to Bebbington et al., FENOCAFENOP agreed to receive funds from MYSA in 2001, which 
amounts to US$ 10,000 with an aim to contribute to microfinance programmes (2011: 216). 
176 Organisations which participated in the congress, such as SUTEP-Cajamarca, Juventud Popular as well as 
the rondas campesinas, were under the influence of the Red Homeland party and this factional link raised 
concerns. Peruvian political parties, including this communist party, lost their legitimacy among many Peruvians 
due to their lack of effectiveness since the 1980s, and the electorate has preferred to support outsider or anti-
systemic candidates, as illustrated by the elections of Fujimori, Toledo and Humala.  
177 For poor peasants who lived on subsistence agriculture, socio-economic issues were more important than 
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difficulties at regional level, rondas campesinas still have a substantial role to play as a base 
organisation, which has been demonstrated in their high visibility at regional protests in 
defence of the environment and water, particularly since the late 1990s, including 
mobilisations in December 1999, March 2001, Cerro Quilish in 2004 and those against the 
Conga project since 2011.  
 Alongside the rondas campesinas, several NGOs have constituted the trans-local networks 
over time. Not only local NGOs but also other organisations at a different scale became an 
integral part of this network in Cajamarca by exchanging their accumulated experiences and 
making connections. Initially the role of these NGOs within the network was concentrated on: 
providing technical information and legal advice; facilitating contacts with other actors; 
helping to raise environmental awareness among the population; and pressuring the mining 
company and coordinating dialogue. ECOVIDA, for example, conducted a technical study on 
water quality in Cajamarca several times and disseminated the information in a way that was 
accessible to the local population. The involvement of these urban-based environmental 
NGOs constructed a wider network that in turn facilitated information, the exchange of 
experiences, as well as making multiple contacts. One of the incidents which set off an 
environmental alarm relating to mining activities among the local population was the mercury 
spill at Choropampa. The production of a documentary on the accident – produced by 
Guarango with financial support of Oxfam America – contributed to raising popular 
awareness.
178
 Between the late 1990s and early 2000s, Project Underground became 
involved in the region‟s mining issues in various ways. Before its coordination with 
FEROCAFENOP, in 1998, this NGO had access to the MYSA report submitted to MINEM, 
in which the company admitted that it had been discharging acid water and heavy metals 
since initiating its operation in 1993 (Arana, 2002: 106-7). The organisation‟s disclosure of 
this report raised concerns about water quality among the local population. In 2001 when 
peasants and local denizens mobilised due to concerns about water security, Project 
                                                                                                                                   
environmental contamination. They sometimes tended to favour improvised material compensation granted by 
the mining company (see de Echave 2009a). In this sense, it can be noted that the construction of trans-local 
networks was imbued with tensions and contradiction among diverse interests. 
178
 Guarango is a Peruvian NGO which was founded in Lima in 1994. The organisation is dedicated to the 
production and dissemination of documentaries in order to stimulate public opinion, with a particular interest in 
the excluded and themes like development. Its other documentaries relating to mining problems include: 
„Tambogrande: Mangos, Muerte, Minería‟ (2007), which documents the chronology of social conflicts between 
local communities and Manhattan Minerals Corporation (a medium-size Canadian mining company) over the 
Tambogrande mining project; „Operación Diablo‟ (2010), another documentary which dealt conflicts around the 
Majaz project (Piura) highlighting the state and a private security company‟s (FORZA) repression of local 
peasants and members of GRUFIDES, including the ex-priest and environmental activist Marco Arana.  
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Underground informed US senators about the issue, questioning the IFC (a shareholder of 
MYSA)‟s loan for an investment project of an unsustainable nature (see CAO 2007).  
 
In sum, during the first decade of MYSA‟s presence in Cajamarca, there were a series of 
social protests against mining activities. MYSA‟s mineral extraction accumulated perceptions 
of „injustice‟ and social and environmental grievances among local populations, particularly 
in the context of the near absence of state regulations and an institutional system for dispute 
conciliation. Through collective actions, various social actors, including rondas campesinas, 
progressive priests and parishes with their contacts, as well as local and international NGOs, 
began to work together and create a loose web of trans-local networks. However, this 
formulation of the network was not a smooth and strategic nexus between actors at different 
scales. Instead, the process was full of tensions among diverse interests. But at the same time, 
they have become an integral part of the massive mobilisation against the Conga project.  
 
 
5.5. Conclusion 
The capitalist development of export crops in the northern coast started to impact on the 
socio-economic structure of Cajamarca from the 1880s. The expansion of the dairy industry 
intensified commercial agriculture post-1940. In this process, landlords took a „Junker‟ path 
of capitalist development by subdividing their lands and increasing investment on more 
fertile soils, a process that also led to more differentiation among the peasantry. In Cajamarca, 
as in other parts of sierra, local peasants were historically marginalised from the state and 
local power structures dominated by hacendados. Provincial society was hierarchically 
structured around patron-client relationships between landlords and peasants. Rather than 
unilaterally being exploited, however, local peasants responded to political and economic 
powers by using local power structures or central government. Additionally, immigration to 
the northern coast provided an opportunity to resist proletarianisation. APRA, originating in 
Trujillo, has exercised a strong influence on Cajamarca‟s rural and urban population since the 
1930s. The party‟s anti-imperialistic and reformist stance gained legitimacy among the 
peasantry in Cajamarca. However, when it turned to the right by the mid-1950s and opposed 
agrarian reform, APRA‟s dominance in the countryside came under challenge.  
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 One of the most important peasant organisations in the region, FEDECC, reflected this 
change of influence. It was founded by APRA in 1961 and later the PCP-U and VR took 
control of the organisation. Its association with CCP radicalised its activities to a certain 
degree and led to land occupations in locations such as Huacataz (1973) and Pomabamba 
(1974). The slow and inappropriate implementation of agrarian reform in Cajamarca did not 
solve the problem of minifundización, one factor that helps explain the creation of the 
nightwatch patrols (rondas campesinas) in the face of economic crisis during the 1970s and 
1980s. This grassroots peasant organisation successfully dealt with direct problems (i.e. cattle 
rustling) and extended its functions into areas such as constructing an alternative peasant 
legal system. The efficiency of rondas gained legitimacy among the rural populace and their 
experience became repeated across the country. Alongside activities of peasant organisations 
and rondas campesinas, the role of bishop Dammert Bellido, with his commitment to social 
justice, helped raise political consciousness among the peasantry. The aftermath of agrarian 
reform saw a highly fragmented rural landscape as it left a small number of „included‟ and a 
majority of „peripherised‟ campesinos, leading to the stratification of rural producers in 
Cajamarca. However, a historical accumulation of social relations via political activism 
thickened the social texture and constituted a particularity of this part of the rural highlands, 
becoming an important element of socio-environmental protests against MYSA‟s mineral 
extraction since 1990.  
 Peru went through a significant structural reform process under the Fujimori regime. With 
a series of investment preferential policies and deregulations, mineral extraction has 
expanded exponentially across the country since the 1990s. Against this backdrop, MYSA 
arrived in the region, bringing expectations and promises for progress. To the disappointment 
of many local denizens, benefits from mining activities have been unequally distributed, 
inciting different responses. Rather than addressing local poverty and quelling social unrest, 
mineral extraction became an arena for power struggles among national and local authorities, 
as well as MYSA. In addition, the power-geometry of MYSA‟s mineral extraction laid a 
ground for unity among various social actors‟ political activism. During the 1990s, protesters 
demanded fairer treatment and a better distribution of benefits, with conflicts being largely 
limited to the countryside. However, a series of environmental accidents, including a major 
mercury spill in 2000, raised environmental awareness among the local denizens not only in 
the countryside, but also in urban areas. In particular, accusations regarding the negative 
impact on water resources raised concerns, with the 2004 massive mobilisation in defence of 
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Cerro Quilish representing an obvious expression of many cajamarquinos‟ fears over water 
quantity and quality. Accumulations of struggles helped the creation of trans-local networks 
among various social actors. Despite the inherent tensions, these networks were based on 
previously constructed social relations in the countryside, laying ground for the anti-Conga 
movement, which is the focus of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
The Anti-Conga Movement:  
Constructing Political Identity of ‘Environmental Justice’  
 
 
It seems a bit weird to me. People protest against the Conga project in defence of the 
environment, particularly arguing that water is as important as the life of people. But 
you can easily see people throwing rubbish on the streets on their way back home 
after the protests. They seemingly have no idea about recycling. This is one of the 
reasons why I decided to start an environmental education campaign in the nursery 
which I worked for.
179
 
 
The Conga project comprises part of MYSA‟s extension plan and is designed to develop two 
mineral deposits, Perol and Chaihuagón, in order to exploit gold and copper over the next 
nineteen years in the provinces of Celendín (districts of Huasmín and Sorochuco) and 
Cajamarca (district of La Encañada). Its opponents‟ main criticism is that the project is 
located in an ecologically vulnerable area and, once started, would generate an irreversible 
environmental impact on the region. In particular, concerns over the quality and quantity of 
water have been a principal motivation for mobilisation since 2011 and now the project has 
been temporarily suspended after two years of massive protests. 
 The excerpt above is an interview conducted with a South Korean volunteer who was 
dispatched to a local nursery in Cajamarca from KOICA (Korea International Cooperation 
Agency), part of the South Korean government‟s programmes for official development 
assistance (ODA).
180
 This observation suggests that although the defence of the environment 
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 ‘물은 생명이라며 콩가 광산 반대를 외치던 사람들이 집회 후 집으로 돌아가던 길에 쓰레기를 아무렇게나 버리는 
것을 보며 충격을 받았다. 그들이 사실은 환경보호 (예를 들면, 재활용)에 무관심하다는 것을 깨닫고, 봉사하고 있는 유치
원에서 환경관련 교육을 하기로 마음을 먹게 되었다.’Interview, Informant F, via Email, 1 June 2014. I was aware 
of the educational campaign during my fieldwork, at a time when the anti-Conga movement was at its zenith. 
The interviewee initiated an environmental campaign in the nursery where she was volunteering. When she 
came to know the recycling campaign, „Yo Reciclo‟ („I Recycle‟), promoted by the environmental department of 
Cajamarca city, she contacted the department and also participated in the city‟s recycling capacity-building 
programmes. After six months of education activities on recycling, she coordinated with the environment 
department of the municipality of Baños del Inca district a „recycling concert‟ around Christmas time in 2012. In 
order to gain more detailed information, I conducted an interview via email. 
180 KOICA was created in April 1991 with the aim to carry out programmes to support socio-economic 
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and water is one of the main arguments of the anti-Conga movement, local denizens in 
general, including movement participants, seem to lack awareness of environmental 
protection, a position which many environmentalists of a post-materialist stance or 
„conservationist‟ would take. Moreover, what „environment‟ signifies for movement 
participants is distinguished from a rhetorical criticism posited by many proponents of the 
Conga project: the „anti-mineros‟ (opponents to Conga, particularly supported by „foreign‟ 
NGOs), proponents argued, are „naïve environmentalists‟ and their position is „anti-
development‟. In contrast to these interpretations, protesters‟ understanding of the 
„environment‟ exhibits a broader or distinct connotation. In explaining the nature of socio-
environmental movements, Bebbington categorised five strands: „conservationist 
environmentalism‟; „deep ecology‟; „environmental justice‟; „environmentalism of the poor‟; 
and „resource-nationalist environmentalism‟ (2009: 19, see also Martínez-Alier, 2002). The 
former two are more associated with arguments of post-materialist environmentalists based in 
Western Europe and North America. The latter three are primarily concerned with social 
justice claims, i.e. the social distribution of environmental impacts, socio-economic benefits 
and the sovereignty of natural resources. The last point is where many leftist governments in 
Latin America are involved as seen in Chapter 2. 
Rather than seeing the „environment‟ per se as an object for protection or inclusive 
development, this chapter aims to elucidate the complex trajectories of constructing a 
political identity of „environmental justice‟ via political activism. While the local population 
has been distinctively influenced by the „power-geography‟ of MYSA‟s mineral extraction, a 
source for fragmentation of subaltern groups, this also provides them with a ground for unity 
as they go through similar grievances. With particular regard to the Conga project, protesters 
have created „maps of grievance‟ with a series of resistance activities. In this way, it is 
plausible to examine the political potential of rural subjectivities rather than focusing on their 
fragmentation. The accumulation of political activities has enabled locating causes for 
grievance and in this process „networked forms of resistance‟ have been constructed against 
MYSA‟s Conga mining project, which I term „counter-extractive networks (CENs)‟. The 
CENs are composed of diverse social groups at different spatialities, thereby creating 
„prefigurative solidarity‟ and constructing political identity, which can be understood as the 
                                                                                                                                   
development in developing countries and thus improve diplomatic relationship with those countries. One of the 
Agency‟s activities is to dispatch national volunteers to support programmes of development and cultural 
exchange in less developed countries. During my fieldwork in Cajamarca, there were three Korean volunteers 
working in the city of Baños del Inca, Cajamarca province. 
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process of contesting causes of grievance generated by the Conga mining project and 
neoliberal extractivism more broadly. In this way, the chapter examines the complex 
trajectories of resistance acts through the interconnectedness among subaltern groups in the 
rural highlands. 
 
 
6.1. Mobilisations against the Conga Mining Project 
Conga Project 
According to a fact sheet issued by the Newmont Mining Corporation, „the Conga project is a 
copper-gold porphyry deposit located 75 km northeast of the city of Cajamarca, Peru‟ and 24 
kilometres from Newmont‟s Yanacocha mining complex (see Map 1).181 Over 19 years, 
MYSA is expected to exploit two open pit deposits: Chailhuagón and Perol.
182
 The company 
intended to construct four artificial reservoirs (Chaihuagón, Perol, Superior and Inferior) to 
substitute four lakes (Chailhuagón, Perol, Azul and Mala) at the mine site (see Map 2). The 
exploitation was programmed to start by late 2014 and 2015 according to the original plan, 
but has been suspended after massive mobilisations by the local population beginning in 2011. 
As Gilfford and Kestler note, „[M]ost families in the Conga Area earned a livelihood in 
subsistence agriculture and dairy‟ (2008: 349).  Residents fear the mine could undermine 
their livelihood. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
181 Available at http://www.newmont.com/node/4937. The fact sheet was updated in June 2013.  
182 According to de Echave and Diez, two mineral deposits of the Conga project, Perol and Chailhuagon, were 
discovered in the early 1990s and then incorporated into MYSA. Exploration activities were conducted from 
2004 onwards and the environmental baseline study was carried out during 2005 and 2007 (2013: 73). 
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     Map 1. Large-Scale Mining Projects in Department of Cajamarca 
 
    Source: Newmont Mining Corporation 
 
     Map 2. The Conga Project 
 
                  Source: La República (6 November 2011). 
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Chronology of the Anti-Conga Mobilisations in Defence of Water
183
  
One of the main concerns of the local population with regard to the Conga project is water. 
Opponents have argued that it will be located in the „ecologically vulnerable‟ headwaters of 
five watersheds (Jadibamba, Chailhuagon, Chirimayo, Chugurmayo and Toromacho), and the 
operation will be conducted in jalca areas. They argue that it is highly likely that the 
excavation will generate irreversible environmental damage, particularly to the region‟s water, 
and this worries local peasants as well as the urban population in terms of their access to 
sufficient and clean water. Considering the location of the project, the area of influence is not 
limited to nearby communities, but extends to downstream areas and to the city. Based on 
this main argument, a majority of cajamarquinos have opposed the Conga project and 
conducted a series of mobilisations in defence of water. While most local residents show their 
disapproval of the project, ronderos and campesinos in Celendín and Bambamarca are most 
visible in the streets via their collective activism. In addition, members of SUTEP, the 
University student union, civil construction union, as well as NGOs (most visibly 
GRUFIDES) members, local politicians (such as Jorge Rimarachín) and the regional 
government (led by its president Gregorio Santos) and local authorities from three provinces 
have demonstrated their opposition to the scheme.
184
 As will be examined later, these actors 
constitute the main component of the „networked form‟ of resistance against MYSA‟s Conga 
project. This section will contextualise the anti-Conga movement by looking at the 
chronology of mobilisation between 2010 and 2013, before engaging in a deeper analysis in 
the following sections.  
 According to Peruvian law, the mining company should meet stipulated EIA 
(Environmental Impact Assessment) requirements prior to initiating the exploitation process 
with an aim to prevent or mitigate negative environmental impacts. MYSA submitted its EIA 
for the Conga project on 9 February 2010 and received authorisation from the MINEM on 27 
October the same year. During this period small protests occurring around the project area 
demanded revision of the EIA. On 5 April 2010, the municipality of the district of Sorochuco 
organised a forum, „Sorochuco, Environment and Mining‟ (Sorochuco, Medio Ambiente y 
                                           
183 See Appendix II. 
184 According to a poll conducted by Ipso Apoyo, 78 per cent of the population in Cajamarca oppose the Conga 
project; in the countryside the percentage rises to 83 per cent („El 78 % de cajamarquinos rechza el proyecto 
minero Conga‟, El Comercio, 22 August 2012).  
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Minería), in which an agreement was reached to oppose the Conga project.
185
 After constant 
small-scale protests, authorities from the regional government of Cajamarca visited the Perol 
and Chailhuagón lakes on 11 July 2011, when opponents of the project asked the regional 
government to revise the EIA (de Echave and Diez, 2013: 93).
186
 For the protesters, the 
process of how the MINEM authorised MYSA‟s EIA was inappropriate since the person in 
charge did not seem to be impartial.
187
 In addition, they argued that the company failed to 
provide the local population with any proper information and explanation about the project.  
 The EIA‟s lack of credibility undermined the viability of the Conga project in the eyes of 
the local residents. As will be seen later, the democratic deficit of the process and different 
understandings of the „environment‟ have become the movement‟s main focus of contention 
since they were perceived as the causes of „grievance‟ through acts of resistance. For the 
Humala government and the mining company, there is sufficient reason to defend the project. 
It is one of the largest foreign investments in Peru, at US$ 4.8 billion. For the government, 
this considerable investment is necessary for sustaining economic growth and generating a 
fiscal bonanza. For MYSA, the project is indispensable since it furthers its extension plan; the 
sheer quantity of deposits available is also an important factor in its calculations.
188
 
Therefore, facing massive mobilisations against the project in November, the government 
started to react. After MYSA‟s announcement of its investment plan in July 2011, social 
                                           
185 Four important points from the forum were: to protect water resources and lakes in Sorochuco (lakes Perol, 
Mala, Empredrada, Chailhuagón and Azul); to uphold the municipal ordinance of Celendín 020, which protects 
water resources in Huasmín and Sorochuco; to press for a free, prior and informed consultation process on 
authorising a new mining project; and to call for public hearings in Sorochuco, Huasmín and Celendín (de 
Echave and Diez, 2013: 92-93).  
186 From late November 2011 when mobilisations started to intensify, the presence of the president of regional 
government, Gregorio Santos, stood out. However, according to one informant, it was not clear whether he had 
an enthusiastic intention to defend water against the Conga project and, if so, when he decided to support or lead 
the anti-Conga movement (Interview informant A, Celendín, 28 March 2012). Despite his initial indecision, he 
stated that Santos was persuaded to support the movement‟s cause and has become an important leader 
(alongside Marco Arana and Wilfredo Saavedra), and in the process becoming a main target of criticism from 
pro-Conga side. 
187 Approval of the EIA is supposed to be signed by the General Director of Mining Environmental Issues 
(Director General de Asuntos Ambientales Mineros) within the MINEM. But the Conga project‟s EIA was 
signed by an advisor of the Ministerial branch (asesora del Despacho Ministerial) since the general director, 
Felipe Ramírez, worked for MYSA as an executive shortly before he took up the government position (de 
Echave and Diez, 2013: 74). 
188 According to the company fact sheet (published in June 2013, see footnote 3), it is estimated that there are 
6.5 million ounces of gold reserves and 1.7 billion pounds of copper available for mining (as of 31 December 
2012). 
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tensions began to rise via protests, marches and road blockages. On 24 October 2011, more 
than 2,000 peasants from the district of Huasmín mobilised and marched to the lakes, giving 
the company an ultimatum of eight days for them to withdraw from the site. Then the premier, 
Salomón Lerner, attempted to negotiate and set up a roundtable dialogue on 28 October. In 
response to demands from local authorities, a government delegation composed of the 
ministers of the Environment (Ricardo Giesecke), Agriculture (Miguel Calliux) and Energy 
and Mining (Carlos Herrera) travelled to the Azul and Perol lakes on 2 November. However, 
this visit generated controversy when two ministers flew to the area in a helicopter provided 
by MYSA. After this visit, the minister of Environment suggested a revision of the EIA, 
which the mining company denounced as endangering an important investment for the 
country‟s development, a point which suggests that the „dominating power‟ of the neoliberal 
state and MYSA is porous rather unitary and consolidated, opening up possibilities for 
contestation. Accordingly, it is relevant to examine the complex trajectories of social 
relations and „entangled‟ power at different spatialities beyond the binary geography-power 
framework.
189
  
 After this improvised attempt at conciliation, the first indefinite strike was called mainly 
by local campesinos and ronderos on 24 November. Loosely constituted trans-local networks 
that emerged through protests against MYSA‟s mining activities in previous years have 
facilitated this collective action, becoming an integral part of „networked resistance‟. On 29 
November, a confrontation occurred between protesters and the police that left many injured; 
two people suffered gunshots and were detained. This repressive government reaction elicited 
criticism from across the country. At this stage of the conflict, mobilisations against the 
Conga project moved beyond a local and regional level and started to gain national and 
international attention. As will be seen in the next section, this aspect formed an important 
part of the „maps of grievance‟ and „CENs‟ of the anti-Conga movement. The escalating 
confrontation obliged the government to negotiate with local authorities and grassroots 
leaders. The movement‟s insistent argument for the cancellation of the project dragged out 
the negotiations. An impatient executive consequently declared a state of emergency in four 
provinces of Cajamarca (Cajamarca, Celendín, Hualgayoc and Contunmazá) on 4 December 
in the midst of an attempted dialogue led by Premier Salomón Lerner‟s delegation in 
Cajamarca. After the first state of emergency was imposed in Cajamarca, Oscar Valdés was 
                                           
189 A technical team from the Ministry of Environment examined the Conga EIA and submitted a report to the 
government on 21 November 2011. This was later denied by the government. 
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appointed as the second premier of the Humala administration after the resignation of his 
predecessor, Lerner. Following the lifting of the state of emergency on 16 December, the new 
premier proposed inviting international experts to examine the EIA. In addition, he held 
meetings with local authorities without inviting the president of the regional government and 
prominent movement leaders, one in Lima and another in Cajamarca, an example of a „divide 
and rule‟ strategy. After the second dialogue roundtable in Cajamarca on 13 January 2012, 
the government announced a development plan that would invest more than S/. 5 billion in 
the region.
190
  
 During February-April 2012, the movement and the government entered into a series of 
disputes concerning the project‟s water issue: this involved the „National March for Water‟ 
(„Marcha Nacional del Agua 2012‟); the „peritaje internacional‟ and „peritaje alternativo‟; 
and the constitutionality of the regional ordinance 036.
191
 The movement organised the 
„National March for Water‟ over ten days (1-10 February 2012) from Cajamarca to Lima. 
The march was one of various efforts to raise public awareness of the movement and its 
defence of water supply and quality across the country. The considerable support and 
solidarity gained on the road to Lima, suggested that the movement possessed a broad base 
and was not restricted to politically-minded radicals or anti-development and mining 
environmentalists, as the Lima media and official spokespeople tried to label it. In addition to 
the coordinating act of „trans-local‟ networks of rondas campesinas, frentes de defensa and 
NGOs, those who shared similar experiences with neoliberal extractivisim in other Peruvian 
departments became an integral part of the March for Water. In response to the government‟s 
plan to invite international experts to review the EIA (a „peritaje internacional‟), the 
movement came up with their alternative version, the „peritaje alternativo‟. The movement‟s 
idea of an alternative peritaje (expert‟s revision) was intended to deflect the government‟s 
criticism, which argued that its opponents did not understand the project due to a lack of 
„scientifically-grounded‟ information and were being mobilised by politically-minded 
extremists. In addition, protesters voiced their defence of regional ordinance 036, which had 
been declared by the regional council of Cajamarca on 5 December 2011 and had been 
waiting for the Constitutional Tribunal adjudication as its legality was put into question by 
                                           
190 „Ministro ofreció a Cajamarca obras por 5,000 millones de soles‟, La República, 13 January 2012. 
191 On December 2011, the regional government of Cajamarca approved Regional Ordinance 036, which 
declared the protection of the basin headwaters and the cancellation of the Conga mining project. 
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the National Prosecutor. The ordinance proclaims that for the regional public interest it is 
indispensable to protect the headwaters and thus it is necessary to halt the Conga project.  
Approaching the announcement of the peritaje internacional report and the ruling by the 
highest court, the movement reinforced its protests and mobilisations, pressuring the 
government. On 22 March 2012, the movement organised a popular march to the threatened 
lake areas, marking World Water Day. On 28 and 29 March, „the Unitary Assembly of Fronts 
of Defence and Social Organisations in the region of Cajamarca‟ took place in Celendín. The 
meeting included hundreds of peasants, rondas campesinas, Fronts of Defence (Frentes de 
Defensa), members of the teachers‟ union (SUTEP) and other trade unionists, environmental 
activists – national and international – and local authorities, including the president of the 
regional government. At this event, participants debated collective action strategies, as well 
as underlining their unity and continued commitment to the movement. On 30 and 31 March, 
the first „National Assembly of the Peruvian People‟ was held in the city of Cajamarca and 
chaired by Wilfredo Saavedra, president of the Environmental Defence Front of Cajamarca. 
The event was accused as generating fissures within the movement by those who participated 
in the previous meeting in Celendín, in particular, and a majority of the participants came 
from other departments. However, these two assemblies coincided in claiming „no to Conga‟. 
In parallel, several regional protests were mounted during this period. On 21 April, the 
government finally announced the approval of the project subject to several conditions, 
referring to recommendations by the peritaje internacional.
192
 At the same time, the 
Constitutional Tribunal adjudicated that the regional government had exceeded its 
administrative authority in announcing regional ordinance 036 on 17 April when three 
international experts submitted their report on the EIA.  
For the movement, the state‟s position of „yes to Conga‟ and the Constitutional Tribunal‟s 
adjudication made it clear that the government had taken sides with multinational capital, 
triggering a series of collective actions. Between 21 and 29 May, movement leaders 
coordinated the „March for Caxamarca‟, aimed at gaining public solidarity with the protest as 
they marched across the department‟s thirteen provinces. On the same day as the delegation 
of this march was expected to arrive in the city of Cajamarca, local proponents of the project 
also gathered in the main square under the banner of „The March for Peace and Development 
                                           
192 These requirements include: to protect two lakes, Azul and Chica (out of the four lakes in the original plan); 
to quadruple the water supply volume via the construction of reservoirs; to create social funds; and to guarantee 
the generation of 10,000 jobs for local people. 
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for Cajamarca‟. This event was organised by a „Colectivo por Cajamarca‟ (Group for 
Cajamarca), with strong backing from protagonists such as the ex-mayor of Cajamarca‟s 
municipal government, Luis Guerrero, ex-mayor and aprista Emilio Horna, and the president 
of the Cajamarca Chamber of Commerce, Jorge Vergara, among others.
193
 Against the 
backdrop of this tense atmosphere, the second indefinite strike started on 31 May. The 
polarisation of positions on the project („Yes‟ vs. „No‟ to Conga) further radicalised the 
movement. With the drafting in of police reinforcements and militarisation of the restive 
regions, another confrontation occurred between police and protesters in Celendín and 
Bambamarca. On 3 July, three people were killed in a clash, more than 27 were injured and 
15 arrested in Celendín. In an attempt to control the situation, Lima imposed a second state of 
emergency in the three provinces of Cajamarca, Celendín, and Bambamarca. The following 
day, another protester died in a confrontation in Bambamarca, and one of the injured from the 
Celendín confrontation lost his life on 5 July. On 3 August the government extended the state 
of emergency for another month, despite the efforts of dialogue facilitators and the 
movement‟s requests not to. 
This repressive state response provoked much criticism from inside and outside Peru, 
raising concerns about the human rights of protesters (see the next section). The government 
was therefore pressured to adopt a more conciliatory stance. On 9 July, Father Gastón 
Garetea and Miguel Cabrejo, the bishop of Trujillo, arrived in Cajamarca in order to facilitate 
a dialogue between the movement and the state. With the appointment of a new Premier, Juan 
Jiménez, the government attempted to moderate its position. On 23August 2012, Jiménez 
confirmed a temporary suspension of the Conga project until a number of conditions would 
be met for the exploitation to go ahead, i.e. along the lines of „water first and then mining‟. In 
parallel, the government created new institutional entities aimed to prevent or pacify social 
conflict and to improve the system of overseeing any environmental impact: the National 
Office of Dialogue and Sustainability (Oficina Nacional de Diálogo y Sostenibilidad, ONDS) 
                                           
193 The event was denounced by many critics for its supposed connection with MYSA, despite the strong denial 
by the Colectivo. The list of accusations was never short. According to the magazine Hilderbrandt, many MYSA 
workers or its subcontracting companies were pressured to participate in the meeting. In addition, tickets for a 
free lunch were supposedly distributed to participants, a point that matched with the author‟s collection of local 
testimony. At the same time, there were accusations that the pressure on local authorities to participate was very 
high. The governor of Baños del Inca district attested that representatives of the government demanded his 
resignation due to his refusal to participate („Cajamarca en su hora cero‟, Hilderbrandt, 1 and 7 June 2012). 
Although these accusations regarding the Pro-Conga mobilisations are not easy to verify, it was evident that 
social tension between proponents and opponents was high during the period, particularly in the context of the 
government taking sides with the mining company. 
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and SENACE (Servicio Nacional de Certificación Ambiental para las Inversiones Sostenibles, 
National Service of Environmental Certification for Sustainable Investment).
194
 In the face 
of this moderation of the government‟s position, the movement lost its „visibility‟ from the 
Lima media in particular. However, peasants from Bambamarca and Celendín maintained 
their protests, demanding a complete cancellation of the project. They accused the company 
of continuing preparatory operations despite announcing their suspension. The focal point 
became the construction of reservoirs. To its opponents, this indicated that MYSA intended 
to continue with the project, which they will not allow. In the meantime, for the government 
and company, it meant to secure water provision for the local population, one of the 
recommendations made by international experts and the government for the project‟s 
viability. In other words, the situation reached an impasse. Despite the tension, the 
construction of the first reservoir Chailhuagón was completed in May 2013.
195
 The mining 
company has attempted to continue with the second reservoir, Perol. In response, local 
peasants, so-called „guardianes de lagunas‟ (guardians of the lakes) have grouped together in 
nearby areas in order to impede its construction, which produces regular confrontations with 
police stationed in the locality. 
 
Based on the accumulation of previous negative experiences caused by the presence of 
MYSA‟s mining operation, these political activities against the Conga project have helped 
create what Featherstone called „maps of grievance‟, suggesting that the movement is not 
limited to an anti-mining protest. The first source of grievance was the government‟s 
concentration of decision-making on the mining project and its use of authoritarian measures 
against the movement, which raise questions about the „democratic deficit‟ of Peruvian 
                                           
194 By late July, the government came up with the idea of establishing ONDS and designated Valdimiro Huaroc 
as High Commissioner for Dialogue and Sustainability. The Office is expected to substitute the role of „Oficina 
de Gestión de Conflictos Sociales‟ (Office for Social Conflict Management) under the supervision of the 
Premier‟s office. According to Huaroc, this new entity intends to create a permanent institution for preventing 
and managing social conflicts across the country. This goal is expected to be carried out in coordination with 
regional governments, thus creating regional counterparts. The Humala government promulgated the law which 
created the SENACE on 19 December 2012. It is a specialised technical organisation under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Environment (MINAM) with an aim to approve the EIAs of private and public investment 
projects. The President argued that the government‟s goal was to transfer responsibility for approving EIAs to 
MINAM in order to recover the population‟s trust in the EIAs‟ reliability, which, it is hoped, will reduce 
environmental conflicts (media communication of the MINAM, 19 December 2012. More information available 
at http://www.minam.gob.pe/el-ministerio/organismos-adscritos/senace/). 
195
 For more information, see http://www.yanacocha.com.pe/reservorio-chailhuagon/. 
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democracy. The second is associated with the limitations of the present development model 
based on natural resource extraction. With particular regard to the Conga project, the limited 
interpretation of „sustainable mining‟, with an emphasis on „efficient‟ management of the 
environment via „modern‟ technology, has become a main contention point, insinuating 
different understandings of „sustainability‟ and „development‟. These two dimensions of 
„grievance‟ will be examined in the next section. 
 
 
6.2. ‘Mapping the Grievance’ of MYSA’s Conga Project 
Policing of the State: ‘Public Order’ for Neoliberal Extractivism 
A report published by various international organisations concerned with human rights issues 
in Latin America stated, „[I]n recent years we have observed with greater concern a sharp 
increase in tendency to persecute, punish and criminalize social protest activities and the 
legitimate claims of those who promote and defend human rights, especially in cases related 
to large-scale economic investment‟ (APRODEV et al. 2012: 1). The Peruvian case 
represents an obvious example given the backdrop of rising socio-environmental conflicts 
related to extractive industries. When the local population started to mobilise in defence of 
their water, environment and lives, the response of the Humala government was reminiscent 
of its predecessors. During the 2011 election campaign, Humala gained strong electoral 
support from the long-term marginalised, one section of whom are those who have suffered 
both socially and environmentally from mining activities.
196
 Once in power, however, 
Humala had to decide between economic growth (largely based on mining) and socio-
environmental issues (such as the protection of water resources). Facing this dilemma, 
Humala now argues that „el oro‟ (gold) and „el agua‟ (water) can go hand-in-hand.197 For the 
government, the Conga project is viable if sufficient water provision is guaranteed for human 
                                           
196 In a meeting in the city of Bambamarca during the electoral campaign in May 2011, then candidate of Gana 
Perú, Ollanta Humala, argued that the protection of water resources was more important than gold extraction. 
See the video clip of the meeting, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EP22MjFfEec. 
197 „Ollanta Humala sobre Conga: Queremos el agua y el oro‟, La República, 16 November 2011. In a press 
conference on arriving from an APEC meeting in Hawaii, Humala distanced himself from those who opposed 
the Conga project, arguing that he rejected their extreme position: „water or gold‟. 
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consumption and economic activities, such as agriculture and mining.
198
 In this view, 
demands for policy change are acceptable only if they do not endanger the interests of private 
investors and, more generally, the present economic model based on the extraction and export 
of natural resources. Otherwise, the central government can take all possible measures in 
order to maintain the neoliberal path of development. This attitude underpinned a move 
toward the authoritarian and unilateral position (mano dura) which the Humala 
administration adopted, especially with the appointment of the regime‟s second premier, an 
ex-military official Oscar Valdés, in December 2011. The government took mano dura 
measures to protect the interests of private investors, e.g., multinational mining companies, 
and increasingly used a „law and order‟ rhetoric to punish opponents of the country‟s 
„development‟, i.e. economic growth based on exporting natural resources. Consequently, 
during the first year of his administration, 15 people died and more than 800 were injured, of 
whom 52 per cent were wounded by firearms due to their participation in social protests (IDL, 
2012: 10).
199
 This number of victims demonstrates continuity with previous governments, 
including the highly modernist García‟s second regime (2006-2011), with its „perro del 
hortelano‟ stance.200  
 One of the mano dura measures is to declare a state of emergency. According to Article 
137 of the 1993 Constitution, „the president of the republic, in accordance with the committee 
of ministers, can decree a state of emergency for a certain period of time (no more than 60 
days) across the nation or in a specific region and should notify it to the permanent 
commission of the Congress‟. The „Regime of Exception‟ can be adopted „in case of 
                                           
198 In order to carry out what it called „development with social inclusion‟, the use of the fiscal bonanza 
generated by extractive industries in social investments was one of the government‟s principal arguments. To 
meet the high expectations of many Peruvians, the government created a new Ministry of Development and 
Social Inclusion (MIDIS) and implemented a series of social programmes such as Pensión 65, Cuna Más, 
Juntos, Quli Warma, Beca 18, among others (For more information, see MIDIS website: www.midis.gob.pe). 
Once the Conga project was suspended, the government came up with an additional investment plan, which is 
estimated to be S/. 200 million in potable water and sanitation systems, S/. 756 million in road construction and 
S/. 230 million in rural electrification („Región Cajamarca recibirá menos recursos repliegue de algunos 
proyectos mineros‟, La República, 16 January 2013). 
199 By March 2013, the number of citizen deaths rose to 24 and 649 civilians were injured, according to Rocío 
Silva Santisteban, president of the CNDDHH, available at 
http://minacorrupta.wordpress.com/tag/grufides/page/2/. 
200 During the second presidency of García, 191 people died, including 153 civilians and 38 police and military 
forces. Approximately 600 citizens were arrested or prosecuted for their involvement in social protests (IDL, 
2012: 10). See also „Conflictos sociales: 191 muertos durante último gobierno de Alan García‟, La República, 
29 August 2011. 
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disturbance of peace or public order, of catastrophe or serious circumstances which can 
endanger the population‟s life‟. Although this delegation of extraordinary power to the 
executive was intended to protect the citizens‟ security, its imposition should be a last resort 
considering that it restrains basic constitutional rights of citizens, such as the right to liberty 
and personal security, the right to domestic privacy, right to liberty of association, and the 
right of liberty of movement. In this sense, abusive use of this measure can highly restrict the 
basic rights of citizens or facilitate human rights violations, as occurred during the period of 
political violence in the 1980s and 1990s. Faced with rising social conflicts against extractive 
industries, the Humala administration resorted to this measure in an excessively frequent 
manner, even before all possible conciliatory alternatives were pursued.  
During the protests in Cajamarca, the first state of emergency was imposed in four 
provinces (Cajamarca, Celendín, Hualgayoc and Contunmazá) on 4 December 2011 (D.S. No. 
093-2011-PCM) and generated widespread criticism of how the government dealt with the 
movement. When faced with violent confrontations between demonstrators and the police, 
the Humala government declared another state of emergency in Cajamarca on 4 July 2012 
(D.S. No. 070-2012-PCM) and extended it for another month.
201
 An abusive act under the 
state of emergency became apparent when constitutional rights were restricted before the 
measure took effect. One example was the violent detention of ex-priest and environmental 
activist Marco Arana on 4 July 2012 when he was sitting with a placard („Conga No Va‟, „No 
to Conga‟) in the main square of Cajamarca city.202 This police repression took place before 
the government‟s measure was due to take effect, which was to be the next day, 5 July 2012 
(IDL, 2012: 17). 
 Parallel to this particular coercive measure, the government criminalised leaders and 
participants in social protests, a result being a plethora of legal charges inflicted against them: 
the number of local authorities and social leaders who were accused amounted to more than 
94 by May 2012.
203
 On December 2011, several movement leaders were detained without 
                                           
201 See „Ollanta Humala declara Estado de Emergencia en provincias de Cajamarca‟, La República, 4 
December 2011; and „El Gobierno declare Estado de Emergencia en tres provincias de Cajamarca‟, La 
República, 4 July 2012. In the face of growing tensions in the province of Espinar (Cusco department) due to 
social protests against the Xstrata Tintaya mining company, the Humala government decreed a state of 
emergency on 29 May 2012 (D.S. No. 056-2012-PCM). See „Estado de Emergencia en Espinar fue oficializado 
hoy en diario „El Peruano‟‟, La República, 29 May 2012. 
202 See a video clip of this detention, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Bw8FCelp8w. 
203 „CUL: Denunciaremos a la fiscalía‟, El Mercurio, 8 May 2012. According to a recent Front Line Defenders 
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clear reason after attending a meeting (the Commission for Indigenous People National 
Congress) in Lima. Wilfredo Saavedra (an ex-member of MRTA and president of the Front 
of Environmental Defence of Cajamarca) and Milton Sánchez (president of the PIC) were 
arrested and transferred to DIRCOTE (the Counter-Terrorist Directorate) along with other 
leaders. After more than eight hours in custody, they were released.
204
 In terms of the 
criminalisation of the movement, it is worthwhile listening to Mirtha Vásquez, a lawyer and 
administrative manager of the local environmental NGO, GRUFIDES, who argues that: 
The Humala government detained people who were associated with protests against 
the Conga project, a policy implemented to criminalise social movement leaders and 
participants, many of whom have already been accused. In other words, this is a total 
persecution against those who are engaged in the anti-Conga protests. Now the 
government‟s response has strengthened in order to ensure its pro-Conga position. 
Measures taken against social movement leaders, participants, and local people are 
really abusive, representing an alliance between the mining company and the 
military (suggesting the president and then prime minister, Oscar Valdés, who are 
former military officer).
205
 
Although a number of legal charges were closed due to a lack of evidence, legal proceedings 
hampered activists by „interrupting their work‟, „restricting travel‟, „imposing upon them the 
pressure of high legal costs‟ as well as „psychological pressure‟, measures aimed at 
undermining their commitment (CIDSE, 2011: 3). 
 Simultaneously, the Humala government introduced the administrative resolution 096-
2012-CE-PJ on 1 June 2012 with the aim to change legal jurisdiction to other departments. 
This targeted Cajamarca and Cusco, with prosecution being transferred to Lambayeque and 
Ica respectively (IDL, 2012: 35).
206
 It was argued by opponents that this measure was unjust 
                                                                                                                                   
(FLD)‟s report, leaders had had at least 30 legal proceedings opened against them, although they have never 
been convicted: Milton Sánchez under approximately 50 lawsuits, Ydelso Hernández with more than 45 and 
Edy Benavídes with 30 cases more or less. The FLD was „founded in Dublin in 2001 with the specific aim of 
protecting human rights defenders at risk, people who work, non-violently, for any or all of the rights enshrined 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights‟. Its report, titled „Environmental Rights Defenders at Risk in 
Peru‟, is available at http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/peru-reportonhumanrightsdefenders.  
204 „Dirigentes de Cajamarca sufrieron absurda detención de diez horas‟, La República, 7 December 2011. 
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 „Justamente están deteniendo la gente que está en contra del Conga. Esto es una política que es para 
criminalizar todas las protestas. Han hecho varias denuncias. Hay una total persecución hacia la protesta por el 
tema de Conga. Ahora es durísimo porque el gobierno no quiere dar una marcha atrás. Lo que está haciendo es 
una actitud sumamente abusiva contra los movimientos sociales, contra la población misma, una alianza entre la 
empresa minera y los militares‟. Interview with Mirtha Vázquez: Cajamarca, 13 March 2012. 
206 „The resolution found bases on the Article 24 of new criminal code which the Justice is delegated with 
power to establish a special system of judgement on the criminals who committed a serious crime‟ (IDL, 2012: 
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because it „creates obstacles to legal access for campesinos and local authorities‟ (IDL, 2012: 
37). The state‟s hostility to the protesters involved other measures. As the regional 
government and its president have actively supported the movement, pressure from the 
central government became intense. Lima obstructed the transfer of revenue to sub-national 
governments via the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) (IDL, 2012 15). In addition, 
according to one national newspaper, official spokespeople accused the regional president, 
Gregorio Santos, of diverting public resources to support the movement.
207
 In response to a 
National Audit Office inspection, Santos argued that this action was part of the central 
government‟s strategy of intimidation with the intention of destabilising and dividing the 
movement. The list of denunciations against Santos and the regional government is 
endless.
208
 As part of this destabilising strategy, the Lima government also tried to erode the 
influence of Santos by negotiating with mayors of districts in the Cajamarca region.
209
  
 Alongside the criminalisation of social protest, the government also militarised the region. 
This measure was accompanied by legal regulations that facilitated human rights abuses, 
while granting impunity to the military and police. When the announcement of the peritaje 
internacional report on the EIA was imminent, movement leaders (including Milton Sánchez, 
Idelso Hernández and Edy Benavídez) made public their plan to carry out a series of 
mobilisations and regional strikes. In response, Lima sent nearly one thousand police and 
                                                                                                                                   
35). In this way, the Public Prosecutor‟s Office emitted two resolutions: No.1343-2012-MP-FN for the transfer 
of jurisdiction from Cusco to Ica and No. 1344-2012-MP-FN, from Cajamarca to Lambayeque, on 31 May 2012 
(IDL, 2012: 36). Additionally, the Executive Committee of the Justice and the Public Prosecutor‟s Office 
announced another administrative resolution No. 136-2012-CE-PJ, dictating that legal proceedings would be 
moved to Lima (IDL, 2012: 36).  
207
 According to one conservative national newspaper, it was argued that Gregorio Santos not only diverted 
resources of infant nutrition programmes by financially supporting the consulting fees and costs of the 
movement, but also ordered local schools to participate in anti-mining marches, („Santos oblige a los colegios a 
marchar contra Conga‟, Perú 21, 11 March 2012). In the case of Espinar, the mayor, Ó scar Mollohuanca, was 
arrested by the police after his leadership in social protests against Xstrata Tintaya. „Alcalde de Espinar fue 
detenido por policías tras dejar la clandestinidad‟,  El Comercio, 30 May 2012. 
208 Faced with allegations over his supposed involvement in corruption on granting public works contracts, 
Gregorio Santos recently faced a preventative detention on 25 June 2014. Despite this, Santos was inscribed in 
the JNE as a candidate for MAS (the Movimiento de Afirmación Social) in his attempt for re-election. 
„Confirman detención preventiva contra Gregorio Santos‟, La República, 14 July 2014. „He is the third regional 
president detained in this way in recent months as part of the government‟s crampdown on corruption‟ (Peru 
Support Group (PSG) News, 31 July 2014). 
209
 According to the magazine Hilderbrandt, „The government attempts to weaken the influence of Santos in the 
region, in direct coordination with lower ranking local authorities ... There are 16 legal charges instigated by the 
public prosecutor against Santos. The National Attorney Office accused him of disturbing the public peace and 
not respecting his obligation of public service‟ („Conga sabe que ya ganó y Cajamarca espera‟, 16-22 March 
2012). 
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military to the provinces of Cajamarca, Bambamarca and Celendín. The president of the 
regional government denounced the measure as constituting „militarisation‟ and an attempt to 
intimidate the population. According to local leaders, a recent legislative bill on „the use of 
the state‟s lethal power in cases of protests‟ was approved in Congress.210 Unsurprisingly, 
this approach by the security forces caused many injuries and five deaths in Celendín and 
Bambamarca, with impunity for those responsible. In an interview with a rondero from 
Celendín, one of 17 people injured in a mobilisation in November 2011, he described how he 
was shot by the police during their peaceful march: „The police shot me. We were in a 
peaceful march in defence of our water and environment and the police were shooting at us. I 
went to help my injured compañero (friend) who was shot by the police and it was then that I 
was shot. I lost the vision in my right eye‟.211 Violent reactions from the military and police 
also extended to non-threatening activities: e.g. when local women opened an olla comun in 
the Plaza Bolognesi (Cajamarca), the police attacked the activity, beating women and a local 
journalist.
212
  
Regarding the militarisation of social protests, several legal regulations are noteworthy. 
García‟s second administration (2006-2011) announced a series of decrees: in late July 2007, 
11 legislative decrees, including Decree Laws 982, 983, 988, and 989, were introduced with 
an aim to strengthen sentences for social disturbances for up to 25 years and guaranteed 
immunity for the police and military forces from prosecution when they used their arms in 
order to control protests.
213
 Of these decree laws, „Article 1 of Decree Law 982 amends 
Article 20 of the Penal Code, declaring that members of the armed forces and national police 
are not subject to criminal liability for causing injury or death in the line of duty and when 
using their weapons in accordance with regulations (emphasis in the original)‟ (APRODEV, 
2012: 5). One notorious case of the militarisation of social protests related to natural resource 
                                           
210 „CUL: Denunciaremos a la fiscalía‟, El Mercurio, 8 May 2012. A recently proclaimed Law No. 30151 
„granted members of the armed forces and the national police exemption from criminal responsibility if they 
cause injury or death, including through the use of guns or other weapons while on duty‟ (FLD report, June 2014, 
emphasis in the original). According to the report, the law was initially suggested by the Fujimori bloc in 
Congress in September 2011, which received approval in June 2013 amid a lot of controversy. 
211 „A mí me baleó la policía. Estabamos en la marcha pacífica, en defensa de nuestra agua y nuestro medio 
ambiente. La policía nos disparaba. Fui a recoger a un compañero herido de bala y allí me dieron balazo. Perdí 
la vista de ojo derecho‟ (Interview, informant B, Celendín, 28 March 2012). 
212 See a video at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zfTRyO5qWuQ. 
213 Mirtha Vasquez, „Un gobierno pro minero hasta el final‟, available at 
http://www.noticiasser.pe/25/07/2011/cavilando/un-gobierno-pro-minero-hasta-el-final 
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extraction under the García regime involved the resistance of indigenous people in the 
department of Amazonas (the „Baguazo‟). On September 2010, these measures were 
reinforced with yet more emergency decrees, including the legal provisions 1095 and 1097, 
which legitimised the use of lethal arms to control social conflicts and attempted to place 
protesters on trial as a preventive measure.
214
 In particular, Decree Law 1095 facilitated the 
militarisation and criminalisation of social protests, securing impunity for military and police 
forces.
215
 This decree under the previous regime facilitated military intervention in the 
protest against the Conga project. In addition, a draft legal bill was submitted to the 
legislature (proyecto de Ley, No. 81/2011-CR) which intends to extend the application of 
Decree Law 1095 to the national police.
216
  
 Against this backdrop, privatisation of the public security system has contributed to the 
vulnerability of rights for activists and the local population. Following changes in the work 
system of police officers (working every other day) under the first García administration 
(1985-1990), they were allowed to provide security services for a third party other than the 
Peruvian state on their off-duty days by the Fujimori government, called „individualised 
(security) services‟ („servicios individualizados‟) (Costa and Romero, 2011: 88; see also 
Kamphuis, 2012). One prominent private security company working for mining 
multinationals, is FORZA. A notorious example of its operations was found in the media 
exposure of photos in January 2009, when 29 comuneros of Yanta and Segunda y Cajas 
(provinces of Ayabaca and Huamcabamba in the northern department of Piura) were captured 
and tortured by members of the police and FORZA guarding the Majaz mining site.
217
 On 1 
August 2005, a group of community members (including two women) were kidnapped after 
                                           
214 See footnote 209. 
215
 The decree 1095 permits: „the intervention of armed forces during social protest without prior declaration of 
a state of emergency‟; „the implementation of exclusive military actions to counteract the activities of “hostile 
groups” (whose definition is ambiguous enough to encompass peaceful social protest movements)‟; „giving 
military and police forces jurisdiction to judge “unlawful conduct attributable to military personnel as a result of 
actions taken in the application of this Decree” (APRODEV, 2012: 5). 
216 See http://comisedh.blogspot.co.uk/2012/07/preocupante-situacion-de-riesgo-para.html. 
217 „En Majaz sí se torturó el año 2005‟, La República, 9 January 2009; „Barbariedad en Majaz‟, La República, 
10 January 2009. Minera Majaz, then owned by British mining company Monterrico Metals, acquired 
concessions for the Río Blanco copper mining project in 2003. In April 2009, almost 90 per cent of the stake 
was acquired by the Chinese Zijin mining consortium (Zijin Mining Group (45%), Tongling Nonferrous Metals 
Group (35%) and Xiamen Construction and Development (20%)) from Monterrico Metals (see Bebbington et al., 
2007). „En Majaz sí se torturó el año 2005‟, La República, 9 January 2009; „Barbariedad en Majaz‟, La 
República, 10 January 2009. 
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demonstrating against the project and were tortured by members of DINOES and FORZA for 
three days, causing the death of one campesino. Despite accusations of torture and 
mistreatment, as well as sexual harassment against two women, the prosecutor, whose 
presence at the incident was confirmed in photos, accused the victims of inciting violence. 
While legal complaints were submitted by the Peruvian NGO, FEDEPAZ (Fundación 
Ecuménica para el Desarrollo y la Paz, Ecumenic Foundation for Development and Peace) 
in 2008, no charges were brought against those who were responsible for the incident 
(Kamphuis, 2012: 545). Concurrently, legal proceedings against Moterrico Metals and its 
Peruvian subsidiary were initiated in the English High Court in early 2009 and on 20 July 
2011, „the company settled the case out of court by compensation payments and without 
admitting liability‟.218  
 In Cajamarca, FORZA has provided MYSA with a private security service since 1993, 
while the police had a „confidential contract‟ with the mining company for the same purpose 
(Kamphuis, 2012: 548). This private security company conducted a „systemic program of 
digital surveillance, intimidation, death threats, and defamation – which primarily targeted 
GRUFIDES personnel, but also spanned approximately 30 other related local 
environmentalists and campesino leaders in 2006, which was called the „Operation Devil‟ 
(„Operación Diablo‟) (Kamphuis, 2012: 550). The Operation has been conducted at the 
request of FORZA when conflicts arose between the comuneros of Combayo and MYSA in 
2006.
219
 According to Kamphuis, „in 2009, GRUFIDES lawyers filed a petition with the 
Inter-American Court on Human Rights (“IACHR”), alleging that the Peruvian State violated 
its obligation under the American Convention on Human Rights to prevent and sanction these 
crimes‟, although a decision has been delayed for many years (2012: 550-551). Recently, 
Marco Arana, one of the main targets of the spying, argued that the Operation Devil 
                                           
218
 Available at http://business-humanrights.org/en/monterrico-metals-lawsuit-re-peru-0#c18018. 
219 For documentation of the persecution against members of the environmental NGO, GRUFIDES, see the 
documentary, The „Operation Devil‟ (Guarango, 2010), available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tWPE0I2KesE . Afterwards, GRUFIDES had to move their office to another 
location, and the distrust displayed towards anyone outside the NGO or the movement seemed especially high, 
which was noted when I visited for an interview with its members. 
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continued in relation to the Conga project.
220
 Persecution and threats also occurred against 
members of GRUFIDES during the Conga conflict.
221
 
 In explaining strategies of policing transnational protests, della Porta et al. note: 
 at stake are not only personal freedoms but also citizens‟ rights to political 
participation, and thus the very essence of the democratic system. The public order 
strategies employed by the police reflect the respect the state shows for the rights 
and freedoms of citizens. In this sense, policemen acting to control protest 
demonstrations is perceived not just as a representative of political power but also as 
an indicator of the quality of democracy in the political system (2006: 150).  
Echoing her reflection, the mano dura measures, such as the state of emergency, 
criminalisation of activists, militarisation and impunity for those responsible, point to the 
limitations of Peruvian democracy. They restrict freedom of association, demonstration, and 
highlight a lack of access to justice, alongside limits to people‟s participation in decision-
making processes. Through acts of resistance, movement participants located one of the main 
causes of „grievance‟, instead of adopting strategically „global justice frames‟ to use it for 
their local protests within the structure of domination and resistance. Locating this grievance 
generated by the neoliberal state‟s authoritarian measures was made possible in the process of 
political practices by diverse social groups at different spatialities, which facilitated the 
construction of CENs and brought this lack of democracy into contestation, as will be 
examined later. 
 
Sustainable Mining: ‘Modern’ and ‘Efficient’ Management of Environment 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, „sustainable mining‟ is a concept that comprises two components: 
„social inclusion‟ and „environmental sustainability‟. The former involves the distribution of 
canon minero to local or regional governments, as well as CSR programmes, while the latter 
focuses on efficient management of the environment. MYSA has argued that it undertakes 
„socially and environmentally responsible‟ mining and stated that the Conga project should 
be carried out in order to further regional development. The main controversy surrounding 
                                           
220 http://www.rpp.com.pe/2013-01-16-cajamarca-marco-arana-sostiene-que-operacion-diablo-continua-
noticia_558427.html 
221  http://www.noticiasser.pe/19/12/2012/cajamarca/mirtha-vasquez-y-sergio-sanchez-de-grufides-denuncian-
agresion 
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the investment is MYSA‟s plan to construct four reservoirs which, it posits, are more 
„efficient‟ than the existing natural lakes in guaranteeing water provision. In an interview 
with an employee of the company‟s environmental office of the Conga project, it was argued 
that: 
Minerals are located close to lakes Chailhuagón and Perol. Therefore, these lakes 
could be affected and this is why the company intends to construct reservoirs that 
will have a better capacity of water provision than the lakes since they will be used 
for mineral extraction as well as for local communities.
222
 
According to this source, environmental impacts could be addressed through advanced 
„modern‟ technology, while securing water provision to local populations is considered as 
„the best possible‟ solution. However, on 29 March 2012 a local congressman, Jorge 
Rimarachín, confirmed after his visit to the reservoir San José – which was completed and 
inaugurated in the presence of ex-president Alan García on 28 April 2008, by MYSA – that it 
was practically empty.
223
 In other words, the reservoir was not functioning as the mining 
company had been arguing. In response, MYSA demonstrated that the reservoir was 
undergoing maintenance work, a position that did little to alleviate the concerns of the local 
population.
224
 Securing sufficient water provision was argued to be favourable both to local 
communities and the company‟s mineral extraction. MYSA emphasised this element of 
„environmental sustainability‟ with an aim to enable gold extraction to proceed. Indicatively, 
beyond this limited meaning of sustainability (i.e. securing sufficient water provision via 
efficient management) demands or debates were viewed by officials as something „political‟. 
Indeed, for both MYSA and the government, the „political‟ should be separated from 
„economic‟ considerations. Consequently, arguments made by opponents of the project are 
considered to conceal political interests or a lack of information, which can be inferred from 
the following interview: 
                                           
222 „Los minerales están bien cerquitas a la laguna Chaihuagón y la laguna Perol. Entonces de todas maneras se 
van a impactar las lagunas. Lo que propone la minera Yanacocha es construir reservorios. Estos reservorios 
tendrán mucho más capacidad que las lagunas porque reservorios van a servir tanto para las minera también para 
poder dar agua para las comunidades‟, Interview, informant C, Cajamarca, 18 March 2012. 
223 This reservoir was constructed in the district of Baños del Inca and its storage capacity is expected to be six 
million cubic metres with promises of sufficient water provision for Cajamarca. The congressman argued that 
the reservoir has been empty since late 2011. See „Cajamarca: Reservorio San José enciende la polémica entre 
Yanacocha, Rimarachín y Santos‟, La República, 29 March 2012. 
224 „Reservorio San José de Yanacocha está vacío desde el año pasado‟, La República, 6 July 2012. 
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People here think that MYSA‟s plan to construct artificial reservoirs will not be 
materialised as planned. They consider the idea is practically unviable. According to 
our estimation, they will be assimilated to the natural ecosystem over time. In this 
sense, criticisms over the construction of reservoirs are technically groundless. 
Rather, opponents seem to be politically-minded radicals and distort people‟s 
perception with wrong information. The regional president wants to improve his 
popularity rating among sectors C and D (mainly from the economically vulnerable 
population) via his involvement in the movement. In other words, Santos wants to be 
president of Peru in the future. Poor people are tired of the fact that the mining 
company earn more, while they are left nearly empty-handed. In the past, 
„irresponsible‟ mining caused environmental damages. Therefore, people equate the 
mining company with contamination. However, MYSA is one of the companies 
which are concerned with environmental management and thus invest in high-end 
technology.
225
  
 This stance suggests that there is a clear line drawn between „economy‟ and „politics‟. 
Accordingly, „sustainable mining‟ should be distinctively separated from any „political‟ 
debates. „Sustainability‟ is acceptable when it comes to technological and managerial 
questions. From this perspective, social or community development programmes are designed 
and monitored by a „professional‟ team while environmental issues should be „managed‟ 
through advanced „modern‟ technology. By holding this attitude and adopting this 
„technocratic‟ approach, MYSA could claim it engaged in „responsible mining, different from 
the „irresponsible‟ mining conducted in the previous decades.226 Based on this understanding 
of „sustainability‟, fundamental environmental problems (such as regulations on the use of 
toxic materials, mitigation of contamination, ecological and geological impacts of mining 
activities) fall into the „political‟ arena, which generates unnecessary and inefficient obstacles 
                                           
225 „Las personas aquí no creen que el plan va a pasar como se ha planteado. Tienen la idea de que un reservorio 
no puede sustituir una laguna. Pero con los años, estos reservorios también forman sus propios ecosistemas. Así 
que eso no es un problema de tecnología, sino de política. Los protestantes son radicales que están 
desinformando a la gente. El presidente regional está buscando más popularidad y aceptación del sector C y D… 
porque tal vez quiere ser el presidente de la nación en el futuro. Están cansados de que las empresas mineras 
transnacionales ganan mucho, pero las personas de abajo no ganan, casi nada. También ha habido minerías 
irresponsables en el pasado. Antes, había mucha contaminación. Las personas piensan que lo único que la 
empresa minera hace es contaminar. Ahora a las minerías grandes les exigen mucho más controles. Yanacocha 
invierte más dinero en el tema ambiental, la última technología‟, Interview, Informant C, Cajamarca, 18 March 
2012. 
226 In explaining the sustainable development narrative of US mining companies, Bridge and McManus 
expounded, „the technological processes involved in mining are recast as “enhancements” that add value to 
nature. […]Wetland creation, the planting of native shrubs and grasses and the mitigation of endangered habitats 
are frequently paraded as evidence of mining‟s ability to improve environmental quality and contribute to the 
goals of sustainable development‟, position similar to MYSA‟s reservoir construction (2000: 35-36). 
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to mineral extraction. Accordingly, as Bridge and McManus point out: „[B]y redefining the 
nexus of environment/development discourse in terms of resource efficiency, professionalism, 
and best-practice standards –rather than pollution, degradation, and waste – corporate 
discourses concerning mining and the environment create a basis for common ground 
between stakeholder groups that, individually or collectively, could oppose corporate 
interests‟ (2000: 36). In this way, differing understandings of sustainable mining and the 
environment was signalled as another cause for creating grievances in the process of 
resistance against the Conga project. The next section examines how opponents contest these 
„maps of grievance‟, i.e. the „mano dura‟ of the neoliberal state and limited understandings of 
„sustainable mining‟, within what I term „counter-extractive networks‟ (CENs). How they 
construct a political identity of „environmental justice (EJ)‟ in the process of contesting 
neoliberal extractivism will also explored. 
 
 
6.3. ‘Counter-Extractive Networks’ and Constructing Political Identity of 
‘Environmental Justice’  
Constructing Counter-Extractive Networks for Sustainable Development  
The term, „counter-extractive networks‟ (CENs), is borrowed from Featherstone‟s „counter-
global networks‟ in his account of networked forms of subaltern politics which contest the 
dominant ways of globalisation and wherein „prefigurative solidarity‟ is constructed among 
subjectivities located at different spatialites. This is based on a relational geographical 
ontology, beyond „place-boundedness‟. The concept is grounded in „Gramsci‟s notion of 
counter-hegemony which signalled forms of resistance constituted through connections and 
articulations between unlike actors‟ (Featherstone, 2008: 22). Featherstone attempts to 
elucidate „the diverse forms of geographies of connection‟, or „unruly patterns of flow and 
alliances‟, rather than „a smooth space of flows‟ posited by Hardt and Negri (2008: 22, 34). 
By doing this, Featherstone highlights „forms of agency and identity constituted through 
spatially stretched forms of resistance‟ and thus sees political imaginaries of social groups 
that bring into contestation neoliberal globalisation in an antagonistic way (2008: 34). I find 
the term useful in the sense that it can illuminate the political possibility of trans-local 
networks which have been created among various actors in opposition to neoliberal 
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extractivism. Rather than viewing place-based local resistance as a reactionary response to 
the advance of global capital, I understand that struggles against new mineral extraction 
created the CENs around the „maps of grievance‟ above, which played as a „converging space‟ 
where local, national and global actors make connections and interactions: i.e. „prefigurative 
solidarity‟. Within the CENs, subaltern actors can locate „maps of grievance‟ via political 
activism and construct political identity by bringing into contestation neoliberal forms of 
mineral extraction. This is important since the local-global geographical binary tends to be 
understood within a bifurcated power structure: the powerless vs. the powerful, only viewing 
the former as a passive receiver of the latter‟s benevolent actions and being deprived of 
political power. In contrast, actors can create solidarity in a „prefigurative‟ way and the CENs 
created via political activities. Accordingly, they also construct a political identity, being 
„entangled‟ with negotiations and contentions. Based on this conceptualisation, I will develop 
how opponents of the Conga project created the movement CENs via mobilisations around 
„maps of grievance‟ (i.e. authoritarian neoliberal state in defence of mineral extraction and 
the limited understanding of „sustainable‟ mining). Equally, this networked form of resistance 
questioned the quality of Peruvian democracy as well as the present development model and 
this is where a EJ political identity was constructed. 
 Many national and international NGOs started to get involved in mining-related issues 
from the late 1990s, alongside base organisations such as peasant communities and the 
rondas campesinas. They were largely committed to sustainable development and promoting 
the well-being of marginalised people. There has been an increasing coordination between 
these NGOs and base organisations which have been constructing the loose form of the CENs 
in order to address various problems caused by mining activities. For example, five peasant 
communities in the province of Espinar (Cusco) in the neighbourhood of the Tintaya mine 
were concerned with an unfair land sale process and environmental impacts, and decided to 
create CORECAMI Cusco in 1998 (Aroca, 2008: 150-151). Simultaneously, peasants began 
to receive technical advice from a Peruvian NGO, CooperAcción.
227
 In November 2000, 
CONACAMI, on behalf of CORECAMI Cusco and local peasant communities, asked the 
                                           
227  This national NGO was founded in July 1997, with an aim to promote consciousness of social, 
environmental, political, cultural and economic rights and to materialise them in reality, as well as to develop 
sustainable territorial administration with a gender and multicultural emphasis. The director of this organisation, 
José de Echave, took a position of the deputy minister of environment under Humala‟s first cabinet. However, 
he resigned from the post amid mobilisations against Conga project in late November 2011. See „Viceministro 
de Gestión Ambiental José de Echave presentó su carta de renuncia‟, La República, 28 November 2011. 
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mining Ombudsman office of Oxfam Australia to address problems with the then owner of 
Tintaya mine, BHP Billiton (Aroca, 2008: 151).
228
 CooperAcción supported this effort with a 
legal and environmental report, describing problems which local communities faced (Aroca, 
2008: 152). On 10 December 2001, Oxfam Australia called all the actors concerned, 
including BHP Billiton, CONACAMI, CORECAMI Cusco, Oxfam America, CooperAcción 
and the mayor of Espinar province, Ó scar Mollohuanca, to convene a meeting, which 
constituted an initial process of dialogue (Aroca, 2008: 153). An important decision to open a 
round table (mesa del diálogo) rose from this gathering and subsequently committees 
examining four themes (land, environment, human rights, and sustainable development) were 
established (Aroca, 2008: 153-156). Finally, a series of agreements were reached in 
December 2004. This articulation of diverse concerned actors and the creation of a dialogue 
roundtable were partially successful within a loosely created network.
229
 
 Another example of the impact of CENs involves the case of conflict between Manhattan 
Minerals Corporation (MMC), a Canadian junior mining company, and the local population 
of Tambogrande (Piura department, located on the northern coast) in the exploration process 
of a gold mine. This is considered to be one of the most successful cases, leading to the 
cancellation of a project via local mobilisation between 1999 and 2003 and a subsequent 
referendum. The main concern for local denizens was its possible impact on agriculture, 
despite the MMC‟s argument for its compatibility with mining activities. Faced with this 
problem, local organisations, including la Junta Administrativa de Regantes del Valle de San 
Lorenzo, la Asociación de Colonos, la Asociación de Agricultores de Mango y Limón, three 
nearby peasant communities, as well as urban organisations and political associations, created 
the Frente de Defensa de Tambogrande (FDTG) in August 1999 (Paredes, 2008: 273, 285). 
In April 2000, a trans-local network, Mesa Técnica de Tambogrande (MTT) was created, 
consisting of various local and national groups, mainly NGOs: including the „local deaconry 
of Catholic Church, Propuesta Regional, CEAS (Comisión Episcopal de Acción Social), 
CooperAcción, civil association Labor, ECO (now Andes) and SPDA (Sociedad Peruana de 
                                           
228 The ownership of Tintaya mine changed various times in the aftermath of its privatisation. In 1994, 
concessions were acquired by the US Magma Copper Company, which was integrated into the Australian 
corporation, the Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd. (BHP), in 1996. BHP was merged with the UK enterprise Billiton 
Plc., i.e. BHP-Billiton (Aroca, 2008: 140). The Swiss-based Xstrata acquired the mine from BHP-Billiton in 
2006. 
229 However, protests ensued in the following years partly due to unfulfilled promises, as well as by 
communities excluded from the distribution of material benefits from this agreement.  
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Derecho Ambiental)‟, as well as FEDEPAZ (Paredes, 2008: 287). The MTT played an 
important complementary role, by providing the FDTG with legal assistance, along with 
communicating expertise (Paredes, 2008: 288-289). In the face of increasing conflicts, the 
MTT planned a local referendum (consulta vecinal or popular) in coordination with the 
FDTG and district municipality, in an attempt to find a peaceful solution (Paredes, 2008: 
293).
230
 On 2 June 2002, the referendum took place with US$ 20,000 of funding supported 
by Oxfam UK. Some 98.6 per cent of participants showed their opposition to mining (Paredes, 
2008: 295-297). In the end, the MINEM in Lima announced that the MMC was not qualified 
to maintain the mining concession in Tambogrande on 12 December 2003 (Paredes, 2008: 
298). This cancellation of the mining project represented a successful example of „counter-
extractive networks‟, comprised of networks of local organisations and national and 
international NGOs. In the process of creating trans-local networks, a national organisation, 
RED MUQUI, was created in 2004 (Bebbington et al. 2007: 12). Subsequently, these CENs 
played an important role in mobilisations against the Rio Blanco project (also in Piura 
department). 
 
CENs for the Opposition to Conga: From Social to Environmental Justice 
A long list of social protests by cajamarquinos against MYSA‟s mining activities over the 
past two decades created a loose form of CENs, which became an integral part of the anti-
Conga movement. During the initial mobilisation stage, representatives of rondas campesinas 
from each village, district and province actively participated in regional assemblies, sharing 
their experience of local problems generated by mining activities and debating possible 
strategies to counteract them. For example, the regional meeting of „the fronts of defence, 
municipal environmental commission, rondas campesinas and social organisation‟ took place 
in the SUTEP offices in Bambamarca, 18 and 19 August 2011, even before mobilisations 
against the Conga project commenced. Many ronderos from different provinces expressed 
their concerns about the Conga project and emphasised the necessity of unity in the proposed 
                                           
230 Local populations who expressed their firm opposition to various mining projects via the „consulta vicinal 
or ciudadana‟ (local referendum) include Tambogrande (2002); Majaz (2007); and Islay (2009) (de Echave and 
Diez, 2013: 145). The Tambogrande case was followed by other anti-mining movements in Latin America: e.g. 
Esquel (Patagonia, Argentina) in March 2003 and Sipacapa case (San Marcos, Guatemala) in June 2005. 
Regarding the anti-Conga movement, there were a lot of talks about proceeding with a consulta popular, 
particularly among the movement leaders by the time their protests reached their zenith during the first half of 
2012. But the plan did not materialise (my fieldnote).  
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action plans. These rondas assemblies laid the basis for alliances with their counterparts and 
other grassroots social organisations. Coordination occurred with activists from different 
regions who shared similar problems or who sympathised with their cause. NGOs and other 
social organisations, not only departmental but from across Peru, often coordinate workshops 
which provide an opportunity for grassroots activists to exchange their experiences and 
propose alternatives. I had an opportunity to participate in one of these workshops via my 
informant, a meeting that took place in Cajamarca in September 2011, before the anti-Conga 
movement gained visibility. It concerned a workshop organised by a network of NGOs, 
including GRUFIDES and Red Muqui, environmental activists and educators, among others. 
Participants presented their experiences and the methods employed to mount successful 
collective actions, the aim being to share information and views on various issues (see Photo 
4). This kind of public space was coordinated through the initiative of NGOs and their 
networks, and went in tandem with the peasants‟ regional meetings in preparation for 
collective action. Importantly, the contribution of these urban actors to peasant mobilisations 
provided an opportunity to exchange opinions about issues such as the environment, human 
rights and sustainable development. From these beginnings, in March 2012, hundreds of 
delegates from every province of Cajamarca gathered in Celendín in order to elaborate their 
movement‟s collective action strategy (See Photo 5).231 They also held macro regional 
assemblies in coordination with other social organisations, including the Fronts of Defence 
(Frentes de Defensa), SUTEP, the CGTP (the national labour union), university students, 
NGOs (including local environmental NGOs, GRUFIDES and Red Muqui), and even the 
regional government. In one such event, held in Cajamarca (February 2012), representatives 
from Amazonian and Northern coastal regions also attended the assembly in the city‟s 
SUTEP building. During the day-long meeting, participants raised their voice in accord, 
arguing that it was impossible to allow the Conga project to proceed in an ecologically 
vulnerable area; in consequence, it was stressed, participants needed to be united in order to 
confront the asymmetrical power relations. Moreover, many grassroots entities in Celendín 
formed an umbrella group, the PIC (Inter-institutional Platform Celendina, with Milton 
Sánchez as its leader), with the aim to act cohesively and pursue a unified strategy. 
According to one member, the PIC was composed of more than 35 base groups, including the 
rondas campesinas, Fronts of Defence and SUTEP; more organisations joined as the 
                                           
231 Hundreds of ronderos (composing a majority), union members, activists and NGOs at the event showed how 
much concern the project had generated (My participation on 28 and 29 March).  
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resistance gained momentum. As the movement needed to become more coordinated and 
strategically unified in the face of government repression, participants established the CUL 
(Comité Unitario de Lucha, Unified Committee of Struggle), with Idelso Hernández as its 
leader. 
 
    Photo 4. 
 
       Photo: taken by the author, Cajamarca (2 September 2011).    
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Photo 5. 
 
          Photo: taken by the author at SUTEP heaquarters in Celendín (28 March 2012). 
 Within the CENs, the rondas campesinas play a prominent role in the preparation and 
coordination of collective action. This base organisation‟s function is grounded in their 
previous experience and has earned legitimacy among the rural population. Through the 
ronda experience, peasants have come to believe they have the ability to be an agent in 
determining their own destiny. Despite the ebb and flow of ronda activities, their legitimacy, 
based on their capacity to solve problems, has been maintained among the population. As 
Muños et al. (2007) argue, this legitimacy has even become a source of collective identity 
among the local population. In other words, people are not hesitant to identify themselves as 
ronderos. Muños et al. have explained that: 
… in a region where ethnicity is not likely to be the mobilizing factor, since 
indigenous language and traditions have for the most part not endured, another 
powerful identity has created itself – the ronda. This identity is focused on a feeling 
of “efficiency”, and on the recognition of their important role in the community a 
number of ronderos who were interviewed said that they were proud that the ronda 
effectively sorted out problems of rustling, boundary disputes and even domestic 
conflicts, rapidly and with almost no additional costs (2007: 1933). 
Facing the enormous power asymmetry created by multinational capital, the local population 
recognises the legitimacy of the rondas campesinas based on the effectiveness of previous 
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activities and the promotion of social justice for peasants. When peasants are faced with a 
new challenge or crisis, they possess a vehicle to organise themselves – even if this is mostly 
at village level – in order to solve their problems. In the anti-Conga movement, participants 
associate this rondero identity with their cause for social justice. As one informant argued, 
being a rondero was the reason for engagement since their protests against the project are 
well grounded in technical, legal, social and environmental justice.
232
 Another informant 
stated: „We as ronderos, all the population of Celendín, and almost the whole region of 
Cajamarca, participated in the march. We are fighting against the mining company and the 
state. As rondas campesinas, we organise ourselves because we do not have any support from 
the authorities. The law is not for us and that is why we organise ourselves‟.233 Idelso 
Hernández, a movement leader, argued in a speech delivered at a regional march, „Our 
rondas campesinas are an example of justice and dignity…We are organised here to demand 
before the President, Ollanta Humala, premier, Oscar Valdés, and the mining company 
Yanacocha, that we, cajamarquinos, do not want to be fooled again with more 
marginalisation. We are people who have courage and require respect and dignity for which 
Cajamarca is united here.‟234 
In addition, the Catholic Church forms part of the CENs of the anti-Conga movement. In 
particular, the San Francisco Church and now deceased priest, Issac Shahuano, showed a 
great deal of solidarity with the movement.
235
 The Church offered accommodation and food 
for peasants coming from other provinces to participate in mobilisations.
236
 Moreover, the 
gate and wall around the San Francisco church became filled with posters and placards placed 
                                           
232 „Siendo rondero, estoy participando en esta lucha. Nuestra lucha es técnicamente, legalmente, socialmente y 
ecológicamente justa‟ (a conversation with Informant D, in a march in Cajamarca, 9 April 2012). 
233 „Nosotros como ronderos, el pueblo de Celendín y casi toda Cajamarca, participamos en la marcha. Estamos 
luchando contra la Empresa y el Estado. Nos organizamos porque no contamos con el apoyo de las autoridades. 
A nosotros la ley no nos apoya, por eso, nos organizamos para luchar por nuestros derechos‟, Interview, 
Informant E, Celendín, 28 March 2012.  
234
 „Nuestra rondas campesinas son ejemplo de justicia y dignidad... Estamos aquí para decirles al presidente 
Humala, al premier Valdés, a la empresa Yanacocha, que nosotros, los cajamarquinos no vamos a permitir más 
burla, más marginación, y estamos aquí todo el pueblo para hacer respetar la dignidad y el coraje que nosotros 
cajamarquinos nos merecemos. Para decirle al Gobierno central que Cajamarca está unido‟. From my notes 
during a regional march, 9 March 2012. 
235 The main square of the city of Cajamarca has two Catholic churches. Sited opposite the cathedral and the 
bishop‟s residence, the San Francisco Church has historically been orientated toward the poor and has become 
an important place for their mobilisation.  
236  During regional strikes and mobilisations, nuns prepared an olla común (communal kitchens) in 
collaboration with local women‟s groups. 
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there by movement participants (see Photo 6). Many of them expressed firm opposition to the 
Conga project in defence of water, proclaiming that the mining company has not brought 
„progress‟ but „contamination‟.237 Some posters provided technical information and critical 
comments on the proposed scheme. Demonstrators also congregated around the church 
whenever protests occurred and sometimes movement leaders gave speeches in front of the 
church gate. 
 
       Photo 6 
 
          Photo: taken by the author in front of the San Francisco Church, Cajamarca (29 May 2012). 
 
National March for Water: towards „Environmental Justice‟ 
The National March for Water (Marcha Nacional del Agua), in which participants travelled 
from the lakes of Cajamarca to the country‟s capital, Lima, over ten days (1-10 February 
2012), gained significant support across the country. The event was organised by the CENs, 
                                           
237 They include: „Agua sí, Oro no‟ („Yes to Water, No to Gold‟), one of the movement‟s emblematic slogans; 
„El agua es vida, Minera asesina, Conga no va‟ („Water is life, Mining the killer, No to Conga‟); „¿Progreso es 
contaminación? No‟ („Progress is contamination? No‟); „No a la represión, Conga no va‟ („No to repression, no 
to Conga‟), among others. 
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composed of the rondas campesinas, Fronts of Defence, NGOs from Cajamarca, as well as 
elsewhere in Peru. The march was well received because many people shared similar 
problems and grievances, generating sympathy with the protesters‟ search for „environmental 
justice‟, i.e. a right to address the environmental impacts generated by neoliberal mineral 
extraction and a right to secure clean and adequate water provision. There is more than one 
„Conga‟ in Peru. It is not only cajamarquinos who have suffered from contamination, land 
loss, and lack of access to natural resources through mining. Moreover, there are many 
Peruvians who are concerned about the quality and quantity of water as a consequence of 
extractive activities by multinational capital, not only mining companies but including 
companies in agro-industry. One weekly magazine points out that the problems relating to 
Conga is repeated across Latin America: 
If we look at the mining map across the continent, it is easy to observe a well-
planned international strategy: the criminalisation of social protests, defamation of 
environmental, rural, or indigenous leaders, the repression of police and military 
forces, the imposition of states of emergency, illegal arrests, improvised 
environmental impact assessments, the media taking sides with the government and 
capital, tax privileges favouring the multinational mining companies. In other words, 
neither cajamarquinos nor the Humala regime is an exception to this strategy 
(„Conga no está sola‟, Hilderbrandt, 24 February – 1 March 2012). 
As the magazine mentions, Latin America has been witnessing a multitude of socio-
environmental movements reacting to extractive industries. In Peru, many people are affected 
by mining activities and have mobilised, voicing various demands.
238
 Given this situation, 
when participants in the anti-Conga movement marched from Cajamarca to Lima to raise 
popular awareness of their cause, support was high. Milton Sánchez, president of PIC and a 
prominent movement leader, argues: „on the road to Lima, we had a lot of support from local 
people. This is because there are many people sharing similar experiences across the nation. 
Their support mirrors [the impact of] many mining projects across the country‟.239  
Through this national march, protesters intended to raise public awareness about their 
cause. They stressed that they are not „anti-mining‟ per se, „anti-development‟ or „extremist‟, 
but that their argument against the Conga project is based on their pursuit of justice, i.e. the 
                                           
238
 These demands include more benefits for the local population; guaranteed access to basic resources like land 
and water; and the appropriate regulation of mining activities and the environment, among others.  
239 „Camino a Lima, recibimos mucho apoyo de pueblos locales. Eso fue porque la gente estaba compartiendo 
las experiencias similares por todo el país. También porque muchos proyectos mineros están impactando a todo 
el país‟, (My field note, Celendín, 28 February 2012). 
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defence of water, environment and life. In this process of political activity, solidarities were 
created and a political identity (i.e. „environmental justice‟) constructed within the CENs. 
The ronderos and their organisations played a fundamental role in this process, becoming a 
crucial vehicle for grassroots education and debate. „Conga‟ did not only mean one mining 
project in Cajamarca, but tapped into wider feelings of „injustice‟ when participants marched 
to the capital. „No to Conga‟ not only involved opposition to a particular project, but became 
a synonym for environmental justice.  
At the end of the March for Water, movement leaders handed over several draft legislative 
bills in the hope that there would be substantial debates over mining and water regulation in 
Congress. The bills included: demands to protect water access as a basic human right; 
prohibiting mining activities in the headwaters of lakes and glacier areas; and halting the use 
of chemicals (such as cyanide or mercury) in mining activities. In tandem, the movement 
coordinated peaceful marches in lake areas which became a symbol of the movement, and 
also fixed march dates to coincide with international events, such as World Water Day, thus 
associating their cause with trans-local awareness-raising activities. Based on this process of 
constructing an environmental justice political identity, the next section will examine how 
opponents of the Conga project within the CENs develop EJ political identity via political 
activities, as well as how these political practices call into question the quality of the Peruvian 
democracy and the present development model.  
 
Developing ‘Environmental Justice’: Questioning the Quality of Democracy and 
Development 
The EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) 
After declaring the first state of emergency in December 2011, the Lima government 
announced that it would invite international experts to examine the EIA of the Conga project. 
From the outset, local activists questioned the EIA‟s impartiality and veracity, since for them 
it is unfair for the MINEM to be both a promoter of foreign investment in the mining sector 
and judge on the awarding of environmental permissions. In addition, it was argued that the 
process per se contained many deficiencies: the MINEM did not possess the competence 
necessary to examine an EIA report containing thousands of pages full of technical terms in 
such a short period of time. Apart from a lack of professional expertise, it did not have the 
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financial resources. To compound matters, the report was conducted by private companies, 
albeit from an approved list developed by the MINEM, but contracted by the company.
240
 
For the movement, the EIA represents a completely biased process, one giving preference to 
investors in order to maintain the dominant development model around extractivism. Against 
this backdrop, the government‟s idea of assessing the EIA („peritaje internacional‟) was 
interpreted by opponents as another mechanism to mitigate criticism of the EIA, in addition 
to providing legitimacy for the continuation of the project. For the Humala administration, 
the plan seemed fairly plausible since „international experts‟ should be impartial because they 
are from foreign countries, and are technical and scientific professionals, who are not 
„politically-minded‟. 241 The main objective of peritaje internacional is supposedly limited 
to the „technical‟ aspect.  
To official disappointment, many local people doubted the real intentions of the 
government, arguing that this examination of the EIA would only serve to allow the Conga 
project to proceed. For protesters, the peritaje internacional would not reveal the true impact 
of the operation because the project is planned for an ecologically vulnerable area. In addition, 
they are concerned that water resources could be irreversibly affected since the mining 
project involves a large-scale open-pit and the use of cyanide heap leaching methods. The 
potential effect on the wider interrelated ecosystem would not be taken into consideration by 
the EIA. As one local magazine points out, „the purpose of this examination of the EIA is to 
identify and propose several measures which could better mitigate the environmental impacts 
caused by the Conga project, with the aim to generate social peace and build trust among 
local population… It does not allow any discussion over the viability of the project from a 
point of view which respects the environment‟.242 To compound matters, the process of 
designating three international experts was not likely to demonstrate official sincerity about 
the issue. The government delayed the announcement of these experts several times and when 
                                           
240 MYSA made a contract with a consulting company, Knight Piésold S.A. which has been providing 
environmental and technical advisory services in Peru since 1994 (de Echave and Diez, 2013: 73). 
241 Examinations of a similar nature had already been conducted by the National Water Authority (Autoridad 
Nacional del Agua, ANA) in August 2010 and by a technical team of the MINAM in November 2011. Both 
entities noted that the Conga project would have a serious environmental impact. 
242 „Peritos Pillados‟, Hilderbrandt, 13-19 April 2012. 
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they were finally made public, their career history only confirmed public distrust, casting 
doubts over their impartiality.
243
  
The lack of public confidence in environmental regulations and procedures related to 
mineral extraction led to the movement‟s coordination of an „alternative‟ peritaje (peritaje 
„alternativo‟). The government‟s argument concerning the technical and professional 
impartiality of the peritaje internacional prompted the movement to enter into a „technical‟ 
debate. Its alternative peritaje was intended to demonstrate that opponents do not protest 
against the Conga project due to „politically minded‟ opposition, as many from the „yes to 
Conga‟ side argue; they hoped to demonstrate that the cause of „no to Conga‟ was technically 
sound. A local environmental NGO, GRUFIDES, collaborating within the CENs, coordinated 
and facilitated the publication of an alternative version of the EIA revision, an initiative that 
received the support of the regional government.
244
 Dr Robert Moran drafted the alternative 
peritaje and emphasised the fact that the movement‟s position is based on technical evidence; 
the Conga project is technically unviable, confirming the „no to Conga‟ position.245 Other 
local „experts‟ also backed the movement‟s arguments by producing their own technical 
reports.
246
  
Alongside technical studies presented in the official political realm, the regional 
government and local NGOs attempted to disseminate a simpler version of the alternative 
report, in order to enable the public to understand the technical information more easily. 
                                           
243 One of these three „experts‟ once criticised people in Islay who were opposed to the Tía María (Arequipa 
department) mining project as „uncivilised‟ radicals. For more on the illegitimacy of these international experts, 
see http://celendinlibre.wordpress.com/tag/rafael-fernandez-rubio/ .  
244  „El Proyecto Minero Conga, Perú: Comentarios al Estudio de Impacto Ambiental (EIA) y Temas 
Relacionados‟ (The Conga Mining Project, Peru: Comments on the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
and Related Issues), prepared by the Environmental Defender Law Center. (The author has this document). 
245 Dr Moran is an internationally renowned „expert‟, having worked for many years in the field and was also 
involved in the Tambogrande conflict (Piura). According to Spalding, Dr. Moran „worked six years in the Water 
Resources Division of the US Geological Survey, followed by twenty years as a hydrogeologist for private 
clients, including mining companies. After he shifted to community contracts, his curriculum vitae notes 
projects in Hoduras, Peru, Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, El Salvador, Bolivia, and Colombia, as well as other 
regions of the world and the United States‟ (2013: 49). Organisations, such as „Oxfam, Friends of the Earth, 
Christian Aid, Greenpeace, the International Development Research Center‟, were among his clients for 
„consulting and research reports on Latin America cases‟ (2013: 49). 
246 For example, „Conga es un crimen planeado contra el medio ambiente‟ (The Conga project is a criminal 
plan against the environment) by Wilder A. Sánchez, a sociologist from the National University of Cajamarca 
(Hilderbrandt, 9-15 March 2012). Also see a study conducted by a civil expert on the issue, Peralta Quiroz, 
„Peralta: „Más barato saldrá regar plantas con Coca Cola que con agua tradada‟, El Mercurio, 10 April 2012.  
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Making a contract with a national newspaper with a fairly neutral position, GRUFIDES came 
up with a „popular‟ version of the alternative report, which was widely distributed among the 
local population.
247
 Movement leaders accused the mining company of impeding the 
distribution of the newspaper supplement by purchasing massive quantities of La República 
on the date it featured the alternative report.
248
 Before this, the company had already 
circulated their own version via the same newspaper, surprisingly arguing that it considered 
water a priority before gold extraction.
249
 The movement‟s efforts to disseminate technical 
information among the local population also included a presentation conducted by a NGO 
expert in a regional meeting of rondas campesinas held in Celendín.
250
  
 In addition to contesting official accounts at the technical level, pursuing a sophisticated 
media campaign and engaging in a „popular‟ education exercise, other comments were 
expressed on the walls of the San Francisco church and main square in Cajamarca. Local 
university students put up posters in the city‟s main square disseminating information on the 
MYSA‟s mining activities and their impact. This developed into an open public space where 
people could leave their messages and comments on posters (see Photo 7).
251
 A documentary, 
entitled „En el Corazón de Conga‟ („In the Heart of Conga‟) was shown at the Ollanta 
convention centre in Cajamarca city during the regional march on 11 April 2012. It aimed to 
                                           
247 „Una verdad incómoda: El EIA del Proyecto Conga‟ („Uncomfortable truth: the EIA of the Conga project‟), 
published as a supplement to the national newspaper, La República,18 March 2012. The regional government 
also published their own newspaper supplement: „Por qué Conga No Va‟ („Why no to the Conga project‟), La 
República, 4 March 2012. 
248 This accusation is difficult to verify, but I could gain access to the publication during my participation in a 
regional meeting of rondas campesinas in March 2012, where large numbers of this supplement were distributed 
among the participants. 
249 „El agua primero, la mina después: Lo que no se habla del proyecto Conga‟(Water first and then Mining: 
more complete information about the Conga project‟), La República, 19 February 2012.  
250 The Unitary Assembly of Fronts of Defence and Social Organisations of the Region of Cajamarca took place 
in Celendín on 28 and 29 March 2012. The expert from GRUFIDES gave a presentation on the Conga project 
and its possible environmental impact by using visual materials. The way he presented the information was 
fairly straightforward and clear to understand for the author, who is not familiar with ecological and technical 
terms. 
251 When the regional government and other movement leaders called for regional marches and protests during 
early April 2012, proponents of the Conga project criticised the mobilisations as completely motivated by 
radical movement leaders with personal political interests. During this time, the city‟s main square was occupied 
with cultural activities, such as posters displayed on the ground, largely created by young people. The 
movement‟s songs were sung during events and local artists also joined in. Several people grouped together in 
order to ask for solidarity for the injured during the confrontation with the police. On some nights, sympathisers 
held candlelight vigils in front of the Cathedral.  
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illustrate the environmental impact of mineral extraction in Cajamarca and was presented 
alongside other cultural events. 
 
        Photo 7. 
 
               Photo: taken by the author, in Cajamarca, 14 April 2012. 
NGOs active within the CENs through providing technical advice and a wide range of 
contacts contributed to the development of an environmental justice political identity inside 
the anti-Conga movement. Via this apparent technical controversy vis-à-vis the government 
in Lima, they not only advanced competing views on the environment, but also advocated an 
alternative development model. Constructed around this cause of grievance, actors within the 
CENs questioned national environmental regulations which, they argued, were biased in 
favour of the extractive industry and emphasised the necessity to forge an alternative or 
sustainable model of development not restricted to the „efficient‟ management of 
environment. For the government and MYSA, natural resources exist only to be commodified 
and this is based on economic reductionism and a limited modernist development perspective. 
From this perspective, mineral extraction is economically viable once sufficient water 
provision is guaranteed, a main argument for advocating the construction of artificial 
reservoirs to replace the natural lakes. On the other hand, the CENs consider water as part of 
an interrelated and complex ecosystem and underline the necessity to develop an integral 
development plan through the demarcation of an Economic and Ecological Zone via 
Territorial Ordinance. This need has been debated over recent years with little progress. At 
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this stage, EJ political identity was developed within the CENs so as to contest environmental 
regulations related to mining operations and the development model per se based on national 
resource extraction. 
Based on Moran‟s alternative EIA which was forged within the CENs, opponents were 
reassured that it is impossible to proceed with any project in basin headwaters. Since the area 
belongs to an interconnected ecosystem, it was argued, once started, the mining operation 
would inevitably generate environmental problems and this would result in an irreversible 
negative impact on the local population. It would violate their basic rights to water. In 
response, the government held that the alternative report was not „technically‟ based but 
„politically‟ motivated. The then Minister of Environment, Manuel Pulgar Vidal, insisted that 
the report presented by the Cajamarca regional government was essentially „political‟ and 
failed to present any convincing technical evidence.
252
 According to the national government, 
MYSA will ensure that environmental damage would be mitigated and the provision of more 
water guaranteed according to the recommendations of international experts in response to 
the concerns of cajamarquinos. In others words, the Conga project can – or should – go 
ahead („yes to Conga‟) if several conditions are satisfied. 
It became obvious that the Humala administration did not have any intention to overturn 
the decision on the Conga project or discuss environmental issues seriously. On this question, 
one local newspaper pointed out that, regarding „Conga va‟ („yes to Conga‟), „the contract 
has been made between the government and three international experts. This is why the 
government needed to militarise the whole city of Cajamarca. In the contract, it was only 
water provision which would be examined, and issues concerning land and the impact on 
biodiversity have not been considered. The peritaje internacional was not about the viability 
of the Conga project‟.253 In contrast, campesinos and activists within the CENs suggested 
that environmental regulations should be reformed in a more ecologically integrated way to 
address mining-related ecological degradations. Furthermore, if the MINEM continued to act 
as both a promoter of mining investment and a judge of EIAs, local people would not recover 
trust in the EIA procedure. This alternative perspective on the dominant development model 
was expressed in a series of technical debates, coordinated by the CENs (involving the 
                                           
252 See „Peritaje alternativo sobre Conga es de índole político‟, El Clarín, 13 March 2012. 
253
 See„Conga va... así lo establece el contrato de los peritos‟, El Mercurio, 16 April 2012. 
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official political arena, media and documentaries, regional meetings and public spaces, such 
as the main square of the city and the walls of the church), as did EJ political identity develop.  
Another critical point regarding the EIA was associated with the quality of democracy, 
with a particular regard to the „participatory‟ element of the EIA process. When considering 
the scope of MYSA‟s mining activities in the region and their influence on local people‟s 
livelihoods and environment, it was argued that the process of decision-making should 
include the participation of local people. However, policy-making is highly concentrated in 
Lima. Particularly when it comes to mineral extraction, the project depends predominantly on 
the MINEM. The only official channel for the participation of the local population is via the 
„audiencia pública‟ („public hearing‟), a formal element which the mining company is 
required to include during the EIA approval process. This public hearing process is supposed 
to disseminate information about a mining project among the local population. In practice, 
however, the process itself is not likely to elicit participation of the local populace. Given 
usually a short notice, it frequently gets „captured‟ by company mine workers or people who 
receive money for their participation. Moreover, the process is unilateral, not communicative, 
in the sense that it only allows the provision of information, but not the consideration of local 
opinions if these are in opposition or have suggestions to modify a project. Consequently, 
many communities opposing mining projects have devised another channel for expressing 
their opposition, e.g. a local referendum, as the case of Tambogrande. Pointing out the 
limited nature of the consultation law (consulta previa), de Echave and Diez argue that 
„although the law could facilitate the implementation of ILO Convention 169 and widen 
popular participation in the decision-making process… it is to be applied exclusively for 
indigenous people, who do not compose a majority of the population in Cajamarca‟ (2013: 
146). This lack of participation within democratic institutions helps explain why it is difficult 
to strike a consensus through case by case roundtables, particularly involving mining-related 
conflicts.  
Regarding the centralisation of decision-making in relation to local development, there is 
another point to note. In response to Regional Ordinance 036, the public prosecutor appealed 
to the Constitutional Court, arguing the unconstitutional nature of the ordinance. Faced with 
this, the CENs of the anti-Conga movement, including the regional government, responded 
by turning to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (CIDH, Comisión 
Internacional de Derechos Humanos). The legal debate over Regional Ordinance 036 
resulted in much controversy between the movement and national government. A first point 
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of disagreement concerned competing legal jurisdictions between the central and regional 
government, particularly when it comes to who has the authority to make a decision on local 
development issues. Although decentralisation was initiated by the Toledo administration 
(2001-2006) with the aim of deepening democracy, decision-making powers are still highly 
concentrated in Lima.  
The commodification of natural resources such as water and land puts local populations at 
risk through reducing opportunities to access these essential resources. On this question, 
actors within CENs argue that decisions over these basic resources, as well as the local 
development model, should be made with the participation of the grassroots population via 
acts of resistance and legal procedures. Second, guaranteeing the local communities‟ access 
to clean and sufficient water and land inevitably comprises a constituent part of their basic 
human rights. Therefore, it is argued that priority over the right to natural resources should be 
given to the local population rather than private investors. In the end, however, the 
Constitutional Court confirmed the unconstitutionality of the regional ordinance on the same 
day as three international experts announced their favourable report on the Conga project‟s 
EIA: i.e. „Yes to Conga‟ was decided despite all obstacles and opposition. 
 
Human Rights: An Integral Part of Environmental Justice Political Identity 
Activists within the CENs could develop a broader meaning of human rights as a 
consequence of their accumulated experiences in local communities, which were affected by 
the extractive industry over many years. This led to a questioning of the authoritarian nature 
of Peruvian government vis-à-vis social movement. A first issue concerned „the right‟ to 
make decisions on their way of life, access to natural resources, as well as forms of local 
development, alongside the elemental rights to have access to clean and sufficient water. 
Debates around these questions highlighted the centralisation of decision-making and the lack 
of participatory mechanisms available to ordinary citizens, as seen in debates related to the 
EIA and regional ordinance. Second, concerns and criticism relating to the nature of the 
contemporary Peruvian state and democracy arose in the face of government repression of 
movement leaders and activists of the CENs. The imposition of a state of emergency 
infringes on basic human rights, which became particularly critical when police and military 
forces were dispatched from Lima in order to impede people‟s right to demonstrate. More 
seriously, lethal arms were allowed to be used in the name of upholding „law and order‟, with 
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impunity guaranteed for those responsible for the injured or fatalities. As a consequence of 
these events, local and national human rights NGOs today constitute an important component 
of the counter-extractive networks.
254
 The CENs of the anti-Conga movement, which 
comprise CNDDHH, CEJIL, FEDEPAZ and GRUFIDES, denounced the Peruvian 
government for its „military-extractive‟ character at a hearing titled „Human Rights and 
Social Protests in Peru‟ which took place at the CIDH, Washington on 11 March 2013.255 
Many social and environmental organisations, including the AIDESEP, the CCP, the CNA, 
the CONACAMI and the ONAMIAP (the National Organisation of Andean and Amazonian 
Women of Peru), submitted a petition to the CIDH on 12 April 2012, demanding measures 
protect activities, local authorities, local communities and ancestral territory.
256
  
 Social networks form another integral part of the counter-extractive networks, who 
question the quality of democracy. The Humala government, like its predecessors, has 
attempted to discredit activists and protesters, arguing that they were anti-developmentalists, 
radical environmental protectionists, egoists, and the like.
257
 „Terms, such as “terrorism” or 
“hostile groups”, gave the impression that human rights defenders are synonymous with 
„criminals‟, their activities being portrayed as crimes and their organisations being criminal 
associations‟ (CIDSE, 2011:2). The media has played an important role in promoting an 
image that protesters instigate violence at the cost of the „national interest‟ and public order. 
                                           
254 NGOs include GRUFIDES, CNDDHH, FEDEPAZ, CEJIL (Centre for Justice and International Law), 
Defensoría del Pueblo). National and international academic centres, International NGOs and Human Rights 
institutions (PSG, Amnesty International, Human Right Watch, CIDH, IACHR) are also involved. 
255See http://minacorrupta.wordpress.com/2013/04/03/denuncian-ante-la-cidh-al-regimen-minero-militar-de-
ollanta-humala/. 
256
 On 5 May 2014, the CIDH rejected support for the movement‟s claim: the government took precautionary 
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http://servindi.org/actualidad/84867). 
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The Lima-based mainstream media has been overwhelmingly hostile, describing the 
movement as a social disturbance, and as part of many ongoing police cases.
258
  
In an attempt to discredit them, the main stream media has also stressed divisions among 
movement leaders, and described their intentions as purely political in order to gain popular 
support for personal ends and engaged in character manipulation.
259
 Opponents have been 
described as being manipulated by anti-mining and anti-development radicals, extremists, 
terrorists and naïve environmentalists, particularly financed by foreign NGOs while the base 
has been portrayed as „ignorant Indians‟.260 Despite the success of the March for Water in 
early February 2012, the majority of the media gave far more attention to the capture of 
„Camarada Artemio‟, a leader of Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), and the arrival of the 
three designated international experts hired to examine the EIA.
261
 Milton Sánchez, the 
president of PIC, made the point that popular support all along the road to Lima boosted 
participants and leaders‟ determination to continue their protests.262 In response to a largely 
hostile national and local media, the movement has generated alternative information 
networks, such as blogs and social media (Facebook and twitter accounts) and put video clips 
filmed by mobile phone or camera on YouTube.
263
 In an interview with a young 
environmental journalist in Celendín, he argued:   
[the alternative media can provide graphic testimonies.] When people listen to 
testimonies, they change their opinion. When there are testimonies, such as pictures , 
people are more impressed. The images are more convincing. People in Lima, 
university students, and people from other countries sympathise with the cause of 
the movement. One image can be worth more than a thousand words. Social 
networks like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube have contributed a lot to the 
distribution [of information] about what is really happening as well.
264
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 „Cuando la gente escucha testimonio, ellos cambian de opinión. Cuando hay testimonio, como fotografías, la 
gente se queda más impactada. Los imágenes convencen más. La gente de Lima está realmente impactada. Los 
estudiantes universitarios y la gente de otros países se solidarizan con el movimiento. Una imagen vale más que 
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  One example of the CENs‟s utilisation of non-mainstream media is the case of the Chaupe 
family. In November 2012, a video clip linked to YouTube circulated via various accounts of 
social network, asking for solidarity with the Chaupe family given the police repression they 
had endured. The clip was filmed by a daughter of the family via her mobile phone when 
family property was invaded by the police. The household‟s land is located in the Tragadero 
Grande zone, Sorochuco district, and falls within the Conga project‟s designated area of 
operation. Given their refusal to sell their land, the family suffered from intimidation and 
legal disputes launched by the mining company for nearly two years. According to the 
Chaupe family, their property, animals and persons were physically attacked by the police in 
August 2011. However, in October, the judge of Celendín accused them of usurpation of the 
land and sentenced them to three years in prison. A fine of S/. 200 was also imposed as civil 
reparations. The local court did not consider the land title submitted by the family. An appeal 
was lodged to the court in Cajamarca, backed by legal advice from GRUFIDES, with support 
from other national and international solidarity organisations. The legal team for the Chaupes 
argued they held valid property rights and the initial ruling was declared void in August 
2013.
265
  
 
Tensions in „Environmental Justice‟ Construction  
Before concluding the chapter, it is worth mentioning that the constraints of mineral 
extraction‟s realpolitik remain an important issue. In other words, the movement could not 
bring about direct improvements in the local population‟s livelihoods. As activists have 
argued, it takes time to carry out integral and alternative development. As a consequence, it 
has proved to be difficult to avoid criticism from proponents of mining activities, especially 
given the weight of a largely hostile media. According to information provided by the 
Chamber of Commerce of Cajamarca, the economic loss incurred by abandoning Conga 
                                                                                                                                   
mil palabras. Redes sociales como Facebook, Twitter y YouTube han contribuido mucho para difundir la 
información de lo que está pasando realmente‟. Interview, Informant E, in Celendín, 28 March 2012. This 
informant continued to emphasise the necessity to recover his local radio programme since radio is one of the 
most important channels for country people to get information. At the same time, he strongly denounced the 
pressure exerted by MYSA‟s anti-movement campaign.  
265 However, the Court in Celendín adjudicated against the Chaupe family once against on August 2014, 
delivering a sentence of two years and eight months in prison and US$ 1,900 compensation be paid to MYSA. 
Family lawyer criticised the decision and announced their intention to appeal. See „Cajamarca: Yanacocha ganó 
juicio por tierras a familia Chaupe‟, El Comercio, 5 August 2014. 
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investment (including other mining projects, such as the suspension of Galeno and the 
reduction of the Michiquillay projects) is estimated to be S/. 600 million. The president of the 
Chamber argues that thousands of job opportunities have been lost due to the project‟s 
suspension.
266
 
 Additionally, the CENs were created among various actors with distinct demands. Initially, 
the factor uniting these disparate elements was opposition to Conga, but now that the project 
has been suspended, and faced with regional elections in October 2014, internal fissures have 
surfaced.
267
 This suggests that the constructing process of the CENs is also imbued with 
power relations, tensions and contradictions. Even so, and despite the fact that the movement 
has largely disappeared from the national media and slipped down the Lima government‟s list 
of priorities, groups of peasant continue to protest around lake areas and sustain their demand 
that the project be cancelled. As is in common with rural social movements, a period of 
intense activism has been followed by one of relative calm. But the underlying causes of 
grievance persist, signifying that the potential for heightened social tension and a resurgence 
of protest activity is ever present. 
 
 
6.4. Conclusion 
The anti-Conga movement represents the most high profile political expression of rural 
population who have suffered from mining activities for nearly two decades in the absence of 
effective state regulation in Peru. Expectations of change were high among many country 
people when the Humala government assumed office. However, once in power, it became 
obvious that the president‟s economic policies and response to social movements were 
similar to his predecessors. After nearly two years of massive mobilisations, the Conga 
project remains temporarily suspended, while some groups of peasants continue to be 
mobilised, demanding its cancellation. The main concern of protesters is that the location and 
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 A number of authors have emphasised the prevalence of weak social organisation in Cajamarca department, 
focusing on an inability to embrace and effectively promote different demands, leading to internal fragmentation 
and an erosion of cohesion (Bury 2002, 2004, 2005; Bebbington et al. 2008b; Lingán 2008; de Echave et al., 
2009a; Meléndez 2009; and de Echave and Diez 2013). This perspective, however, underestimates the crucial 
unifying and facilitator role played by the rondas campesinas in mobilisation (see Taylor, 2011). 
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process of extraction could negatively impact on water resources across a wide area, adding 
to pre-existing worries fuelled by an accumulated distrust of MYSA‟s mining operations. 
 In contrast to positions adopted by proponents of mineral extraction (who criticised the 
movement as being led by naïve environmentalists and thus taking an anti-development 
stance), the chapter has intended to examine the complex trajectories of networked forms of 
resistance against the Conga mining project and the construction of an „environmental justice‟ 
political identity around the „maps of grievance‟ caused by MYSA‟s mineral extraction. 
Through oppositional political activities, there has been increasing coordination between the 
rondas campesinas and NGOs, local and trans-local, committed to sustainable development 
and human rights. These diverse actors have created networked resistance, i.e. the counter-
extractive networks (CENs). The understanding of „sustainable mining‟ by the government 
and MYSA is restricted to „efficient‟ management of the environment via „modern‟ 
technology, which is, they argue, very different from „irresponsible‟ mining as conducted in 
the past. Based on this limited interpretation, the Conga project is viewed as viable, once 
water provision is secured by constructing artificial reservoirs. Beyond this definition of 
„sustainability‟, other demands, such as the enactment of appropriate regulations regarding 
the use of toxic materials, the formulation of an environmental mitigation plan and effective 
participation mechanisms in decision-making processes, are considered as „political‟. This 
highly modernist stance interprets the movement‟s „political‟ demands as generating 
obstacles to mineral extraction and thus the country‟s development. Moreover, the „need‟ (or 
desire) to secure private investments and guarantee „public order‟ has led the government to 
introduce authoritarian measures, such as a state of emergency, pursuing the criminalisation 
of protesters, the militarisation of the conflict zone, as well as enacting legal changes which 
permit the use of lethal arms, hand-in-hand with guaranteed impunity of security forces. This 
economic reductionist stance on „sustainability‟ and the state‟s mano dura measures have 
generated considerable anxiety as a main concern among the local population, fuelling 
longstanding grievances. These „maps of grievance‟ point out the shortcomings of Peruvian 
democracy and the present development model. 
By flagging the main causes of grievance, activists have made „prefigurative solidarity‟ 
within the CENs and coordinated various collective actions. Rather than forging unilateral 
solidarity provided by abundant NGOs in the global North, various actors at different 
spatialities have made linkages and connections around grievances of neoliberal 
extractivitism. One of the aims of the National March for Water was to gain support and 
２３３ 
sympathy for the movement across the country. During the march, the opposition to „Conga‟ 
came to signify not just one anti-mining protest but also started to construct a political 
identity of „environmental justice‟, which included demands for the „right to address 
environmental impacts‟, the „right to secure clean and sufficient water provision‟ and 
ultimately „water as a basic human right‟. In elaborating this identity, activists within the 
CENs have promoted „technical‟ debates around the revision of the EIA, the peritaje 
internacional. Countering the government‟s focus on efficiency, („foreign‟) professionalism 
and technology regarding the environment, the CENs have contested existing environmental 
regulations as only favouring mineral extraction. This, they have posited, occurred at the 
expense of a broad meaning of the „environment‟ and integrated development, via the 
peritaje alternativo. To disseminate this message, information regarding „technical‟ 
information about the project has been distributed via public meetings, public places, and the 
media. These events highlight and criticise the limited mechanisms of participation. The only 
official channel for local people‟s participation in the EIA process was a „public hearing‟, 
through which information of the project was delivered unilaterally to a limited number of 
citizens with no space for the latter‟s opinion to be voiced effectively.  
Alongside this centralised decision-making process, many activists committed to human 
rights within the CENs have questioned the quality of present-day democracy, in response to 
the government‟s authoritarian measures. Furthermore, they have used alternative media in 
the face of an onslaught of hostile media attacks on opponents of the project. Therefore, 
political activism against Conga via the CENs has brought both neoliberal extractivism and 
the nature of Peruvian polity into contention. In this process of networked resistance, 
subaltern groups have constructed a political identity of „environmental justice‟. Despite 
internal contradictions and tensions, this re-formulation of subjectivities demonstrates the 
political imaginaries of subaltern groups in the rural highlands, suggesting the importance of 
„the political‟ with regard to their marginalised and precarious living conditions. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 
 
The ‘Relational Content’ of Neoliberal Extractivism and Rural Resistance 
The purpose of this dissertation is to question the „death of the peasantry‟ by examining the 
re-articulation of rural subjectivities in opposition to neoliberal globalisation. Rather than 
focusing on the fragmentation, powerlessness and passivity of rural subaltern groups faced 
with the asymmetrical power of global capital, I have argued that the intensification of 
dispossession and disempowerment has become „grounds for unity‟ among various actors, 
which we have been witnessing in the political and social dynamics of many contemporary 
rural social movements in Latin America. In particular, this dissertation has concentrated on 
the Peruvian northern highlands to examine how impoverished and marginalised campesinos 
have forged connections and solidarities in order to contest neoliberal extractivism, i.e. the 
mineral extraction of the multinational mining company, Mineral Yanacocha S.A. (MYSA). 
In doing this, I have paid particular attention to the construction of counter-extractive 
networks (CENs) around „maps of grievances‟ and of an environmental justice political 
identity in the process of bringing the current model of development and democracy into 
contestation. 
As seen in Chapter 2, David Harvey‟s term, „time-space compression‟, represents his 
spatio-temporal understanding of the current phase of neoliberal globalisation based on 
capitalism and its accumulation process. This historical and geographical depiction highlights 
the importance of the economic forces which have a predominant influence on people‟s lives 
around the world. Since the 1973 crisis when capitalism faced a chronic overaccumulation, 
capitalists found new investment opportunities in the neoliberal privatisation process. With 
the demise of the Bretton Woods system, policy recommendations promoted by IFIs had a 
great influence on debt-stricken countries in Latin America, guiding the latter to implement 
SAPs: opening up domestic markets; privatisation of SOEs; and reduced intervention of the 
state and deregulation. One new development model recommended by the IFIs in Latin 
America was the extraction and export of natural resources which were abundant in most 
countries. Although natural resource extraction is not a new phenomenon, the years following 
the implementation of neoliberal reform have witnessed its unprecedented intensification. 
２３５ 
Several factors explain this boom in natural resource extraction: IFIs‟ policy 
recommendations to create favourable investment conditions in the extractive sectors; IFIs‟ 
direct and indirect involvement in large-scale investment plans, such as mining, energy and 
infrastructure projects; the high prices of primary commodities in international markets, 
sometimes boosted by increasing demand in developing countries such as China; and the 
development of new technology. Eduardo Galeano (1997) has commented that the continent 
and its inhabitants have become witnesses to „open veins‟ („venas abiertas‟) in an 
increasingly extreme way through multinational capital‟s exploitation of minerals, 
hydrocarbon, oil, monocultural plantations (eucalyptus and pine) and logging, the production 
of agro-fuels (soya and maize), as well as large-scale industrial shrimp and salmon farming, 
among others (i.e. neoliberal extractivism), as seen in Chapter 2.  
In Peru, minerals were a key motive for Spanish colonisers and have continued to be an 
important export earner since the late nineteenth century, eliciting debates over national 
„development‟. The central and southern regions witnessed intensive copper extraction by 
foreign mining companies over the last century (Thorp and Bertram, 1978; DeWind, 1981; 
Dore, 1988). The US-owned Cerro de Pasco corporation was the main owner of minerals, 
smelters and land in the central highlands during most of the twentieth century before its 
nationalisation by the Velasco government. Faced with increasing labour militancy and 
reformist demands, the military regime gained control of the mining sector in the mid-1970s, 
only to show its inefficiency and incapacity to improve the already declining mineral 
production. Many mining SOEs entered into crisis or became bankrupt during the 1980s. In 
the aftermath of the 1980s crisis, the Fujimori regime implemented SAPs and Peruvian 
neoliberalism took an orthodox form as seen in Chapter 3. The „new mining boom‟ was 
boosted by both international and national factors during the 1990s. Chapter 4 elucidated that 
the WB promoted extractive industries, including the mining sector, as a new development 
strategy, and the Peruvian government introduced policy reforms such as the creation of 
favourable conditions for foreign investors; the privatisation of SOEs; and deregulation in 
relation to the environment and land. Accordingly, the mining sector emerged as the „motor‟ 
of the country‟s recent economic growth.  
When it comes to this neoliberal extractivism, Harvey‟s explanation clarifies the nature of 
capitalist accumulation of multinational capital in extractive industries: accumulation by 
dispossession (ABD). In other words, capitalist accumulation advanced by dispossessing 
countless communities around the world, especially where mostly marginalised and 
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impoverished peasants, indigenous people and the urban poor live. It is hard to deny that 
ABD resulting from neoliberal extractivism is one main cause behind the increasing 
incidences of contemporary rural social movements led by the affected local communities in 
Latin America, including the case study in this dissertation. However, this observation tends 
to highlight asymmetrical power relations of capital mobility: the domination of multinational 
capital vs. dispossession and disempowerment of local communities, which has omitted other 
significant components of the „spatial‟, i.e. the „relational content‟ (Massey, 2005: 93). As 
Massey notes, global capital mobility involves „the stretching out of different kinds of social 
relationship over space‟, as well as „the stretching out over space of relations of power, and of 
relations imbued with meaning and symbolism‟ (1994: 158-159). Beyond economic 
reductionism, this relational geographical perspective observes that diverse social groups are 
differently placed in relation to the „time-space compression‟ of neoliberal extractivism, 
depending on their degree of mobility and power, i.e. the „power-geometry of time-space 
compression‟ (Massey, 1994: 149). In other words, the advance of neoliberal extractivism 
and its implications can be understood as „a highly complex social differentiation‟ unless it is 
limited to economic reductionism (Massey, 1994: 150).  
In Peru, while booming mining activities have brought macroeconomic stability and fiscal 
wealth, they have become the main arena for a long list of socio-environmental protests since 
the late 1990s, particularly in the impoverished countryside. Chapter 3 demonstrated that the 
reformist military government led by general Velasco promoted state-led development with 
an aim to overcome the structural crisis of capitalist development and to respond to rural 
unrest and increasing social pressure. The agrarian reform intended to increase agricultural 
productivity and quell rural unrest. However, the beneficiaries of the reform were mostly 
limited to ex-hacienda workers and by-passed most poor peasants. Namely, although the 
some peasant groups benefited from Velasco‟s agrarian reform, most poor campesinos 
remained marginalised. Their living conditions further deteriorated with the implementation 
of neoliberal reform. In this complex rural landscape where „stratified‟ and „fragmented‟ 
subaltern groups reside, neoliberal mineral extraction gained momentum across the country. 
Accordingly, rural inhabitants were differently located with regard to the advance of 
multinational capital and thus the „power-geometry‟ of mineral extraction is observed in the 
complex nature of socio-environmental protests. Moreover, faced with increasing social 
protests, more countries and mining companies introduced „socially responsible‟ and 
„environmentally sustainable‟ components in their policies. Along with concerns about 
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sustainable development, legal changes were introduced to the distribution regime relating to 
the fiscal bonanza generated from mineral extraction (i.e. canon minero) by successive post-
Fujimori governments. This devolution of canon to regional and local government, however, 
did not produce the expected results and complicated the nature of socio-environmental 
struggles in the decentralised local context. The devolution of canon occurred before 
decentralised administrative agencies were institutionalised to properly administer it. This 
lack of administrative capacity fuelled more protests at a sub-national level, i.e. 
„decentralising‟ conflicts due to the mismanagement of distributed fiscal resources. In 
addition, blurry territorial demarcation also increased competition for and conflict over 
receiving additional canon between neighbouring districts. Power struggles among various 
actors (including local politicians, local and regional authorities, and local communities) also 
proliferated. Meanwhile, mining companies incorporated community development or social 
programmes within the CSR framework: as they became more involved in distributing socio-
economic benefits, they became a target for local claim-makers. Apart from such materialist 
demands, other communities protested against neoliberal forms of mineral extraction owing 
to their lack of participation in decision-making processes. Differing understandings of 
territory and development further fuelled mobilisation, questioning the hegemonic 
development model and the quality of Peruvian democracy. This complex dynamic of socio-
environmental struggles against the new mineral extraction is better understood through 
considering the multiplicity of actors who are distinctively located in relation to mining 
activities: i.e. the „power-geometry‟ of new mineral extraction. 
Similarly, in Cajamarca MYSA‟s mineral extraction has shown a complex „power-
geometry‟ as socio-economic benefits and environmental impacts have been unequally 
distributed among local populations. Despite the initial high expectations of an acceleration 
of local „development‟, the multinational‟s capital-intensive mineral operation did not 
generate many employment opportunities, nor contributed to the purchase of products and 
services in Cajamarca to the expected degree. Both urban and rural populations have 
undergone a significant transformation over the last twenty decades, depending on how their 
livelihoods are located in relation to MYSA‟s activities. While small numbers of residents in 
the city of Cajamarca have benefited from increasing commercial opportunities due to the 
proximity of the mining complex, most urban population have not been beneficiaries, while 
experiencing a rise in criminal acts, prostitution, living costs, as well as house rents. 
Moreover, the influx of national and international professionals into the region and their 
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affluent lifestyle, presents a stark contrast to the deteriorating living conditions of the 
majority. In rural areas, the unequal impacts of MYSA‟s presence are more obvious and 
become a main cause of grievance for most campesinos, stimulating their resistance against 
mining activities. Poor peasants in the jalca area could benefit from the MYSA‟s social or 
micro-finance programmes to a certain degree, since this ecological zone have been the least 
favoured for agricultural pursuit. In the meantime, most campesinos residing at lower 
ecological levels were adversely affected in various respects. Access to land has been put in 
jeopardy due to increasing prices; a revaluation of land-use; and an absence of land-titling. 
Furthermore, both the quality and quantity of water supply concern rural inhabitants in this 
ecological zone. 
While MYSA‟s mineral extraction has enabled an unprecedented distribution of fiscal 
resources to regional and local governments via the canon minero, its unequal distribution 
(which did not match the region‟s poverty landscape) and inadequate administrative 
management have not contributed much to poverty reduction. Neither has it quelled social 
unrest. Instead, the canon has become an arena for power struggles among various actors, 
including government authorities from Lima, Cajamarca, local municipalities and the mining 
company, as they endeavour to gain political legitimacy. MYSA has also become an 
important local power broker, being both a provider of wealth and a source of division among 
cajamarquinos, who adopt different positions vis-à-vis mining activities. During the two 
decades of MYSA‟s presence, there has been a long list of social protests. By examining the 
relations among various social groups which are located in different spatialities and power 
relations with regard to MYSA‟s mining activities, I argue that resistance acts of 
cajamarquinos are not simply anti-mining or anti-development local struggles vis-à-vis 
multinational capital.  
Alongside the limitation of economic reductionism in examining the political potential of 
rural subjectivities, another aspect I point out in the dissertation is the essentialist 
geographical perspective. While recognising the causes of local struggles vis-à-vis 
multinational capital, scholars like Harvey and Hardt and Negri underline the political 
ineffectiveness of „place-based‟ struggles. They argue that these local forms of resistance  
have limitations since they are „fragmented‟, „postmodern‟ or „reactionary‟ local struggles 
which defend values „bounded to a place‟, such as identity, tradition and territory. They 
maintained that if place-based resistances remained at a local level, „dispossessed‟ and 
„disempowered‟ subaltern groups will only find themselves co-opted or controlled by 
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„powerful‟ global capital, unless they are „rescaled‟ for empowerment. Similarly, in the 
context of national political discourses which depict the sierra peruana as a static and 
backward area where it is necessary to „modernise‟, „civilise‟ or „develop‟ campesinos 
serranos, the political potential of these rural subaltern groups has been highly 
underestimated. Place-based socio-environmental struggles by local communities against 
„new mineral extraction‟ are often understood for their fragmentation and minimal political, 
economic and social impacts, alongside low levels of organisation and links to political 
parties (if any). In addition, their empowerment is made possible only once they are „rescaled‟ 
by making alliances at a higher level. In a similar vein, the official discourse maintains that 
place-based struggles represent local reactionary responses, which are mostly led by radical 
leftists or naïve environmentalists, thereby forming an obstacle to „national development‟, i.e. 
macro-economic growth. As argued in the dissertation, this interpretation of socio-
environmental protests is based on the dichotomous structure of geography and power: 
development led by „powerful‟ global capital vs. „reactionary‟ responses generated by 
„powerless‟ local communities, mostly living in the rural areas. National economic growth is 
interpreted as a synonym to „development‟, which can be attained only by attracting 
additional foreign investors in extractive industries. Therefore, protests against multinational 
companies‟ large-scale mining projects, are criticised as a reactionary response that only 
defend locally-bounded identity, tradition or culture without consideration of the country‟s 
development, as demonstrated in the discourse of „perro del hortelano‟. Additionally, 
„politically-minded‟ activists and foreign NGOs are viewed as the national government‟s 
main headache, since their ill-advised „propaganda‟ has promoted political activism among 
„ignorant‟, „innocent‟ campesinos or indigenous people. However, the power of global capital 
is not „consolidated‟ and „concentrated‟ but „diffuse‟, „partial‟ and „constitutive‟, thereby 
opening up possibilities to be contested. As Sharp and her colleagues argue, „no moment of 
domination, in whatever form, is completely free of relations of resistance, and likewise, no 
moment of resistance, in whatever form, is entirely segregated from relations of domination‟ 
(2000: 20). Namely, power is „entangled‟ with social relations at different spatialities. 
Echoing Massey‟s geographical approach, Chapter 2 took a critical approach to this binary 
framework of power and geography: i.e. space/place, global/local, and powerful/powerless. 
As Featherstone notes, this essentialist geography „obscures the ways in which subaltern 
politics generates multiple spatialities, which construct agency precisely through their 
distinctive and productive negotiations of cross-cutting relations of power‟ (2003: 408). 
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Based on this theoretical approach, this dissertation highlights the „relational content‟ of 
MYSA‟s mineral extraction and rural resistance in the Peruvian highlands in order to 
examine the re-formulation of rural subjectivities in the anti-Conga movement, instead of 
concentrating on the dispossession, fragmentation, powerlessness and passivity of local 
campesinos vis-à-vis multinational mining capital (Massey, 2005: 93). To this aim, it is 
relevant to understand Massey‟s conceptualisation of „a progressive sense of place‟, which is 
different from an essentialist place-boundedness which associates a given place with a fixed 
identity or bounded territory. It is „formed out of the particular set of social relations which 
interact at a particular location‟ (1994: 168). Accordingly, a particular articulation of links 
and interconnections of social relations of different scales gives a particularity to a place. In 
addition, „all these relations interact with and take a further element of specificity from the 
accumulated history of a place with that history itself conceptualized as the product of layer 
of different sets of linkages both local to the wider world‟ (Massey, 1993: 68).  
Based on this „progressive‟ understanding of a place, in Chapter 5 I examine historical and 
geographical components of social relations which have been articulated in rural Cajamarca 
and consequently became an integral part of the networked resistance of subaltern 
subjectivities against MYSA‟s mining operation. Based on this, I underline the political 
potential of the „networked forms of resistance‟ by subaltern groups in opposition to MYSA‟s 
Conga project in Chapter 6. MYSA‟s mineral extraction over the last two decades resulted in 
a further fragmentation of campesinos, who had already gone through social differentiation in 
the aftermath of Velasco‟s agrarian reform via minifundisation. However, I argue that it has 
also provided common „ground for unity‟ among various actors as they share common 
experiences of dispossession from mineral extraction. In other words, based on connections 
and linkages constructed between diverse subaltern groups at different spatialities (local, 
national and international), such peasants and urban-based NGOs committed to human rights 
protection and sustainable development are enabled as they found similar grievances 
resulting from neoliberal mineral extraction. While the scalar approach sees the local-global 
nexus as a strategic aggregation of common interest at a different scale, I introduce the CENs 
as „networked forms of resistance‟, echoing Featherstone‟s explanation. Moreover, forming a 
„progressive sense‟ of this part of the rural highlands, prior organisational and political 
experiences, notably the rondas campesinas and the Catholic church, and a loose form of 
„trans-local‟ networks constructed during the previous protests against MYSA mining 
activities, have also become an integral part of the CENs. Despite the comparatively weak 
２４１ 
role of community and ethnicity in highland Cajamarca, rondas campesinas and other 
grassroots campesino organisations have filled the political vacuum left in the aftermath of 
agrarian reform. In particular, the rondas‟ efficiency in dealing with cattle rustling have 
gained them political legitimacy throughout the countryside. Despite the rise and decline of 
the rondas‟ activities during the 1980s and co-optation attempts by the national government 
and political parties, these grassroots organisations have played an important role in protests 
against mining activities since the 1990s.  
Constructing the CENs of the anti-Conga movement, local campesinos, grassroots 
organisations and NGOs committed to sustainable development and human rights protection 
and other social groups at different spatialities have shared common experiences and created 
what Featherstone calls „prefigurative‟ solidarities through oppositional political activities. 
They contest the main causes of grievance (i.e. the „maps of grievance‟), such as authoritarian 
policies of the neoliberal state and different understandings of sustainable development. 
Accordingly, opposition to the „Conga‟ project is not limited to the anti-mining project. It 
developed a political identity of „environmental justice‟ during the national march for water 
encapsulated in: „the right to address environmental impacts‟; the „right to secure clean and 
sufficient water provision‟; and „water as basic human rights‟. Contesting the limited focus 
on efficiency, an uncritical acceptance of the opinion of international experts, and the 
„infallibility‟ of modern technology, arguments advanced by the government, the CENs have 
become engaged in technical debates regarding peritaje internacional. Activists within the 
CENs argue for the broader meaning of environment and integral development via various 
political activities (the peritaje alternativo and the dissemination of technical information in 
diverse forms that question the official and company version). In addition, they contest the 
mechanism of participation in the EIA, i.e. the unilateral flow of information via a „public 
hearing‟ that eventually ignored consideration of local people‟s opinion. Alongside this 
centralised decision-making process, many activists committed to human rights within the 
CENs question the quality of Peruvian democracy regarding the government‟s authoritarian 
measures vis-à-vis the movement. They also use alternative media to respond to hostile media 
attacks on opponents of the project. In sum, these oppositional political activities via the 
CENs brought neoliberal extractivism and the quality of Peruvian democracy into contention. 
Through this networked resistance, subaltern groups construct a political identity of 
„environmental justice‟, which can be understood both as the process of construction and a 
collective expression of contestation (involving both material and postmaterial demands) by 
２４２ 
the CENs. Despite internal contradictions and tensions, the newly formulated rural 
subjectivities constructed among „unlike‟ actors (urban-based NGOs and social organisations, 
working with the rural populations and their organisations) have attempted to demonstrate the 
importance of „the political‟ with regard to their marginalised and unsatisfactory living 
conditions. In this way, I argue against „the death of the peasantry‟ argument, which was 
strongly based on a materialist understanding, by examining the „relational components‟ of 
neoliberal extractivism and their complex trajectories of networked forms of resistance 
among rural subaltern groups.  
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List of Interviews: 
 
Mirtha Vázquez (GRUFIDES): Cajamarca, 13 March 2012. 
Milton Sánchez (PIC): Celendín, 28 February 2012. 
Informant A: Celendín, 28 March 2012. 
Informant B: Celendín, 28 March 2012. 
Informant C: Cajamarca, 18 March 2012. 
Informant D: Cajamarca, 9 April 2012. 
Informant E: Celendín, 28 March 2012. 
Informant F: via email, 1 June 2014. 
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Appendix I 
Socio-Environmental Conflicts in Peru and Cajamarca 
 
Social Conflicts 
(National Level) 
Cajamarca 
Total 
Socio-
Environmental1 
2006 
Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 
May 
June 
July 
Aug 
Sep 
Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
75 
75 
77 
76 
77 
80 
84 
91 
95 
100 
98 
97 
13 (17%) 
13 (17%) 
13 (17 %) 
13 (17%) 
13 (17%) 
14 (18%) 
14 (17%) 
19 (21%) 
22 (23%) 
22 (22%) 
20 (20%) 
20 (21%) 
From January to July, six social 
conflicts have been recorded as 
latent. 
During July and August, one active 
case was added, the conflict in 
Combayo. 
When the conflict in Combayo 
became latent, another active case 
was added in Hualgayoc. 
 
 
2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Latent Active 
Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 
May 
Jun 
Jul 
Aug 
Sep 
Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
97 
86 
79 
76 
77 
75 
74 
76 
76 
80 
79 
78 
21 (22%) 
23 (27%) 
21 (31%) 
27 (36%) 
30 (39%) 
32 (43%) 
33(45%) 
35 (46%) 
36 (47%) 
38 (48%) 
37 (47%) 
37 (47%) 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
7 
7 
2 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
3 
4 
4 
4 
2 
2 
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2008 
Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
83 
88 
93 
41 (49%) 
43 (49%) 
45 (48%) 
7 
8 
8 
2 
1 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Socio-
Environmental 
 
Others2 
 
Active Latent 
Apr 
May 
Jun 
Jul 
Aug 
Sep 
Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
104 
116 
132 
147 
161 
177 
189 
195 
197 
51 () 
31 (48%) 
65 (49%) 
75 (51%) 
78 (49%) 
83 (48%) 
88 (47%) 
91 (49%) 
93 (47%) 
1 
2 
6 
5 
5 
5 
3 
3 
3 
 
 
2 
3 
3 
4 
7 
7 
7 
2 
2 
6 
6 
6 
7 
8 
8 
8 
2009 
Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 
May 
Jun 
Jul 
Aug 
Sep 
Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
211 
218 
238 
250 
268 
273 
272 
284 
288 
286 
284 
267 
100 (49%) 
105 (48%) 
116 (49%) 
125 (50%) 
133 (50%) 
128 (47%) 
125 (46%) 
135 (48%) 
132 (46%) 
132 (46%) 
129 (46%) 
124 (46%) 
6 
6 
6 
8 
10 
10 
10 
10 
12 
11 
12 
9 
5 
5 
4 
3 
2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
3 
2 
3 
8 
7 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
8 
9 
8 
6 
2010 
Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 
May 
Jun 
260 
252 
255 
260 
255 
250 
121 (47%) 
121 (48%) 
126(49%) 
132 (50%) 
132 (51.8%) 
126 (50.4%) 
10 
11 
9 
11 
11 
11 
0 
0 
2 
2 
2 
2 
5 
5 
3 
4 
5 
5 
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Jul 
Aug 
Sep 
Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
248 
246 
250 
250 
250 
246 
125 (50.4%) 
125 (50.8%) 
121 (48.4%) 
120 (48%) 
120 (48%) 
117 (47.6%) 
11 
11 
11 
11 
9 
8 
2 
3 
3 
3 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
4 
3 
3 
2011 
Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 
May 
Jun 
Jul 
Aug 
Sep 
Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
239 
234 
236 
233 
227 
217 
214 
214 
215 
217 
220 
223 
116 (48.5%) 
113 (48.3%) 
116 (49.2%) 
117 (50.2%) 
117 (51.5%) 
118 (55.4%) 
118 (55.1%) 
119 (55.6%) 
119 (55.3%) 
124 (57.1%) 
125 (56.8%) 
126 (56.5%) 
8 
8 
8 
9 
9 
10 
11 
10 
8 
9 
9 
7 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
5 
4 
4 
4 
5 
4 
5 
4 
3 
5 
5 
5 
5 
2012 
Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
Apr 
May 
Jun 
Jul 
Aug 
Sep 
Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
228 
229 
237 
243 
245 
247 
243 
243 
238 
233 
230 
227 
129 (56.5%) 
133 (58.1%) 
139() 
145 (59.7%) 
149 (60.8%) 
150 (60.7%) 
148 (60.9%) 
148 (60.9%) 
149 (62.6%) 
149 (63.9%) 
150 (65.2%) 
148 (65.2%) 
6 
6 
 
6 
8 
8 
8 
8 
9 
8 
10 
10 
6 
6 
 
6 
4 
4 
3 
3 
0 
1 
1 
1  
5 
5 
 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
3 
3 
2013 
Jan 
Feb 
Mar 
220 
222 
224 
147 (66.8%) 
147 (66.2%) 
149 (66.5%) 
9 
9 
9 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
2 
２４７ 
Apr 
May 
Jun 
229 
225 
223 
154 (67.2%) 
149 (66.2%) 
145 (65.0%) 
10 
10 
10 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
Jul 
Aug 
Sep 
Oct 
Nov 
Dec 
225 
223 
223 
220 
221 
216 
148 
147 
148 
145 
143 
139 
   
Source
: 
Defensoría del Pueblo Reports
 
1. From May 2008, the category was changed from „environmental‟ to „socio-environmental‟. 
2. 
Other than socio-environmental characters, there are conflicts related to problems with local government, 
regional government, national government as well as issues of elections and of territorial demarcation.  
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Appendix II 
The Anti-Conga Movement (2011-2013) 
 
Date Activities/Actors Location Notes 
9 February 2010 MYSA‟s submission of the EIA on the 
Conga project. 
 Authorised on 
October 27 2010. 
5 April  Forum on „Sorochuco, Environment and 
Mining‟ by the municipality of the district of 
Sorochuco. 
Sorochuco  
 
11 July 2011 Visit to the Parol and Chaihuagón lakes 
/Authorities from regional government 
  
27 July MYSA‟s official announcement of 
investment plan 
  
18-19 August Ecuentro Regional de Frentes de Defensa, 
Comisión ambientales, Municipales, Rondas 
Campesinas y Organizaciones Sociales de la 
región Cajamarca 
/Rondas Campesinas from various 
provinces, NGOs, SUTEP 
SUTEP 
Building in 
Bambamarca 
I became aware of the 
criticism over Conga 
project and made 
contacts with 
ronderos from 
Celendín. 
21 September March  
/About thousands local populations called by 
SUTEP 
The city of 
Cajamarca 
More regional level 
14 October Road Blockage 
/Local denizens from La Encañada, called 
by its mayor, Jorge Vásquez 
Road between 
Bambamarca 
and Cajamarca 
 
24 October March to the lakes 
/About 2,000 campesinos from Huasmín 
 8-day ultimatum , 
granted to MYSA 
2 November Visit to lakes (Azul and Perol) 
/Government‟s authorities 
 Controversy over the 
use of MYSA‟s 
helicopter 
9 November Paro (strike) 
/called by the president of the regional 
government 
The city of 
Cajamarca 
 
21 November Submission of the EIA revision 
by MINAM‟s environmental technical team 
  
24 November 1
st
 indefinite strike, march and road 
blockage 
  
29 November Confrontation  
between protestors and the police, as well as 
MYSA‟s security forces 
 Many injuries and 
detentions; 
gaining national and 
international attention 
4 December 
 
1
st
 state of emergency (lifted on 16 
December) 
in 4 provinces (Bambamarca, Cajamarca, 
Celendín, and Contunmazá) 
 Subsequent cabinet 
change 
 
1 – 10 February 
2012 
National March for Water From Cajamarca 
to Lima 
Raising public 
awareness across the 
nation 
25 February La Asamblea Extraordinaria de la 
Federación Provincial de Rondas 
Campesinas, Urbanas e Indígenas de 
Cajamarca 
by SUTEP, Rondas Campesinas from 
Cajamarca, other departments 
SUTEP building 
in Cajamarca 
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28 February Meeting 
by Rondas campesinas, SUTEP 
SUTEP building 
in Celendín 
 
9 March Regional mobilisation The city of 
Cajamarca 
 
17 March Asamblea de Frente de Defensa, 
Organizaciones Nativas, Campesinas, 
Roderiles, Populares, Sindicales y Políticas 
de la Macro-Región Norte y Oriente del 
Perú 
 Sudden change of the 
meeting location 
22 March March to the lake Azul 
by SUTEP, Rondas Campesinas from 
Cajamarca, Bambamarca and Celendín 
 Not gained the access 
28-29 March  Gran encuentro Unitario de Frentes de 
Defensa y Origanizaciones Sociales de la 
Región Cajamarca 
SUTEP building 
in Celendín 
 
30-31 March La primera Asamblea Nacional de los 
Pueblos del Perú en Cajamarca 
/Various organisations led by Wilfredo 
Saavedra 
Ollanta 
convention 
house in the city 
of Cajamarca 
 
9 April Regional mobilisation The city of 
Cajamarca 
 
11 April Regional strike The city of 
Cajamarca 
 
17 April Submission of revision of international 
experts (peritaje internacional); 
Adjudication of Tribunal Constitutional over 
Regional Ordinance 036 
  
18 April March 
by about a thousand local denizens 
In the streets of 
Cajamarca city 
 
21 April Government‟s announcement on Conga 
project 
  
21-29 May La Marcha de los Caxamarcas 13 provinces of 
Cajamarca 
 
29 May Pro-Conga mobilisation   
31 May  2nd indefinite strike   
3 July 2nd state of emergency; confrontation   5 deaths on 3-5 July 
9 July Arrival of two dialogue conciliators in 
Cajamarca 
  
23 August  Announcement of the project‟s temporary 
suspension and subsequent activities of 
„guardianes de lagunas‟ 
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Guarango (2002), „Choropampa: The price of gold‟, 
Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h1OfuRrKjGc 
         (2007), „Tambogrande: Mangos, Muerte, Minería‟, 
Available at:     http://youtu.be/D2pbZqfcQ8I?list=PL7474326488D80933 
           (2010), „The Devil Operation‟,  
Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tWPE0I2KesE 
‘En el Corazón de Conga’ (In the Heart of Conga) (2012), 
Available at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XqDgpY1BQFQ 
 
 
